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THE REIGN OF RELIGION
IN
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THE
REIGN OF RELIGION
IN
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

BY
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TO MY FRIENDS

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PREFACE

THIS book attempts to show that of the two live philosophies of the present day, pluralistic theism and monistic idealism, the latter is the more reasonable as affording to the spiritual being of man full satisfaction, moral as well as intellectual. It is my opinion that systems which play the game of philosophy squarely and fairly, with freedom from presuppositions and religious neutrality, naturally end in absolute idealism ; and if they lead to other conclusions, we may always suspect that the game has not been played according to the rules. The current pluralistic systems are the outcome of the interference of religious prejudice with the genuine spirit of speculation. In this volume an examination of contemporary philosophy is undertaken with a view to showing how its deviations from the " high road " of absolutism are all due to " the reign of religion in philosophy."

Since it is not possible to take each individual thinker or system for examination, I have taken some representative views. Even in their evaluation, I have set to myself the limited task of exposing, through criticism, their absolutistic implications. It may be said that I am open to the charge of lacking in appreciation for, or being unjust to, the great services they have rendered to the progress of philosophy. But I take shelter under Green's statement that " pulling a philosopher to pieces is a true

way of showing one's reverence for his greatness." I have put in a discussion of the monadism of Leibniz since it is so "new" in its characteristics and offers to us the model for so many systems of a later day. The discussions of pragmatism and neo-realism are fragmentary and inadequate since I believe they are not so much metaphysical systems as logical methods. The technical sides of these systems I thought it best to drop out of account here.

It is the misfortune of the present undertaking that it has to face a world which has already formed its judgement about the merits of the question discussed in it. Rightly or wrongly—if what I say here is true, then wrongly—it is thought that philosophical absolutism is as mischievous in its effects as political absolutism. The great war came to confirm this view. But it is a mistake to regard philosophical idealism as exalting the state at the expense of the individual since it recognizes that the only end in itself is the true freedom of the spirit. Secondly, the systems which absolutism has to fight against enjoy a great reputation in the world of philosophy. It is said that for the first time in the history of thought we have popular metaphysics. The bald severity and the adamant-ine structure of the classical systems of Kant and Hegel, and to a lesser extent of their disciples in England, are displaced by an ease of style and looseness of texture which are the wonder of the world accustomed to think that philosophy cannot speak the language of the plain man. We now feel that philosophy "is not harsh and crabbed as dull fools suppose, but musical as is Apollo's lute." Most of the thinkers here presented have a very distinctive style which helps to make their philosophies real and alive. The speculative efforts of James, Bergson, and Bertrand Russell, and in a lesser degree of Balfour,

Howison, and Schiller, are so attractive and imposing that we are sometimes tempted to rank them as works of art. They are undoubtedly the romances of Philosophy. The task of criticising the conceptions of such great minds is painful and perhaps foolhardy ; but it will not be unprofitable if it helps us to see vividly whatever of philosophic strength there is in them. That is some small service to the better understanding of these systems themselves which this criticism, if it is not altogether beside the mark, may render.

The last chapter is put in to rescue the book from the charge of being wholly polemical and negative in its results. There is a definite view running throughout the book conditioning the manner of approach. Indications of a positive idealism which are found scattered in the course of the book are brought together in the last chapter. There is no establishment of the system as such. This must wait for another place and occasion. The main lines are suggested by the philosophical pilgrim's progress on his voyage of discovery, where he passes from crass prejudices to metaphysical conclusions through the natural dialectic of the soul.

I request those who may do me the honour of reading what I say, to remember that the book is to be taken as a whole, so that statements in one chapter might be understood as qualifying those in another. I know there is repetition here and there, which I hope will be excused, as it may serve to remind the reader of the unity of purpose.

My deepest obligations are due to Professor J. H. Muirhead of Birmingham for the great trouble he took in reading the proofs and making many valuable suggestions, and to my old teacher and friend, Professor A. G. Hogg of the Madras Christian College, who found time,

in the midst of much other work, to read more than half of the proofs and make several valuable criticisms. My thanks are also due to Messrs. Bertrand Russell, F. C. S. Schiller, and Hastings Rashdall for reading the proofs of the pages dealing with their views.

The following articles, which have already appeared in various periodicals, have been made use of with the kind permission of their editors: 'The Vedantic Approach to Reality' (*Monist*, 1916); 'Bergson's Idea of God' (*Quest*, 1916); 'Is Bergson's Philosophy Monistic?' (*Mind*, 1917); 'Bergson and Absolute Idealism' (*Mind*, 1919); 'James Ward's Pluralistic Theism' (*Indian Philosophical Review*, 1918-1919).

I owe the Index to my publishers.

In conclusion, I have to express my gratitude to the University of Mysore for the facilities and encouragement it gave me in connection with this work.

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CHAPTER I

SCIENCE, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

I

WHAT is philosophy? It is not easy to give an exact definition of it, either by the nature of the problems discussed, or the results arrived at; for the problems are as many as there are sides of experience, and the results are none of them universally accepted. The clue to the nature of philosophy lies in the method pursued. Philosophy is obviously an *intellectual* attempt to deal with the nature of reality. In the words of Hegel, it is a *thinking* consideration of things. It is a systematic study of the ultimate nature of reality. This definition of philosophy distinguishes it from science on the one hand, and art and religion on the other.

Science aims at a systematic study of reality, but not of the whole of it. The philosopher as the spectator of all time and existence aims at giving a unified account of the world as a whole. The scientist concerns himself with aspects of reality and studies them in abstraction from the whole to which they belong. Philosophy contemplates experience as a whole and attempts to comprehend it under its scheme. But each science has its own special field and special problems to explore and investigate, and does not feel called upon to take up the whole field of reality for its problem. So it is generally said that science deals with abstractions and not with reality. This statement is true in more than one sense.

The qualities studied by the several sciences do not exist separate from one another, but live in close and intimate union. The chemical constitution of an object which chemistry investigates is indissolubly blended with its physical properties which physics studies and its organic nature which physiology has in view. In the live reality, they do not exist separately though for purposes of science we view them as if they were separate. Again, science treats facts purely from the objective point of view, while philosophy treats them as items of experience in relation to the interests and aspirations of the thinking subject. Philosophy studies experience as a whole, as a subject-object relation, as the unity of things with the mind which is conscious of them. It cannot be said that philosophy is only an aggregate of the conclusions of sciences, in the sense that, as the several sciences deal with their bits, the mere assemblage of all these conclusions will constitute the nature of the whole. For in every object we have a whole vision besides the partial visions. There are properties of the whole as a whole, which are not considered by the partial views. For example, the questions, What does all our experience come to? Is there any ultimate purpose in the universe? are not touched by the sciences. We require a discipline which shall investigate the ultimate nature of reality, God, the highest good. We cannot piece together the conclusions of sciences and put down the product to philosophy. Nor again can philosophy be looked upon as the study of the highest abstractions common to all the sciences. It is the business of philosophy as the critic of the sciences to reconcile the conclusions of sciences. If the science of nature compels us to conclude that everything in nature acts according to law, and that the principle of mechanical necessity is supreme in the universe, then it comes into conflict with the science of ethics which takes for granted the relative freedom of man. It is not possible for one part of our knowledge to conflict with another. Our intellectual house cannot be divided

against itself. It becomes the function of philosophy to reconcile the conclusions of sciences by delimiting their spheres of validity. As the ultimate questions which arise when man exercises his mind, viz. the whence and the whither of things, are not considered by the sciences, we are sometimes told that sciences do not care to go to the roots of reality, but swim only in the surface phenomena. In their pursuits, they make assumptions without inquiry, which philosophy cannot do. Physics assumes that there is such a thing as self-dependent matter; geometry takes for granted space. Even philosophical sciences like logic and ethics postulate ideals of truth and goodness. It is the task of philosophy to find out how far the premises assumed by the sciences are valid. It asks whether matter and space are real or ideal. The postulates of sciences become the problems of philosophy. Philosophy must give a logical defence of every premise that it demands. It requires that every conclusion, before acceptance, shall be carefully considered and justified before the bar of reason. It starts with experience and builds its whole structure on its basis without the aid of uncritically assumed premises. This is what Kant means when he says that philosophy ought to be critical and not dogmatic. Scepticism is a better preparation for philosophy than dogmatism. When dogmatism holds that there are some conclusions which we may not question but must accept without inquiry or reason, scepticism rightly revolts against this attitude and condemns it as unphilosophical. Criticism is the breath and being of philosophy. Dogmatism is the enemy of truth and knowledge. We may be asked whether it is possible to philosophise without partial theories or suggestions. Of course not. But the theories we start with should not be theories which appeal to us on account of their serviceableness in extra-philosophical relations. They must be theories which are suggested by the facts and which claim to render experience intelligible. Philosophy cannot be carried

on by mere logic: it has to depend on the constructive suggestions received from half-formed insight, intuition, etc. Philosophy as an interpretation of experience cannot spin out its theories by shutting itself in a dark room away from the world of experience. It looks at experience, takes note of the suggestions forced by it on the mind of man and confirms them as theories, if they possess the requisite explanatory value. While science is an intellectual attempt systematically to study facts, philosophy is deeper than science in that while science takes certain premises on faith, philosophy is under an obligation to prove everything that it requires. As philosophy goes to the root of the matter and thinks to the bitter end, it is more thoroughgoing than science in the intellectual spirit of inquiry. It is one with science in that it is not satisfied with the first appearances of things, but transcends the view of things as they immediately present themselves to us in perception and seeks to arrive at a deeper view of them through objective laws and principles. Philosophy assumes a scientific attitude towards the whole of human experience, and not merely to the positive facts extracted from mechanical science. It is because science is confined to facts which gravitate, and is unconcerned with deeper facts of life and experience, that sincere souls are misled into thinking that science is the enemy of philosophy and religion. The exclusive worship of the positive facts of science leads to what we may call scientific metaphysics, which is the worst kind of metaphysics.

Yet, after all, the method of philosophy is just the method of science. Philosophy is distinct from science mainly because of its subject-matter; it attempts to study the whole of experience. But are there not other attempts to grasp the whole? Has not religion also a similar aim, and how then is it different from philosophy?

Both religion and philosophy ask the why and wherefore of things. Both try to grasp the sum total of things and understand the good of it all. Yet, the end in view is

different. While the salvation of the soul is the end of religion, the discovery of truth is the object of philosophy. Also the method of approach is different. Though true religion is independent of authority, being based on the insight born of meditation, still large numbers do not have any such immediate spiritual vision but take their religious views at second hand from the prophets. So they do not ask for criticism and inquiry. They accept the views because religion claims to be revealed. Religion becomes a system of dogmatics. While philosophy is a product of thought and inquiry, religion turns to be a product of poetry and fancy. Philosophy answers the problem of the whole by logic, while religion answers it by faith. Philosophy tries to interpret the meaning of things by the concepts of understanding while symbols which satisfy the heart are the field of religion. Religion happens to insist on mere authority. The religious prophet does not try to vindicate the views of his religion, but merely gives them. When he steps forward with the Bible or the Koran in his hand, he does not argue, but calls upon his hearers to believe whatever it says. He opens with the silencing appeal of "Thus saith the Lord." The religious attitude suppresses the logical. It warms the heart but silences the mind.¹ Philosophy arises out of the logical demands and aims at theoretical satisfaction. While the philosopher reasons and argues, the religious man believes and acts, lives and loves. Whatever philosophy might say the worship of the Madonna and

¹ With special reference to Christian dogma, "Vernon Lee" observes: "Religious habit leaves the contradiction in its crudest form, the astounding symbol of a Divinity thwarted by a Demon of his own creating, rebelled against by his other creature Man, and having lost patience (as Father Tyrrell tells us) at the excesses of the principle of evil, 'making man's necessity into God's opportunity,' and letting himself be partially placated by the monstrous sacrifice of a portion of himself in expiation of man's disobedience. This inconsistency religion keeps and enshrines in every metaphor, in every verbalism susceptible of rousing human emotion; and having silenced the sense of logical contradiction in the overpowering union or harmony of feeling, religion insists that there is no contradiction" (*Vital Lies*, vol. i. p. 218).

the Child will continue to attract the mass of mankind. Religion, as it appeals to the emotions, has a large following which philosophy cannot hope to have.

II

But the spirit of popular religion is detrimental to the interests of philosophy. Faith unsupported by reason is the suicide of reason, though religious fanatics urge that reason should completely submit to religion as answers to religious questions are given by supernatural revelation, while reason is the instrument of finite man and as such cannot be infallible. According to this view there is no need for philosophy at all. There was a time when religion was giving its opinions on the world of sense. But soon it understood that its authority would not be tolerated, should it continue to deliver judgements on the world of science. Galileo held that the earth moved contrary to the text of the scripture ; he cared for truth and so did not adhere to the popular belief which was committed to the immobility of the earth. The Biblical world has been shaken constantly all these centuries. So in sheer self-defence religion withdrew from the world of sense, made truce with science and declared that while the world of sense was the province of understanding and reason, that of the unseen was the province of faith and revelation. Thus science and religion entered into a treaty, and the quarrel broke out between philosophy and religion as both dealt with the unseen world. The sphere of reason is limited to the finite world, and it cannot say anything of the world to come. Were we to rest on the verdict of reason, it is urged, with what logic we know, there is no other world than the one we see before us. Whatever amount of value this attitude might have possessed as an antidote to the eighteenth-century rationalism of Europe, which treated with scorn and contempt faith and religion as superstition and myth, and called upon man not to surrender his pride and birthright, the use of reason and

make a slave of himself to the idols of the tribe and the church, it is beyond question that the interference of faith in reason and authority in philosophy is fraught with dangerous consequences. We are told that in worshipping God, the ideal of perfection, all doubts of the worshippers are dissolved, and to ask for rational explanation would only cause unsettlement and chaos. But philosophy which is cast in the logical mould cannot allow itself to be consumed in religion which does not insist on founding its faith on logic. Where the logical motive in human nature predominates, we have the philosophic temper with its passion for truth, and it cannot be suppressed by anything extralogical.

It never strikes the unphilosophical temper to question the prevailing form of religion ; it has a sort of good faith in whatever obtains. Philosophy fails of its purpose and is unfaithful to its ideals if it *assumes* that particular religious beliefs should be accepted. The temper which acquiesces in the given code, and does not ask for its reasons, may show a pious disposition or a good sentiment, but it does not show a philosophical attitude. Loyalty to philosophy requires that if a sincere philosophic endeavour results in the repudiation of popular beliefs such as faith in God, etc., these should be surrendered without any scruple. The whole tradition of philosophy is a witness to the antagonism of popular beliefs and theoretical convictions. Diogenes asked, when a certain philosopher was praised, " What great result has he to show, who has so long practised philosophy and yet has *hurt* nobody ? " If the supremacy of religion and popular prejudice over truth and philosophy had been rigorously maintained, there would have been no growth in either religion or philosophy. It is because the true philosopher has been able to think for himself, irrespective of the religion in which he is born, that he has been able to improve religion. From the beginning philosophy has appeared as a reaction against religion. Though the two were originally intertwined, they had to separate very early

for each to grow. Xenophanes, in the true philosophic spirit, observed that the origin of religion is in man's frailty: "It is men who have created the Gods, for in these latter they find again their own shape, their feelings, their speech; the negro thinks of them as being flat and black-nosed, the Thracian as fair and blue-eyed. If oxen knew how to depict, they would give to their gods the form of oxen." Protagoras, the sophist, declared: "It is not for me to seek out either if the gods exist, or if they do not exist; many things hinder me from this, notably the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life." Surely Protagoras would not accept the popular creed. He confessed that he had neither the time nor the competence for the inquiry into the existence of God. We admit that philosophy by its very nature can appeal only to a select few and cannot therefore secure the hold on the public mind which religion has. It very generally happens that the philosophical truth contradicts the popular religion and gets itself suppressed. But there is no denying that in the interests of true religion philosophy should turn aside from merely traditional faith and beliefs. Free thinking is the only guide to truth, but it is a risky game. It is far easier to defend popular beliefs and pet prejudices. The names of Socrates and Jesus, Bruno and Galileo, Descartes and Spinoza, Hobbes and Locke, Hume and Kant, Voltaire and Rousseau are witnesses to the traditional opposition of religion to philosophy and of the state to truth. These testify to the conservatism of man and the danger of free thinking. From the time of Socrates downwards it has been the lot of philosophers to criticise the popular conceptions of religion and suffer for the sake of their ideals. The powers of church and state were from the beginning of time employed to suppress philosophical heresies, but without success. It is supposed that temporal power is no longer so anxious to proceed against disagreeable philosophical opinions as of old, but the tyranny of popular beliefs and religious practices we now have in republican countries is much worse than

that of the worst despot. How much truth is generally at the service of prejudice is strikingly brought home to us by the statements of the intellectuals of every country, trained to sift evidence and see truth, when they assert with a naïveté which is disconcerting to a degree, that their own country is right and every other wrong in the present war. They are using their intellects to justify the policies of their countries and pour out vials of wrath and invective on their enemies. Integrity of thought is lost and truth-seeking has become the handmaid of state policy. In the belligerent countries at the present day the intellectuals must think, if they think at all, in one particular way. If they show any independence they do so at the risk of their lives or their freedom of action. There is no use of making any profession of impartiality. We must think to order. It has become notorious how in Germany no philosopher will be tolerated who does not deify the German state, and if there are men who feel conscientiously that this war is an evil, they cannot thrive even in free England. In some cases even universities have become state dominated. The state does not seem to have any concern for truth. It supports what is useful to it, whether it be truth, half-truth or error. The Church follows the state and philosophy follows both. It has become a department of state. Before our eyes we see how intellect has become the servant of diplomacy. It looks as if the intellectual forces were also mobilised in this war. Spiritual powers are being exploited for temporal interests. Religion is made to turn the mills of state authority. We have another evidence of the same tendency of thought to be unfree in the many attempts made at the present day to reconcile Christianity with war and force. The Sermon on the Mount is a counsel of perfection, as a state conducted on its lines cannot, as Bismarck declared, last for twenty-four hours. Jesus, the saint of non-resistance, is the fiction of the theologian. We can pity him but not admire him ; we can love him at best but not worship him. The real

Jesus is not the one who bade us turn the other cheek, but the one who used the scourge in the temple. Christianity is muscular and militant. We are but using the swords lent us by God. Thus is Christendom mocking the pure and spiritual religion of Christ.¹ Philosophy has truly become "the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct" (Bradley). If our instincts lead us to support the use of force, we make our philosophy do so; if they tend in the direction of non-resistance, philosophy would give reasons for that. It dignifies feeling and faith and confirms prejudices and partialities.

At the present day a system of philosophy is judged not by its truth and objective value, but by its conformity with the prevailing religious views. Systems of philosophy like absolutism which fail to satisfy this test are dismissed as dangerous. They are rejected as reprehensible not because they are untrue, but because they condemn the idols of the tribe and corrupt the youth of the country! The prejudice of religion has penetrated so deeply into the world of philosophy that a discipline which ought to be the most unprejudiced in the world has become blinded on account of the tyranny of dogma or the herd instinct. The philosophic conscience is violently sacrificed to the religious instinct, and the free spirit of inquiry has been replaced by slavish imitation. The independent voice of philosophy becomes the echo of the street cry. We think in conformity with a Christian church, a German court or a mob-cry. Wherever this tendency has prevailed, philosophy has suffered. The Mediaeval Roman Catholic tradition thought that Aristotelianism was the only true philosophy because it alone was con-

¹ Cf. Mr. Wells in *God: the Invisible King*. "We of the new faith repudiate the teaching of non-resistance. We are the militant followers of, and participants in, a militant God. We can appreciate and admire the greatness of Christ, the gentle being on whose nobility the theologians trade. But submission is the remotest quality of all from our God, and a moribund figure is the completest inversion of his likeness as we know him. A Christianity which shows for its daily symbol Chr st risen and trampling victoriously on a broken cross would be far more in the spirit of our worship" (pp. 122-3).

sistent with the Christian religion. Any other theory which could not be fitted into the framework of Christian religion and revelation was anathema. The result of it was the arrest of philosophic development. If the crude and undeveloped religion of the man in the street dominates philosophy, it puts down all philosophy as a waste of effort and energy. Speculation about supra-mundane things is profitless. But philosophy insists that we have no right to take a thing as true simply because the religion in which we were trained believes it or we could not be happy unless it were true. In philosophy truth is our goal and logic our guide. It admits only the one ideal of truth and is subject to none else. The philosophical attempt must be carried out in the spirit of scientific research. The philosopher acknowledges nothing higher than truth however frightful and disconcerting it may be. But wherever he bends the knee to a state policy or a religious view, he subordinates truth and owns something else to be higher than that. True philosophy then disappears and the spurious type appears on the scene, and if it passes current and appeals to even the trained thinker, this only shows the low level at which most of the intellectual minds move. The system of philosophy should be the result of thorough and logical inquiry, founded upon a universal examination of reality. The philosopher has no practical end in view. He cares not for gain or fame. His one duty is to search for truth and destroy error. "Life resembles a spectacle. Some attend it in order to participate in the contests; others to do business; the best to look on; so it is in life. The vulgar seek fame and money; the philosophers truth" (Diogenes Laërtius, Proem. 8, viii. 16). Philosophy is its own end, and to make it a means to anything external to it is to mistake its function. The mental habits of present-day philosophers prove that they have not the right view of the nature of philosophy. Non-logical elements help to make their intellectual views. Prejudices and traditions, suggestions and motives which

cannot be strictly assimilated with the central philosophical spirit continue to give the systems of philosophy the forms which they have. Nietzsche observes: "And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological demands for the maintenance of a definite mode of life" (*Beyond Good and Evil*, i. 3). Present-day thinkers force, unintentionally perhaps, their interpretations into the scheme of things and justify what they want arbitrarily and unreasonably. Philosophy has become a list of beliefs held by faith and not a reasoned system of metaphysics. Independence of thought, which is the breath and life of philosophy, has become rare, and the progress of philosophy is checked. And so a few philosophers with the true vision arise and call to order the stray sheep, and tell them that philosophy should pursue the method of science in an attitude of ethical and religious neutrality. "It is my belief that the ethical and religious motives, in spite of the splendidly imaginative systems to which they have given rise, have been on the whole a hindrance to the progress of philosophy and ought now to be consciously thrust aside by those who wish to discover philosophical truth. It is, I maintain, from science, rather than from ethics and religion, that philosophy should draw its inspiration" (*Scientific Method in Philosophy*, pp. 3-4; see also *Our Knowledge of the External World*, chapter i.). Mr. Bertrand Russell is quite right in emphasising the need for freeing philosophy from the trammels of external creeds, traditions and institutions. If philosophy requires us to give up the sacred heirlooms of humanity, we must do so without hesitation or scruple. It is its task to give us a true estimate of the purpose of life. Truth is its motive and inspiration. It must develop in obedience to this one standard. It may lead to disagreeable results, but that does not matter. Logic is like a calculating machine producing results which were never anticipated, and if we adopt it, we must follow it right through whitherso-

ever it leadeth us. But now we do not care to ascertain whether an opinion is true or false, but only whether it is "life-furthering, life-preserving." We start with a certain view of life, think of a few things as necessary to it and conclude that they are true and objective. Philosophy becomes a mere arrangement of man's hopes and fears. "They (the philosophers) all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained, through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic; whereas in fact a prejudiced proposition, idea or suggestion, which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event" (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, i. 5). Impulse to knowledge and love of truth cease to be the motives of philosophy, and some moral ideas or religious prejudices which we wish to defend even at the cost of logic and consistency take their place. Philosophy wants to prove those ideas by which their authors think they would be able to live better. Even Bergson, himself a representative of the new spirit, recognises that life has to be seen, viewed as it is, without reference to practical needs and utilities. It is because he believes that intellectual habits and forms of thought are suited to action that he asks us to dispense with them, give up our prejudices, go to experience at its source and grasp its nature before it is turned in the direction of practical needs. We have to install ourselves in experience pure and simple to feel its truth and reality. The true philosopher should be pitilessly just to truth and not consider anything of value except truth. We want hard and straight thinking and not soft or emotional or sentimental thinking. Philosophy must prove logically derived conclusions and not defend at all costs pious wishes and pleasing imaginings. Philosophy should say what is true—it does not matter whether it pleases or irritates. "The mere fact that a theory leaves no room for freewill, pluralism, immortality or God does not make it false, even though belief in such

ideas should happen to help us over the dismal places in life" (Prof. Thilly, *Philosophical Review*, xvi. 123). Intellectual freedom is the greatest hope of the world. It is the duty of the 'intelligentsia' to emancipate thought from its bondage to state or church or wealth or instinct or prejudice. Only intellect will enable us to see without glasses life as it is and ultimately make us feel that a "gloomy truth is a better companion through life than a cheerful falsehood." It is absurd to think that suffering humanity cannot live without some lie or other to console it. We should not corrupt our minds with soothing illusions. We must, as George Eliot says, try to do without opium. We cannot discredit intellect simply because it does not give us what we want. "It is not rational to discredit the intelligence because it fails to give us the world we want or the heaven we want or the God we want. The direst need cannot make black white, though it may persuade us to paint it white, nor does the fact that hypotheses happen to please the will to believe or succeed in this sense make these hypotheses true" (*ibid.* p. 122). The most daring and logical empiricist, Hume, observes: "There is no method of reasoning more common and yet more blameable than in philosophical debate, to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. When an opinion leads into absurdities, it is certainly false, but it is not certain that an opinion is false because it is of dangerous consequences" (*Inquiry*, pp. 136, 137). Hume showed himself a devoted votary of truth when he declared that his philosophy could not satisfy practical needs. Arguing from consequences alone, is not a valid procedure. So many things which we thought must be true have been proved to be false. On so many occasions the votaries of religion confidently prophesied the deluge if certain beliefs were abandoned. We have abandoned them and yet the world has not come to a stop. It is going its normal rounds.

III

It is urged that philosophy has no business to confine its attention to the intellectual demands as there are other aspects of human nature, feeling and will. Certainly, but philosophy is an *intellectual* attempt to organise the whole of experience, intellectual, emotional and volitional. It takes into account other sides of human nature than the cognitive and their needs. In tracing the psychological genesis of man's attitude to reality, philosophy knows that the promptings of the heart, feelings towards nature and aspirations towards the unseen determine his outlook. Emotions generally control ideas. The true nature of reality will be revealed not merely to man's intellectual nature, but to the other sides as well. From this it does not follow that philosophy should cease to be intellectual. In philosophy we do not sing or muse but think. It is its intellectuality that distinguishes philosophy from art and religion. To say that philosophy should cease to be intellectual would be to surrender the philosophical attempt and admit the discomfiture of reason. So long as we believe that the universe is an intelligible reality, that it will answer to the demands of reason, the attempt of philosophy cannot be abandoned. While philosophy deals with feeling and immediate experience, it ought not to trust itself to them. They may not possess the value which the subject in his ignorance attributes to them. Matthew Arnold says: "Nor does the being hungry prove that we have bread." Professor Varisco writes: "The **Psychical** fact of feeling may be evidence of a reason, the manner in which a reason of which a subject has no knowledge, or at least no clear knowledge, authenticates itself to his consciousness. But it may also be that the value of that fact is very different from that which the subject in his ignorance attributes to it. For instance, one child is irritated by an injustice done him, another by a scolding which he has deserved. As observed facts, the two feelings will be very similar ;

but the first is reasonably justified whereas the *raison d'être* of the second lies in a mental disposition which ought not to exist. The feeling of the Divine is justified, as we shall see ; yet not all the opinions based upon it—opinions which in a man incapable of deep reflection could have no other foundation—are justifiable" (*The Great Problems*, p. 8). "The true nerve is the genuine thought ; and only when the thought is true can the feeling be of a genuine kind" (Hegel). Philosophy as the study of experience as a whole takes note of feelings, etc., but attempts to render full reasons for everything it accepts. Religious feeling must also pass through the fire of metaphysical thinking. "Religious experience, peculiarly so-called, needs, in my opinion, to be carefully considered and interpreted by every one who aspires to reason out a more complete philosophy" (James, *Pluralistic Universe*, p. 30). It is undoubted that experience has improved by the discovery of much of its irrationality. Unanalysed or undiscussed experience is not conclusive as much of it may be irrational. If philosophy should neglect extra-intellectual aspects of human life it is open to condemnation. If reason in the interests of theory concerns itself only with theory, then the distrust of it is justified. A philosopher who neglects non-rational sides of experience is the chartered metaphysician of Lord Morley who is ever in hunt after he knows not what. Philosophy is not merely a piece of consistent thinking or cogent ratiocination, for fantastic fairy tales may be consistent though not true, but a fruitful rendering of the meaning of experience in its entirety. The empiricist who trusts to experience believes in the operation of reason in it ; only he is not quite consistent. While he is vacillating in his faith in the reasonableness of experience, the philosopher is wholly in earnest about it. It is unjust to discredit philosophy when in the interests of theory it studies the whole of experience. Philosophy is an attempt to construct a theory about reality as a whole.

As the absolutistic systems of philosophy which deny

the surface views about the world, God and man, are mostly rationalistic, James declares that philosophy should be empiricist, radically empiricist if possible. There is no doubt that philosophy should be empiricist in the sense that it must arise out of and be built upon experience. The difference between true empiricism and false is, that while the false wants to confine experience to the world of sense or the world at its surface, the true takes for its field the whole of experience. False empiricism believes in sense phenomena, immediate feelings, impulses, and rejects deeper realities. True empiricism is radical in that surface phenomena and highest religious intuitions both form its data. The scientific empiricism of the nineteenth century viewed experience as limited to the world in space and time. As it did not believe in the sphere beyond the physical, religion then went to the wall. But now when radical empiricism asks us to confine our attention to the immediate certainties and felt intuitions of life, the higher interests of truth are jeopardised. The former resulted in atheism and materialism; the latter in religious dogmatism and idolatry. The term 'experience' is ambiguous. The scientist calls himself a believer in experience. But he confines experience to the objective facts, eliminating all the subjective factors. Everything else but the object, though not unreal, is neglected by him. He argues that if these subjective fears and aspirations and ideals should interfere, then the scientific attitude is given up, and the religious attitude adopted. Final causes and other expressions of the subject's feelings which are regarded as unscientific are just the data for religious experience. While science investigates the order of nature, religion concerns itself with the salvation of the soul. Science is satisfied with one side of experience, the side which is open to scientific law: religion is satisfied with feelings and aspirations. The ideal of science is abstract intelligibility; that of religion satisfaction of human feelings. These two become opposed as their fields are really abstractions

from experience. In experience the subjective and objective sides exist together. While science and religion are justified in employing different conceptions in their spheres, they are not justified in refusing reality to what is outside their scope. Religion which considers its facts to be most immediate, real and concrete cannot dismiss the physical facts as unreal ; nor can science dismiss the subjective side of experience as non-existent. The whole of experience, scientific and religious, is the problem of the philosopher. But if he starts with predilections on the side of either science or religion, and if, in the process of his pursuit, he does not get over this bias, the cause of philosophy is ruined. When a philosopher identifies himself with science in the narrow sense of the term he ends as a materialist or something in that neighbourhood. Witness Descartes. He was untrue to the ideal of philosophy when he thought that only those things were true which could be reduced to mathematical form. His philosophy became a dogmatism which the critical philosophy eliminated, though, unhappily, not for good. The narrow scientific spirit which starts with a prejudice against religious experience, and thinks the inward life of the mystics to be a worthless dream, is not the true philosophic spirit. The data of science and religion, observation and meditation are the field of philosophy. We cannot say that scientific experience alone forms the basis of philosophical speculation as art and moral life are equally vital and profound. Science is not the sole truth and religion is not a tissue of illusions. Radical empiricism consists in taking note of all sides of experience, facts of religious faith, moral ideals and spiritual intuitions, as well as the crust of the earth and the stars of the sky. The modern system which goes under the name of radical empiricism is solicitous only about the claims of the plain man. Early English empiricism wished to come to terms with science, dogmatic rationalism with religion, but modern empiricism with the plain man's faith.

Religion is a subject to be investigated by philosophy

as is any other side of experience. It is more essentially the problem of philosophy as it assumes a system of values which philosophy has also to consider. Religious facts have therefore more significance for philosophy than any other. Religious faith reveals an aspect of human nature deeper than intellect. While religion dogmatically asserts its scale of values and rests its proof on the feeling of the heart, philosophy tries critically to estimate them and evaluate their worth. Religion is one practical attitude to life as atheism is another, materialism a third and so on. If some men feel assured that there is a God, others with equal vehemence assert that they do not feel any need for God. There are men who have honest doubts about the existence of God, who are willing to subscribe to the agnostic's prayer, O God, if there be a God, save my soul if I have a soul! It is the task of philosophy to estimate the values of these several attitudes to life. When philosophy sets about its task of constructing a theory of the universe it meets with the prevailing religious creeds. It comes across the sacred books of the East as well as those of the Hebrews and the Christians. It has to scrutinise the stock of superstitions and sophisms with which the mind of man has entertained itself in its upward spiritual ascent. It does not accept religious intuitions at their face value, taking them for inviolable truths. It accepts no view unless it be with the consent of logic. While the religious consciousness is entitled to recognition at the hands of philosophy, still no institution, however valuable it may be for life, is consented to until hard reasoning justifies it.¹

We see how baseless is the charge that philosophy which is intellectual leads to a divorce between theory and

¹ "Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to such criticism everything must submit. Religion through its sanctity, and lawgiving through its majesty, may seek to exempt themselves from it. But they then awaken just suspicion, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason accords only to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination" (Preface to Kant's *C.P.R.*, 1st edition).

life. This charge that metaphysics is discontinuous with life has been urged since the time of Aristotle. The term 'metaphysics' is apt to suggest that to philosophise means turning one's back upon the natural or the scientific world. It has been thought that metaphysics as dealing with things airy and unsubstantial has no basis in experience. Aristotle did not mean by it anything like this. He meant a study of pure being which has existence even outside the realm of science. Philosophy is the science of being in general and not of matter or of nature. Aristotle, opposed as he was to Platonism, took his stand on experience and tried to account for it. Philosophy is not divorced from life as its problem is provoked by life and as its validity is tested by its adequacy to account for life. It is a confusion of thought to suppose that because philosophy is interested in theory it revels in theory. Philosophy is no doubt a theory, but it is not a theory of theory, but a theory of life, and therefore it is at home in life and not in a far-off region of false abstractions. It starts with the given, comprises all the given in a totality, and from that total vision redescends to the given to understand it and transform it if necessary. Simply because it insists that ethical and religious conclusions should not control philosophical discussions, it does not follow that philosophy has nothing to do with ethics or religion. After all, we think to live, but do not live to think. Views of philosophy will have an effect on life and conduct, but views of conduct and life need not disturb the philosopher's vision. Philosophy which estimates the meaning and purpose of life will have some significance for life and religion. Religion is ultimately dependent on philosophy, and the two cannot be kept in separate compartments. Religion is only an application of a metaphysic to life. And no philosophy is worth its name if it does not furnish an explanation of religion. It is better if religious beliefs are in agreement with reasoned metaphysical thinking. Instead of trying to make philosophy religious, we should make religion philosophical if possible. If thought does

not help us to support our beliefs, it does not follow that we should seek for their basis somewhere else than in thought, in emotion, will or immediate experience or intuition. If thought does not give us the religion we want, it does not mean we may believe what we like.

IV

It is irrational to think that the ordinary feelings of religion are the criteria of truth, especially in view of the fact that religion has changed as a result of philosophic growth. The vast changes that have marked the history of religious progress are due to the attempt to rationalise religion, the impulse to bring reason and religion into harmony. A religious creed which has no rational philosophy underlying it is bound to fail. Religion is a matter of feeling, and for it to be shared with others an objective philosophy is needed. Feeling in and by itself is private and dumb. It cannot render an account of itself. Though essentially it is a cry of the human spirit or a sentiment of the heart, it requires to be buoyed up by intellectual consistency, to live and spread. Religion is the poetry of thought, according to Cardinal Newman. It is thought touched with emotion. Repeatedly the feeling of the religious believer has to be tested and checked by reason. Religious views have changed in obedience to philosophical demands. Fetishism was possible with a low culture. But fetishistic and animistic ideas were soon replaced by a polytheism. The primitive gods were petty, local and partial, being the early idealisations of uncivilised and half-civilised peoples. Later in development we come across the beautiful figures of Apollo, Aphrodite, etc., which represent more profound intuitions of the human mind. Development of the conception of the uniform reign of law knocked the bottom out of the polytheistic religion which believed in numberless gods and demons with powers to interfere with the causal nexus. Soon a radical theism, best represented

by the early Hebraic doctrine, displaced polytheism. The later shadowy theism of Christianity is a compromise between the Absolute of philosophy and the God of religion. In the Old Testament itself the God of Moses is not the God of Isaiah; in the New Testament the Father revealed by Christ is not the word incarnate of the Fourth Gospel. At the present day the religious mind seems to be perfectly satisfied with a theistic religion of a modified type, and it is not impossible that something more satisfactory from the philosophical point of view may replace it. When enthusiasts for particular religious beliefs look upon philosophy as an unsettling force, they have only to be told that philosophy has been that from the beginning. It has been disturbing faith and introducing new Gods. Were religion in the ascendant, persecution would have been the fate of all philosophers, and there would have been no growth in religion.

V

True philosophy will result in true religion, as ultimately there cannot be any conflict between faith and reason. The religion is true not because it is a particular religion, but because it is a philosophical religion. When we say that true religion and true philosophy will agree, we do not mean that the religious experience of the primitive savage and the totem worshipper will be acknowledged to be valid by the philosopher. We mean that the specialist in religion, the mystic with his experience, wisdom and insight will agree with the rational thinker. After all, as Royce said, the mystics are the only 'thoroughgoing empiricists.' Reality reveals itself in two different forms to the mystic and to the thinker, and ultimately the two should harmonise with each other. Unity and harmony ought to mark the relation of true religion to genuine reason. There is no secret hostility between the different sides of human nature. Philosophy when most itself will be religious, and religion in its deepest aspects will be

philosophical. A religious system, though the terminus of philosophic study, should not be its governing influence. It does not augur well for the future of either religion or philosophy if religion becomes the starting-point and dominating motive of philosophy.

VI

It is the case that many philosophers approach the problems of philosophy from the direction of ethics and religion. Hegel, for example, had a very keen appreciation of the aims and objects of religion. But he did not adopt without inquiry the dogmas of the religious consciousness of his time. He sought to find a philosophical justification for them. While the absolutist thinkers generally approach philosophy from the side of ethics and religion, they do not make ethics and religion the criteria of their philosophy. These set the direction of their thought but they do not pursue them to greater lengths. The fact that the greatest absolutist thinkers of modern philosophy, Spinoza and Hegel, who both started from the side of ethics and religion, ended in conflict with the prevailing religious creeds shows that they did not use logic and philosophy to support the religious convictions of their times.¹ Sheer logic compelled them to assert that all is one in God, and the world of plurality is subordinate to the fundamental unity of spirit. Whatever charges may be urged against the absolutist, it cannot be said with any propriety that their philosophies were biassed by their religious convictions. Though they approach philosophy from the side of religion, still they pursue the method of dispassionate research and do not make ethical and religious considerations interfere in their attempts.

¹ Though it is admitted on all hands that Spinoza came into conflict with the prevailing religion, the case is not quite so obvious with Hegel. But the fact that his system requires us to introduce modifications in Christian theology is enough for our purposes.

VII

Simply because we say that religion rests on faith and not logic, it should not be thought that it has no value. Religion is necessary to educate and ennoble man, and help him to rise above his baseness and work upwards. It serves as a balm or an opiate to the troubled soul, securing for it peace of mind and solace of heart. The conception of God as a judge and the fear of hell have their effects on the mind of man.¹ It is to be noted that religion has been used throughout the world from the beginning of history, as a means of overcoming resistance in the exercise of authority. The worst kind of slavery has been perpetrated and defended in its name. This has been possible because we do not ask reasons for faith. If religion should be rid of its evil effects and serve the purpose which it has in view, it should be supported by philosophy.

VIII

Philosophy as the pursuit of truth has a practical interest, seeing that truth gives intellectual comfort. The world we see around us is bewildering and chaotic. The presence of evil, misery and suffering in it makes it a riddle to be solved. There are no people who are impervious to the demands of this world. If the world's evil did not make an appeal to us, we would not have any interest in theology. As a rule, we are interested in religion, and this shows that the problem of philosophy also has its meaning and value for us. The individual is conscious of the inadequacy of the finite world. He feels it to be incomplete and in need of supplementation. He falls back on religious faith for the needed complement. Instead of relying on the dogmas of religion, the philosopher tries to think about it all and get intellectual

¹ Cf. "Some things which a highly cultivated intelligence would probably discard, and discard without danger, are essential to the moral being of multitudes" (Lecky, *The Map of Life*, p. 227).

satisfaction. An unphilosophical or irreligious temper would look upon the universe as a fearful conflict between two opposing forces and would believe that this struggle is the alpha and omega of the world of reality. But even this attitude becomes a philosophy, though it is not called philosophical. It is unphilosophical, as the view is not the product of any systematic reflection on the facts but is only excited by the crude observation of the surface world. It is the view of vague uncriticised common sense. As the nature of man is to think, he cannot but philosophise. He cannot but feel the duty to doubt. Philosophy is not something that a man can put on or off as he chooses. Every human being who lays claim to a level above that of animal life will have a philosophy. The intellectual nature of man cannot rest until a systematic solution of the world problem is reached. Man is not only a political animal but is also a philosophical and a religious animal. He is by nature a metaphysical being. He is not content to live a life of feeling and will or drift with the current, but feels an impulse to see his life in the light of the central reality. He cannot but ask, What is the truth of it all?

CHAPTER II

RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY

I

IN Chapter I. we have seen how philosophy is distinguished from science by its subject-matter, and from religion by its method. It is the application of the logical method of explanation that gives philosophy its distinctive nature. If we abandon this method, philosophy becomes identical with religion and mysticism. The philosophical attempt which aims at constructing an objective and necessary theory of the universe has to follow the guidance of logic, even though in so doing it comes into conflict with popular beliefs and prevailing religion. We do not demand of a philosopher religious fervour or moral earnestness, but only logical seriousness. But this spirit of philosophic inquiry is not adopted by some present-day thinkers, but is even severely rebuked by them. As an instance we may quote William James : " The besetting sin of philosophers has always been the absolutism of their intellects. We find an assumption that was the soul of scholasticism, the assumption, namely, that anything that is necessary in the way of belief must be susceptible of articulate proof, as rampant as it ever was, in the irreligious agnosticism of to-day ; and we find it, moreover, blossoming out into corollaries, as, for instance, that to believe anything without such proof is to be unscientific, and that to be unscientific is the lowest depth to which a thinking mind can fall " (Preface by William James to Paulsen's *Intro-*

duction to Philosophy). In short, James asks us to be content with faith and religion, and not seek for logic and proof, to disown philosophy and substitute distrust of intellect for the absolutism thereof, as the latter leads to 'irreligious agnosticism.'

II

What has led to this change in standpoint, to this new habit of soft thinking? Why is religious belief or serviceableness made the test of truth? For this change in the conception of the function and method of philosophy certain historical accidents are responsible. For long philosophy had been under the spell of mathematics. Descartes, Spinoza and Kant wished to reach in their systems of philosophy mathematical certainty. But the end of this tendency was reached in Kant who clearly established the possibilities of human knowledge. Intellect dominated by the mathematical ideal, Kant showed, busied itself only with the external show, the unreal shadow. God, human freedom, etc., could not be established by reason but only be felt by the heart. Thus Kant sounded the danger to human values which the mathematical ideal of knowledge carried with it. Pascals and Bossuets, Rousseaus and Hamanns rose up and sought refuge in faith and feeling, for faith alone could support the validity of the values of spirit.¹ But Hegel who came later clearly established the limits of the mathematical ideal. The soul of philosophy which was lulled into sleep in the theology-ridden universities of the middle ages, and had not come to its own but was wandering in other fields even in the days of Kant, regained its consciousness in Hegel. It was reborn when Hegel negated the narrow standpoint of Kant. With Hegel's emphasis on life

¹ Lotze opposed intellectualism in the interests of ethical and religious needs. According to him we must look to the highest forms of mind for the fullest revelation of reality. Moral life or the world of values is the true basis of metaphysics.

and purpose, it was recognised that philosophy spelt no danger to human values. Though in Hegel philosophy recovered its lost soul, it did not come into prominence till late in the nineteenth century. For one thing, the anti-intellectual movement of the post-Kantians, led by Jacobi, Herder and Schopenhauer, led to the importing of other considerations into philosophy. As a reaction against the dominance of this intrusion of faith into reason, and religion into philosophy, against the church's guardianship over science, against the tendency to suppress intellectual demands for logic and demonstration, proof and inquiry, materialism and positivism spread like wildfire. The reaction went to the other extreme, so much so that the Rationalist Press Association thinkers and the no-God men had the ear of the public. Scientific progress and evolutionist philosophy emphasised this spirit. Mill and Spencer, Huxley and Leslie Stephen in England, Lange, Feuerbach, etc., on the Continent, gave a materialist turn to philosophy and the last word was no less than 'irreligious agnosticism.' Science swept everything away. The earth was bare and the heavens empty. There is no doubt that Hegelian idealism shook to its foundations the scientific empiricism of the nineteenth century. But the entrance of democracy into philosophy resulted in making both scientific empiricism and Hegelian idealism stand on a par, for both of them failed to satisfy the aspirations of the human heart. While the former spoke of the vast cosmos as a huge machine of which the individual formed an insignificant part, the latter regarded the world process as the realisation of an absolute purpose. Both are at one in chilling the heart, and they considered man's yearnings and aspirations, his loves and hates to be mere incidents in the world process. Human values which the man in the street feels to be of supreme moment were not conserved by either. Hence the sudden reaction in favour of religion in philosophy which is expressing itself in a fascination for things ununderstandable and the fashion of intuitive

mysticism, which, whether true or not, warms the heart of the plain man, and helps him to live better in his own estimate. The future is declared to be for faith as the past was for science. All this may seem a help to religion, but is it not a certain loss to philosophy? and is it really a source of strength to religion? If we strike reason to the ground, does not the all-dissolving doubt smite religion too?

In the middle ages philosophy was playing the second fiddle to Aristotle and the Bible. It freed itself from this bondage and came under the influence of mathematics and logic. Later, biology exerted a good deal of influence over it. Now it is practically identified with religion. In the last twenty-five years there has been the re-establishment of the presuppositions of religion, and much of the good work done in the field of philosophy has been under the auspices of the Gifford trust for natural religion. Philosophy now goes after religion and is anxious to strengthen its foundations.

I see men's judgements are
A parcel of their fortunes; and things outward
Do draw the inward quality after them,
To suffer all alike.

SHAKESPEARE.

Here Shakespeare emphasises that most real relevancy of environment to faith. After a great wave of materialism, agnosticism and atheism, we see in Europe to-day a revival of the religious spirit. This new tendency has affected men's judgements. As it is believed that materialism, etc., were due to the scientific and the philosophic temper, modern thinkers wish to guard against the possible degeneration of the wave of religion by the pursuit of pure philosophy. So with the very noble idea of preserving moral and religious values assumed by unreflecting common sense, these start with a preconceived metaphysics and prejudices against intellectualism, etc. With a naïveté which is astonishing in philosophers, we find them taking for granted religious ideas and beliefs and trying to defend them at any cost. Anything which

chimes in with their desires is regarded as true. It is forgotten that philosophers are primarily lovers of truth and as such should treat their problems scientifically and seek for objective truth. But in the eagerness to regain the attention of the ordinary man extra-philosophical demands enter into philosophy and spoil it. Since the adventurous individual of the twentieth century believes in the reality of time, the significance of change, the openness of the universe, his own separateness, freedom of action and a God like himself, this region is marked off as the field where the philosopher has only to submit. Certain forms of belief are determined beforehand where we cannot meddle though beyond them we have a wide range for the discretion of intelligence. Within the fabric nothing should be altered. Every reasonable system of philosophy ought to grant these convictions of the average man. With the ultimate scheme of things settled, with certain values taken for granted, the philosopher now approaches his task. Like the mediaeval school-men who accepted Aristotle and the Bible as authorities, and then gave themselves the luxury of intellectual discussion by asking how many angels could dance at the point of a pin, even so our philosophers accept certain beliefs as true, and give themselves intellectual recreation by philosophising in other matters. It is indifferent to them if this procedure of marking off a particular portion and demanding in this sphere nothing else than a justification of the common-sense beliefs involves a surrender of the true method of philosophy. But we cannot imprison men's minds for all time. They will sooner or later break through the spheres of illusion to discover truth. To add to our difficulties, the enlightened man's religion is not crude and undeveloped as it once was. Religion itself has become highly philosophical, and we do not feel so fully and poignantly the opposition between the two. Philosophy was easily emancipated from the trammels of mythology and religion in the days of antiquity, since the mythical and religious

conceptions of the world were crude and gross, unscientific and unphilosophical. With the progress of philosophy, the prevailing religions have assimilated much of philosophical thought, so that it has become well-nigh impossible to steer clear of religion. But the progress of true religion requires a clear delimitation of the spheres of religion and philosophy, and if trained thinkers take shelter in the highly philosophical character of the prevailing religion, it will be hard to remedy its defects and improve its tone.

III

What are the effects of the change in the angle of vision? The first to be noted is the *democratic* tendency of the present-day philosophy. Plato set up the tradition that philosophy should be aristocratic. While religion is for all, philosophy is not. Religion is adapted to the needs of the plain man, since it demands faith and acceptance. To the philosopher, faith must show its dependence on profound insight and thought. Philosophy is an art quite as much as shipbuilding or shoemaking. As a specialised discipline requiring thought and training it cannot be practised by any except the specialists. It is now transferred from the forum to the street. When it becomes democratic, philosophy gets mixed up with religion, knowledge with opinion, truth with dogma. Philosophy becomes quite useless to all, the masses included. At the present day philosophy has become fundamentally plebeian or democratic. Its one self-chosen aim is to arrange the life of the ordinary man. If he requires a God, philosophy supplies him with one; if a ghost, it will also be supplied. The prejudice of the plain man is the seed of the plant of this new philosophy. The democratic movement has come to stay, not merely in politics where its value is undoubted, but also in art, literature and philosophy. Cheap literature, fiction, etc., fill the book-stalls more than serious and high-minded works of art and creative genius. We do not like any

serious literature, classic or drama that makes us think. We long for sensational novels which excite us, or the film that thrills us with breathless escapes, or the drama that evokes volleys of laughter. We do not want high thinking or serious purpose, but are satisfied with excess of emotion and extravagance of sentiment. In philosophy there is a distrust of intelligence and order, but faith in life, will, immediate experience, novelty, change and creative evolution. Intellectuals are supposed to be out of touch with the actual interests and emotions of mankind. James speaks of a "rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call itself religious, but that keeps out of all definite touch with concrete fact and joys and sorrows" (*Pragmatism*, Lecture I.). And so he wants us to have a philosophy which is true to surface appearances. Such philosophic theories will be, in the words of Professor Bosanquet, those "of the first look of the man in the street, or of the traveller struggling at a railway station, to whom the compact self-containedness and self-direction of the swarming human beings before him seems an obvious fact, while the social logic and the spiritual history which lie behind the scene fail to impress themselves on his perceptive imagination" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 80). The natural separateness of human units strikes the vision of the popular mind most. As a result of it we have the political movement of democracy which wants to give each man a vote and decide issues by counting heads, and the economic ideal which seeks to allow to each man the necessary opportunity to perfect himself. The chance must be open to every man to become an artist or a philosopher or a millionaire. It is because the faith of democracy insists that each man has in him the promise of a philosopher that systems are required to be judged according as they suit his fancies or not. It is supposed that the plain man is logical in his views, and to systematise them is the task of philosophy. The man in the street is the centre and everything else revolves round him. Philosophy and thinking must supply his needs. It is

dangerous to differ from him, especially as he has political power in his hands. Systems of philosophy become mirrors of the plain man's faith. James and Bergson, representatives of the two great democracies of the world and respected names in philosophy, express this democratic tendency, in the endeavour to satisfy the popular demands and support the prevailing notions. "In a word, to James belongs the glory of having first divined the secret of the plain man, and ministered to his desire for a knowledge that is relevant to action and to life" (*Mind*, No. 86, p. 242).

The reality of evil has become a part of the accepted code of philosophy. Sensitiveness to pain and suffering is a peculiar feature of our age, thanks to the propaganda of humanitarianism. Who can withstand the temptation to regard evil as a fundamental reality, who that lives in this age to witness the rape of Belgium and other such unspeakable atrocities of civilised Europe in the twentieth century? Who can say that the struggle of the European battlefields is a sham fight with a sham power? It has become impossible for the modern man keenly sensitive to pain and suffering to dismiss evil as an illusion. He has no patience with systems of religion and philosophy which explain it away or set it aside. The absolutist who, while admitting that evil is the essence of moral life, is not prepared to grant that it is a characteristic feature of life divine is put down as a philosopher who disdains to walk the streets of earth, but longs to float in the cloudland of fancy. But the difficulty that if evil is real, then the appearance of evil conquering good will also become a fundamental reality does not impress him much. Were this appearance real, there is not much chance for man to gain victory over evil, for that which is absolutely real cannot be negated. The plain man does not know that granting the reality of evil would involve the absolute supremacy of evil in the world struggle. But logic is nothing to him. He feels evil to be real and philosophy must submit.

It follows that the idealist doctrine that the world is an idea is also a sham. How can the solid-seeming world with its wonderful setting of streets and skies be looked upon as a floating dream or a figment of imagination? The world is not a thought-product, not an appearance, but a reality quite independent of human experience. Even when we stop thinking about it, it is there, a permanent and imposing structure. The empirical tradition has yielded to the realistic doctrine that the world *is* apart from all consciousness.

From the preceding account of the nature of evil and the world it follows that we must hold to the conception of a finite God. If evil is not an accidental phenomenon, but something forming part and parcel of life's very structure, how can its existence be reconciled with the control of the universe by a Being of absolute moral perfection? Can this world with all its evil and imperfection be the creation of a perfect and good God? Can such things as the recent European war be, if the true God be just and merciful and good? How dare we say that he is a power of righteousness? Professor Gilbert Murray cites an interesting example: "I remember a dreadful incident in one of the Consular reports of the Armenian massacres of 1895. At that time the universal dread and horror throughout Armenia sent most people praying day and night in the churches. But the Report tells of one woman who sat by the road and refused to pray. 'Do you not see what has happened?' she said. 'God has gone mad. It is no use to pray to him'" (*International Crisis*, p. 39). If God is the author of Nature, is he the author of evil also? The modern mind is not willing to lay the responsibility for evil at the feet of God. It is referred to something else than God. Were not evil due to some other force, God would not tolerate it and look on passively without interfering. A dualistic philosophy which is not in humour with the world has the attention of the public at the present day. A finite God struggling along with

man to overcome evil is the only way of escape from this contradiction. God is confronted by the prince of darkness, the principle of evil. The dualism of Ormuzd and Ahriman is the only rational hypothesis. Mr. Britling in Wells's novel says: "How can God be a person? how can he be anything that matters to man unless he is limited and defined and human like ourselves, with things outside him and beyond him." That is the conclusion of Wells's hero in the face of the great war. A merciful God will not allow a war in which the flower of the highest nations in the world is cut off. We must say that as the best men with the best of motives were not able to avert this world catastrophe, even so God was not able to do it. He is not omnipotent. "The real God of the Christians is Christ, not God Almighty; a poor mocked and wounded God nailed on a cross of matter. . . . God is not absolute; God is finite . . . a finite God who struggles in his great and comprehensive way as we struggle in our weak and silly way—who is *with us*—that is the essence of all real religion. If I thought there was an omnipotent God who looked down on battles and deaths and all the waste and horror of this war—able to prevent these things—doing them to amuse himself, I would spit in his empty face" (*Mr. Britling sees it Through*, p. 397). A finite God who struggles with man can alone satisfy these tempers. God fights with evil as light with night, life with matter, existence with non-existence. He is working under limitations, though we for the sake of his divinity prefer to call these definitely imposed limits self-imposed. No other conception can relieve the human mind of its familiar embarrassment and perplexity. Mr. Wells in his later volume on *God: the Invisible King*, voices the modern conception of religion. He has no sympathy with the logical and necessary concept of the Absolute, the Great Power behind all things; for the plain man knows nothing about it. The real God is a person like ourselves, our Friend and Comrade and King and Leader and Captain. ". . . If

a figure may represent him, it must be the figure of a beautiful youth, already brave and wise, but hardly come to his strength. He should stand lightly on his feet in the morning time, eager to go forward, as though he had but newly arisen to a day that was still but a promise ; he should bear a sword, that clean discriminating weapon, his eyes should be as bright as swords ; his lips should fall apart with eagerness for the great adventure before him, and he should be in very fresh and golden harness, reflecting the rising sun. Death should still hang like mists and cloud-banks and shadows in the valleys of the wide landscape about him. There should be dew upon the threads of gossamer and little leaves and blades of the turf at his feet." God is courage and love, beauty and youth. " God is a person who can be known as one knows a friend, who can be served, and who receives service, who partakes of our nature ; who is like us, a being in conflict with the unknown and the limitless, and the forces of death ; who values much that we value and is against much that we are pitted against. He is our king to whom we must be loyal, he is our captain, and to know him is to have a direction in our lives. He feels us and knows us ; he is helped and gladdened by us. He hopes and attempts. . . . God is no abstraction nor trick of words, no infinite. He is as real as a bayonet thrust or an embrace" (*ibid.* p. 67). And this God grows as man grows. He is a God of becoming, full of youth and energy, fighting evil and darkness along with man. Such is Mr. Wells's conception of God. Dr. M'Taggart thinks that if there be a God he must be a non-omnipotent, non-creative God. Canon Rashdall believes that he is non-omnipotent but not necessarily non-creative. James takes refuge with Mill in a finite God who is not fully master of the world. For only such a hypothesis can account for the growing evil and imperfection of the world. The world is not completely a divine order. There are non-divine elements in it, and to them perhaps are due the evil and suffering of the world. Dr. Howison

supports the conception of a non-creative deity, and propounds a radical solution by tracing evil not to one fundamental prince of darkness, but to his many worshippers. "Indubitably we stand in need of a new idealism, which shall be thoroughly pluralistic . . . and which, while it refers Nature and all its woes derivatively to minds, presents these as the minds other than God . . ." (*Hibbert Journal*, i. 121). In the face of the infinitude of human misery and suffering, it is thought that anything else than a finite God is intolerable. "Manichaeism cannot be exiled from the actual belief of mankind" (Leslie Stephen).

The reality of moral distinctions and the significance of moral effort confirm the belief in a finite God. The plain man who feels the fight of life to be a real one exempts God from this necessity, and makes him stand above and apart from the conflict of the world. He neither gains nor loses—as the work of the world moves on or backward. But the interpreters of the plain man's faith quite logically make God a growing God. James says: "God himself may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity." Mr. Wells has also a similar idea. "He has his own ends for which he needs us" (*The Invisible King*, p. 42). Christian doctrine which makes God manifest himself in the world and share in the suffering which it involves, helps to strengthen the suggestion. He himself takes part in the conflicts and sorrows of finite creatures, but a perfect God in whom there is no difference between duty and desire, law and fulfilment cannot be subject to the ills to which the finite creature who feels the obligation of an ideal hovering over his finite will is open. We cannot attribute to God suffering, imperfection and growth which are incidents of human life. But it is argued, an infinite God or an absolute that is the all, cancels the existence of the many individuals. But God as the *existent* reality is only one of many existences. It is impossible that his existence can also be the existence of

others. God cannot be other egos nor can the other egos be God. God as an existent reality can only be a finite entity opposing others.

The Religious needs require that this finite God shall also be a person. In his despairing grief man requires the help of a loving, struggling, suffering God who works with him. Perplexed by the reality of evil, man questions and seeks after a God who takes sides, has plans and purposes, has pity for man's frailty and grants his prayers. Only a personal God can be of help to a broken heart. Only a personal God of limited power explains the facts of experience. It alone gives us a chance of genuine co-operation in the cosmic struggle with God. The absolutist conception of God as a close and vivid presence, "closer to us than breathing, nearer than hands and feet," is brushed aside as good for nothing so far as the demands of religion are concerned. God is not so much *in* us as *with* us (compare the title of Boyce Gibson's volume *God with Us*). In matters of science we do not adopt the views of the plain man, but consult the specialist. The specialists in religion, viz. the mystics, do not require a personal godhead. "The existence of an outside providence who created us, who watches over us, and who guides our lives like a Merciful Father, we have found impossible longer to believe in. But of the existence of a Holy Spirit radiating upward through all animate beings, and finding its fullest expression in man, in love, and in the flowers in beauty, we can be as certain as of anything in the world" (Sir Francis Younghusband, *Within*). If God as infinite reality, as the all-embracing whole, satisfies the passionate quest of the sincere mystic soul, it ought to be taken as the highest conception of God, whether it satisfies the plain man or not. In religious thought, emotions and practical needs are regarded as more fundamental than logical necessity and theoretical satisfaction. As a matter of fact religious faith is self-contradictory, and throughout religious consciousness we find the dualism of logic and emotion to be the govern-

ing factor. The two are set side by side without being organised into one whole. Theoretical logic demands the presence of a fundamental principle at the back of things. To it God is the great universal presence ; he is the All, for a limited God is a contradiction in terms. God is illimitable. Emotional demands ascribe to this principle, sympathy and righteousness, goodwill for man and suffering for his sake. They make of him a finite personal God who struggles and through the struggle grows. At once the question arises, who is the author of evil if God is good and righteous ? A wicked devil is posited as the necessary complement of a good God. The play of the universe is due to the interaction of these two forces. Logic asks us to rise to the impersonal conception ; but the emotional demands can be satisfied only at the expense of logic. Our philosophies are the reflections of our souls which are more emotional than logical. We do not reckon the cost at which our hearts' desires are being satisfied.

From all this it follows that the monistic conception of the world should be replaced by a pluralistic one, for it is just a step from dualism to pluralism. To the common-sense man the universe is a congeries of individuals sometimes fighting with one another, sometimes trying to live in peace. Society is a sum total of selves. The plain man who is a personalist in theology, a democrat in politics, a realist in regard to the existence of evil and the world is necessarily a pluralist in metaphysics. Pluralism in philosophy is the logical development of the spirit of democracy ; for he who has respect for the sacredness of individuality will not be inclined to sacrifice this uniqueness for the sake of the absolute. Every individual is a unique existence with not much in common with others. We feel that each of us is a self, but do not feel the reality of an infinite all which wraps us round, involving in some mysterious whole both the selves, and that by which they are faced. The common-sense man who lives and loves, dares and dies, strikes and suffers, feels the reality of

many selves, and not of one spirit. It is nothing to the pluralist if the thinking men of the world, with rare exceptions who prove the rule, have declared for a single spirit. If it is said that the craving for unity has not been a universal one, no craving has been that, not even the craving for common good. But argument is of no avail.

As every individual is a free being, having it in his power to make or mar his future, he requires a world where there is freedom, where he can take risks to realise his ideals if he has any. Such a world our immediate experience reveals to us, and there is no reason why it should give place to the spick-and-span world of the absolutist. Our immediate experience gives us a world which satisfies the will of man by bending to his needs, and it is true and real. Any philosophy which has no room for play and freedom, risk and adventure, chance and novelty, in short for the romance of the twentieth-century life of the unregenerate man, is untrue. Absolutism has no room for individual initiative :

The ball no question makes of Ayes or Noes,
But Here or There as strikes the player goes ;
And he that tossed you down into the field,
He knows about it all—he knows—he knows.

This view is unsatisfactory, as it ignores the outlines of human personality and sacrifices the dignity of the soul. The Absolute may be free, but who cares for the freedom of the Absolute? What is of moment to us is not the freedom of God, but of man.

From the free man and the plastic world which allows itself to be moulded by him, it is only a step to the theory of the world as unceasing flow and creative change. The scientist tells us that the whole world is in motion. We feel that we are changing every moment of our life. The principle of the universe is a principle of change. Change is the central factor of the universe. We are so much in love with it that we make a God of it. Evolution or change is the object of our worship. The modern type of

mind which wants sensation and more, for which change and mobility have a glamour, reduces the whole universe to life and movement. In our passion for change, the love for permanence is lost, and we forget that there must be something that changes, a permanent underlying the mutable. The kaleidoscopic whirl of mental states we call civilised life at the present day is mirrored in the aimless and randomly busy cosmic principle so beautifully described in Bergson's *Creative Evolution*.

Quite naturally what is looked upon by the thinking few as the curse of modern society, its hurry, its fever, its restlessness, its excitement which blinds us to the divine in things and gives us no breathing time for self-searching or worship of the unseen, is deified by these systems. Leisure for disinterested contemplation is compatible only with a different outlook on life. The absolute idealists may dream sweet dreams of the unity of all life and the mystic apprehension of the infinite. But these have no place in a philosophy where restlessness is regarded as the truth of things. Men are suffering from the fever of violent motion and so they make a philosophy of it. In one way or another, the 'new' philosophers advocate action for the sake of action. Pure contemplation, aesthetic ecstasy or reflection on the end of life is dismissed as mystic raving or poetic dreaming. What counts is action, and we need not pause to think about the end action is to achieve. For if Bergson's lead is followed, action which realises a plan ceases to be true action, a new creation. The activism of Rudolf Eucken and the primacy of the practical of William James and the pragmatists represent this tendency. As we shall see in the sequel, action to be of any value must be inspired by some vision, some conception of the end which it tries to realise. It is beyond us to imagine how we can go on working blindly, refusing all reflection as an irrelevance. Incessant thoughtless action leaves us nothing to rejoice in and thus defeats its own end.

The conception of pluralism, with its emphasis on the reality of the individual, with its insistence on change, with its love of democracy, cannot but adopt in ethics the economic or utilitarian view. What profit is it to us? What bearing has it on man's life? The inevitable *cui bono*? meets us everywhere. We have to suffer an age of materialism in life, realism in art, prose in literature, and pluralism in philosophy.

It does not mean that philosophy has no care for the plain man's needs. There is no doubt that his needs should receive respectful attention, but this is not to make them the standard of truth. We would offer him real help and consolation rather by declaring to him the truth about things than by pandering to his tastes and making him the measure of the universe.

IV

Distrust of intellect is the characteristic note of recent philosophy. If all our convictions are to be supported by philosophy we cannot pursue it in a spirit of free thinking and disinterested inquiry. It must support them, and if reason does not do it, then philosophy must become extra-intellectual. Since Hegel this tendency to reduce thought to a position subordinate to feeling has been growing. In the hey-day of philosophy it started with an enthusiastic faith in the powers of human reason. To-day we have nothing else than contempt for the tribe of thinkers. Instead of reason-philosophers, we have faith-philosophers. It has become the fashion to idealise impulse over reason, sentiment over thought, and to denounce all system-making. The age with its craze for excitement and sensation is longing for unconventional systems of philosophy. We have lost all love for rule and convention, order and reason, but are in raptures over novelty and romance, life and impulse.

The overthrow of reason has resulted in a universal doubt which does not spare religion. The anarchy pre-

vailing in the world of thought, due to the idealisation of impulse, may be illustrated by the examples of Nietzsche who propounds a new ethics, Meredith who rejects God and immortality, and asks us to worship Mother Earth, and Bernard Shaw who repudiates the whole structure of our morals and science and announces a new religion of life force. As intuition is the final authority, we cannot call in question these theories. Faith in intuition lands us in subjectivism, as there is no higher power to sit in judgement over the findings of intuition. When therefore cold-blooded intellect is discredited simply because it gives us severely cheerless conclusions, it cannot be in favour of impulse which gives us no guarantee that it will remould the scheme of things in a manner answering to our hearts' desires. The inevitable attempt of conservative minds is to make reasonable and respectable to themselves the faith already held by them, and bring forward considerations to support and supplement it. This goal, as we have seen, cannot be reached by disowning intellect and falling back on intuition. The temptation arises to use intellect as a means to our ends, to use philosophy and reason to support one's own religious feeling and experience. This is what unconsciously takes place every day, but the new philosophers have christened the old way of popular thinking with a new name, Pragmatism.

"What is the truth?" asked Lady Chettam of Mrs. Cadwallader in *Middlemarch*. "The truth. He is as bad as the wrong physic, nasty to take and sure to disagree." This great lady seems to have given the direction of thought to the modern pragmatists. They somehow feel that the logical truth to be attained by the scrupulous adoption of the intellectual methods is "nasty" to practise, and "sure to disagree" with the ideals and hopes cherished and nourished by average humanity. So they suggest an overhauling of the method of inquiry, and the ideal of truth. We need not ask as to why we believe in anything. The question of why we believe is irrelevant. We believe, and that will do. If

an explanation is wanted, it is this, that the fact gives the right. A belief is true because it is useful. As in politics whatever policy requires is supposed to be just, so in philosophy whatever instinct requires is supposed to be true. Philosophy has become a policy. James says that "whatever is expedient in the way of our thinking is true as whatever is expedient in the way of our behaving is good." Though James here makes truth to be what is *expedient in the way of our thinking*, i.e., *intellectually expedient*, still in developing his thesis he makes it equivalent to what is practically expedient. The truth of an idea is constituted by its working. The test of a theory is its practical consequences. "If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true for pragmatism in the sense that they are good for so much" (*Pragmatism*, p. 73). Again, "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word—experience shows that it certainly does work—it is true" (*ibid.* p. 299). We can believe in miracles if the belief helps the weak man to live his life better. If pure reason discredits popular conclusions, pragmatism reinstates them in the form of valuable errors, desirable untruths and "vital lies." In pragmatism, truth becomes identical with moral edification, practical utility, emotional satisfaction, and religious fruitfulness. Pragmatism is a kind of utilitarianism in philosophy. Here we first give the judgements and then seek for the reasons. We feel that certain ideas have a claim to truth and the whole of reality must bend to make them true. We have the belief, and that is a sufficient reason for its truth. Reality must accept it or else so much the worse for reality. Reason is given to man, just to enable him to invent reasons for what he wants to believe and do. Philosophy becomes a catalogue of acts of faith. Logic becomes a footnote to ethics, and philosophy a supplement to religion. While it is true that "the possession of a truth is not an end in itself, but only a preliminary means to other vital satis-

factions," still the philosopher is interested in truth for its own sake, more for the light it brings than for the fruits it bears. The suggestion of pragmatism is to be repudiated as its adoption deprives philosophy of its characteristic method and makes it one with art, aiming at the construction of an imaginary universe conformable to the desires of man. The attitude of believing anything which is in keeping with man's higher interest, and refusing to consider alternatives, is possible in the ordinary man, but a philosopher cannot be content with it. He cannot abandon the attempt to understand, simply because such an attempt is likely to unsettle his religious beliefs. To him religious beliefs, like other bits of experience, are a challenge to intelligence.

While the pragmatists distort the theory of truth so as to make it serve the ends of life, James and Bergson reach the same goal by taking experience as their guide. To both logic is not the pathway to reality. Intuition takes us to the heart of things. To Bergson it is the inward intuition of life or consciousness that grows and ripens every moment, which gives the clue to reality. Logic does violence to reality, as it does not accept it as it comes. Experience gives us opposition, diversity and multiplicity, while logic presents to us a clean coherent universe. Intellect suffers from an original sin which prevents it from knowing the face of reality as it is; it can only be saved by the grace of intuition. But we are not sure what exactly Bergson means by intuition. If it should be independent of intellect, then it lands us in subjectivism; if it is the crown of the intellectual process it becomes only a revised edition of the absolutistic doctrine which admits the need for an extra-intellectual attempt to grasp the nature of reality. But this necessity for intuition is the result of consistent philosophical thinking. We cannot but admit the need for intuition if a reflective view of the world tells us that there are matters beyond the grasp of human understanding. To James, outward intuition of the life of

self-experience is the guide to reality. His outward vision reveals to him a conglomerate of countless individuals, independent of each other. His empiricism takes things at their face value, gives him a pluralistic vision. As logic denies it, he gives it up.

It will not be an unfair characterisation of these writers, if we say that in them we have the war of the plain man's philosophy for securing independence of logic. These have a message for the age, and that is the declaration of independence from the claims of intellect. They pat the plain man on the back, and give him a philosophy which would justify his beliefs about the world. They tell him, We do not force on you any scheme of metaphysics, but give you only a method or a way of dealing with things, and you are free to fasten the method to any system of values. They fix no standpoints, and profess no theory. They are philosophical anarchists doubting all thought and believing all facts.

If there is any one thing more than another which forms the point of contact binding together these thinkers, it is not any positive feature of belief in pluralism or reality of evil or distrust of intellect, but it is the negative one of positive dislike for absolutism. Absolutism represents the classical tradition, but love of novelty which is a characteristic of the new age induces them to stray away from the high roads to the exploring of new paths. They have a prejudice against the faith of their fathers and the orthodox tradition in philosophy. Absolutism which makes mind the central reality and reduces the world of nature and individual subjects into partial differentiations thereof is as bad as naturalism. Whether we view the movement of things as a purely natural process or a logical process of the cosmic reason, the freedom of the individual is destroyed. The individual comes to be thought of as a mere link in an external process, rational or natural. To a small or great degree, all these thinkers adopt a protesting attitude to both naturalism and absolutism. James and Bergson, Ward and Howison, Schiller and Balfour,

Eucken and Rashdall set themselves against the absolutistic theory of the universe. Anti-absolutism may be set down as the chief characteristic of the new philosophies, for absolutism embodies to them all objectionable features. It advocates the universality of law, the unity of the whole, and the relative unreality of the particular. It is believed that the vital interests of the human spirit are jeopardised in a system of absolutism. Logic is not with the absolutist a means to the support of external beliefs. The romanticists, mystics and pragmatists urge that the absolutists exalt intellect at the expense of the other sides of human nature, and call them ultra-rationalists, or over-intellectualists, unmindful of the charge that the latter bring against them that they prostitute logic and adopt the sophistic device of making the worse appear the better reason. They attack the absolutist's position, and put it down for an abstract imaginary scheme which does not do justice to man's beliefs in the pluralistic universe, the diversity of things, the inconsequence of events, the personality of God, etc., which are the root principles of the religious belief of the contemporary enlightened man of the Mediterranean coast. As his beliefs and ideas which are also facts of experience and immediate consciousness are not guaranteed by the system of absolutism, it is not a philosophy at all, whatever else it may be. It may be a refined system. "Refinement is what characterises our intellectualist philosophies. They exquisitely satisfy their craving for a refined object of contemplation, which is so powerful an appetite of the mind. But I ask you in all seriousness to look abroad on this colossal universe of concrete fact, on their awful bewilderments, their surprises and cruelties, on the wildness which they show, and then to tell me whether 'refined' is the one inevitable descriptive adjective that springs to your lips" (James, *Pragmatism*, p. 22). The system constructed by the absolutists, "is far less an account of this actual world than a clear addition built upon it, a classic sanctuary

in which the rationalist fancy may take refuge from the intolerably confused and Gothic character which mere facts present. It is no *explanation* of our concrete universe, it is another thing altogether" (*ibid.*). Absolutism is unphilosophical, unscientific, unempirical, and contrary to common-sense, since it dismisses the solid world of reality with all its wealth and richness as unreal. Where are we now? A philosophical system should satisfy the scientist with his partial vision, the empiric with his attention confined to outward appearances, the common-sense man with his theory born of habit, prejudice and training. The demos has to be satisfied, and absolutism cannot win the polls. Therefore rationalist absolutism is slowly giving place to romantic empiricism. Absolute idealism, before which English empiricism and the dogmatic rationalism of Germany went down, which was in the ascendant even in the nineteenth century, is fast receding into the background. It has become the fashion of the day to break away from its tradition and build systems which run counter to it. The new systems consider it a matter of pride to be called anti-intellectualist and anti-absolutistic.¹ They may as well call themselves antiphilosophic. In their crusade against absolutism they do not care for truth. They adorn their tales to point the moral of the futility of absolutism. In sober philosophy it is not right to stir up feelings and raise the battle-cry as we do in voting campaigns. Modern absolutists do not dismiss the world of reality as unreal and illusory. It is wrong

¹ Anti-intellectualism is not so prominent a feature as anti-absolutism. What the pluralists are up against, is not so much reason as the results of reason. For Leibniz, Herbart and Ward are counted among their supporters though they employ reason in support of their pluralistic schemes. Most of the monists, when they reach their central conclusions, ask us to surrender intellect and resort to intuition. Belief in logic takes them a long way, but not all the way. At the end of the course we are asked to give up logic and seize the truth by an effort of intuition. But simply because they do so our present-day thinkers do not show a friendly attitude to them. We cannot even say that it is monism they are hostile to, for in that case we will not have the beautiful chapters on Fechner and Bergson in James's book. These writers are opposed to absolutism, tradition and routine, Plato, Spinoza and Hegel.

to assume that they cancel the existence of the Many for the sake of the One. All that absolutism says is that the One is the pervading life and the moving soul of the world. This is not to say that the world of life and change is unreal. When the romanticist represents absolutism as a philosophy which clings to an immutable dead abstraction, they are setting up a straw figure to be knocked down. Hegel was fierce against Spinoza for the latter's advocacy of an abstract absolutism. He condemns Spinoza's substance, as it does not in his opinion contain within itself the principle of the manifold. When the critics urge that the absolutist's theory of the fundamental unity of the universe is equivalent to the unreality of everything else, they commit a leap in logic, but to them logic is nothing, as fashion is everything.

The effort of philosophy is being wasted and is not giving its full benefit, as an unconscious attempt prevails to subject philosophy to religion and truth to dogma. True philosophy has to fight now against the wave of romanticism as it fought in the middle of the nineteenth century against the wave of empiricism. And the fight will be hard and tough since the unphilosophical attitude is quite congenial to man's temperament. The mind of man is not willing to be shaken in its religious habits, and is ever ready to pounce on excuses to believe in theories which reason wants us to disbelieve. Tradition is contagious and fashion is catching. The general tendencies which prevail are so often and so strongly urged that our mind automatically adopts them. Man is only too ready to follow faith unreasonably. But we contend that in so doing mind is untrue to its nature as mind. We shall show in the sequel how the philosophical discussions of the representative writers of this age are vitiated by their unphilosophical attitude of starting with certain prejudices and trying to vindicate them. While their logic leads them in one direction, their bias takes them in the other. Their writings form the theatre where the struggle between logic and prejudice is played out.

CHAPTER III

THE MONADISM OF LEIBNIZ

I

THE problem of philosophy is fundamentally the same, though it is stated by each age in its own way. To Leibniz, as to modern thinkers, the problem presents itself as the relation of the one to the many. Leibniz represents in the history of philosophy the pluralistic reaction against monistic idealism. His Monadology has served as the type for all subsequent pluralistic conceptions. Professor J. Ward adopts his theory of continuity, kingdom of ends, identity of indiscernibles, though he rejects the doctrines of pre-established harmony and exclusiveness of monads.¹ Howison's new Idealism is based on Leibniz's Monadology.² Though Bergson's system cannot be considered pluralistic, there are many points of analogy between the two. From a study of Leibniz's system we may learn the grounds and defects of one recurring type of philosophy. Generalisations are usually misleading, especially so in philosophical theories. It is said that intellectualism and monism, irrationalism and pluralism, go together. This statement shows great logical insight, but it is not a true description of facts. Faith in reason and rigid monism are not always found

¹ See *Realm of Ends*, pp. 53-4.

² Cf. what Howison says: "In the long history of idealistic thinking, even in the Western world, from Plato to the present day, there is but one very eminent mind, the justly celebrated Leibniz, who distinctly and systematically breaks with the monistic tradition" (*Limits of Evolution*, p. ix).

together. The examples of Leibniz and Ward indicate how rationalism sometimes supports pluralism, though it generally leads to monism. There are rationalistic pluralists like Leibniz, and irrationalistic monists like Schopenhauer. The fact that Leibniz is a rationalistic pluralist is a sufficient reason why we should examine his system and see whether rationalism results in pluralism.

Most of the tendencies characteristic of recent philosophy are found embodied in his system. Leibniz is not so much an academic thinker as a democratic one. His writings are called forth "to estimate some recent book, to outline the system for the use of a friend, to meet some special difficulty, or to answer some definite criticism." Mr. Russell observes: "For everything that he wrote he seems to have required some immediate stimulus, some near and pressing incentive. To please a prince, to refute a rival philosopher, or to escape the censures of a theologian, he would take any pains. . . . But for the sole purposes of exposition he seems to have cared little" (*Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 1). Religious idealism and anti-absolutism are the prominent features of Leibniz's philosophy. It begins as a reaction against absolutism. He opposes Spinozism not so much in the interests of philosophic truth and consistency as in the interests of ethical and religious idealism. Leibniz thus describes Spinoza's *Ethics*: "I find in it plenty of fine thoughts agreeing with mine. . . . But there are also paradoxes which seem to me unreal and not even plausible. As, for example, that there is one substance, namely, God; that created things are modes or accidents of God; that our mind has no wider outlook after this life; that God Himself thinks indeed, but nevertheless neither understands nor wills, that all things happen by a certain necessity of fate; that God acts not for an end but by a certain necessity of nature, which is verbally to retain but really to give up providence and immortality. I regard this book as a dangerous one for people who will give themselves the trouble to go deeply into

it, for others do not care to understand it" (Latta's *Leibniz*, p. 24, footnote 2¹). Leibniz cannot bring himself to believe that "there is but one Spirit which is universal and which animates the whole universe and all its parts each according to its structure and according to the organs it possesses, as the same blast of wind produces varieties of sounds from different organ-pipes," or that "the universal spirit is like an ocean composed of an infinite number of drops, which are separated from it when they animate some particular organic body, and which are reunited with their ocean after the destruction of the organism" (*ibid.* p. 239, footnote 63). The orthodox religion of the civilised man of the seventeenth century took for granted a personal God who can be adored and worshipped, who has not merely understanding but power and will, and a free man who is independent of the world and is sure of immortality. Spinozism shatters these ideals, and puts them down for dreams of imagination. It fails to do justice to the facts of life, especially those of moral and religious life. Spinoza's block universe refuses to take account of the implications of experience, viz. individual freedom, initiative; and Leibniz maintains the need for an open pluralistic vision. Revolting against the abstract unity of substance and its a priori deductions, he takes for his starting-point a plurality of real independent substances. These substances are not to be interpreted mechanically, as mechanism is only another name for fate or necessity. Leibniz goes back to the Aristotelian theory of substance as force or entelechy. Each substance, the qualitative essence of which he brings out by the name of monad, is a self-sufficient unit, having the laws of its growth in its own nature. Thus, Leibniz believes, the freedom of the individual is safeguarded. The motive to his system is to be found in his hostility to Spinozism. While Spinoza reduced separate things to the real unity of a universal sub-

¹ The references are to Latta's edition of Leibniz, unless otherwise stated.

stance, Leibniz wishes to emphasise that the monads or the individual units are not in any sense less real than the whole in which they are related. Substances are particular individuals, possessing freewill and personal immortality. His system is the complete antithesis to Spinoza's monism. It is an absolute pluralism. With the idea of preserving the religious creed of the layman which has been attacked by the "atheist" Spinoza, Leibniz puts forth his theory of the multitude of monads as an attempt to reconcile religion with reason. Leibniz is an apologist of the orthodox religion, intent on reconciling science and philosophy with religion and theology.

But the two currents of thought—the logical, which seeks for truth and consistency, and the religious, which proposes to vindicate the ways of God to man—clash in his system. His religious prejudice is responsible for much of the inconclusiveness of his doctrine of monads. Religious interests persuade him to put forward a set of propositions which his logical mind drives him to deny. We propose to show in this chapter the interaction of these two motives. We shall see how his conclusions are not far removed from those of monistic idealism. His philosophy is either a Concrete Idealism, which it would be when its suggestions are rounded off into a consistent metaphysical system, or a mere patchwork incapable of satisfying the logical mind.

II

Leibniz's account of monads is intended to remedy the defects of Descartes' explanation of matter. To Leibniz matter is not simple extension as it is to Descartes. It is force. Nature to Descartes is essentially rigid and static: to Leibniz it is dynamic and active. This change of view-point is an inheritance from Aristotle, which Leibniz was predisposed to adopt by his reaction against the mechanical view and his interest in the progress of biology. Change is the essence of matter.

Motion is the central feature of physical reality, the ultimate fact to which everything else has to be reduced. But motion cannot be got out of extension. If extension is the essence of matter, then the followers of Descartes, who invoked the continual interference of God as the source of all changes, are quite right. Extension is not adequate to make the physical world intelligible. "Extension is an attribute which cannot constitute complete being. No action or change can be derived from it, that is, it expresses a present state only—not the future and the past, as the notion of a substance would do." Besides, it presupposes something else. "Extension is only an *abstraction*, and requires something which is extended." The idea of extension is relative to that which is extended, and by itself cannot account for the properties of the material phenomena. So Leibniz falls back on force. Motion is not the end in itself. It exists for the sake of the realisation of the idea. By motion the idea realises its existence. Motion, therefore, is force, energy, activity. Force suggests to Leibniz the feeling of activity. To say that the essence of nature is motion is to say that reality is activity, the universe is dynamic. As the activities of nature are such as can be handled by intelligence, as the laws of contradiction, sufficient reason, continuity, etc., are applicable to them, Leibniz infers that the motions of the world must be looked upon as changes, forces, activities, which are bound by spiritual laws. Nature is, therefore, activity, intelligent and spiritual. Life is the truth of matter. Thus Leibniz breaks down the opposition Descartes sets up between mind and matter. Motion becomes a feature of the life of monads. The monad is the spiritual element which is ever active. To Leibniz the world is full of monads, so that "in the smallest particle of matter there is a world of creatures—living beings, animals, entelechies, souls" (*Monadology*, p. 66).

✓ What are the characteristics of the monad? Its nature is perception and action. Different monads have different

degrees of activity. The monad is a spiritual unity, a true substance containing within itself the source of its activity and the succession of its states. It is an indivisible unity to be conceived after the analogy of the human soul. There is an infinite number of monads, each distinct from every other. No two monads are alike. They are individualised by their internal principles. The monads have no windows by which they can act upon or receive influences from other monads. How can a universe with an infinite multiplicity of reals, which act each independently of the other, be a satisfactory conception? It will be a chaotic aggregate, full of anarchy and disorder. Up till now Leibniz has emphasised the law of contradiction in the abstract sense, and it has given us a number of self-sufficing and mutually exclusive monads. They are bare self-identities without any interaction between them. As the universe has order and system, the monads will have somehow to be lifted out of their isolation and independence. So under the influence of the law of sufficient reason, Leibniz gives us another set of characteristics possessed by the monads. Every monad has two features, perception and appetition. Perception is the representation of the many, or the world of objects, in the unity of a simple substance. Appetition is the tendency to realise the ideal. There is always a pushing forward or a striving towards the development of an idea. Perception is of three different kinds, unconscious, conscious and self-conscious, in the three kinds of monads, entelechies, sensitive souls and rational souls. Correspondingly, there are three varieties of appetition, unconscious impulse or tendency, instinct of animals and self-conscious desire or will of rational souls. Leibniz distinguishes three kinds of monads, unconscious, conscious and self-conscious, called respectively entelechies, souls and spirits. The whole is present in all these, but in different degrees. "The world is entirely in each of its parts, but more distinctly in some than in others" (Latta, p. 50, footnote 1). Though each

monad contains the whole in itself, only self-conscious spirits are aware of its presence. The law of continuity requires growth and steady difference, and involves the doctrine of the identity of indiscernibles. The monads are in a continuous series, and provide a harmonious universe. As each monad reflects the universe from its own angle of vision, so each has its own individuality. Since there is no direct influence of monads on each other, each acts on its own internal principle, and is independent of the rest and takes no account of how its action would affect the others. While each monad is individual since it follows its own law of activity unhindered by the activities of others, still its law is determined in a way that is harmonious with the laws of others. After all, each is an embodiment of the order and law of the whole. There is nothing of caprice in the life of the monad; it has both freedom and necessity. The infinitely numerous monads so act that their activities do not collide with each other, since there is a pre-established harmony. Though no substance acts on another, still they behave as they would, if there were mutual interaction. The harmony of the workings of the monads is pre-established. God chose this world because there was in it the pre-established harmony. Leibniz believes that this theory answers better all the problems and paradoxes of experience than the scheme of Spinoza. Let us see whether this theory clears up the confusions and renders significant all aspects of our experience.

III

In attempting to account for the physical universe Leibniz feels the need for the monad theory. He points out how motion, which is the central feature of reality, presupposes force, and then suddenly turns to idealistic metaphysics, which makes self-consciousness the central fact of the universe. This shifting from material motion to spiritual activity is unwarranted and should be traced

to his moral and religious interests. He takes up the physical universe, shows the inadequacy of the concept of extension, and asks us to employ that of force. In all this discussion the material universe is regarded as real, with the changes that take place in it. Force is the metaphysical conception which can explain it. This means the absolute reality of matter. And we seem to be coming to a kind of dualism between matter and spirit. But we are told that force itself is something spiritual; and the ultimate metaphysical explanation lies not in force so much as in the spiritual element underlying it, the monad. To account for the transition, the simple explanation he supplies us with is that reality to be a unity in multiplicity, must be spiritual and not mechanical; for a mechanical combination of matter cannot be a real unity. If the forces which constitute reality in bodies are to be real, then they must be multiplicities in unities, and such unities in diversities we do not meet with in the material world. Anything material has no principle of unity. In our consciousness we have an active force which is one through a series of states. The principle of mind grasps in one act a multiplicity. So real forces must be spiritual realities or souls. An analysis of the material universe somehow convinces Leibniz that the world which provoked his inquiry is only a phenomenal product of the soul forces which lurk behind it. Leibniz now dismisses the mechanical world as unreal. It is nothing but appearance. In the mechanical world everything is manufactured, while in the real world it is all development. In the one the changes are induced from without; in the other, development springs from the inner tendency to realise itself. In the one we have efficient causation; in the other final causation (*M.* p. 79). A mechanical view, Leibniz feels sure, would not be able to account for spirit and its activities. So the mechanical hypothesis is given up. Leibniz forgets that the problem to be solved is the explanation of the principle of matter, and we do not

require for it a theory of monads. Matter and monad belong to two different planes, and one cannot be an explanation of the other. The transition from force to spiritual activity is incompletely logical in Leibniz's system.

Assuming that Leibniz has proved the spiritual nature of reality, let us see whether he satisfactorily establishes the reality of an infinite number of spiritual elements. What makes a real subject? Following one view of Aristotle, Leibniz makes substance the compound of matter and form. In the interests of pluralism he defines substance as the combination of form and matter, and not either separately. "Materia Prima is essential to every entelechy, and can never be separated from it, since it completes it and is in itself the passive potentiality of the whole complete substance" (Latta, p. 97). We ask what is the principle of individuation? The form is the same; only the matter which receives it is different. This matter represents the point of view of each monad. Leibniz's monad consists not in the entelechy by itself, but in the context in which it lies. The monad is a separate individual only on account of its body. It is the degrees of finitude and incompleteness that make the different monads separate. As finite beings, as growing points of view, we seem to feel ourselves with all our imperfections to be real. But suppose our point of view becomes that of God, then we will see that the whole alone is real. The highest point of view is that of coherence and completeness. So the knowledge we have from our several imperfect points of view is relative. The completest point of view will be God's, who has no point of view; and to that Divine vision the whole alone is real. Everything else is a diminution of the perfect point of view, therefore, something less real than the whole. If we suppose that every monad gives up its finiteness—this is what every one is trying to achieve,—that the elements of imperfection which limit its point of view are got rid of, that the full reality latent in it becomes actualised, then the monad would become

identical with God. Thus the several substances are due to finite limitations; the one whole is the metaphysical ultimate. When the whole is attained the several finites cease to exist. The so-called independence and isolation of the monads are due to a relative and partial vision. The individuality of the monads is based on a negative principle. Matter is unsubstantial, unreal. It corresponds to confused ideas. So with the clearing up of confusion matter will disappear. What is the difference between Spinoza and Leibniz? Our separateness and individuality are due to our imagination in Spinoza, to our confused perception in Leibniz. In both the finite is negative and unreal. The difference is constituted by the unreal imperfection, the amount of matter, the dead inertia that has to be overcome. Monads are individual and independent only when they are imperfect. But the barriers of separation break down when they become perfect. The real individual must be positive, and that is God. The so-called individuals are all limitations of God. Individuality is relatively unreal. The all-real is God. It will follow from Leibniz's theory that the whole alone is substance, for every created monad is striving to improve itself, is struggling to become real. It is a part containing the whole, not fully and perfectly, but partially and imperfectly. When its end is reached it becomes completely real.

Sometimes Leibniz, following Aristotle, defines substance as "that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated." This definition should have led Leibniz to affirm the sole reality of the whole, which is the one subject of all predicates (see Russell's *Leibniz*, p. 12). It is his theological interests that lure him to believe that the world consists of simple substances. Everything which can have predicates is not a substance. The compound substances can have predicates applied to them. But Leibniz says they are only accidental collections

and not true substances. If Leibniz agrees that everything which has predicates is not substantial, then the only alternative is that reality or the subject of all predicates is the only substance. Other things in the world have only degrees of substantiality. Metaphysically there is only one substance. Empirically corresponding to our several points of view, we may have degrees of substantiality derived from the whole.

But Leibniz fights shy of this Spinozistic conclusion as it contradicts the reality of the mutually exclusive monads. In his anxiety to preserve the diversity and separateness of monads, he tells us that the monads have their own essences distinguishing them from one another. Each monad has its own essence of quality, and is thus a unique existence (*M.* p. 8). But if these monads have their own essences, then there is no danger of their ever becoming God. But Leibniz says, if the passivity should be completely overcome, then the monads become one with God. From this it follows that the only characteristic which distinguishes monads or makes them unique is not any peculiar essence but only their degree of passivity.

We see that Leibniz is logically unable to pass from spiritual activity to a plurality of spirits. He nowhere tells us why we should view the monads as separate individuals and not as manifestations of one substance. His hostility to Spinozism and his empirical sense are responsible for his theory. Leibniz looks at the world and is struck by the *prima facie* separateness of individuals. And these individuals possess the characters of perception and appetite, and the whole account is bodily transferred to the world of monads. Pluralism is thus a matter of faith or a theory of the first look and not a product of logical thought.

The law of continuity with its corollary of identity of indiscernibles proves only that each monad is a unique expression of the universal, as it reflects the whole from its own particular angle. "All the different classes of beings, the totality of which forms the universe are in the

ideas of God, who knows distinctly their essential gradations, merely like so many ordinates of one and the same curve, the relations of which do not allow of others being put between any two of them, because that would indicate disorder and imperfection. Accordingly men are linked with animals, these with plants and these again with fossils which in their turn are connected with those bodies which sense and imagination represents to us as completely dead and inorganic" (Latta, p. 38). It only means that the absolute spirit, which is the only whole, is not an abstract unity, but a concrete totality. It is hard to conceive how the independent monads can form a continuous series if they are not the expressions of a central harmony. The relative independence of monads and the continuity of the series can exist side by side only in a system of absolute idealism. The hypothesis of a pre-established harmony which Leibniz brings forward will not do, as the harmony which prevails is just the problem. To call it pre-established is not to solve it. The harmony expresses the nature of things or it is externally imposed. The latter conception will not satisfy Leibniz, and the former alternative represents the central truth of the philosophy of the absolute.

IV

An examination of Leibniz's theory of perception will only enforce the truth of absolutism. According to Leibniz the monads are isolated individuals. They have no windows. Each monad has its own states. It cannot pass beyond the circle of its ideas. There is no world which it can mirror. The circle of its experience is a closed one. All surrounding bodies are a problem to it. It does not know whether they are, or are not. All relations are the work of the mind. The states are the private property of each monad. We are landed in subjectivism. There is no escape from it, so long as we consider the monad to be cut off or divorced from the rest.

The world of objects becomes but its private mental construction. If the experience of the monad is completely internal, how is knowledge which is a representation of things possible? We do not know, we cannot know, that other monads exist or that God exists. We have our experiences and we cannot be sure that they are objective. We cannot discriminate between the true and the false or the clear and the confused, as the world which is the criterion of truth is by hypothesis inaccessible to us. We have changes or states. As to what they are, what they signify and what they are caused by, we cannot give any answer. Shut in within the circle of its ideas, how can the monad know the things beyond? How can it know that its ideas are copies, that there are originals, and that some of the copies are true to the originals and some not? Here Leibniz adopts the psychological view of the self, which is in time, one among others. On this hypothesis, knowledge of a common world can only be a mystery, to be accounted for by a pre-established harmony or something else equally out of the way. Such are the results of Leibniz's conception of the monad as an isolated individual. Leibniz owns, when he is under the influence of the psychological or subjective side of his philosophy, that the existence of the external world has only moral certainty. "It cannot be absolutely demonstrated by any argument that there are bodies and nothing prevents some well-ordered dreams from being offered to our minds which would be judged by us to be true" (*New Essays*). "We cannot convince by reason any one who contends that he alone exists, and that others are merely dreamed by him" (*ibid.*). But Leibniz is not able to defend the complete isolatedness of monads. He tells us that while the monad excludes all other monads, it has direct communication at least with God. But how can a monad enter into this relation with God more than with other monads? If it can have relationship with God, why can it not have the same bond with other substances? The more reasonable

course would be to say that it can know other monads which are more or less like itself, but cannot know God who is conceived to be of a different class altogether. God is pure activity, a disembodied spirit. The consistent consequence of Leibniz's psychologism is subjectivism.

But Leibniz contends that the experiences of the monads are of the same universe. He endeavours to correct the weakness of his view of exclusive monads by making out that though the monads *really* exclude each other, they *ideally* include the whole universe by mirroring it. "For there is no individual thing which is not to be regarded as expressing all others; consequently the soul in regard to the variety of its modifications ought to be likened to the universe which it represents according to its point of view, and even in a way to God, whose infinity it represents finitely because of its confused and imperfect perception of the infinite, rather than to a material atom" (Latta; footnote 20 to *M.*). Each monad represents the same universe, though from its own point of view. The experience of each monad is essentially private and is at the same time public, as it is the experience of the one world common to all the monads. The same experience is both private and public, subjective and objective, particular and universal. The logical or epistemological self is not attached to any point of view; it is not opposed to any environment. It is the whole world. Each soul from this point of view is the same universal, a world in itself. This is Leibniz's meaning when he says that in the notion of a single individual, say Adam, there is included all that happens, not only what is personal to Adam, but all that happens to all his posterity. "The nature of every substance involves a general expression of the whole universe." "I maintain that every substance comprehends in its present state all that has passed and that is to come; that it expresses the whole universe according to its point of view, nothing being so remote from the rest that it is not in connection with it" (see *M.* pp. 48, 49, 57). The whole operates in the part.

It is contained in the part potentially or ideally. The part represents the whole from its own point of view. This limitation is due to its finitude. "God has put in each soul a concentration of the world" (Latta, p. 70, footnote 1).

When Leibniz adopts the psychological point of view, he feels that all of the infinite number of souls are attached to physical organisms, are subject to beginning and end, and have temporal histories. But they are only partial unities. Leibniz cannot account for knowledge or the perception of the external world. Each soul's experience is its private property, being attached to a part of nature; other souls are attached to other parts. But knowledge is possible only if this limited separate point of view is transcended. So he argues that the soul expresses the whole universe (logical self), in accordance with its own limitations (psychological self). But this finite nature is something to be got over. We do not say that the psychological self is unreal. It is no doubt actual, but its reality is in the higher logical self. Leibniz is right in urging that the soul is the entelechy of the body, the logical self is the truth of the psychological. The two points of view are needed, only the psychological self melts into the logical. The independence and isolation of the monads which are the indispensable features of pluralism is only relative, partial, and finite, for even the petty monads in all their confusion are aware of the connectedness of all things in the universe. The isolation of the monads is, strictly speaking, incompatible with the completeness of the whole and the connectedness of things. As the two principles of Contradiction and Sufficient Reason are left unreconciled in Leibniz's system, even so their logical consequences of the individuality of everything real and the harmony of all things are left side by side. As we shall see, the two are phases of the concrete whole.

V

Leibniz starts his philosophy with the definite purpose of preserving the individuality of the human being which, he thinks, has been sacrificed at the altar of the universal in Spinoza's scheme. But does Leibniz succeed in his attempt? What is Leibniz's explanation of the external world and the individuals in it? Leibniz arrives at his theory of monads from the external world. The reality of the monads, their kinds, their characteristics, their existence in a hierarchy between the lowest monad and the highest, are all inferred from the space world which he regards as a plenum. Under the influence of the mathematical ideal of philosophy, he reduces everything to simple notions. The complex world is broken up into a simple framework. But can we go back from these simple monads to the material world? How can we pass from the world of ideal unextended non-temporal dynamic realities to a material world with its existence in space and time? Monads are the sole reality and they are spiritual. They are not to be conceived as *partes extra partes*. Quantitative aspects do not belong to the essence of real things. Space and time in which the material world has its being are the relative, phenomenal and imperfect expressions of monads which are non-spatial and non-temporal. They are the products of confused apprehension and when this confusion is got over, then space and time vanish. The monad which has no element of confusion in it, which is pure activity, which has eternally rational knowledge, knows that spirit alone is real, and space and time are not so real. In the clear light of thought in the mind of God, space and time have no existence. But monads are distinct from one another only if space and time are real. In their absence the distinctions of monads should also disappear. Leibniz asserts that space and time have their roots in reality. The exclusiveness of the monads in space and time is the phenomenon of their ideal exclusion in the spiritual

system. But it is only an assertion without any proof. It is strange that a philosopher who considers change the central fact of the universe should regard time as unreal. But Leibniz is quite consistent here, for, according to him, all the states of the monads are contained eternally in the monads themselves. There can be no talk of free action or adventure on the part of these monads.

The things of the world are unreal. Strictly speaking, there are no things at all. Matter is a physical phenomenon. *Materia secunda* is quantitative and unreal. Compound substances are groups of monads imperfectly conceived by us. Their groupings may vary from time to time, and they are only temporary collections; to the perfect understanding of God they are unreal. But Leibniz says that even God somehow believes in them. For he says, "God creates monads when the time comes, and detaches them from the body by death" (Latta, p. 117). The individualities of human beings are therefore phenomenal as they are in Spinoza's philosophy. We may be told that change is real to Leibniz while it is unreal to Spinoza. But even in Leibniz the changes we feel are only phenomenal since we are compounds; only the changes of simple monads of which we have no experience whatever are considered to be real. The changes we feel are as much illusions of imagination as we ourselves are. Denying the reality of our individuality and our activity as much as Spinoza, he tries to satisfy us by holding out a vision of a city of God where we are supposed to possess in some unimaginable way the properties of activity and individuality. We have already said that even the activities of the monads cannot be regarded as real seeing that time is unreal and all the states of the monads are contained in themselves from eternity.

Leibniz suggests that matter is only a composite of monads. The monads are the conditions of matter though not the constituents of it. They are the reality of which matter is the appearance. The differences we feel among the phenomenal bodies are rooted in reality. We call

a body inorganic when its dominant monad is a bare monad with unconscious perceptions. If the dominant monad belongs to a higher scale we call the body organic ; if still higher and conscious we call it an animal body ; if still higher we call it a human being. We do not have material monads as nature is organic throughout. Leibniz argues that the monads are the root principles of material things. But it is only a matter of faith since the monads and material things are as wide as the poles apart. Still he believes that material phenomena being rooted in reality are *phenomena bene fundata*. They are to be distinguished from dreams and illusions. They are not real substances, but only phenomena, but still phenomena well founded, and as such more real than dreams. They follow a settled order and possess a stability which enable us to depend on them and plan our future. Leibniz says : " But the most powerful proof of the reality of phenomena is success in predicting future phenomena from those which are past and present " (Latta, p. 99). But if there is so much order and system about them, why should we consider them to be accidental collections ? What, after all, is Leibniz's test of reality ? With the pragmatists, he defines truth as dependability or serviceableness in experience. " Although this entire life were said to be nothing but a dream and the visible world nothing but a phantasm, I should call this dream or phantasm real enough if we were never deceived by it, when we use our reason rightly " (*ibid.* p. 99). But to make this world real would be to dispute the sole reality of the world of monads. Leibniz compares the phenomenal world to a rainbow. As the rainbow is not real, but only an appearance to those who actually behold it, and is a phenomenon of something else, so is this world of sound and smell, of figures and motions a subjective phenomenon and not a reality. The real is that which underlies this world, that which gives it its order and connection. Ultimate reality is the world of monads ; sense and imagination deceive us into thinking that the external world also is real, while it is only an

abstraction. We ask for an explanation of the material universe which is mathematically calculable, and the historical world with its temporal becoming. We are told that this whole process is unreal and are referred to the doctrine of the souls. Efficient causes are dependent on final causes, and spiritual things are in their nature prior to material things. "The source of the mechanical is in the metaphysical." The material is the lapse of the spiritual. As to how the one is the explanation of the other, Leibniz is not clear.

If we consider Spinoza to be an abstract absolutist, who abolishes all distinctions and puts down the apparent existences to the credit of a weak imagination, Leibniz is not a whit better. He is equally fierce in condemning the solid-seeming world with its space, time and compound substances to be a phenomenon. The difference is only between Spinoza's one reality at the back of things and Leibniz's many. As the theory is carried to the region of the miraculous we cannot verify for ourselves whether the thing in itself is one or many. Both fail to derive the material world from their spiritual principles. Both fail to give a satisfactory account of the relation between the noumenon and the phenomenon, the metaphysical and the physical. There is a gulf fixed up between the sphere of monads and the world of bodies. Both assert that God is the cause of the world. But how exactly, they do not tell us. In both all differences are lost. Particular things and persons are phenomena which vanish when clear knowledge is attained. What remains is the real substance or substances. Simply because Leibniz regards the fundamental reality to be not one but many, it does not follow that he has not denied the differences of the world. Differences are swallowed up in a blank oneness or manyness. If Leibniz tells us that these things in themselves or monads are eternally active, and *causa sui*, Spinoza tells us exactly the same thing about the one Substance.

VI

Our next problem is to find out whether Leibniz, who severely criticises Spinoza for not providing for freedom in his system, gives us anything better than Spinozistic freedom. Leibniz feels that freedom is not real unless it is taken in the sense of arbitrary choice: if his freedom is to be better than Spinoza's, then it must be contingency. So Leibniz struggles hard to give contingency to both the creator and the created monads, but fails miserably. Taking first the case of God, Leibniz proposes to grant him freedom by making the world follow not from his intellect but from his will. If the world should be completely necessary, then God would not be God. We would then be limiting the infinite power of God. So Leibniz makes out that the world is the expression of the will of God. It does not follow *necessarily* from the will of God. Leibniz argues that it would involve a logical contradiction if two and two do not make four. But there would be no logical contradiction if God had chosen any other world than the one chosen. God chose this world out of moral necessity only. God's choice is free and contingent because he chose this world even though its opposite was not inconceivable. His choice is determined by the principle of the best. But this argument is not satisfactory. For that which is contingent to our limited knowledge is really necessary for complete rational knowledge. The source of the contingent is in the necessary. Complete knowledge would enable any one to foresee in all cases the exact result. Therefore in all cases the opposite of what happens is inconceivable and self-contradictory. On ultimate analysis there is no distinction between logical and moral necessity. When Leibniz says that God is not compelled by any absolute metaphysical necessity, but is inclined by a moral necessity to create the best world, all that it means is, were God indifferent morally, he could have created other worlds and it would not have been self-contradictory. Other worlds

were not impossible to him. But given the God of absolute perfection, other worlds were impossible. There is nothing contingent here. If a good God, knowing all possible worlds, has it in him to refuse to create the best world, if it is possible for him not to be determined by the principle of the best, then there may be contingency in his action. God, as he is good, is constrained to will the best. Possibilities of other universes which are worse than the one created prove nothing about the contingent or necessary nature of God's choice. God's choice does not become contingent simply because there are other possible worlds. If God's goodness is necessary, then his choice of his world is equally necessary. So this world follows by a logical necessity from our idea of God. He cannot but choose to allow this world to unfold itself. As this world is the expression of the good-will of God, his power and his understanding, we may take it that it is the expression of his nature. He is the source not only of all actual existence but also of all possible existence. No doubt the possibles are independent of God as they are the objects of his understanding. But ultimately they are dependent on God. "Without Him there would be nothing real in the possibilities of things, and not only would there be nothing in existence, but nothing would even be possible" (*M.* p. 43). Again, this world would be the essence of God himself, his very nature; for his understanding is perfect and not at all confused, and so its object would be the ultimate nature of things. It follows that God and the universe are organic to each other. The world cannot be other than what it is. Any other view would make the explanation of the world lie outside it. Leibniz distinguishes his system from Spinoza's by holding that the world is due to divine choice. But this choice has come to nothing. If the choice were pure choice, then the world becomes an accident. So Leibniz hastens to correct his first statement by saying that it is a choice determined by reason, and that means there is a strict logical necessity about the

existence of the world. The same conclusion may be enforced by pointing out that the possible universes should either constitute a system or not. If they do, God's choice is determined by the system of possibles ; if they do not, God's choice is arbitrary. Neither horn of the dilemma commends itself to Leibniz. The truth of the matter is, Leibniz is not able to give a more satisfactory account of the dependence of the world on God than what Spinoza has supplied us with.

Before we pass from this section let us turn to Leibniz's account of creation. Creation as a temporal act is a metaphor, since time is only an ideal relation of the development of the monads. His main theory of creation is just what we outlined. Creation is due to the will of God who turns possibilities into realities (*M.* p. 43). So the world is not created out of nothing, for all that creation means is a transformation of a possibility which is in the understanding of God into an actuality. Creation adds nothing new to the universe. God sets free possibilities by removing the obstructions. So every reality is traced to God. The weakness of this argument has been already referred to. There is another theory of creation in Leibniz. It is not a special act or single event, but it is an eternal act. There are "continual fulgurations of the divinity from moment to moment." If this theory is accepted, then the monads with all their activities become but the passing phases of God's life. Leibniz by his different versions of creation wishes to emphasise the ultimate dependence of the world on God.

Turning next to human freedom, we see that the problem does not arise at all for Leibniz ; the individual and his freedom are both ideal. Activity, causality, freedom are all abstractions (*M.* p. 49). We have only internal developments of the monads due to inner principles which the monads received from God. We have to find out if the internal development of the monad is at least free in a sense different from Spinoza's. Is the development of the monads contingent and

spontaneous? Everything that happens, has happened or will happen in the universe can be read in any one monad as each represents the whole universe. Changes anywhere in the world of monads are represented in every monad according to the doctrine of the pre-established harmony. God, "in regulating the whole, has had regard to each part" (*M.* p. 60). Leibniz thinks that giving windows to monads would be to allow outside interference which would destroy their independence. So he argues that all changes of the monad are rooted in the nature of the monad itself, as the predicate of every proposition is always contained in the subject. Between the two, subject and predicate, there is the same Spinozistic linkage of necessity. Arbitrary choice would conflict with the principles of sufficient reason and continuity. There are no breaks in the life of a soul. Nature never makes leaps. Everything that occurs has its sufficient reason in the nature of the monad. The present is pregnant with the future. The law of pre-established harmony is also incompatible with the contingency of the monads' activities. The whole thing is settled; the end is inevitable. Leibniz admits as much when he says that the monads are machines, though they are called self-directed or spontaneous machines. But contingency has no place in the life of the monads. Evolution means that the complex whole is virtually contained in the germ. If against Spinoza the criticism is possible that the phenomenon of growth is not the addition of anything from without but simply the unfolding of that which already exists, Leibniz is open to the same attack. Growth in Leibniz is only an unfolding or an unwrapping. The progressive differentiation is contained in germ in the original monad. Complete determination seems to be Leibniz's theory. The nature of each monad is absolutely determined from the first, so that God had to count upon it in choosing the best world. Professor Ward who follows Leibniz on many points feels that he does not effect an escape from Spinozistic determinism, as develop-

ment happens to be only an unrolling process. So he adopts the conception of epigenesis or the production of the genuinely new along a line of ever-growing differentiation.

Though all action is determined it is spontaneous. Spontaneity or self-direction belongs to the very nature of the monad. Its life expresses its own internal principle. Its conduct is not determined by influences foreign to its nature. But there are passages where the internal development of the monad is made completely dependent on the will of God (*M.* p. 47). Every monad has in it a potentiality or a possibility tending to realise itself. It remains a possibility as there are checks thwarting its realisation, and unless the checks are removed the possibility will not become real. For this negative function the co-operation of God is needed. He should set free the possibilities by removing the counteracting influences. When God interferes and removes the obstruction, then the possibility springs forth into being. God has therefore to be eternally active. The development of the monads, that is, the unfolding of their natures, is dependent on the good-will of God. "All things and all the realities are continually produced by God." He gives to monads their original principles. He determines the successions of their changes. The spontaneity of the monads is completely sacrificed. The monads are dependent on God. Leibniz takes shelter in faith and says that God does it all. As to how he does it we have no means of knowing. The so-called spontaneity of the monads has also vanished.

The best that Leibniz has to say on this question is identical with the absolutist theory of freedom. An action is free in proportion to the clearness and distinctness of the reason which determines it. The degree of the monad's freedom depends on the degree of its intelligence. A capricious act implies lack of freedom. If we have more of the passive element, we perceive the universe only in a confused and inarticulate way. It is so far a limitation of

mind. When we are determined by the passive element we are determined by something foreign to mind. Such acts where the mind is a slave to its sensuous or passive basis are unfree. "Distinct knowledge or intelligence has its place in the true use of reason, while the senses furnish confused ideas. Hence we can say that we are free from slavery just in the degree that we act with distinct knowledge, but are subject to our passions in just the degree that our ideas are confused." True freedom means complete determination. It is perfect rationality. God alone is absolutely free. All his acts are determined by infinite wisdom to the best possible ends, "whence it is manifest how the Author of the world is free although He does all things determinately, for He acts from a principle of wisdom or perfection. Indifference springs from ignorance, and the wiser a man is, the more is he determined towards that which is most perfect" (*On the Ultimate Origination of Things*). God acts in the light of the eternal view of things. As finite, man has not this insight into truth; he is in bondage to the world of sense. Full freedom, as in absolutistic systems, is only the goal. It is the ethical ideal. Evil is due to defective insight. With perfect insight we shall see that the true self of the individual is organic with the universe. "It is an imperfection of our freedom which causes us to choose evil rather than good, a greater evil rather than the less, the less good rather than the greater. This comes from the appearances of good and evil which deceive us; but God, who is perfect knowledge, is always led to the true and to the best good, that is, to the true and absolute good."

Our conclusion in the matter is, Leibniz in his reaction against Spinozism wants to make out that the activities of God and man are free and not determined, and so holds that they are contingent and spontaneous. But he is not able to establish it, and his principles compel him to admit complete determination of all conduct, divine as well as human. He tries to avoid fatalism and

approach the freedom of indifference, but lands us in absolute fatalism. At every step we are told that it is all due to God. Quite logically Leibniz ranks human freedom on a par with that of other monads, minerals, plants, etc. The best he has to say on the point is what Spinoza has already said.

In spite of all his ethical idealism and optimism and anxiety to preserve the independence and free will of monads, his universe is only as open as Spinoza's. According to his law of continuity, the monads form a regular continuous series, from the lowest to the highest. If a change occurs in one of them, other changes should occur elsewhere to maintain the equilibrium of the whole. The perfect and the imperfect elements in all their possible permutations and combinations are found in the series of monads. Change only means a reshuffling of the old elements, without any disturbance to the balance of the elements of the whole. Progress and retrogression are alike incompatible with this scheme. If there is ascent here there must be descent somewhere else. With Heraclitus we may say: "The way up and the way down is one and the same." There are changes in the world, but the whole moves neither forward nor backward. Leibniz's universe may not be a static universe; it is certainly not a progressing one.

VII

Does Leibniz grant us personal immortality? He tells us that there is no metempsychosis since the monads undergo gradual changes and not sudden breaks. There is neither absolute birth nor absolute death. Birth and death are phenomenal; they are only the names of the great changes compound substances undergo. But monads are unborn and imperishable. "It may be said that not only the soul is indestructible, but also the animal itself" (*M.* p. 71). But is the human being to be content with the immortality possessed by animals and plants?

Leibniz draws a distinction. While animals and plants are indestructible in the sense that nothing is destroyed, rational souls are immortal, as they have memory and consciousness. Thus rational souls are given an ambiguous position, as they have some vested interests. Leibniz tells us that the monads differ only in degree. The lower monads rise in the scale if they develop clearer perceptions. The series of monads form a continuum. So the rational souls must differ from the animal souls only in degree. But then they cannot pretend to any special form of immortality. So Leibniz quite inconsistently concedes to them certain special privileges. While the monads can develop into animal souls, and the animal souls degenerate into the organic ones, it is assumed that the rational souls cannot degenerate into anything lower. The rational souls in all the changes they undergo will not lose their rationality. Spirits alone are made in the image of God. "Souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created things, but minds are also images of the Deity or Author of nature himself, capable of knowing the system of the universe, and to some extent of imitating it through architectonic ensamples, each mind being like a small divinity in its own sphere" (*M.* p. 83). Though we cannot consistently draw any distinction of kind between the rational souls and the other monads, still such a distinction is presupposed in Leibniz's view of indestructibility and immortality.

But is the immortality of the rational monads the same as personal immortality? How can we say that the self-conscious monad is just the 'I' which we wish to be preserved in after-life? Is the self a monad? The individuality of man is constituted by a group of monads with a dominant monad in it. But these are phenomenal aggregates and not organic unities. No one can say this body is mine. The bodies move on passing from one to another. If there should be an organic unity, if the dominant monad should be the form of the

body as the entelechy is the form of the *materia prima*, then mind and body will make one substance. But on Leibniz's theory we need not be solicitous of our future, as *we* do not exist. Individuals are only appearances, phenomenal products. We can be sure of one thing in the world, and that is not personal immortality, but the indestructibility of a principle, we know not what, underlying the world, which, for shortness' sake, Leibniz calls the monad.

VIII

The problem of the relation between the Absolute and God arises in Leibniz. The Absolute is the whole reality which transcends the distinction of good and evil, not by negating it but by overcoming it. God is the being aspect of this whole regarded as good and personal. But such a God becomes finite, and if he is regarded as infinite, then he ceases to be good. The struggle between the two conceptions of God comes out in Leibniz's account of evil.

If God had the power to produce any world, if he had the will to choose the best, if he had the knowledge to think the various possible worlds, and if the results of this constellation of powers and virtues be the present world, then it only means that all worlds were not possible to God. He could not choose a world free from evil. But, at the same time, God is not responsible for evil, for he did not create it ; it was there in the world itself. He did his best, and his best is this. The evil of the world is independent of the will of God. His weakness but not his will consents. Evil is not due to the wickedness of man ; it is not due to God. It is in the original plan of things. The best of all possible worlds contains it. In this world there is the least amount of evil, and so God chose it. Disowning responsibility for the evil in the world, God takes credit for the good in it. " It follows that created beings derive their perfections from the influence of God, but that their imperfections come

from their own nature, which is incapable of being without limits" (*M.* p. 42). "An instance of this original imperfection of created beings may be seen in the natural inertia of bodies" (*ibid.*). The *materia prima* is not due to God. It is due to the essential limitations of created things. It happens that every monad has this inalienable imperfection. It belongs to its essence. So in the world we seem to have two principles—one perfect, divine, spiritual, active, or God; the other imperfect, material, inert, and passive, or *materia prima*, the common property of all created things. We cannot say that evil is unreal, for without it there is no world process, no claims, no aspirations, no efforts. In the world we have a conflict between the two tendencies, the perfect due to God, and the material whose parentage is unknown. The strife of the two is the process of the world.

Is the struggle the end of things? Is the dualism final? Is God eternally opposed by the process of evil? Is he always to struggle with this hostile and refractory principle? Is there any chance that he would rise superior to its opposition and obstruction? If there is a chance, what happens to the independent reality of this evil? If evil is independent of God, then triumph over it is not assured. We cannot then say that God is infinite. He cannot be universal, illimitable, the sum of all reality when an essential element of reality is outside of him and independent of him. Leibniz's description of God requires that the principle of evil should be reckoned a phase of his nature. If he is the whole real, then he must include imperfection, though this is not the same as saying that he is imperfect.

There are suggestions in Leibniz that *materia prima* or the element of imperfection is a phase of his nature. But in this matter we cannot be sure of Leibniz's meaning, for he employs the word *matter* in more than one sense. Matter is used for either the primitive soul, the entelechy or the *materia prima*, or the externally conditioned monad containing the principles of activity

and passivity, or *materia secunda*, or the phenomenal universe. There are hints which can be developed in the sense that *materia prima* is also dependent on God. Passivity is the confused manifestation of activity, or its potentiality as it is sometimes expressed. Confused ideas are not a genus apart from clear ideas; the two differ only in degree. Activity and passivity are only differences of degree. *Materia prima* is the lapse of spirit, as it is only the confused side of the monad. The distinction is only a contrast within the mind itself. *Materia prima* is a confusion of mind, a lower grade of the same energy. It is the element which limits the pure spirit and completes it. When this aspect of completion is emphasised, Leibniz contrasts matter with mind and shows the necessity of matter for mind. "Matter is essential to every entelechy, and can never be separated from it since matter completes it." "Matter or primitive passive power completes the entelechy or the primitive active power so that it becomes a perfect substance." The dual nature is necessary to make an organic unity. The unity is real, as the two aspects are aspects of one whole. When Leibniz says that only the monads are real unities, while compound substances are not, he is emphasising the organic nature of the relation between the entelechy and the *materia prima*. The two are the opposites into which the one whole can be conceptually broken up. God the author of the one must be the author of the other also, for the one necessarily contains the other. Matter, the passive potentiality, and soul, the active spirituality, are both due to him. Only this view can do justice to Leibniz's characterisation of God as infinite, perfect, all-real, the source of all possible and actual existence.

God expresses himself in being and not-being, activity and passivity. As his nature is activity, he has in him the principle of individuation or limitation. It is the presence of this negative element in the very heart of reality that accounts for the creation of this world.

The infinite collection of particular forms, this wonderful world of finitude, individuality and plurality, is conceivable only with the help of this negative element. God is not mere affirmation or pure position. He is affirmation through negation, identity in difference. The negative element enters into the constitution of affirmation. It represents an aspect of the true being of things. The negative is not the diminutive, the defective or the privative, but is central or radical to reality. Apart from it no activity is possible.

If this account of the relation of activity and passivity is correct, then the two elements are abstractions or unreal shadows by themselves. They are real only in their union. The *is* and the *is-not* are real as distinguishable aspects of the world of change. They are mutually dependent though antagonistic moments of the universe. God and matter are by themselves ideal, the two aspects of the one continuous life. God or pure energy and matter or dead inertia constitute the upper and lower limits of the world. They are the two limiting notions of the hierarchy of the teleologically active individuals. Everything real is at once active and passive, person and thing. The world consists of monads, each of which is struggling to realise the unity of soul and body, of entelechy and *materia prima*. This account, which follows from the Hegelian theory of the relation of being and not-being to becoming, is partially anticipated by Leibniz. According to him, every aspect of the universe is active-passive, finite-infinite. It strives to reach the infinite, but on account of its entanglement in the finite cannot do so. "In a confused way the monads strive after the infinite, the whole ; but they are limited and differentiated through the degrees of their distinct perfections" (*M.* p. 60). An element of finiteness is found in all creative monads. "I do not admit that there are souls entirely separate from matter, nor created spirits detached from body." Every finite soul is joined to a body which represents its finiteness. Matter is the finitude and the passivity.

Every monad has a soul and a body, entelechy and *materia prima*. But Leibniz says the spirit of God is disembodied spirit, and here the absolutist line of argument meets with a check. If God is pure activity without any limitation, then he will be a deserter from the general order. Pure activity is an ideal limit quite as much as pure passivity. Leibniz recognises that there can be no such thing as pure passivity, but wrongly imagines that pure energy is real by itself. He admits the reality of the pure spirit when he makes God the extra-mundane absolute substance who calls the realm of monads into existence, and institutes order among them. But then God the creator will differ from the created monads not in degree but in kind. This involves a breach of the law of continuity. If that law is to be observed, then the limitation necessary to the created monads, however much it may be reduced, cannot vanish altogether. However infinitely near to perfection the nature of a monad may approach, it can never become entirely perfect. So all monads are limited in that they possess degrees of imperfection. If the imperfection were got over each monad would become a blank page. Leibniz is aware of this difficulty, and so suggests that God is only the highest monad in the series of monads, differing from the others, not in kind, but in the degree of its activity and perfection. He is not consistent on this point, however. When the monads which are cut off from other monads are looked upon as capable of entering into communication with God, he makes God pure activity without any element of materiality.

Much of the confusion on this point is due to a neglect to emphasise the distinction between negation and contradiction. The finite beings of the created monads are subject to an inner discord or self-contradiction, and this subjection is a sign of their finiteness. The contradiction is a defect which can be overcome. God is free from contradiction. But he is not free from the element of negativity. It is not a quality that can be eliminated from the whole. Reality is active through negation. It

realises itself through opposition. Contradiction is incompatible with unity, and so the finite beings are only partial unities struggling to reach peace in wholeness. Negativity is quite consistent with, nay, indispensable to a true whole. Without negativity the whole reduces itself to an abstract oneness; with it, it is raised to a concrete totality. God or the whole has the element of negation, for the richer the whole the greater is its negativity.

According to modern absolutism reality is a concrete spiritual whole. Its several distincts co-operate with one another and promote the purposes of the whole. The conflict of the two tendencies is present throughout, but this common element appears in so many forms. The struggle of the two expresses itself in the forms of plants, minerals, animals and human personalities. But being has not come to its own even in human consciousness. There is still the struggle felt by the mind of man in the world. So long as the dualism between spirit and nature, self and its other is present, it is an indication that the highest, where the self finds itself in the other, has not been reached. But still though human consciousness is not absolutely real, it is more real than the other vegetable, animal manifestations. Absolutists recognise the discontinuity between matter and life, life and consciousness, consciousness and intellect, but still they contend that they are lower and higher forms of one spiritual whole. They are the variety of forms distinct from one another, but still united in the whole. This view is opposed to Leibniz's in many points. While the absolutist doctrine recognises that matter is a real though low manifestation of spirit, Leibniz thinks that it is unreal, and life, consciousness and intellect are real. While the absolutist holds that life, consciousness and intelligence are discontinuous in the sense that while the one can prepare the ground for the other, still it cannot adequately account for it, Leibniz breaks down this continuity. Reality to Leibniz cannot be a concrete whole since it is throughout psychical. Whatever exists is mind, and this is different

from saying, whatever exists is for mind. Let us consider whether Leibniz is justified in setting himself against the absolutist tradition on these points.

How is matter related to life? Leibniz answers that matter stands to life as life stands to consciousness, or as consciousness to intellect. Matter is the field of mechanism, and it cannot account for life. But can life account for consciousness? Can consciousness account for moral value? Leibniz thinks that, given the monad, it automatically develops into the higher stages or declines into the lower. But is it so? Leibniz himself recognises that the special interference of God is needed to develop rational souls out of sensitive monads. "It appears to me also for various reasons probable that the human souls then existed only as sensitive or animal souls, endowed with perception and memory and devoid of reason; that they remained in this state up to the time of the begetting of the man to whom they were to belong but that then they received reason; whether we suppose that there is a natural means of raising a sensitive soul to the rank of a rational soul (which I find difficult to conceive) or that God has given reason to this soul by a special act or if you like by a kind of transcreation" (Latta, p. 117). "God creates minds when the time comes and detaches from the body by death" (*ibid.*). Leibniz finds it difficult to conceive the transition from sensitive to rational souls. He recognises a discontinuity between consciousness and self-consciousness. And on this discontinuity he bases his arguments for the immortality of self-conscious beings. He cannot, therefore, contend that self-conscious souls are only sensitive souls with a clearer grasp. There is as much difference between the conscious and organic beings. "The difference between those monads which express the world with consciousness and those which express it unintelligently is as great as the difference between a mirror and one who sees." This is not a difference in degree. If there is difference between life and mechanism, there is

as much difference between consciousness and life, or self-consciousness and mere perception. If the inadequacy of mechanism to account for life is enough to degrade it to unreality, we should condemn life and consciousness as unreal since they cannot account for the higher values of the human spirit. But if the discontinuity between life and consciousness or consciousness and intellect is small enough to be slurred over, that between mechanism and life is not great enough to be stressed. Either all of them, matter, life, consciousness and intellect, are real as distinct elements of one whole, or none of them is real at all. Leibniz will not accept the latter view, and so ought to accept the former. But here we are not using matter in the sense of *materia prima*. While *materia prima* is the negative moment of soul or entelechy, related to it as non-being to being without any distinct existence, matter is the other of spirit with a positive status. It is formed matter or the first outcome of the growing struggle between being and non-being, in which as the lowest stage non-being is predominant. As we rise higher up, it grows weaker and weaker. There is also continuity in so far as one is a preparation for the other. Matter is the condition and life the conditioning element. Matter represents the basis in which life is realised. To fulfil this purpose, it cannot lose its nature as material, necessary and external. If nature is animated, if matter is psychical, if it is swallowed up in spirit, then it cannot fulfil its function in the world. The two, life and matter, are opposed as force and quantity, purpose and mechanism. One is necessary for the other. Leibniz says: "Force is not something divine which could be actual without matter." Life is just the purpose and reason of the natural. There is an inner harmony between the material and the vital, the mechanical, and the biological. Matter is related to spirit as the body of the compound substance is related to its soul. The dominant monad is the soul of the whole. The world of nature has its significance in spirit which will not become self-conscious until it comes into contact with

the necessary and external determination of matter. It has to assert itself against it till its opposition is overcome. The obstruction of matter cannot be overcome unless matter is also a necessary phase of the spiritual whole. What seems to be external to and destructive of spirit becomes a necessary condition of its progress. Matter opposes spirit till spirit finds itself in matter. The two presuppose a unity in which they are bound together. Matter is a manifestation of the absolute whole working along with other elements in it. The whole is the explanation of all its parts or stages. It alone is ultimately real while all else has a dependent and derivative reality. Instead of saying that the nature of all reality is psychical in character, it would be more accurate to say that the nature of all reality is spiritual or rational. There is not an element in the world which is absurd or irrational. The world answers to reason and thus shows itself to be rational.

IX

The world is a variety in unity ; variety, because there are so many points of view represented by the monads, and unity because all the monads have the same ideal and mirror the same universe. The several monads are aspects of a single universe according to the special point of view each represents. The world is the most complete unity in the greatest variety. "There is obtained as great variety as possible, along with the greatest possible order" (*M.* p. 58). What Leibniz says of the monad may be applied to the world as a whole. Activity is its general characteristic. There is unity brought about by co-ordinate action, and we have an end which reveals the meaning of the activity, and is the ideal expression of the unity. The laws of continuity, pre-established harmony and interdependence of the monads emphasise the unity of the universe. The unity is a real unity in diversity. It is not a simple one but

a harmonious whole, including various manifestations. This unity of the universe, which we may call the unity of God, is the central fact.

For from the organic nature of the world, we cannot but infer that it is the manifestation of life. Nothing else can account for the continuity of development and the harmony of relations. These are everywhere the marks of life. The relation between the supreme and the subordinate monads of the compound substance may be taken as the type of the relation between God and the world. As in the living body there is a purpose, form or soul immanent in it, even so there is a soul in the world which expresses its joy in the living pulsating harmony of the universe. God is the soul of the world, as the dominant monad is the soul of the compound substance, because God is the final cause of the world, the power which controls it and the force which acts through it. The whole world is struggling to reach the feet of God. Leibniz seems to be afraid that this kind of relationship between God and the world would destroy the independence of the individual soul. But if the supremacy of the one monad is compatible with the subordination of the rest, and if this relation does not in any way interfere with the independence of the subordinate monads, then we need not fear that the positing of an absolute experience will deprive the finite centres of their initiative and endeavour. It has been already said that this absolute energy, being a concrete whole, requires a world to manifest itself in. Leibniz himself admits the reality of this highest unity. He considers that the relation of this unity to the world is more organic, more intimate than that of even the soul to the body. For he says: " Besides the world, or the aggregate of finite things, there is a certain unity which is dominant, not only as the soul is dominant in me, or rather as the ego itself is dominant in my body, but also in a much higher sense. For the dominant unity of the world not only rules the world, but constructs and fashions it " (*On the Ultimate*

Origination of Things). The unity of God is the highest unity of the universe.

From this it will follow that God is neither the highest monad nor the external source of the monads, but is the whole which includes them all. God cannot be the highest monad, since he has to be an object of, *i.e.*, to exist in, every monad; he cannot be an element of the system, since he has to be that unity of the whole which is the only true sufficient reason. So God as the highest monad is not the source of the system of monads. Again, if God is the external source, then the system would be incomplete without the highest monad of the series. There will be a breach of the law of continuity. Besides, if God is the external creator of the monads, then he alone exists, and the monads are completely dependent upon him. So God cannot be within the system of things; he cannot be outside. This only proves that God is the organic whole, the universal harmony. The ultimate ground of the existence and life of the monads is God. Creation means only the reality of God or the presence of the whole in every part. The whole exists in every part, or as Leibniz would put it, God is the object of every monad. All monads put together form the whole and express the divine idea. The several phases lose their opposing characters and melt into the harmony of the life of God. As the monad is the source of all the differences it contains, and is the ground of the whole variety of its existence, even so is reality a dynamic self-revealing whole. Each monad is a multiplicity in unity simply because the whole which is reflected in each monad is a unity in diversity. God is thus the harmony between the real and the ideal, thought and reality.

This is the ideal involved in Leibniz's system as a whole. According to him the real is the fitting, that which is of a piece with the system of the world, that which coheres with the ordered whole of experience. The law of Sufficient Reason tells us that the world is an all-embracing system. But Leibniz does not wish to face

this conclusion. His dread of Spinozism and love of individualism are responsible for it. The law of Sufficient Reason cannot lead to God as the external source of the world. The so-called cosmological proof of God becomes unnecessary and vicious. According to it, the grounds of contingent truths are to be found in other contingent truths and this leads to an infinite process. The final reason must be sought in something outside the system of contingent things, viz. God (*M.* pp. 36-37). "The reasons of the world lie hid in something extra-mundane, different from the concatenation of states or the series of things, the aggregate of which constitutes the world" (*On the Ultimate Origination of Things*). The system as a whole requires no peg to hang upon. It is its own explanation. There is nothing beyond it. It is the sole and the all real. "We may also hold that the supreme substance, which is unique, universal and necessary, nothing outside of it being independent of it, this substance which is a pure sequence of possible being, must be illimitable, and must contain as much reality as is possible" (*M.* p. 46). God is the first principle of all things. He is the universal spirit of which particular individuals are merely modes. "God alone is the primary unity or original simple substance of which all created or derivative monads are products" (*M.* p. 47). "He is the primary centre from which all else emanates" (*Latta*, p. 243). God is the sufficient reason of the world in the sense that the more clear is the explanation of the less clear. God who is absolutely clear is the explanation of the world which is more or less clear. The system as a whole is the explanation of the parts of the system. The harmony of the world is neither pre-established nor externally imposed. It is in the nature of things. The intelligible order of the life of the monads is explicable only in the light of this hypothesis. The whole is potentially present in each of the parts and seeks its realisation in them. The heart-beat of the absolute is felt in all finite things. The controlling force is the unity of God.

But this unity is a matter of faith with finite beings. By means of its self-determined activity, each is trying to bring the whole into clearness and distinctness. In the absolute experience or the mind of God all is brought to unity. The infinite is contained in the finite, the end is in the beginning, but by means of free evolution or self-determined development all that the beginning contains in itself is to be realised.

X

We may conclude with a brief account of Leibniz's views about ethics and religion. With the absolutistic thinkers, Leibniz considers that becoming one with God is the aim of ethical and religious endeavour. Every monad contains the whole ideally, and is struggling to reach it. But this infinite ideal can only be approached and not reached. In the finite world the persistent element of matter prevents the perfect realisation of form. Man as man is finite, and for a finite being to reach the infinite is impossible. "It is true that the supreme felicity can never be complete, because God being infinite cannot be entirely known. Thus our happiness will never consist in complete enjoyment, which would leave nothing more to be desired and would make our mind stupid ; but it must consist in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections" (*Principles of Nature and Grace*, p. 18). This contention is true so far as it brings out that man as finite cannot reach the infinite, and when he reaches the infinite, he ceases to be finite. In the finite universe, at-onement is only an ideal and not a fruition. It is the end of life, the ideal goal. But it is not unreal. The nature of God is just the truth or the ultimate reality of our nature. God is all that the monad is capable of becoming. But in the finite world he has the pain, the dissatisfaction, the unrest in life due to contradiction which is the sign of his finiteness. But when we reach the infinite this contradiction is transcended. Our end is realised only when

we reach the infinite which we are seeking unwittingly and confusedly every day of our lives and every minute. The destiny of the part is reached only when the part and the whole, the finite and the infinite, the created being and the creator become one. If this is viewed as an impossible ideal, then Leibniz's system is a most disheartening pessimism. Leibniz is wrong when he says that the condition of atonement is one where we have nothing to do, and where our minds become stupid; for, in that case it is a sacrilege against God. The mind of God is not inactive; it is not stupid. Eternal wisdom is not stupidity; eternal energy is not inaction. Leibniz does not recognise that the absolute whole has in it the element of negativity which is the impulse to action, though it is free from contradiction or the element of finiteness. If God can be eternally active, then the monad become God can also be eternally active. As to whether salvation is by grace or development, Leibniz cannot be conclusive, since the life of the monad is viewed by him as both an unfolding of its own nature and a creation by God. As the orthodox religion requires that God should be personal, Leibniz makes him the President of the Republic of spirits. But it is not easy to conceive how God, the soul of souls, the monad of monads, can be a person.

XI

In his reaction against Spinozism, Leibniz asserts the reality of many substances free, isolated, independent, and externally related to God, but these properties of the monads are cancelled by the principles of Pre-established Harmony, Continuity, and Sufficient Reason which he is obliged to adopt. He has pointed out the central fallacy of abstract philosophies, monistic or pluralistic. The static self-identity of Spinoza is as mischievous as the plurality of self-identities of Leibniz. The abstract principle of contradiction which leads

Leibniz to the conception of the world as a collection of independent things has to be supplemented by that of Sufficient Reason which compels him to resort to the external expedient of a God who has to keep together the several centrifugal forces. But the two should be viewed as the different phases of a concrete identity. Then the whole will be an unfolding unity with the monads as its inter-related aspects. This is the truth which Leibniz's philosophy is struggling to reach, and if read in any other light, it remains, in the words of Hegel, a metaphysical romance (*History of Philosophy*, iii. p. 408, English translation).

CHAPTER IV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROFESSOR JAMES WARD

I

OF the current systems of pluralism the least unsatisfactory is that of Professor James Ward. It is an honest attempt to stand within the realm of thought and face the dangers and difficulties of pluralistic conceptions. Starting from pluralism, Ward attempts to show that by itself it is inadequate and must give place to a theism. Ward does not want to give up logic for the sake of his philosophy ; he does not stifle the demands of intellect simply because intellect is inconvenient, and makes him conscious of the limitations of his views. He frames his system on the pattern of Leibniz's *Monadology*, though he does not slavishly imitate it. He knows that if Leibniz had followed out the consequences of his doctrines, he would have been led to the monism from which he sought to escape. The infinity of God and the world, the absolute determination of every event, the eternal dependence of the infinite number of monads on a central spirit would leave no room for real struggle and endeavour, but would lead to a monistic unity where all things are one. Ward assigns to himself the task of re-editing Leibniz's *Monadology*, dropping out all doctrines which are incompatible with a pluralistic scheme of things.

Ward accepts the fundamental motive of Leibniz's *Monadology*. He is decidedly against absolutism. Absorption of the all in the One he cannot tolerate. As a

psychologist, he takes his stand on experience, and the most patent fact of experience is the plurality of individuals. Materialism and absolutism both deny the reality of this plurality, and so Ward dismisses them as false theories. As against naturalism, he argues for the reality of *spirit*; as against absolutism for the reality of *many* spirits. He knows that the time-spirit requires that he should recognise the manyness of facts. "It will be well, too, as regards method to let the spirit of the time lead us; turning aside from what has been described as 'naturalism's desert on the one hand, and the barren summit of the Absolute on the other,' to follow the historical method as far as possible in tracing the gradual evolution of ideas, but trusting to speculative methods only in the endeavour to divine the most satisfactory solution of the problems to which they give rise" (*P. and T.* p. 24).¹

In the first series of Lectures on *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Ward establishes the futility of the naturalistic and agnostic assumptions about the constitution of the universe and man's place in it. Naturalism regards the world as a single mechanical system of constant mass and energy, and mental reality as an epi-phenomenon or a by-product of the physical evolution. The three props of this system are (1) the mechanical theory which resolves all physical processes into movements of masses, (2) the theory of evolution which believes in the production of organic from inorganic beings, and (3) psychophysical parallelism which thinks of the psychical series as running parallel with the physical series without entering into causal relations with it. Ward points out that even the scientists recognise that the scheme of atoms and their dance is only a rough notation and not a real account of the actual world. When we take the real categories of science as distinct from the descriptive ones, such as dynamic causation, unity of nature and purpose, we see that they are all derived from the subject side of experience. While in all experience we

¹ Unless otherwise stated all references are to *Pluralism and Theism*.

have a subject-object relation, in science we confine our attention exclusively to the object side. Ward succeeds in showing that the physical series is something more than mass particles in motion, that the theory of evolution cannot account for the life and purpose of the universe, and that the events of the mental series are not simply parallel with those of the physical. The impossibility of a connected view of the whole universe of experience as a complete mechanical system is proved. Simply because matter and motion do not account for organic growth and mental process, it does not follow that idealism is the true hypothesis; for it may well be that while matter does not account for mind, mind does not account for matter. If materialism does not account for history, it may be that spiritualism does not account for science. The world may be broken into the two parts of man and nature, mind and matter. We should then have to be content with a dualism which posits the existence of two utterly disparate but equally real worlds, a world of matter and a world of mind. This theory is criticised as having its origin in an intellectual confusion between duality and dualism. Experience is a subject-object relation, and therefore a duality in unity. Though the two aspects can be analytically discriminated, they cannot be actually separated. Dualism mistakes logical distinction for actual separation. The hypothesis of abstract absolutism which holds that Reality is something different from mind and body, a *tertium quid*, a neutrum behind mind and matter, is next considered, and dismissed as philosophically unsatisfactory. A spiritualistic hypothesis is suggested as the only satisfactory guide that takes account of all the concrete facts of life and experience. "It is only in terms of mind that we can understand the unity, activity and regularity that nature presents. In so understanding we see that nature is spirit" (*N. and A.* vol. i. p. 10).

We have no quarrel with Ward thus far. As a matter of fact all idealists are grateful to him for the service he

has rendered in freeing idealism from the objections of mechanism and agnosticism. But when from the established conclusion that the world is spiritual, Ward proceeds to argue that nothing really exists but spirits, we feel considerable hesitation in following his lead. Once again the dominant motive is his interest in ethical and religious idealism. The progress from spirit to spirits is due to his terror of the monistic tradition which holds up a dead inhuman unity in which all life is extinguished and distinction abolished. Absolutism, or Singularism as Ward prefers to call it, believes that "beyond the universe of the many (minds or spirits) there is a single transcendent experient, who comprehends the whole" (*P. and T.* p. 228). Taking his stand on experience, Ward finds that it is impossible for him to feel that the world in which he acts is merely a shadow or an appearance of the one substance. The individuals in the world are experiencing subjects quite as much as God himself. The world is full of knowing, feeling and willing subjects. "This world immediately confronts us not as One Mind nor even as the manifestation of One but as an objective whole in which we discern many minds in mutual interaction" (*P. and T.* p. 5). Ward contends that while Hegel starts with the right premise of pluralism, he draws a wrong conclusion from it, viz. absolutism. When once we reach unity of this type, we cannot get plurality from out of it. Ward also refers to the panlogistic strain of Hegelianism which makes the historical development of the world the phenomenal unfolding of the timeless Absolute Idea, which is the sole reality. In contrast with this, he proposes to regard the historical development as real and not apparent. The development of the world is a process of creative synthesis. The world of monads is a real history. Its evolution is not merely the explication of the old but an epigenesis or a creative process in which the subjects themselves are the agents. Reality is a realm of ends, a progressive epigenetic process in which the ideal aspirations of individual subjects are realised. Though Ward recognises

that there must be some unity among the minds of the world, he is not prepared to say that there is as much unity as absolutism postulates. For, if there should be so much unity, then the appearance of the many would be inexplicable. Absolutism seems to care nothing for the facts of experience but goes on its own "high priori road." "In the flights of pure thought up to the Absolute, the atmosphere of empirical fact by which it is sustained is too diffused to be detected, and when the summit is reached, the particular, the many of actual experience tend to disappear or to be explained away" (*P. and T.* p. 23). In whatever manner we may conceive of the Absolute, whether as Absolute Subject with Fichte, or as Absolute Substance with Spinoza, or as Absolute Self with Hegel, it cannot offer an explanation of the multiplicity of the world. The reality of the many is annulled and abolished in it. Ward urges that we cannot call the Absolute a Mind, since the essential characters of mind as known to us are absent there. Mind, as we know it, is a relation of subject and object which are not separable, though distinguishable. If the Absolute is a mind without the distinction of subject and object, *i.e.* if it transcends this distinction, then its unity and nature are incomprehensible to us. We have no right to call it mind at all. There are thinkers who consider that the Absolute is in some sense its own other. But if we make the idea of the Absolute its other, then the finite minds are reduced to the passing thoughts of the Absolute. Or it may be contended that the necessity for an other points only to the limitation of finite minds, and it need not be a characteristic essence of mind as such, in which case there is no other for the Absolute.

We may at once admit that the crux of absolutism lies in the relation of the finite minds to the Absolute. But as we shall see, Ward has the same difficulty in exhibiting the relation of God to the finite centres. But no sane absolutist of the present day thinks that Reality is a One exclusive of the Many, though the solutions

of the problem of the relation of the One and the Many till now put forward may not be considered quite satisfactory in every way. On examination we shall find that Ward's theory is satisfactory only when it conforms to the traditions of concrete idealism, but is unsatisfactory when it sets itself up against them in its zeal for a pluralistic construction of experience.

II

Experience is the starting-point for the theist, the pluralist, and the absolutist alike; the differences arise later. Whatever point of view we occupy in philosophy, we cannot but "begin our inquiry about the universe as a realm of ends" (*P. and T.* p. 432). We take the many as given, but even Ward admits we cannot end with it. Pluralism can be accepted only 'within limits.' It has to be supplemented before it can be accepted as the ultimate truth. While the pluralist stops short at the totality of finite experiences, the theist tries to satisfy the religiously-minded by positing a transcendent God. The absolutist affirms that pluralism and theism should find their fulfilment in the reality of an objective spirit. It is inaccurate to say that while pluralism starts with experience and proceeds upwards, absolutism starts with the absolute and ends there. Absolutism also starts with the pluralistic vision, but while Ward says that pluralism has to be supplemented by theism, the absolutist contends that it has to be supplemented by absolutism. To both it is obvious that while we start with the many we cannot conclude with it. There is more unity than appears at first sight. Absolutism has no other basis than things as they are. But it soon finds that finite and human experience has to be transcended, and in the last analysis, absolutism recognises only one experience, and that is the real. The uncritical acceptance of pluralism has to be modified before it can be turned into the final truth of the universe. But

whether the modification should be in the direction of theism or absolutism, is the problem.

III

From experience, Ward says, we learn that all that is real is minds or individual centres of force and appetition. The world is an indefinite variety of psychical existences, of different degrees of perfection, all tending to self-realisation. Each of them is a self. No two of them are exactly alike. The world as it comes to us in experience is a many, a system of individuals which interact. The history of the world is a real creative evolution. We see in it a steady progress towards greater individuality as well as solidarity. Though we have at the beginning a number of free spontaneous independent monads acting at random, we have gradually more and more integration. The world is a slow organisation of conflicting individuals into an ordered whole. The history of biological organisms and human societies testifies to this growing unification. We may reasonably expect that perfect unification will prove to be the goal of the world. Yet this unity is not the starting-point, but only the culmination. It is the goal but not the ground of the process. The universe is not a unity differentiated into a plurality, but a plurality organising itself into a unity.

Our difficulties in regard to this theory may be stated thus. Is it possible to view the whole world as spiritual in the sense that everything in it is a spirit with its duality of subject and object? Does not this theory land us in solipsism? And does not any attempt to get over solipsism take us straight to the hypothesis of an all-comprehensive absolute mind? Does Ward's philosophy provide us with a freedom and immortality really different from the absolutistic conceptions thereof? Can the growing unity of the world be accounted for on the basis of a radical pluralism? If theism is necessary to supplement

pluralism, is not this supplementing unreal and ineffective unless the theist's God is identified with the Absolute Spirit? These are some of the questions we propose to consider in this chapter.

IV

Idealists will appreciate Ward's thorough and searching criticism of dualism and will assent to his proposition that ultimate reality is spiritual in its nature. But it is not easy to understand how all reality is psychical. Exposing the fallacies of the dualistic metaphysics does not necessarily amount to proving the non-existence of matter. To dichotomise the world into the two opposed parts of nature and soul is wrong, for everywhere matter serves as the environment for the soul. We cannot follow Ward when he says that in this world we have all persons and no things. We can understand his proposition that matter is not opposed to spirit in the sense that it is an element in the spiritual world, and that the distinction of matter and mind lies within the life of the spirit. We agree to the proposition that the ultimate metaphysical principle is mind or spirit, but we cannot consent to the view that matter is mind. Ward's contention that experience is a subject-object relation, a duality in unity, may be admitted. For it only shows that matter is not an object in itself unrelated to a subject. Materialism is mistaken if it believes that matter can exist by itself. It can exist only as an element in a larger whole. Philosophers who are of opinion that nature is the object of spirit, the material universe the object of the world-soul, admit this plea. But when it is argued that physical facts are selves, that matter has its own duality in unity, we do not find it easy to follow. To say that mechanism can get its ultimate interpretation only in terms of mind is one thing; to say that mechanism is mind, quite another. To say that the world is not through and through mechanical is one

thing ; to say that it is through and through psychical is another. The former emphasises the relativity of man and nature, but the latter asserts the identity of the two. The former says that nature is only the other of the idea but not its copy, while the latter reduces the world to a series of spiritual atoms. The former is the hypothesis of absolute idealism, the latter that of panpsychism. Absolute idealism urges that there is a part of nature which is mechanical but it is subordinate to the spiritual. The mechanism of the world serves the ends of spirit. It is an instrument for the life of mind. Matter is not an end in itself. Ward recognises this when he says that just as machines contrived by conscious agents for industrial purposes serve the ends of man, even so the mechanism of the world aids man in his upward ascent. But as the machine is not the mind of man who made it, even so nature is not spirit for which it exists.

The first argument which Ward advances in support of his theory of panpsychism is the inadequacy of mechanism to account for mind. "While it may be possible, setting out from mind to account for mechanism, it is impossible setting out from mechanism to account for mind" (*P. and T.* p. 18 ; see also p. 431). "The concepts of physics are inadequate to the description of life, even in its lowest forms" (p. 9). Ward emphasises the distinction between matter and life, mechanism and individuality, science and history. "The world of science is a world of mechanism as much as ever, invariable in its ultimate constituents and absolutely determined in all its movements. Given its state at any moment, then all its previous, equally with all its subsequent, movements are calculable." In the world of history "we find that facts, individuals, purpose and meaning, progress or decline are the essential elements of which it is composed" ("Mechanism and Morals," *Hibbert Journal*, iv. 81-82). Ward contrasts law with fact, universality with individuality. He holds that history describes unique individuals while science

deals with laws. If science touches an individual, it reduces him to a type, makes him an instance of a law. "The tendency of science is to diminish the seeming variety of the world and ultimately to eliminate it. Qualities in the end are to be resolved into diverse arrangements of prime atoms, corpuscles or electrons, differing in nothing but their positions and motions. For pluralism, quality is vital" (*P. and T.* p. 65).

The undeniable impossibility of explaining mind by matter proves not the psychical nature of matter but the ultimate supremacy of spirit in the world. Mind can account for matter; nature is intelligible to spirit. This shows only that nature is not an alien 'other' but has its ground and being in the same spirit, which at one stage expresses itself as matter and at another as the human self. Ward notices this unity in the midst of opposition. For he says, "The world of science and the world of history have little or nothing in common: their terminology, their categories, their problems are wholly different; and so too are the philosophical questions to which they severally and immediately give rise. The one never reaches the individual and the concrete, the other never leaves them; for the one spontaneity and initiative are impossible, for the other inertia and rigorous concatenation; to the one the notions of end and value are fruitless, nay meaningless, for the other they are of paramount importance, and yet the two cannot be separated, for Nature not only provides the scenery and properties of history, but the actors themselves seem to have sprung from its soil, to owe their position largely to its co-operation and to come into touch with each other solely through its means" (pp. 2-3). While nature is opposed to life, it is still intimately related to life. There is continuity as well as discontinuity between life and matter. In contrasting law with individuality Ward makes the mistake Bergson does. We have creative synthesis even in the material world. When water is produced from a combination of certain proportions of oxygen and

hydrogen we have a synthesis which is creative, a novel production. The distinction between science and history is to be traced to Kant, who misconceived the nature of knowledge by confining it to the physico-mathematical type. The human and the historic cannot be reduced to this type. The world is not ultimately the working out of any mathematical necessity, but the realisation of an increasing purpose running through the ages. Mathematical science gives us the law or the concept while the historical deals with the real or the individual. Then we should require to aim at a direct and not a scientifically mediated experience of reality; for the moment science touches it it creates a barrier between the mind and the object. But this whole account is a misconception. The object of science is not the abstract universal any more than the object of history is the concrete individual. The two, fact and law, run together. The difference between naturalistic and historical knowledge is only of methodological value. The laws bind history too. The difference between science and history is not one of reason and unreason, law and anarchy. It is reason everywhere which manifests itself in diverse ways in different material. Knowledge is everywhere conceptual, trying to grasp reality in the fulness of its aspects. In naturalistic sciences the recurring aspects predominate and so the category of mechanism is applied; in historical sciences the non-recurring aspects predominate and so we employ the category of teleology. Both the scientist and the historian have the same end in view, but adopt different devices to suit different material. That is all the difference. Why should the disability of matter to account for mind point to the panpsychist conclusion? On Ward's philosophy, it ought to prove nothing. For, according to him, the progress of the world is made up of a series of accidents. The growth of the world is characterised by epigenesis or creative synthesis involving new beginnings which are discontinuous with the old.

If epigenesis is a fact, then there is no surprise in the rise of life out of the womb of matter. When Ward argues that mechanism cannot account for mind, he rejects epigenesis and thinks that matter cannot give rise to something totally different from it in nature. In other words, he denies the reality of epigenesis and disallows all new beginnings. When emphasis is laid on the inadequacy of matter to mind, Ward is under the impression that out of the material only the material can come, and not the vital or the mental. Idealists agree with this view that while the inorganic or the physical processes precede those in which life and mind manifest themselves, still they cannot account for them. The lifeless cannot give rise to the living. While matter is the prelude to mind it is not an explanation of it. But when from this position Ward jumps to the conclusion that we are to get rid of the apparent breaches of evolutionary continuity by supposing that "the level of self-conscious existence of spirit in the narrower sense is reached continuously by development through earlier stages of more or less conscious life" (*P. and T.* pp. 264-265), and that the world starts with a number of monads, feeling and striving subjects conative in their nature which, on account of their initial instability and impulse of betterment, come into relations with one another and help the onward march of progress, we must say that this is all a conjecture and not a reasoned theory. The apparent breaches of evolutionary continuity occur not only between the lifeless and the living, but also between the living and the conscious, and the conscious and the rational. Evolution fails to explain not only the progress from matter to life, but also from life to mind, and from mind to reason. Physics cannot account for biology any more than biology for psychology or psychology for logic. If there is continuity between life and mind, and mind and reason, then there is as much continuity between life and matter ; if there is discontinuity between life and matter, then there is as much discontinuity

between life and mind or mind and reason. It is not only the material that cannot account for the mental, but the vital also fails. The animal mind cannot account for the human. Ward feels the "glaring psychological discontinuity between man and brute" (p. 90). An appreciation of these facts should have led him to admit that nature comes into existence for us as something opposed to the self, and that from thence there is a steadily growing attempt on the part of self to overcome the externality of nature. The self begins by opposing the world to itself and ends by finding itself in it. The self becomes fully self-conscious through the mediation of externality. The initial opposition of self and objects is broken down. The object becomes conscious of itself in us. This is what Hegel means when he says that nature comes to self-consciousness in man. In man matter loses its rigidity and becomes fluid. It becomes transparent to mind. From the historical point of view, nature is mind not yet come to itself, while from the logical, nature is mind out of itself (p. 154). In the historical world we see how nature or mere isolation or pure externality, which is the ideal limit, gradually grows into the individualities of the physical bodies, biological organisms and human personalities. The process of nature, while not spiritual from the beginning, still helps the progress of spirit. The breaches of continuity in the historical world cannot be accounted for unless we suppose that there is an all-pervading spirit of which the several parts are the lower and higher manifestations. These are the successive attempts of nature to return to spirit from which it has issued.

The second argument which Ward adduces to establish the psychical nature of the world is the consideration that mind is always implicated in life. In biological evolution there is a teleological factor. We have here the principles of self-conservation and subjective selection. These "teleological factors imply not a nondescript force called vital, but a psychical something endowed with feeling and

will. Finally, recalling our survey of evolution in the wider sense, we have seen that, unless the cosmos itself is to be regarded as a finite and fortuitous variation persisting in an illimitable chaos, we must refer its orderliness and meaning to an indwelling, informing Life and Mind " (*N. and A.* ii. 302). But this only proves that there is an all-pervading mind and not that everything is a self. If the former hypothesis is enough, we do not need the latter. The law of parsimony requires that we should not multiply entities without necessity. If nature is teleological, if it conforms to human intelligence and is amenable to human ends, it only shows that the opposition between the two is not absolute (see *N. and A.* ii. 254). Ward argues that to call descriptive schemes "pure or rational science is to emphasise its source in mind; and when this intelligible scheme of our devising with which the scientific inquirer greets Nature is confirmed by Nature's response, are we not justified in concluding that Nature is intelligent or that there is intelligence behind it?" (*P. and T.* p. 5). The two alternatives are not the same. Nature is intelligible but not intelligent. There is unity between nature and mind but not oneness.

The next argument is that based on the law of continuity. Granting that there is guidance or direction in vital process, does this prove that it is a mind that is everywhere present? Ward appeals to the law of continuity. "Of such guidance or direction we have immediate experience only in the case of our own activity, as in building a house or organising a business. It may well seem rash, therefore, to attribute such processes as the formation of chlorophyll in a blade of grass or of albumen in a grain of corn to guidance in this sense. But at all events they are processes pertaining exclusively to living organisms and found nowhere else. . . . But it may be asked, what right have we to identify life and mind; what right, for example, to credit plants with souls as Aristotle did? The right that the principle of continuity

gives us. No sharp line can be drawn between plants and animals, nor between higher animals and lower" (*Heredity and Memory*, pp. 7-8). But continuity is just the problem to be explained. It is a neat summing up of the question and not its solution. The only argument which Ward offers in support of continuity is this. "Recent knowledge has shown the range of life to extend far into the region of what was once regarded as the inanimate, purely physical world, and it has further shown the lowest known organisms to be highly complex and extremely varied. But there is nothing to suggest that we have reached the limits of life; all we can say is that our senses and the artificial aids and methods of research at present available do not enable us to discriminate between yet simpler forms of life and their environment; not that they do not exist" (*P. and T.* p. 21). We cannot say that they do exist. It is an open question. They may exist or may not. But there is no doubt that we have a limit to life if there is matter or mere externality. And even though life were present throughout, it would not follow that it is present in the form of a self. Logically the argument would require us to consider continuity to be complete from matter upwards. The law of continuity brings out an essential truth that while matter is necessary to life, life is necessary to mind, and so on. But it does not ask us to reduce all the complex facts of experience to a single type.

The next argument of Ward is that we cannot have an inanimate object; for "what can neither do nor suffer, what is nothing for itself, is truly nothing at all; every individual thing, so far as in it lies, endeavours to persist in its own being" (p. 21). Nature, if real, must be a plurality of conative individuals. Now it will be conceded that all objects tend to persist in their own being; but is this tendency an impulse? and is every impulse a conation? If pluralism believes that every object is a self with a conative impulse localised in it, it is an assumption. "Pluralism assumes that the whole world is made

up of individuals, each distinguished by its characteristic behaviour" (p. 51; italics not the author's). It is Ward's belief that throughout we have spontaneity, though not absolute activity. Since the materialist's atom is completely determined from without and has no spontaneity, it is unreal. Wholly inert things which are mechanically related to each other are unreal. In a world of pure matter thus conceived motion would be impossible. On the panpsychist theory, matter is to be regarded as "the manifestations of the interaction of perceptive and appetitive monads or entelechies" (p. 63). The changes of the material world are not due to any transcendent cause, but to the "impulses initiated and determined by feeling" (*ibid.*). But all this is the statement of the theory and not its proof. When driven into a corner, Ward admits that panpsychism is simply a matter of faith. He only proves that there is no such thing as a mere potentiality unrelated to any mind. It is merely the lower limit which is always in conjunction with a higher limit. The upper and the lower limits are the ideal abstractions which are found present in all the monads. "So then it would seem that as the unattainable upper limit of pluralism points towards an absolute unconditioned Being transcending the Many, so the unattainable lower limit points towards an indeterminate Being that affords no ground for the discrimination of individuals at all" (p. 196). The lower limit is the *Prakriti* or the bare potentiality or matter or non-being. Any attempt to regress to the lower limit takes us to the notion of pure potentiality, and this, of course, Ward admits to be an abstraction. If it should exist by itself, then we would require a *Prime Mover* from outside to set it in motion. And so he says that the first concrete living individual is a mixture of both and has in it the tendency to act. What we have is only life or activity, though our intelligence is able to perceive in it these two aspects. The upper or the active is the principle of kinship or identity. The lower or the passive

is the principle of individuation. The former gives the unity of direction. The latter makes the monads different. When the individuals strive to better themselves, it is the imperfection due to the lower limit that they are trying to get over. Thus the upper and the lower limits are the Being and the Non-being of the absolutists.

It is also argued that the adoption of the theory of panpsychism is needed to make freedom of action a reality. For according to it nature is not quite determinate, but is determinable still. What appears to be fixed routine is really fluid. "All nature is regarded as plastic and evolving like mind ; its routine and uniformity being explained on the analogy of habit and heredity in the individual, of custom and tradition in society ; while its variety is attributed to spontaneity in some form" ("Mechanism and Morals," *Hibbert Journal*, p. 92). We shall recur to this topic again and see whether panpsychism is the only hypothesis that has room for freedom if indeed it has room.

Ward thinks that panpsychism alone is needed for theism. "We cannot begin with theism, nor, unless dualism is refuted, can we ever attain to it. Naturalism which regards matter as wholly independent of mind and mind as wholly dependent on matter is the inevitable outcome of dualism and has ever barred the way to theism" (*P. and T.* p. 483). It is true that naturalism is an obstacle to theism, true that a Cartesian dualism leads to naturalism, true also that we must have a spiritualist monism ; but this spiritualist monism need not be of the panpsychist type.

Ward's panpsychism is not very different from the primitive anthropomorphism which made souls of everything. It has had a long history. Thales believed that the world was full of Gods. Leibniz thought that all nature was animated. Clifford regarded the molecules as possessed of mind-stuff, which became consciousness when present in sufficient complexity, as in man. The truth that the panpsychist hypothesis contains is the

kinship of nature with spirit. It asserts that in spite of all apparent opposition and antagonism nature is not alien to spirit ; but when it denies all distinction between them it goes hopelessly wrong. It is at the opposite pole to materialism. While the latter reduces all to the lowest limit, the former elevates all to the highest. But nothing is gained by spiritualising matter or materialising mind. Body is not soul and matter is not monad. The idealists are charged with confusing things with thoughts. Whether the idealists are open to this charge or not, Ward is. He dissolves the concreteness of the world into a white blankness. The mystic unity of mind swallows up all differences. While it is important to maintain identity it is equally important to maintain difference. It is useless and unphilosophical to exaggerate or minimise identity or difference. It is strange that the critic who is vehement in attacking the absolutists for minimising the significance of diversity should himself have succumbed to this temptation.

V

If the whole world is psychical, how is it that we have dead nature ? If everything possesses a self, how does it happen that we have apparently selfless beings in the world of matter ? With Bergson, Ward argues that matter is only the arrest of spirit. As Bergson urges that reality is life, *élan vital*, and matter is the arrest of spirit, even so Ward thinks that throughout the world we have present the psychical in the sense of the historical, the purposive or the spontaneous, which becomes later mechanised. As in human life the behaviour which is first unique and purposive becomes later regular and automatic, even so in the world fixity and materiality are the products of spirit and spontaneity. The living purposes of selves get crystallised into inert solids. From this it follows that we have no fixity at the beginning, but that the orderliness and regularity come into operation in the

later stages. "In the historical world we place determinate agents first; the order and development which we observe we trace to their action and interaction" (p. 20). The whole world at the beginning is *natura naturans*, where the subjects make trials and efforts. When the trials succeed they get stamped in as *natura naturata*. The regular ordered aspects of the universe represent the *natura naturata*. At the start there is no order: it is yet to be. In the initial stages everything is indefinite. The individuals create order which is just the ground traversed. Freedom represents the *natura naturans*. "What is done, *natura naturata*—the decisions made, the habits formed, the customs fixed—constitute at any stage the routine, the general trend of things within which future possibilities lie. What is still to do, *natura naturans*, implies further spontaneity and growth: new decisions to be taken, fresh experiments to be made with their usual sequel of trial and error and possible eventual success" (p. 73). Thus, according to Ward, the spontaneity of living agents underlies the whole uniformity and regularity of the historical world. But are we to suppose that the golden age was in the past, and the future which we are achieving at great cost and trouble will result in a complete mechanisation of mind? Is this the goal of the epigenetic process of the world? Or perhaps, as epigenesis involves new beginnings, it can somehow create perfection of creative activity. While a dead automatism promises to be the goal of the process when viewed logically, still, as we allow new beginnings, it may be that perfect automatism becomes at the end transformed into perfect spontaneity. Ward has a way out of this difficulty which is not very convincing. He argues that the process of epigenesis is as continuous as that of mechanisation and is therefore logically exclusive of any final stage of perfect automatism. Again, it is not easy to see how mental activities become material states. How can the interaction of spiritual entities called monads

account for the appearance of matter? That mind and matter are opposed in their features does not show that mind is real and matter is shadow. Ward knows that it will also be objected to the theory that "we have only to an insignificant extent shaped Nature. We have not made it" (p. 20).

Ward is not satisfied with this account of the genesis of matter. His system requires that nature should operate from the beginning of things. So he puts forward a different theory that nature is only an indefinite number of simple monads. The bare monads or the lowest forms interact directly without any intervening medium. These constitute the material environment which serves as the uniform medium for the intercourse of the higher monads. The inorganic world consisting of bare monads constitutes the mechanical basis for the life of the higher monads. "The existence of an indefinite number of simple monads would provide all the uniform medium for the intercourse of higher monads which these can require" (p. 257). The bare monads and the higher monads are all monads and therefore alive. But in the one case it is life without memory and recognition; in the other it is life with them. As the consciousnesses of the bare monads are momentary, and as they do not learn by experience, they act in a routine manner. A bare monad is in essence its own body. It has only a momentary consciousness without memory, a pure sensation, an immediacy of awareness. To use Bergson's phrase, the bare monad is self-repeating movement, while the higher is unique creative movement. The lower limit of the plurality of the monads is, according to Ward, the mass point or centre of force physical and psychical. He says it is a momentary consciousness devoid of memory and recognition. But why should we look upon it as psychical or conscious when it has none of the features associated with *psyche* or consciousness? It does not grow expert by experiment. When we do not see any signs of consciousness, why should we indulge in the

speculation that it is conscious? That the world of inorganic matter is made up of momentary consciousnesses is a pure guess. We are under no obligation to think that the bare monads have any consciousness at all, or possess perception and appetite, or sensation and activity. If they are not conscious, how do they generate consciousness? Even granting that they are conscious without memory, how is memory produced? How can a momentary consciousness without memory develop into a synthesising mind with memory? Ward calls the primitive condition one in which the monads are not differentiated. It is an indeterminate something in which the 'many' is nascent. How does this indeterminate something of a material environment move out into the world of motion and life? It cannot be said that the bare monads and the higher monads exist together from the beginning, for Ward proposes to be faithful to experience, and in the historical evolution of the world matter comes first and life later. What is it that quickens the bare potentiality called by Ward 'matter' into the development of the universe? Are we to follow Aristotle and hold that a prime mover is needed to set the ball in motion? Is not the way of escape offered by Absolutism, which on the hypothesis that matter is spirit gone out of itself can account for its coming back to its nature at the end of things? The lowest limit, which is mere externality, forces us to posit the highest limit as well. If the bare monads which in historical evolution precede the conscious living monads are to develop into the rich universe, we must either postulate an outside cause, which is illegitimate, or grant that the monads themselves are prime movers, which is a speculation, or admit that the bare and conscious monads are the lower and higher stages of the one spirit, in which case the Absolute spirit becomes the creative ground and the final cause of the universe.

If Ward admits that mind-stuff is present as mere externality in matter, as vitality in plants, feeling in animals,

and thought in men, this is the same as the absolutist doctrine ; only, mind-stuff is not a very appropriate term. Matter, life and consciousness are the different forms in which the one ultimate spirit objectifies itself. But we have no right to identify the lower with the higher and say that all is mind. To wipe out the distinctions between the several kinds of reality is an unscientific procedure to which Ward as a psychologist very solicitous about the distinctions of experience has no right.

Even if we consider that the world is created, it is quite possible that God might have created inorganic matter. There is nothing intrinsically impossible about it. But Ward thinks that to make God the creator of the world would be to attribute to Him two apparently quite distinct forms of divine activity (see p. 248). God has first to produce a world of mechanism and then to create man and call upon him to adjust himself to it at the risk of his life. Ward cannot admit God's creation of the mechanical world since that hypothesis would make God responsible for physical evil. As we shall see, the reality of evil which is the crux of theism is overcome by his conception of a limited God who creates free monads. God does not tempt man but evil is due to man's wilful acts. As the individuals are free to try and venture, error and evil become possible. But if the natural world be looked upon as the creation of God, then He must be looked upon as the author of the evil which takes place in it. God is relieved from the responsibility for physical evil which is traced to the monads. It is said that the monads, on account of their inherent incapacity for progress, petrified themselves into dead inert matter. But to what is this petrification, which is the cause of evil, due ? The monads are not responsible for it, and if God is not, who is ? While Ward is inclined to make God the creator of the world of matter, especially when he is emphasising the necessity of matter as a fixed stable system for the higher purposes of mind and spirit, still when he thinks of the bad effects of the world

called physical evil he makes his God wash His hands of all responsibility.

Another explanation which Ward offers is that the monads which do not belong to the dominant monads are to be viewed as material. Each dominant monad regards its own subordinate monads as alive and vital, while the subordinate monads of other dominant monads are viewed as dead and material. So to each dominant monad its own subordinate monads are not phenomena. They are not constituent elements of the objective world to their own dominant monads. They are objective only to the dominant monads which observe them from outside. This explanation is suggested to him by the way in which reality comes to be perceived by the growing individual. The bicycle when it is fully controlled by the rider is not distinguished by him from himself though he calls it an object when it gets out of control. While this is true as a psychological description of the perception of external reality, it is confusing to substitute it for the metaphysical theory of the nature of reality.

Ward contends that the monads are the real individuals while the material world is only an appearance. "We cannot affirm that a star or a meteor or a cluster of particles is an individual. But neither can we be confident that they are always or necessarily the merely inanimate aggregates we commonly take them to be. All that pluralism contends for, however, is simply that the real beings these phenomena imply have some spontaneity and some initiative ; and to these essential characteristics of all real individuals the uniformity, as well as the diversity, of the physical world is due " (p. 455). Mechanism is a phenomenon, an appearance. For pluralism, "Matter can only be phenomenal, it cannot be real " (p. 65). "Meanwhile we may remind those who demand of us an explanation of the appearance of mechanism, that if the term be strictly taken there need for spiritualism be no such appearance at all " (p. 14). So the appearance of mechanism is due to our defective knowledge.

The higher we advance the more completely shall we be able to interpret the world as a realm of ends. This only means that the opposition between self and the other is gradually broken down and not that the self is the other though it finds itself in the other. Sometimes Ward makes matter an appearance or a phenomenon due to our scientific habits. This is another similarity between Bergson and Ward. What exists is mind. But science describes its outer surface in terms of mechanism. Nature is something relative and unreal. It is a theoretical construction. The laws of science are statistical averages which do not express the behaviour of beings. The real significance of the world can only be understood in terms of mind. Science may give us laws eminently valuable for purposes of calculation. But it is essentially abstract and hypothetical as it does not give us an account of real concrete experience. "No two things are entirely alike and no two things are entirely different. An adequate and intuitive knowledge of the world would embrace both these aspects, and so doing would present the world in its true and concrete unity. Scientific knowledge, however, is neither intuitive nor adequate, but always more or less general and symbolical ; its general concepts and symbols representing the likenesses among individuals and the likenesses among these likenesses, so tending indeed towards an abstract and spurious unity, but farther and farther away from the living whole" (*N. and A.* ii. 91). The distinction of persons and things which we know to be real in the world of experience is dissolved by Ward in a dead unity of life. "The ordinary historian is content to recognise nature as indispensable so far at least as it is the scene and provides the properties of the drama. But this contrast pluralism claims altogether to transcend. To the distinction of person and thing, of nature and history, it allows only a relative value" (p. 50). The gravamen of Ward's charge against absolutism is that it dismisses the distinctions of the many which experience tells us to be real and absolute as unreal and relative. But

is Ward faithful to this experience which also tells us that physical nature is a reality? When he dismisses the physical as relative and unreal, his ideal is not fidelity to experience but speculative consistency. And if this ideal requires the absolutist to consider the world of plurality by itself to be not the final truth, why attack him? He is but following the impulse of logic which, Ward well knows, sometimes overrides the testimony of experience. The result of our discussion on this point clearly establishes that Ward does not give us any logical or consistent view of matter, since he views it either as the product of the interaction of monads or the context of the bare monads or merely an appearance due to defective insight or scientific habits.

VI

In psychology the conception of an individual as an active conative agent is ultimate. Ward starts with the immediate experiencing of the experient individuals. He recognises that these experients are exclusive as regards their standpoints. Each monad's experience is all "idiosyncrasy-idiomorphic so to say." But if each individual starts with his own private experience how can he ever get beyond it? Ward tries to escape from this difficulty by endowing the monads with windows. The monads are not mutually isolated but interact. "The actual intercourse and increasing integration of monads is a basal fact" (p. 487). The individual's experience is not exclusively subjective. It is always experience of a common objective world. The presentations are not merely subjective modifications. "What each one immediately deals with in his own experience is objective reality in the most fundamental sense" (*N. and A.* ii. 155). Again, "the subject is continually in touch with one world, one environment" (*ibid.* Part IV.). Ward tells us that though the dominant monad starts with its own experience, still as the subordinate monads are connected both with the dominant monad

and the environment, there is objective intercourse. "What is true of A's organism is true also of B's, and so we can understand how A's acts may give rise to sensations in B through the double mediation of organism and environment, and how B's acts in turn may give rise to sensations in A. Presently as like sensations occur they become gradually more and more assimilated with previous experiences of them, and the advance to definite percepts is made. What were originally only immediate sensory data have now a meaning. A and B, that is to say, are *en rapport*" (pp. 258-259).

Ward admits that the attempt to systematise the contents of the different experiences leads to the conception of the objective world of science. Experience is private and individual, but there is the experience which is the result of social intercourse. The product of this intersubjective intercourse is the empirical knowledge we have in common. While empirical knowledge is an extension of the individual's experience, rational or universal experience is a systematisation of empirical or common-sense knowledge. But this objective world is not an object of any individual's experience. It has an existence even though this or that individual is not aware of it. There must be some kind of experience to which it is an object, for "an experience that is not owned is a contradiction" (*N. and A.* ii. 111). Ward adopts Kant's theory that since a particular object is not the object of any given consciousness, it must be an object for consciousness in general (see *N. and A.* ii. 170-171). "If we hold it true that all experience implies both subject and object, then we must find a subject for universal experience; and of such subject we must say that it is as essential to its objects—the sun, the earth and the rest of what we call together nature—as the individual percipient to the immediate sensory and motor events of its own objective continuum" (*ibid.* pp. 178-179).

What is the nature of this universal experience? It is not an ideal or a working fiction but quite as real as

any individual experience. If the Absolute experience is only a regulative ideal, a methodological postulate which has no ontological reality, then our whole structure of objective experience tumbles to the ground and the escape from solipsism becomes a spurious and ineffective one. Scientific principles become useful fictions or working hypotheses without any objective validity at all. While they are useful for practical purposes, they cannot be said to be true. Truth and error become subjective. But Ward agrees with the absolute idealists in thinking they are objective.¹ If truth and error are more than subjective and if scientific principles are more than working hypotheses then this universal experience is a reality. Though a matter of faith, still Ward asserts that God is the central reality and his existence a philosophical necessity. This means that the world as it would be for a completed philosophy is immediately present to the divine consciousness or experience. What is an ideal to science and experience is a reality to God.

What is the relation between universal experience and individual experience? Universal experience is one and continuous with the individual experience. "There is no discontinuity between universal and individual experience" (*N. and A.* ii. 184). The divine intelligence knows all that we as self-conscious beings have the possibility of knowing. God is all that man can become. Ward does not draw a hard and fast line of distinction between the two. The individual's experience is subjective and contingent on account of its sensuous basis, and as the individual grows, the subjectivity diminishes and the unity with the world increases. There is no absolute dissociation between reason or thought and sense or perception. Universal factors are present in all stages of conscious experience though they become more explicitly recognised in the higher stages. Even in the

¹ Speaking of error, he says that it is inconsistency. If the erring individual is allowed to see what his error implies, he will be converted to truth (see *P. and T.* p. 376).

immediate experience of the individual, the universal is operating. It is not devoid of synthetic activity. As the individual progresses, he advances to self-consciousness. Progress consists in attaining clear self-consciousness. As sense is a lower form of reason, the individual is a lower form of the universal. Our life is a progressive realisation of the universal experience. "The subject of universal experience is not numerically distinct from the subject of individual experience, but is this same subject advanced to the level of self-consciousness, and so participating in all that is communicable, that is, in all that is intelligible, in the experience of other self-conscious subjects. Universal experience is not distinct from all subjects, but common to all intelligents, peculiar to none." Our life is only a realisation in us of that perfect life or intelligence. We are guided in our knowledge, art and morality by the ultimate reality which is involved from beginning to end. Knowledge is the self-realisation of that reality in our thought as art and morality are in emotion and will. The whole is striving in the part, and it is on account of this impulse of the whole operating in us that we feel the urge to know, love and do. Ward realises that self-realisation is the sole way to advance. The self to be realised is not the small petty self which is exclusive and individual but the Divine self "common to all . . . peculiar to none." We have to "transcend the narrow limits of individual experience, confined to perception, reminiscence and expectation" (*N. and A.* ii. 256). Knowledge means the transcending of the sensuous basis which makes an individual exclusive of others. The *this* we have in sensation with its own inalienable characteristics has to be broken down. The standpoints of the experiencing subjects are strictly exclusive because of this subjective sensuous basis; the effort of knowledge is to transcend this subjectivity and realise the logical self.¹ Pluralism emphasises the finite-

¹ But Ward's fear is that if we should posit a Divine Experience, then since for that experience the process of development is completed,

ness of the individual, his contingency and sensuousness. If this were all, Ward could not escape from subjectivism. But in the attempt to save himself from it, he posits the reality of an Absolute Experience which every individual is trying to realise in his life. This is the ideal or the whole working in all, and when it is reached the individuality is transcended. What is, is a whole in the parts, and while pluralism apprehends the parts, absolutism comprehends the whole. The reality of pluralism is absolutism, as the reality of the part is the whole. In escaping from subjective idealism to which pluralism leads, Ward has transcended pluralism and affirmed absolutism.

VII

Pluralism, Ward thinks, safeguards the freedom and contingency of human action, for which absolutism has no room. Pluralism contends that every individual is a genuine creator, while rigid determinism seems to be the logical consequence of absolutism. "Since the pluralistic view of the world necessarily involves an element of contingency in its very idea of a finite many mutually striving for the best *Modus Vivendi*, it must be allowed that the actual presence—*prima facie* at least—of such contingency in the world of our experience is so far an argument for the pluralist's position; absolutism leaves no place for this contingency" (p. 80). Ward makes out that as the fixity of the world is due to the action of conative individuals, the world at the start was wholly contingent when human agents were creators unfettered by limitations. Yet Ward repudiates absolute contingency which he calls Tychism, and distinguishes the contingency of chance from the contingency of freedom. But Ward's account of the genesis of law commits him to pure contingency, which Ward knows is illogical and

there is no necessity for human life to reproduce it imperfectly. There is no need for meaningless reproductions of reality which is always self-complete. In God is the complete and eternal fact of existence. But God is not apart from the world. The infinite is in the finite.

non-existent. We have to ascertain whether pluralism really provides a place for contingent conduct.

Ward thinks that as he has rejected the mechanical determination of mental events, so determinism disappears. The laws of the world are due to active individuals themselves. The world is quite plastic and fluent. "Since for pluralism there are no natural laws, so to say, in force from the beginning, but on the contrary all natural laws are evolved, there will be no rigorous and mechanical concatenation of things such as naturalism is wont to assume; the fixity so far as it is real will embody the result of experience; so far as it is apparent, it will be due, as we have seen, to the statistical constancy of large numbers" (p. 78). Absolutism also rejects the mechanical determination of conduct, and so far is at one with Ward's philosophy. Absolutism is quite clear that if men were the creatures of a blind mechanical necessity, there would be no ideal standards of thought or conduct. It holds to the supremacy of spirit, and considers the whole universe to be an expression of spirit. Human experience is not completely determined by mechanical necessity. Life is a continuous assimilation of the not-self by the self. But this freedom from mechanical necessitation which absolutism secures easily, Ward is at great pains to reach. Apart from the difficulty of conceiving, *e.g.*, an earthquake as effete mind or the product of past experience, the solution is not brought nearer by simply explaining what mechanism is. Whatever it may be due to, it is there and the individual has to reckon with it.

Even though mechanism and matter be illusions, we may have psychical antecedents which determine our conduct. But according to Ward, psychical determinism is a misconception. The self "freely inserts those links in the chain of nature"; "it cannot be a part of the time order that it makes" (p. 304). In the realm of nature, "events appear as determined by preceding events; in the other (the realm of ends) actions are initiated to secure future ends" (*ibid.*). We cannot

therefore forecast the future course of events. Ward seeks to solve the problem of freedom by making out that as a human being is individual, his actions are not bound by any laws. The great contrast which he establishes between law and individuality, science and history, is designed to preserve the freedom and independence of the individual. We cannot bind an individual by rules ; we cannot reduce him to a formula. Science which proposes to explain individuality by means of general principles reduces man to a bit of mechanism. But there is an element in the individual which baffles scientific treatment, an irrational surd or mystery which science cannot explain. But in this attempt both law and individuality are misconceived. Man's individuality does not consist in his foibles and oddities, his freaks and idiosyncrasies, but in that which is common to him and the world. There is no incompatibility between the significance of history and the reign of law. Individuality is not contingency, nor is law mere sameness. It is a narrow conception of self which opposes self to the whole world, makes it *sui generis* and holds that no laws apply to it. If individuality and law are considered inconsistent, there must follow the unintelligibility of the individual. But an individual is intelligible and therefore subject to laws. The individual is not a mere freak, nor is creative synthesis a mere difference.

If freedom is a property of cognitive and conative subjects, then as the whole world consists of such subjects everything in the world should be free. What Ward says of Schopenhauer is true of himself : " The freedom that he allows is not confined to conscious beings ; and on looking closer we shall see that consciousness has essentially nothing to do with it " (p. 293).

Ward says that only human individuals are free and not the lower monads, for scientific rules are more applicable to them. He thinks that though all nature is animated and all life psychical, and so not resolvable into scientific universals, still these scientific rules give

relatively more accurate views of the habits of the lower monads than of the higher ones. Human conduct cannot be reduced to laws. It cannot be predicted. It is this unpredictability that he emphasises in his doctrine of epigenesis which he contrasts with evolution. Evolution suggests the explicating of what is implicit from the first. Epigenesis is a gradual ordering of elements which had no order in them. It is a steadily-growing organisation of products in the whole which the several constituents in their isolation did not possess. It is creative growth, novel synthesis. Though the higher stages depend for their existence on the lower, still a knowledge of the lower would not enable us to forecast the higher. Though the future is grounded in the past, still we cannot infer the future from the past. We shall have new unforeseen beginnings. But we cannot say on that account that it is contingent. It is true that it cannot be predicted, but still it is not a chance product, as there are motives and laws of the individual's nature operating. The so-called free acts are contingent only to others, but to one's own self there is nothing contingent. Nor is it a case of necessity. Contingency refers only to the spectator. "Though contingent for others, a man's acts are not contingent for him; if they were, we should have to admit absolute contingency or chance" (p. 455). When Ward admits that the laws of which the individual's conduct are the expression are the internal laws of the individual, he admits that individuality is subject to laws. Ward is wrong in thinking that everything which happens according to law can be predicted and counted upon, while those which cannot be predicted are opposed to law (p. 75). Law or rationality may apply to the individual's acts and still we may not know how exactly the rationality would express itself. Unpredictability is not the sign of absence of law. There is a law in all growth, and this law can very well express itself in a series of shocks and surprises.

According to Ward, man becomes material as his habits increase. He steadily loses his freedom and grows

automatic. Contingency tends to decrease as time goes on. The mass of habitual acts will go on increasing and the free acts will be on the decline. Progress means a decreasing contingency. "As a necessary consequence of the interaction of a plurality of individuals, intent on self-betterment as well as self-conservation, there should be a general tendency to diminish the mere contingency of the world and to replace it by a definite progression" (p. 97). But still, Ward believes that there will never come a time when all actions would become habitual. Contingency in the world is inevitable. But this is only a pious assumption. Ward allows that contingency is due to the friction between monads caused by misunderstanding and selfishness on the part of the higher intellectual monads. With growth in knowledge and love this friction and consequent wrong will be minimised until at last when the end is reached they will cease to exist. Contingency is also ascribed to the collisions between the intellectual monads and the habits of the petrified ones. But as the ideal of the intellectual monads is also to reach a condition of an equilibrium they also cease to be spontaneous and become petrified; or there is the other possibility that the petrified monads may become intellectual, in which case a unity of purpose and feeling may be achieved among the monads. But this possibility is shut out by Ward, since he believes that the petrified monads will never revive. And this again is an assumption. We have real freedom only in the primitive condition which is devoid of any fixity such as pluralism postulates. It is pure freedom which we may without impropriety call pure chaos. Stability is introduced by and by. Unity of the universe is the goal and not the ground. Definiteness and order manifest themselves as we move upward. But one would expect that the pure beings which were completely spiritual would have given rise to something better than matter with its automatism. The paradise is pushed into the past and not beheld as a vision of the future. Man is born free though

everywhere he is in chains. Only Ward tells us that the chains are of his own forging, if that is any consolation.

With regard to the theological difficulty of freedom and foreknowledge, Ward's view is that foreknowledge does not exist though there is continuous control by God. We are asked to "substitute providence for prescience, continuous control for eternal decree" (p. 492). God has made us free, and even he does not know how we shall act. This is not a weakness or a limitation, for Ward quotes Martineau with approval that "foreknowledge of the contingent is not a perfection" (*ibid.*). "All is not decreed; the world is not created like a symphony. Again all possibilities are not left open; the Many have not severally unlimited freedom, that freedom of indifference which is indistinguishable from chance. God's creatures are creators, the pluralist maintains; their nature is partly his doing, partly their own: he assigns the talents, they use or misuse them. Not everything that is possible is possible to any, yet some initiative is open to every one: none are left with no talent at all. The *total* possibilities then, however far back we go, are fixed; but within these contingencies however forward we go are open" (p. 315). If the filling of the time process is eternally decreed, then there is complete determinism. But God is only the creator of creators. His foreknowledge extends only to his knowledge of the limits for the operation of human freedom. He does not know what definitely we will do. God is no doubt the ground of man's existence. But this dependence on God does not deprive man of his freedom. Nevertheless, man has only a limited freedom, and this absolutism grants to us. The natural equipment with which we are born is determined for us and not by us, and within these limits we are free to work out our future.

In trying to defend human freedom Ward frees it from law, mechanical determination, fate or predestination, but if he carries out with courage the consequences of his opinions he will be forced to make man a prisoner bound

in chains which he himself has forged. Yet he fights shy of this conclusion and leaves human freedom in a doubtful condition. It is satisfactory to note that the best he has to say on this problem is just what absolutism gives, viz. that real freedom means determination by an ideal. Ward quotes approvingly Professor Bosanquet (p. 136), and observes that determination by an ideal of the whole is not the negation of freedom but the one real condition of it. Ward is an advocate of the contingency of freedom in the sense of self-determination and not of the contingency of chance, which is absurd. Man is free because his conduct is determined by him and not for him. In other words, while Ward denies mechanical necessitation, he admits rational determination. This is the contention of the absolutists. The self according to them is much more than the past deeds of the man or his former character. None can anticipate precisely what another will do, but human conduct is not on that account irrational.

VIII

Ward's account of future life and pre-existence is on all fours with Leibniz's theory. It is defective exactly where Leibniz's is. A panpsychist theory is committed to the doctrine of pre-existence. And Ward holds to the doctrine of a succession of lives. The everlasting monads must either have been created by God or must have continued from eternity to eternity. The former hypothesis is ruled out by Ward's rejection of the creationist theory of the soul's origin (p. 404). So the eternal pre-existence and future life of the monads inevitably follow. But it is no use telling us that the monads are eternal. It is the pride of pluralistic systems that they provide for personal immortality. Does Ward grant us that? An individual is an organism in which there is a dominant monad that rules the whole hierarchy of inferior monads. The dominant monad we call the soul is what is characteristic

of the individual. These dominant monads are eternal, and birth and death are only phenomenal modifications which they undergo. These do not affect the nature of the soul. The soul's existence does not begin with that of the body, and so we need not fear that it will end with it. "If we know that the individual's existence began with that of the body, we might argue that it will probably end with it, but here again the empirical basis for such an argument fails us" (p. 394). So it is said that the individual has what is called personal immortality. Even granting that with the scattering of the other monads which constitute the body of the dominant soul, the individual is preserved (of which there is no chance), there are other objections to Ward's theory. It is not quite clear how God who is the conservator of values does his work of conserving the values acquired by the individual in Ward's system of pluralism (see p. 214). We do not know the exact relation between the law of the inheritance of acquired characters and the doctrines of the preservation of the soul and the real development of the individual (p. 211). The objection to pre-existence sometimes urged, that there is no memory of pre-existence, is not got over, as the dominant monads have no consciousness or memory of their antenatal lives. The personal immortality which the modern mind seeks is promised to the ear but, alas, the promise is broken to the heart.

IX

Ward recognises that in addition to the pluralistic aspect there is also the unitary aspect of the world. Knowledge and morality require the unity of the universe. Absolutism is wrong in making unity the central fact of the universe since it cannot account for the Many. Starting with the Many we can account for the One, but starting with the One we cannot account for the Many. So pluralism is a more satisfactory conception than absolutism. Our question here is, Can pluralism account

for the unity of the world? Ward breaks down the isolation of the monads and grants windows to them, as he thinks that the unity and interrelatedness of the world cannot be accounted for by the concept of windowless monads. Isolated monads cannot interact while distinct monads can. "That a plurality of individuals in isolation should ever come into relation is inconceivable indeed, but only because plurality without unity is itself inconceivable. That individuals severally distinct as regards their existence could not interact is however a mere dictum" (p. 437). The interaction of the monads can easily account for the unity of the universe. Ward describes the historical evolution of unity thus. A multitude of human beings of different tastes and temperaments find themselves in the world, each pursuing its own interests. Adventure and misadventure seem to be the rule at the beginning. The fittest survive in the struggle and regulate the conduct of the rest. Cooperation and division of labour soon set in, and we have in place of an incoherent multitude all seemingly working at random, a social and economic organisation where each man has his own appropriate place and function. Progress goes on, and at length we attain the level of human culture where "we reach a good that is not diminished by being shared, and one that yields more the more it has already yielded. And here in form at any rate, the final goal of evolution comes into sight, not a Pre-established Harmony, but the eventual consummation of a perfect commonwealth, wherein all co-operate and none conflict, wherein the Many have become One, one realm of ends" (p. 435). The ever-increasing coincidence of private and public ends tends continually to enhance the unity of the whole (pp. 55-56). Life by a series of accidents gets itself rounded into a whole till we reach a condition when the whole of humanity is animated by a single, a wise and righteous will, when "the will of the Many and the will of the One would accord completely" (p. 136). The unity and the order of the world are the result of the

interaction of the monads and not its presupposition. The mutual intercourse of the totality of individuals happens to end in unity. When the Many regarded as existentially independent are found to be mutually complementary, conspiring together to realise an intelligible organic whole, then the question suggests itself, Is God the ground of the Many? "Why should the Many tend towards one end unless they had in the One their source?" (p. 267). Ward carefully argues the point, and says that one alternative is to leave such questions unanswered. There is the fact and that is its sufficient reason. But Ward considers this answer to be inadequate for two reasons: "That we as rational beings are part of the world's evolution, and that the demand for a sufficient reason is thus a demand that the world itself has raised" (p. 267). Another alternative is "to deny that things show any tendency towards the realisation of an organic whole or that the world is a single realm of ends at all" (*ibid.*). To deny the tendency is to speak an untruth. There is progress towards a higher unity and it must be explained. We cannot put it down to chance. Absolutism, Ward thinks, is no explanation, as in it the distinction of God and the world disappears. So Ward adopts the theistic hypothesis. God is needed to give the necessary unity to the world. The point of difference between Ward and the absolutists lies in the fact that while Ward considers that the unity is in the future, the absolutists hold it to be in the past. While Ward considers unity to be the goal of the historical process the absolutists consider it to be the ground as well. For Ward the unity of the universe requires only an upper limit of a supreme spiritual reality. This is enough to account for the apparent unity of direction in evolution.

According to this account, unity is only an accident. Novelties occur in the world, and one of these novelties is the gradual unification of the world which was at the start merely a togetherness of things. There is no logical necessity for the development of a unitary world out of a

juxtaposition of many monads. It is a stroke of good fortune that the many monads by their interaction collapsed into a unity. If novelties are in order, and if, from a plurality of individuals, we can get a unitary universe, why should we not consider the naturalist theory to be quite sound and satisfactory? From matter and motion the whole universe with its spirit and spontaneity can be evolved. Only we have to admit the possibility of sudden variations and creative novelties, and Ward allows them. We have no need to posit any higher principle simply because at some stages of evolution we come across aesthetic qualities in nature and moral qualities in man. But Ward rejects the evolutionist theory. He cannot believe that the unity of the world is an accident of nature. There must be some necessity about it. We must have a guarantee that the work of the world will end in a final harmony, unity or system of ends. How can mere pluralism give us this security? As pluralism cannot by itself furnish the ground for the teleological unity and continuity, as in it there is no sustaining ground of values in the historical evolution of the Many it is supplemented by theism. A plurality of interacting subjects cannot account for itself or for the unity which interaction implies. We require a spiritual ground as the basis of the harmony. Thus Ward by his concept of God introduces more unity into his theory of the world than empirical pluralism warrants. He admits a principle which transforms the original plurality into an organic interdependence. God is the originating and sustaining ground of the lives of the Many. He is the purposive ground of the evolution process. He is the surety for the conservation of all ideal values. The world of Many is a realm of ends simply because the rational ground of the Many is the One. Without it, Ward admits, it would be "infinitely improbable" that the Many should freely posit themselves so as to form a harmony (p. 457). The growing harmony of free interacting agents is possible only with God. So beginning

from the many, "we are led both on theoretical and on practical grounds to conceive a more fundamental standpoint than this of the Many, namely, that of the One that would furnish an ontological unity for their cosmological unity and ensure a teleological unity for their varied ends" (p. 442; see also p. 241). And so Ward supplements pluralism by theism.

Our question is How are we to conceive of God if he is to be the guarantee for the growing unification of the world? Ward says that he must be at least a spirit "transcending the world, the ground of its being and yet immanent in it" (p. 421). God is the whole. To account for the unity of the whole or the common direction of the pluralistic endeavour, God must be the universal mind or the all-informing spirit. It is the spirit immanent in the whole that enables the different parts to rise upwards till they reach a common higher life. It is because the same whole operates in all the parts that the unity of the world is essential and not accidental. Unity is not the chance product of intersubjective intercourse but is the necessary result of the interaction of subjects who are all guided by the same impulse. It is obvious that a plurality of individuals impelled by the feeling of self-preservation cannot make for progress. So they must have the ideal of social betterment. What is this ideal due to? It is hard to conceive how the egoistic instinct of self-preservation tends to be displaced by the ideal of social welfare. It cannot be forced on the individual's nature from outside. But if the devotion to the common good is there from the beginning, then its manifestation is due to development from within. The social instinct which makes for progress is not an accident of human nature, but is one of its structural principles. "Through this objective mind, pervading all its members, and not through any infusion from without, each one in being social becomes human" (p. 124). Here Ward emphasises how the community of nature is not forced from without on the individual but is already in him. The object is involved

in the subject, the other in the self. Man realises his true self in society because that which fences him off from others is not the true self of man. That which binds him to others is his real self. Progress consists in the advance towards a higher or a more comprehensive unity and this is rendered possible as there is the same tendency to realise the true self operating in each part. We have "to believe in a universal tendency towards perfection as the very principle of life" (p. 130). With divergent units, harmony is possible because there are fundamental needs in common. They all aim at justice and social order and these common interests make for unity and coherence. And Ward also tells us that these interests are not forced on the individual from without but are rooted in his nature. How can we account for the presence of these ideals in the subject? Ward's answer is that man has the interests of others because himself and others or subject and object are differentiations of a Totum or a whole into self and others. This unity of background accounts for the pervasion of the one by the other. If the starting-point is a world of self-defining monads, united merely by their co-existence, we cannot account for the impulse towards union and co-operation which is a fact of history. To account for this devotion to common ideals, Ward assumes the mutual implication of self and others in a totum objectivum. But the ultimate unity and the original unity are not the same. The original unity from out of which subject and object became sundered is different from the ultimate unity which is a new reality of a higher order. If there is a unity between the self and others to start with, and if the process of the world gradually develops an inward relation between the two, and if the end of the world is a complete realisation of this ideal, is this not absolutism? We have the original unity which gives the ideal, the process or the working out of the ideal and the end where the ideal is reached. The world process is animated by the ideal from beginning to end. Ward admits that the whole historical evolution

is due to God. "How far below us, how far above, the historical extends, we cannot tell. But above it there can be only God as the living unity of all and below it no longer things, but only the connecting acts of the one Supreme" (*N. and A.* ii. 280). When thus Ward is seen to postulate unity both at the beginning and the end, it is hard to distinguish his system from absolutism. Can the hypothesis of an original unity be reconciled with the assumption of the ultimateness of plurality? When Ward says that the ultimate unity is a new kind of reality where the self will find itself in the other without meeting any opposition from it, it only means that the original unity has become concrete, and this is the absolutist theory. The original unity breaks up into subject and object, and the goal of the world is reached when they are reunited. Ward admits all this, but points out that it is inaccurate to say that the actual historical process is the realisation of what is potential in the beginning. He admits that the ideals which the self has and which must be accepted to account for the growing unity of the world cannot be explained unless a primitive community between self and other is posited. He also admits that the goal of the process is the making of the unity explicit and clear, for the community is from the beginning and it has only to be consciously realised. But he objects to the view that the actual development is only the realisation of the potential. This "potential" seems to be the red rag. He asserts that there is nothing else than the actual. "Reality is entirely actuality; the potential belongs exclusively to abstract thought" (p. 108). And yet Ward knows that if we should confine ourselves to actuality we cannot account for either the past continuity or the future certainty. If we do not grant the reality of an ultimate spirit or a higher intelligence, the whole scheme of the world becomes incomprehensible. And if we once posit an absolute spirit, the potential acquires significance. Nothing which is not rooted in the nature of things can appear at a later stage. The dispute

between pluralism and absolutism is represented as one between progress as the integration of a plurality and evolution as the differentiation of a unity. The question reduces itself to one of whole and parts. Is the whole prior to the parts? or are the parts prior to the whole? But Ward forgets that there cannot be any integration of a plurality apart from an underlying unity. Unity and plurality, integration and differentiation are two aspects of the one process, complementary sides of a whole. One cannot be without the other. If radical thinkers emphasise either aspect exclusively they caricature reality. If we start with the many, we cannot reach the one unless the one was prior to the many in the sense of the logical ground of the many. But Ward shrinks from absolutism, as he thinks its acceptance would be to open the flood-gates to mechanism, determinism and other rigid inhumanisms. He cannot agree to the contention that the logical ground of the process is in the beginning as that would involve that the last day of reckoning shall read what the first day of creation wrote. He believes with Bergson that the future is unpredictable, though by reflecting on the past we may discover continuity between the past and the present. He cannot bring himself to believe that the world process is due to any deliberate design on the part of the Creator or is the logical outcome of the nature of the ultimate spirit. To save freedom he makes the world a series of happy accidents. Life becomes a scene of miracles. But Ward knows that in that case he cannot be sure of the ultimate triumph of good and so he posits an initial unity and an ultimate ideal, and when these two are affirmed he comes perilously near absolutism, and that is an impossible situation, and so we find him swinging from the one to the other extreme. His heart clings to contingency, chance, novelty and accident, but his head rebels against this whole list and takes him to unity, logic, necessity and absolute, and between the two his system vacillates. Ward cannot do without the conception of

the absolute spirit ; nor can he do with it. Without it his pluralism becomes a chaos where all connectedness is inexplicable ; with it, it ceases to be a pluralism.

But Ward's difficulty is purely imaginary. Because there is an absolute spirit it does not follow that everything is determined. The Absolute spirit works in man. It gives him the spiritual ideals of truth, beauty and goodness, and the ideals can work themselves out freely and fully. There is no restriction of freedom on the absolutistic hypothesis. It is incorrect to say that the unity of the Absolute is incompatible with the reality of its differentiations. In another context, Ward says that " what development or differentiation an individual experience may undergo, it does not *become* but always is a unity " (*N. and A.* ii. 112). If in an individual's experience unity can be preserved in spite of differentiations, cannot the same thing be true of the Absolute Experience? The unity of the whole is only another aspect of the differentiations of its members. Absolute idealism does justice to both. It is wrong to say that in an absolutistic unity the difference between the One and the Many, God and the world, is abolished. The Absolute is the unity of the two and not one of them.

Ward urges that the unity which is the ideal is not that of an Absolute Experience, but is the unity of a whole or a society of monads. Though the many are gradually tending to become more and more one, still " what we shall reach will never be a single unity independent of the plurality beneath, but only the harmonious co-ordination and consentience of these—ideally an absolute harmony " (p. 111). While Ward admits that the interaction of the many involves the identity of the one, he holds that this one is only a logical one. " To resolve the logical universal itself into a personal individual, of which the several persons that it denotes are but modifications, so far from explaining the facts denoted, seems flatly to contradict them " (p. 223). Since the one and the many are not opposed, Ward's

objection loses point. Ward has taught us that progress has been through the gradual mechanisation of lower elements. Each unit is "the form for the function below it and matter for the function above it" (p. 110). The plurality of the world is the matter and the ideal unity the form. As so many active centres have become mechanised in the individual's body, it is quite possible that further progress may mechanise the finite centres and make them parts of a higher whole. What we have may no doubt be an absolute harmony between society and animal world, and these and organic life and dead matter, but the whole itself will be what is designated an individual and not a society. What objection there can possibly be to this logical conclusion of Ward's premises, we do not know.

X

In the last section we have shown how Ward's God melts imperceptibly into the Absolute of the idealists. We will consider this question in greater detail, bringing out the affinities of Ward's theism with absolutism. Ward admits that there cannot be any intellectual justification of theism, for God is not an object of knowledge. We need not be frightened by Ward's statement that theism is a matter of faith. For he contends that our whole life has been a series of faith ventures. "Almost every forward step in the progress of life could be formulated as an act of faith—an act not warranted by knowledge" (p. 415). Probability is the guide of life. When we adopt a principle on faith, then knowledge may come to our aid and confirm it. In other words our knowledge is slowly extended by faith. This relation of faith to knowledge is nothing new in philosophy; only Ward's use of the term faith for scientific imagination or hypothesis is new. When Ward says that the idea of God is a matter of faith he means that it is a hypothesis which has to be transformed into a theory by verification and

proof. If the hypothesis is confirmed by knowledge we accept it ; if it is not, we reject it. Our question now is whether the facts of life demand theism, whether theism accounts for the complexities of experience. What is given is the world of spirits. The supreme spirit which constitutes the unity of the world is not a fact of observation but one of inference. Let us see if this inferred theism is exclusively adequate to account for the facts of life. We see that the world has been progressing in the direction of increasing moralisation ; the higher ideals have increasing domination over it. We have faith that these ideals will be fully realised. This faith that they can be realised is a rational faith, for it gives completeness to life, and knowledge does not forbid such a possibility. Therefore we must consider this faith to be a reasoned one and thus a real one (see p. 488). This faith cannot be true unless God is real. " Without the idea of a Supreme and Ultimate Being, least inadequately conceived as personal, transcending the world as the ground of its being and yet immanent in it, as it is his idea—the world may well for ever remain that *rerum concordia discors*, which at present we find it " (p. 421). Without the idea of God final unification is not certain (see p. 229). " If theism be true, then evil can only be relative and must gradually disappear ; if theism be not true, though evils remain relative, they may never disappear " (p. 439). The reality of God alone gives us the assurance that the hindrances to progress are not insurmountable. " Without such spiritual continuity as theism alone seems able to ensure, it looks as if a pluralistic world were condemned to a Sisyphean task " (p. 215). But we here beg the question : Why should we presume that life is complete ? A consistent pluralist who does not know what is going to happen would feel that life is not, and he would not know whether it will ever be, a complete unity. But still Ward believes that life is bound to be a whole. " All things in the main and in the long-run work together for good " (p. 131). Taking this for granted

as a faith based on the facts of experience—and the absolutist has no quarrel with it, since to him it is a fact which every bit of experience confirms,—what is the kind of spirit necessitated by this faith? When can we be sure of the ultimate supremacy of good over evil? It is not when God is identified with the principle of goodness and a principle of evil is opposed to him. It is only if God becomes the Absolute of the idealists which is the principle of a perfection higher than good and evil, that we can put down evil for a negative principle which has a transitory life, and which is bound to be broken down ultimately. Ward goes the whole length with absolute idealists in his account of evil, but only his tender and sensitive fibres shrink from the last conclusion of the Absolute. Good by its very nature is self-consistent and evil self-contradictory, and so good is bound to triumph. "There is no such dualism of good and evil, they are not two co-ordinate powers, in a word, there is no *principle* of evil. There is a moral order, but evil is only disorder. When then we compare the unity and solidarity of the good with the motley many-headed shapes of evil ever at cross purposes with each other, the conservation common to all forms of good and no forms of evil, when too we consider the close connection between the good and the true on the one hand, between error and evil on the other, have we not ground for believing in the eventual triumph of the good, have we not ground for maintaining that such moral evil as we find in the world, terrible though it is, is after all not such as to justify the atheistic position" (p. 376). But our regret is that it does not justify the theistic position. The identification of truth and goodness, emphasis on the impulse to truth and goodness being the springs of human endeavour and aspiration, insistence on the relative and negative nature of evil, all point to the absolutist theory. In the world nature confronts spirit with a number of discrete elements. Spirit is called upon to impose order. The question is, can it succeed in its attempt to transcend nature? The

past progress is cited as evidence for the future triumph. Spiritual life has hitherto survived its perils and gone on upward and onward. If it proves anything it is the identity of spirit which prevails behind both nature and man. The Real is the Absolute spiritual life existing as the ground and inspiration of all human endeavour and achievement on the one hand and as the basis of nature on the other. Apart from the hypothesis of an Absolute mind sustaining and pervading the universe, man can have little hope of complete freedom and personality. Without faith in an Absolute spirit, we cannot be sure of rising superior to the oppositions in a struggle with a hostile and superior world. Ward admits it when he says, "God is not simply a transcendent Being existing aloof and apart from the world, he is also immanent and active within it and such active presence of the one spirit who alone knows all, affords an assurance that the pluralist's ideal will be attained" (p. 229). The Divine spirit is transcendent to the world as the primal source of it, and immanent in it as the mind is immanent in its thoughts. The world is his idea. God is "the ground of its being." Surely this is not the limited, finite, personal godhead which theism craves for, but the Absolute spirit which is the all-embracing whole. This spiritual unity seems to have more in common with the Absolute of Singularism than with the God of Theism. Only we take care to point out that the unity is not one which annuls the distinctions but one which includes them all. Absolutism says that the unity which does not manifest itself in a plurality is a blank unity and the Absolute is the eternal spirit which binds together the several parts in a whole. If we ask Ward how on his hypothesis the world and God are related, he silences us by saying, "Any adequate idea of God and the world is beyond us."

It is wrong to think that the difference between Ward's philosophy and absolutism is that, according to him, God is both immanent and transcendent, while according to absolutists God is only immanent in the universe.

Absolutism is here confused with atheistic pantheism, which holds that God is the world and the world is God. But absolutism does not identify God and the world. Ward neatly sums up the absolutist position when he says, "God is transcendent to it (the world) for it is not God but his utterance and manifestation ; yet because it is his utterance and because he ever sustains it, he is immanent in it ; it is his continuous creation " (p. 240).

Besides the argument that God is necessary for experience, Ward mentions that his law of continuity requires an upper limit, namely, God, and he can only be a big man. To the pluralist, "like every other spirit, God must have his unique standpoint ; but it is unique in a quite special way : it is the highest " (p. 192). It means that the difference between God and the other spirits is only one of degree and not of kind. God is the highest of the monads according to the principle of continuity. He is the dominant monad among a whole community of monads, and is not the Absolute including them all. But the religious soul does not hunger for the highest monad. It wants the Eternal Spirit transcending man infinitely, altogether of a different species. But to Ward God does not belong to a class apart but is only a " member of the realm of ends, albeit the highest, and, so to say, the central member " (p. 193). But if God is only the highest member of the series, if he is only the upper limit, how can we have any certainty about the unity of the universe, completeness of life and the triumph of the moral ideals ? It is only if we conceive of God as both immanent and transcendent, as an all-embracing spirit, that we can have this assurance. But, then, God ceases to have any particular standpoint and becomes the whole. Each individual mirrors the whole from a particular standpoint, and so represents only an aspect of the whole. If God has no particular, in the sense of distinguishing standpoint, then he is merely immanent and not transcendent. To avoid the difficulties of pure immanence, Ward gives God a *central* standpoint, which is, and makes itself,

central by maintaining the reality of the other standpoints and by entering into these latter in a manner about which we can only speculate. But this is the position of absolutism. "Now, remove from such an experience the relativity which standpoint implies and you approach the theistic ideal of an absolute experience, the experience of a living and active spirit, 'whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere,' an experience complete at all points and including every one" (p. 229). This is not the God with a unique standpoint but is the Absolute of monistic idealism. Not God but the Absolute is necessary to give a real unity to the pluralistic conception of the totality of beings. Ward tries to distinguish God from the Absolute, but when he follows out the consequences of this distinction he finds that it is only the Absolute which has all standpoints in it though it is not a standpoint by itself that can complete pluralism. To impart the unity to pluralism, Ward's God becomes the Absolute. But then the law of continuity is broken. It requires that God should be either a member of the realm where all are gods, in which case we cannot account for the unity of life, or He has no existence. If God becomes the Absolute then Ward's pluralism becomes quite satisfactory, but only the law of continuity is violated. So in obedience to the conflicting demands of religion and logic Ward swings to and fro. The god of religion is postulated to meet the needs of the religious heart, which longs for intimate living intercourse with God, an intercourse different in nature from that which men have with their fellow-subjects. By making God a co-member of the series, Ward asserts that it is possible for man to have what is called religious communion and fellowship with him. "It would be reasonable to suppose that mutual communication between the Supreme spirit and ourselves—even between other superior beings and ourselves—would be possible of a more immediate, so to say, more internal nature, than that which alone holds between ourselves

and our fellow-men " (footnote to p. 193). If God is one of the system of monads no special intimate communion with him is a fact ; if he is not, he falls out of the scheme.

Ward makes his God the creator of the universe. While absolutism asserts that finite minds are the unique expressions of the universal spirit, still the exact manner of the relation between the two is wrapped up in obscurity. But in Ward's philosophy, too, the creation of the world by God is shrouded in mystery. Ward is afraid that if he should adopt the ordinary theological view of creation, the independence of the souls will be sacrificed. He does not know how he can cling to both creation by the one and independence of the many. Creation as making out of nothing, and creation as the unfolding of a prearranged plan are both repudiated. Ward warns us that we should not employ the categories of transient or immanent causation which hold good only within the world of plurality. Creation means only that God is the central ground of the world's being. He is its *ratio essendi*. At times, Ward is willing to give up creation, theism, etc. He says that pluralism alone would suffice, and we do not know whether theism is true or not. We cannot verify the "indefinite regress which the existence of bare monads implies," and so we cannot decide between the alternatives of theism and pluralism. He thinks that pluralism is a simpler and safer hypothesis, as theism has a tendency to pass into deism, which separates God from the world as potter from his clay. But there is no such deistic danger in absolutism, as it does not allow a God who, like a human artificer, does his work of creating the world and then withdraws from it. Whatever be the nature of creation, Ward admits that the created world is dependent on God. The idea of creation is just the idea of the dependence of the Many on the One. The Many not only exist along with God but live in him and through him. From God is the world born, and by him is it sustained. The world is the continuous manifestation of God. It is not a long step from this to say that the

Absolute is the reality which includes both God and the world. When we introduce duality into the Absolute, we set the diversity of created spirits over against the unity of the creative spirit.

As to whether individuals are free and independent when God is admitted to be their creator, Ward says they are free since God is only the creator of creators. "Unless creators are created, nothing is really created." God is no creator unless his creatures have independence. This is the crux of pluralism. Unless individuals are free, pluralism has no significance. As to how they can be free and at the same time the created products of God is just the problem. "Creator of creators" is unfortunately only a phrase which states the problem without explaining it. The reason why Ward makes his central spirit the theist's God and not the idealist's Absolute is that the former is supposed to have room for the freedom and independence of man while the latter has not. In systems of absolutism, the Absolute alone is free, while the subjects are all the instruments of the Absolute or puppets moved hither and thither by the strings of the Absolute. Ward makes man free and alive, and so he substitutes for the Absolute the living God who works and grows like man. God is a *primus inter pares* and not an *ens entium*, for this alone has room for "a living God with a living world, and not the potter god with a world of illusory clay." If we do not care for the independence of the Many, we may have the Absolute. "There might have been an Absolute, provided there had been no Many, but holding to the reality of these we can regard God as Supreme but not as Absolute; then we seem to save the Many, but we have only a finite God or rather the idea of one" (p. 43). The prejudice against absolutism that it is incompatible with the independence of the Many is unfounded. If the individual can be free, it is only in an absolutist system. It is true that the Absolute alone is free, but the individual is an expression of the Absolute. God is perfectly free, and man who is made in the image of God must also be

free. Again, the relation of the Supreme personality or God to the other minds, when logically worked out, results in absolutism or in degrading God to the level of man. If God is as weak as man, if he has to battle against opposing forces with uncertain results, if to him also there is much that is contingent, then he is as much in need of a God as man himself. If, on the other hand, he is sure of the triumph, if he uses man as man uses the lower monads for his higher purpose, and if the world is only the idea of God, then God is the Absolute. He is the world-soul, while the world is the body of God, but then Ward's pluralism vanishes. Professor Muirhead rightly observes "that just in so far as Professor Ward remains faithful to his pluralistic assumptions of the *apparatus creativus* that he sets up does he fail to make good his promises, and on the other hand, so far as he makes good his promises, he does so by appealing to a principle which he owes to the philosophy he seeks to undermine and which is quite incompatible with his own" (*Mind*, N.S. 87, p. 324).

The next question is, Is God a person? Ward adopts this view. God is a person because he is a member of the Kingdom of persons. Ward is aware that personality involves limitations and so says that God has his limitations. Only the limitations are self-imposed. He has no foreknowledge. What the future of the world would be depends not merely on God but on other free agents "whom he sustains but never constrains" (p. 478). But Ward sometimes feels that this would be to reduce God to the level of man, and so he urges that God is unlimited and all-powerful. He is not merely the knower of the world but the creator thereof. "It is the providence that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will. . . . But the *modus operandi* . . . is to us inscrutable. . . . How God works with us or against us in the government of the world we must again admit we do not know" (p. 479). So though God is a person, he is not a person in our sense of the term. "To have experience is to be a person

among persons. But we are persons in a world of others who *exist* independent of us. God is not in this wise a person; and though it be true that he is confronted by the world and active in it, still other persons are not for him merely objective (known through sense and intellection) or merely ejective (known through instinct or interpretation). Again, the world for God is the world in its unity and entirety; his is not a perspective view, such as standpoint implies; nor is it a discursive view, such as our limited attention entails. God is ubiquitous and omni-contuitive, to coin a term. Finally, self-consciousness and reason in God are not as with us incomplete and intermittent. There are no broken lights in him; he alone can say, I am that I am. We may then describe God as super-personal; or, following Lotze, say, 'Perfect personality is in God only: to all finite minds only a pale copy of it is allotted' (pp. 477-478). It does not matter whether we call a God who is personal in a sense different from the ordinary, personal or impersonal. It is a matter of terminology. In Ward's sense the Absolute Spirit may be called a person, as he has the mind of the finite without its finiteness. To the question whether there is anything else over against God which limits him from without Ward gives a negative answer. God has limited himself in the world. But these limitations which manifest themselves as other spirits account for pain and evil in the world. As the admitted evils of the world cannot be reconciled with God's goodness he postulates the hypothesis of a limited or finite God. Evil is due to the defective use the monads make of their freedom. God made them free and it is not his fault if they abuse the freedom he gave. God made man free to choose, but the fool deliberately elected his own damnation. If God had not granted man freedom, *i.e.* had made all conduct necessary and determined, then we might have had a world where error and evil were impossible, but it would have been a universe for stones and sticks, and not for men. But Ward wishes to make men free to choose within

limits, and still to relieve God from the responsibility for evil, he holds that the world is a plurality of monads. Evil is due to the friction of a growing universe. "Where the many have some initiative, where development is epigenetic, contingency and conflict, fallibility and peccability seem inevitable" (p. 353). Absolute creation is not assigned to God, as then the monads cannot be rendered independent enough to bear the burden of evil. So only the conception of a limited God makes evil explicable. But the perfection of God is also to be maintained, and so it is asserted that the limitedness of God is due to his self-determination. He has created free spirits whose freedom sets limits to God (see p. 191.) God as a member of the realm of ends cannot be infinite. It also follows that the God of continuity should be a living growing God, as process and change are the central facts of the pluralist's universe (see pp. 194 and 436).

Is activity a characteristic of finite experience or is it true of God also? All mind whether human or divine has this characteristic. But activity, as we are acquainted with it, is conditioned by limitations. Life is a growth. It is a warfare where we have to overcome difficulties. "Experience in every case consists in interaction between individual and environment, an alternation of sensitive impression and motor expression, the one relatively passive, the other relatively active. Absolute activity and absolute passivity are limiting conceptions to which we have no answering experience, the one being commonly attributed to God only and the other only to primeval matter" (*N. and A.* ii. 52-53). We are active only in so far as we have a resisting environment which we have to bend to our purposes. Apart from it we cannot conceive of activity. Apart from an environment—a physical environment which is hostile to our ends, a social environment of other minds with their own plans and purposes which conflict with ours—activity to Ward has no meaning. If activity is an ultimate characteristic of reality, it is the same as saying that the dualism

between organism and environment will be a final characteristic of reality. But in Ward the physical environment is unreal. And the social environment will lose its nature as an environment to which the individual has to adapt himself, since the individuals are all guided by a Supreme Intelligence. Ultimately we reach a stage where there will be no disorder and no conflict at all. There will then be no environment for man or God to act against. So the final stage of reality will be neither active nor passive. It will be dead. But if God is active at all, it must be in a sense different from the ordinary. Activity in Ward's sense is possible only for created limited beings, and if God is active in that sense he must also be limited. But on the absolutistic theory the central spirit is active as a creative or artistic genius is active. The mere outflow of his feeling may be creation, and this activity does not mean any limitation in God. Such is really Ward's God. He is the eternal purpose, the innermost ideal which finite wills strain after though they do not realise. But this conflicts with Ward's other descriptions of God.

Our conclusion is that the difficulties of pluralism which Ward tries to meet by the theistic conception are not met so long as he keeps to the idea of God as the personal Creator. But when he succeeds in meeting them by making God the all-comprehensive spirit, his pluralism and theism have vanished. The lesson is clear that even the most brilliant philosopher cannot make pluralism philosophically sound and satisfactory.

CHAPTER V

BERGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

I

"By their fruits ye shall know them," not only plants and people, but philosophies also. Nowadays systems of philosophy are not tested by the logic of their arguments or by the light which they shed on the real problems of life and mind. That tradition has changed and the current democratic trend of ideas has taken in its direction even the narrow circle of thinking men. The philosopher's impulse of knowledge for the sake of knowledge has yielded to the practical man's knowledge for the fruits it bears, the consequences it results in. So now systems of philosophy have in view the business of life which is everybody's business, and they try to do justice to the sense and values of the average man. There are certain things which he takes for granted, which he feels to be true through immediate experience, whatever logic might say, such as the reality of our temporal experience. The plain man feels that the real is not the Absolute or the whole, but an incomplete principle which is working itself out, which is accomplishing its nature in time. He believes in a real evolution, in a real time order. To him, a timeless Absolute and an unmeaning evolution are illusory. He will have nothing to do with a philosophy that speaks of freedom not here and now, but somewhere else and hereafter. He has no patience with a doctrine that makes man a mode of God, or a manifestation of the

absolute substance. There is not much love lost between him and the rationalistic systems of absolutism which offer dry bones when he asks for flesh and blood, which talk of "How blest the paradise to come" when he cries "How sweet is mortal sovereignty." He wants a human system which will insist on the reality of the individual, of the time process, and of his fight for freedom, in short, a system which will do justice to the concrete details of life and the great facts of the world.

True to the tradition of the age, Bergson wishes to be numbered among the orthodox fold, and all that the orthodoxy of the average man requires his system wishes to grant. Since logic does not help him to this end, he surrenders it for mysticism. As rationalism goes against orthodoxy, he exalts vital impulse at the expense of reason and reflection. His impatience with intellectualism and his idealisation of impulse have brought him many followers. After the European war broke out, the circle of Bergson's admirers extended, since German methods are regarded as emphasising the results of intellectualism and hard discipline, while the French embody the ideals of intuition and spontaneity. We have in one the mechanism of matter, in the other the freedom of spirit. In philosophy Bergson regards himself as a reformer of the philosophic method since he reconstitutes the way of approaching and making reality. Bergson takes his stand on life and experience. He is conscious that the popularity of his philosophy is due to his attitude to experience. "Allow me then to say that the spread of what men agree to call Bergsonism is due simply to this, the initiated see, and the uninitiated divine that they have here to do with a metaphysic moulded on experience (whether exterior or interior); with an unpretentious philosophy determined to base itself on solid ground, with a doctrine that is in no sense systematic, that is not provided with an answer to every question and that distinguishes different problems to examine them one by one—a philosophy, in short, capable like science of indefinite progress and

advance towards perfection" (*Bergson, His Life and Philosophy*; Paul and Ruhe). So Bergson rejects absolutism which runs counter to experience, and intellectualism which seeks to solve all problems of life. It is these tendencies of anti-absolutism and anti-intellectualism which manifest themselves throughout his system that have made it so popular. But on closer examination we shall see that Bergson's philosophy is more absolutistic than it is generally known to be. If freed from its inconsistencies, it must end in an absolutism of the concrete variety. Let us consider the problems of the relation of life to matter, of mechanism and teleology, intellect and intuition, the individual self, freedom and God, with a view to ascertaining whether his solutions of these problems are so far away from those associated with absolutism as he or his interpreters would make us believe.

II

The main tendency of Bergson's philosophy is monistic, for according to him there is a universal principle, spiritual in nature, in which all existence is gathered, an initial psychical movement which is responsible for the whole evolution. Creative evolution may be literally compared to the spreading of different branches from a single root. The *élan vital* goes on spreading out new branches, creating new novelties. Matter, life, consciousness are such branches. They are the divergent developments of the unity at the start, where the different tendencies are fused into one. "Evolution arises from an original identity." "Evolutionary process, spraying out like a sheaf, sunders in proportion to their simultaneous growth terms which at first completed each other so well that they coalesced" (*Creative Evolution*, p. 124). All life is a unity and the unity is derived from the initial impetus. A single principle of creation is at the base of things (*C. E.* p. 291). While thus Bergson's aim as well as the main tendency of his philosophy is monistic, in the detailed development

of his view he posits the existence of a second factor, matter, which is indispensable for both the origin and continuance of evolution. "When a shell bursts, the particular way it breaks is explained both by the explosive force of the powder it contains and by the resistance of the metal. So of the way life breaks into individuals and species. It depends, we think, on two series of causes: the resistance life meets from inert matter, and the explosive force which life bears within itself" (*C. E.* p. 103, see also p. 134). The presence of the resisting force of matter is needed to start and maintain the evolutionary process. Without matter to call forth the activity of the *élan*, the latter will be reduced to the level of Spinoza's Substance, inert, static, and incapable of developing into the world of sense-perception. The vital impulse is regarded by Bergson as an effort. It meets with the obstacle of matter at the outset of its course. Its mission is to graft upon the necessity of physical forces the greatest possible amount of indetermination. To cope with physical necessity it requires energy, which it cannot create. It makes use of the pre-existing energy at its disposal (see *C. E.* p. 121). The two, life and matter, through their interaction, create the universe with all its varieties. Matter appears to be quite as original and fundamental for the world-process as the life principle itself. If this is the conclusion of Bergson's philosophy he is not a monist but a dualist. It is this question of the ultimate unity or duality of life and matter that we propose to discuss at the outset.

III

In *Time and Free-will*, Bergson vindicates the freedom of human consciousness. He points out how determinism distorts the flowing life of consciousness by spatialising it and representing it as a succession of states. The illusion of necessity is due to intellect, which twists out of shape duration or the real inwardness of conscious life. "Pure

duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states" (*T. and F. W.* p. 100). Conscious life and inert matter have opposed characteristics. The mechanical ideal may be adequate to the representation of external reality, which is spatial and solid, but it is inadequate to that of life or consciousness which is duration. Life is dynamic while matter is static. In *Time and Free-will*, the dualism or the opposition between the two, matter and life, space and time, mechanism and dynamism, is the most prominent feature. We have a real material world with a multiplicity of objects, a world of space, quantity and simultaneity; opposed to it there is a world of change, quality and succession. "Within our ego, there is succession without mutual externality; outside the ego is pure space, mutual externality without succession. . . . There is a real space without duration in which phenomena appear and disappear simultaneously with our state of consciousness. There is a real duration, the heterogeneous moments of which permeate one another" (*T. and F. W.* pp. 108 and 110). Bergson here affirms the separate existence of two spheres of reality, conscious life and inert matter. Intellect is viewed as giving a defective vision of conscious life though it is adequate to the representation of matter. This dualism though greatly modified still survives in *Creative Evolution*. "The human instinct feels at home among inanimate objects, more especially among solids. Our intellect triumphs in Geometry, wherein is revealed the kinship of logical thought with unorganised matter" (*C. E.* p. ix). Again, "For a conscious being to exist is to change . . . a material object remains as it is or else, if it changes under the influence of an external force, our idea of this change is that of a displacement of parts which themselves do not change" (*C. E.* p. 8). There is set up a rigorous dualism between soul-life, which is change, and material object, to which change is external.

IV

Soon a difficulty presents itself. How can we account for motion or change in the external world? If the world outside is purely spatial and therefore timeless, then motion becomes an illusion. If all change is psychical, then motion is not change. It is but a sum of simultaneities devoid of the very essence of change which is time. But Bergson is not prepared to say that motion outside is unreal. Movement, whatever be its nature, is "an indisputable reality" (*Matter and Memory*, p. 254). Bergson admits that the world outside is also a becoming. Matter is a kind of motion. Modern science in its analysis of the atom into vibrations supports his view. It is not to his purpose to discuss the much-debated question of the nature of the electron. The whole is of the nature of the self. Concrete movement is "capable like consciousness of prolonging its past into the present" (*M. and M.* p. 329). "Matter or mind, reality here appeared to us as a perpetual becoming" (*C. E.* p. 287). That mind is change, we have direct evidence. That matter is also movement "our intellect and senses themselves would show . . . if they could obtain a direct and disinterested idea of it" (*C. E.* p. 288). "Pure intuition, external or internal, is that of an undivided continuity. We break up this continuity into elements laid side by side, which correspond in the one case to distinct words, in the other to independent objects" (*M. and M.* p. 239). Bergson forgets that the reduction of self and universe to motion knocks the bottom out of his defence of freedom in *Time and Free-will*. Freedom originally confined to human consciousness is now extended to the totality of being. "There is no reason why a duration and so a form of existence like our own should not be attributed to the system that science isolates, provided such systems are re-integrated into the whole" (*C. E.* p. 12). The last part of this sentence suggests the reconciliation between the two views of

matter, that it is an inert thing and that it is a kind of motion. The whole is a flux. The universe endures. Duration is the "very substance of the world in which we live" (*C. E.* p. 41). "Matter looked at as an undivided whole must be a flux rather than a thing" (*C. E.* p. 196). For purposes of science we cut off portions of reality and view them in their isolation. Matter, as the scientist regards it, is subject to complete mechanism. For science we want repetition, according to Bergson, and repetition is possible only in the abstract. In the real world there is nothing fixed, no absolute rest, but all is flow, action, creative evolution. Matter as stable and solid is unreal. "All division of matter into independent bodies with absolutely determined outlines is an artificial division" (*M. and M.* p. 259). Intellect makes sections in the continuous flow of becoming which constitutes reality, for purposes of science and action. "The distinct outlines of an object are only the design of a certain kind of influence we might exert on a certain part of space. It is the plan of our eventual actions that is sent back to our eyes as though by a mirror when we see the surfaces and edges of things. Suppress this action and with it consequently those main directions which by perception are traced out for it in the entanglement of the real, and the individuality of the body is re-absorbed in the universal interaction which, without doubt, is reality itself" (*C. E.* p. 12). The mathematical and logical ideals are inadequate to the representation of both life and matter. Bergson does not say that matter is phenomenal in the sense that intellectual categories create matter. He only says that they misrepresent it. Matter exists independently of intellect as soul-life exists. But it is in a fluid condition. Intellect cuts out cross sections of this flow, sharpens their outlines and solidifies their contents. Thus, inert matter on further analysis has become practically identical with conscious life. The real world, subjective as well as objective, is dynamic, and can be grasped only by intuition.

If we start from the side of consciousness it is possible to establish the kinship of conscious life with inert matter. In *Time and Free-will*, Bergson has admitted the possibility of treating conscious life from the static standpoint. Though the essence of conscious life is interpenetration or melting into one another, this coalescence is not always present in the same degree. "It is by no means the case that all conscious states blend with one another as rain-drops with the water of a lake. The self in so far as it has to do with a homogeneous space, develops on a kind of surface and on this surface independent growths may form and float" (*T. and F. W.* p. 166). It is also necessary to view conscious life statically, as there is a definite relation to the objective world in all conscious states. "Every moment of consciousness is contemporaneous with a state of the external world." The distinction between subjective and objective has become so fluid that it is practically impossible to treat the one as dynamic and the other as static. "Neither is space so foreign to our nature as we imagine nor is matter so completely extended in space as our senses and intellect represent it" (*C. E.* p. 214). "What is given are not inextensive sensations: how should they find their way back to space, choose a locality within it, and co-ordinate themselves there so as to build up an experience that is common to all men? And what is real is not extension, divided into independent parts; how being deprived of all possible relationship to our consciousness, could it unfold a series of changes of which the relations and the order exactly correspond to the relations and the order of our representations?" (*M. and M.* p. 326). Conscious life and inert matter are both dynamic and static. Possibly, life can be understood in its essence if treated dynamically and matter statically.

It is this community of nature between matter and spirit that Bergson emphasises in his book on *Matter and Memory*. Our intellect, adapted to action, breaks the world into two and devises all sorts of artificial remedies to glue them together. Idealism and realism are futile attempts

in that direction. If we bear in mind that the dualism is a later product, born of and bred by intellect and not primitive and radical to reality, the problem which idealism and realism attempt to solve vanishes. If by intuition we return to the whole, the false distinctions set up by conceptual analysis disappear. "The obscurity of this problem in all doctrines is due to the double antithesis which our understanding establishes between the extended and the unextended on the one side, between quality and quantity on the other" (*M. and M.* p. 235). Our understanding "creates the opposition which it afterwards contemplates amazed" (*M. and M.* p. 327). But in reality, the problem of perception is slurred over and not solved by Bergson. He evades it by employing the word "image" in reference to the object of perception. While this use is valuable as a protest against the representative theory of perception, still it is weak in so far as it suggests that matter is of the same essence as consciousness, though Bergson does not hold it. In spite of all his devices the dualism persists in his system. The very title *matter and memory* indicates the dualism, for memory is the essential function of spirit. What Bergson has actually achieved is the reduction of mind and matter to movement. They are no more two spheres of reality but are two opposed and coexisting movements, two processes opposite in their direction. "This book affirms the reality of spirit and the reality of matter. . . . It is then frankly dualistic" (*M. and M.* p. vii).

V

In *Creative Evolution* the independence and self-existence of matter is a vital necessity. The account of the relation of matter to life is transferred from human life to the cosmic whole. In man, the discord between spirit and matter is all in all. Growth and development of self is due to the conquest over material obstacles which thwart the evolution of self. Without the struggle

between the two, there would be no life, no change, and the individual may be regarded as practically non-existent. Even so the cosmic spirit cannot act without the resisting medium of matter. Through the interaction of the two the whole universe arises (see *C. E.* p. 123). Again, life is an effort to insert into matter the largest possible amount of indetermination (see *C. E.* p. 132). "I cannot regard the general evolution and progress of life in the whole of the organised world, the co-ordination and subordination of vital functions to one another in the same living being, the relations which psychology and physiology combined seem bound to establish between brain activity and thought in man, without arriving at this conclusion that life is an immense effort attempted by thought to obtain of matter something which matter does not wish to give it" (Report of the French Philosophical Society Meeting, May 2, 1901, quoted in Le Roy's *A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson*, p. 97). This effort requires energy which life cannot create. "All that the effort can do is to make the best of a pre-existing energy which it finds at its disposal. Now it finds only one way of succeeding in this, viz. to secure an accumulation of potential energy from matter" (*C. E.* p. 121). "The impetus of life consists in a need of creation. It cannot create absolutely because it is confronted with matter" (*C. E.* p. 265). Matter is thus an essential factor confronting life and provoking its activity. The very nature of the creative evolution will be inexplicable without the independent existence of matter. The evolution of life is not the realisation of a predestined plan for there are a million by-paths which end as blind alleys. "Progress is accomplished only on the two or three great lines of evolution in which forms ever higher and higher appear; between these lines run a crowd of minor paths, in which on the contrary deviations, arrests and setbacks are multiplied" (*C. E.* pp. 109 and 110). These accidents can be accounted for only as the ways and means put forward by the creative principle to overcome

the resistance of inert matter. If the resisting matter were absent, then these 'failures, " deviations, arrests and setbacks " will have to be laid at the door of the vital impulse itself. To avoid this Bergson assumes two original and ultimate principles, consciousness and space, or roughly life and matter, for matter is the outcome or reflection of the partial victory of the opposing force, and is not that opposing force itself. When the two conflicting principles are present, the rest of the evolution of the universe is child's play to a philosopher of the brilliance of Bergson.

If Bergson's system is to be viewed as monistic, it is necessary to reduce the duality of life and matter to an ultimate unity by reducing either life to matter or matter to life or both to one common principle. We cannot reduce life to matter, for that is to assume that Bergson has written his volumes in vain. If there is one point more than another that he emphasises in his writings, it is the absurdity of mechanising life, or spatialising spirit. Can we reduce matter to life and regard it as the first effect of life's evolution? It hardly seems possible to do so, for life cannot evolve until matter is present opposing it. Evolution presupposes the existence of matter. Granted that life with its possibilities can supervene even without the resistance of matter, it ought to have engendered something more useful and important than mere matter, especially in view of the fact that the evolution of life is unimpeded by any resisting influence. To imagine that the creative impulse gave birth to matter on account of its importance in the later stages of evolution is to import an anthropomorphic or finalistic tendency into Bergson's philosophy. That life should first throw out matter and then make a play of opposing it and with great trouble pressing through and penetrating it, is not conceivable. We are left with the third possibility, the reduction of the two principles to one common centre. Bergson resolves the dualism by making both life and matter spring from one source. " If our analysis is correct, it

is consciousness or rather supra-consciousness, that is at the origin of life. Consciousness or supra-consciousness is the name for the rocket whose extinguished fragments fall back as matter : consciousness again is the name for that which subsists of the rocket itself passing through the fragments and lighting them up into organisms " (C. E. p. 275). Thus Bergson traces matter and life to consciousness. All reality is spiritual. The whole is spirit. Bergson's system is a spiritualistic monism. But there are difficulties in the way of this theory. Why should the supra-consciousness fractionate itself? Why should it break in twain? The evolution of life on this planet is due to its opposition to matter. We ask if the original supra-consciousness or ultimate spirit can evolve into life and matter without the existence of an outside extraneous force, why can we not say that even on earth life does the same? If the supra-consciousness can give out branches, can work out its evolution without any resisting medium, why should we presume that evolution of life on this planet alone requires a resisting obstacle to force it to come out with its possibilities? Evolution must be essentially the same whether it is the evolution of ultimate spirit into life and matter or the evolution of life into plants, animals, and men. Either both require resisting forces or both can dispense with them. The latter alternative does not commend itself to Bergson. So even for the evolution of the ultimate psychical something, a resisting matter is needed. We get back to the dualism of God and matter, supra-consciousness and space.

In this difficulty, Bergson makes matter a negative idea. *Matter and Memory* establishes that life and matter are two opposing movements. There are passages in *Creative Evolution* which imply the same view. "Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave which rises and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter." "Life is a movement, materiality is the inverse movement, and each of these movements is simple, the matter

which forms a world being an undivided flux, and undivided also the life which runs through it, cutting out in it living being all along its track." "As the smallest grain of dust is bound up with our entire solar system, drawn along with it in that undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself, so all organised beings from the humblest to the highest, from the first origins of life to the time in which we are, and in all places and in all times, do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of the movement of matter and in itself indivisible" (*C. E.* chap. iii.). So long as there are two distinct movements, Bergson is not a monist. But he soon makes out that one of these movements is primary and the other secondary. Matter is not an independent movement but only the inverse of the ascending movement of life. "It is a descent which is only an interruption of a rise" (*C. E.* p. 291). Matter "endures only by its connection with that which ascends" (*C. E.* p. 390). Reality is one continuous, creative ascending movement. Its arrest or interruption gives us matter. Matter is thus the negation of the spiritual movement. There is only one movement and that is spiritual. Its interruption gives the inverse of it and that is matter. But we cannot understand why the ascending movement should have been interrupted at all. Why should it ever have become inverted? Why should the original jet of spiritual spray suddenly get solidified into matter? To these questions Bergson has no answer. He does not give us a satisfactory account of how, out of the original psychic force, matter comes. It is not open to Bergson to argue that matter is only a negative idea, a shadow and not a reality, for Bergson's view of negation compels him to consider matter not a pseudo-idea but a definite somewhat. Vital order and geometrical order are opposed, but geometrical order is not a mere nothing. There is no such thing as absence of order. Were it not something positive, it could not serve the purpose of interrupting the rise of life. It could not occasion the activity of life. So matter is a kind of being

and not non-being. It is different from the being of creative activity, but it is not an illusion. But our difficulty is, how can a mere interruption of a positive process create another positive process, though of an inverse order?

In chapter iii. of *Creative Evolution* Bergson urges that intellectuality and materiality rise together. The genesis of intellect and the genesis of matter are correlative (*C. E.* p. 196). "It is the same inversion of the same movement which creates at once the intellectuality of mind and the materiality of things" (*C. E.* p. 217). Bergson holds that intellect is the interruption of intuition as matter is the interruption of life. But there are passages where he makes out that intellect is something essential to and immanent in the evolutionary movement. It is contained in the *élan vital* as much as instinct and intuition. Development of the *élan* has been along divergent lines and intellect is the end of one line of development. Evolution has taken place on three different lines, the line of automatism exhibited in plants, the line of instinct in Hymenoptera, and the line of intelligence in man. The primal impulse must have had in it the promise and potency of these divergent lines. Intellect then is not an interruption or an arrest, but a definite possibility of the *élan* produced at one stage in its onward and upward course. It is one of the products of the creative impulse (*C. E.* p. 110). It is created by life. It is hard to comprehend how intellect can be both a primal tendency of life as well as an interruption of it. If intellect is something positive, even so is matter; if it is only an interruption, then matter is only that.

VI

Bergson's account of matter is riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions. Throughout the course of life the dualism is kept up, though Bergson has faith in ultimate unity. The difficulties we have raised in this

discussion will perhaps be brushed aside by Bergson as purely imaginary ones, due to an abstract and vicious intellectualism. If we only rise to intuition and grasp things as they are, then the difficulties will disappear. If we think penetratingly, then our thoughts become one with things and the whole reality, life as well as matter, will appear to be essentially one duration. The difficulties here set forth may be regarded as due to a confusion between the theory of the *élan vital*, as the metaphysical principle of reality, and the theory of the historical evolution of life. While the latter is essentially something presented to us as a phenomenon within our ordinary intellectual view, the former requires an effort of intuition. To the intellectual view matter is a condition of life. This necessity is involved in the use of intellect itself. But intellect is only a product of creative evolution, and when we transcend intellect we transcend the dualism of life and matter. Thus our difficulties about the relation of life to matter are traced to a confusion between the metaphysical and the empirical, the intuitive and the intellectual views of the universe, between the concepts of the *élan vital* as the ultimate comprehensive reality of the universe, and that of the origin and progress of life as a historical process. This way of getting over the pressing problems of philosophy is strongly reminiscent of the monistic school of Indian Vedanta in which all the puzzling problems of the relation of Absolute to *Maya* are traced to a confusion between the *paramarthik*, or the metaphysical or the noumenal, and the *vyavaharik*, or the empirical or the phenomenal, conceptions of reality. But the noumenal and the phenomenal cannot be held apart. The metaphysical has to be related to the historical. Absolutist philosophers who make the real immutable being, find it hard to account for change ; Bergson who makes the absolute duration finds it hard to account for permanence and stability. The absolutists who are mostly 'identity' philosophers reduce difference and diversity to an appear-

ance, illusion, non-being, and irrationality. Bergson, installing himself in movement, difference, and change, disowns all permanence and identity, and dismisses them as dreams of the mind and abstractions of thought. Bergson asks us to rid ourselves of the illusions of permanence and stability by transcending intelligence and rising to intuition. This is just the discipline the absolutists set us to, if we wish to rise from the world of change to that of motionless perfection. Each of the two, identity and difference, permanence and change, which are organically related to each other, is exclusively emphasised and so caricatured. Bergson, instead of giving us a philosophical explanation of the difficulties and contradictions, exhorts us to surrender ourselves to the spontaneity of intuition. We are asked to dispense with all symbols, take shelter in faith, and in that attitude seize reality as it is. We then see God who is the centre of all things, the source of all evolution, who is unceasing freedom, activity, and creation. A cheap and facile monism indifferent to the difficulties of rational philosophy is given us.

It is hard to see how the system really differs from an abstract absolutism. In both there is one essential principle from which all things originate. Spinoza's Substance is the *ens realissimum*. It is the totality of all being. So is Bergson's absolute duration. All aspects of the universe, plants, animals and human personalities, take their rise from the creative principle. Even though Bergson calls the central principle duration, still he has as much difficulty as any absolutist in accounting for change. Plato's non-being, employed to account for the finite universe, is replaced by matter in Bergson's philosophy. This non-being or matter in both systems is neither ultimate, for in that case the monism is affected, nor phenomenal, illusory or Maya, for then the play of the universe cannot be accounted for. Indications of a more concrete idealism are not wanting in Bergson's philosophy. The ultimate unity is spiritual. Life and

matter are assumed to have started from the same source and are recognised to be complementary to each other. They both co-operate in promoting the central identity. Life and matter are the mutual implications of the original unity. Human life suggests to us the way in which the relative oppositions between life and matter, consciousness and life, can be overcome in the higher unity. The individual is essentially a discord, he is a limitation of the *élan vital* by matter: "we are the vital current loaded with matter" (C. E. p. 252). The individual can attain harmony and reach the point of view of God by spiritualising the human and the finite. Intuition and intellect are not two opposed methods of grasping reality, for only a comradeship between the two can help us to knowledge of reality as it is. But these germs of the concrete idealism in Bergson's account of life and matter we here propose to elucidate.

VII

What is the absolutist theory of the relation of life to matter and of both to the whole? In idealistic systems of philosophy, the play of the universe is looked upon as the manifestation of the creative joy of the one spirit. Activity is the essence of mind, and in its process of self-realisation the absolute mind goes forth into the forms of finitude and difference. The universe is the realisation of the nature of the Absolute. The infinite life has to limit itself in order to become manifest. All forms are brought forth for the manifestation of its nature. This self-limiting power of the Absolute is called in Indian philosophy *Maya*. Its life appears as spirit and its *maya* as matter, and these two are never disjoined during the manifestation. The supreme spirit is thus both force and matter, active and passive, male and female (Purusha and Prakriti).¹

¹ In Indian Philosophy, the Absolute becomes the self-conscious *Iswara* facing the other. *Iswara* is the personal lord facing *Mulapra-kriti* or root matter. *Iswara* becomes self-conscious through the other. The root matter later differentiates itself into various beings through the energising of *Iswara*. Before the manifestation the undifferenti-

The supreme One in relation to the universe breaks into the inseparable two, self and not-self, subject and object, being and non-being. The formless, spaceless, timeless something which would remain if the Absolute should completely annihilate itself is what we call non-being. Being and non-being depend on each other. Subject and object are correlative functions. In all our experience we have this subject-object relation. These imply each other, are broken up out of the whole and attain their reality in the whole of becoming. When the two tendencies are postulated, the rest of the work of the universe is only a struggle of one of them to dominate the other. In the lowest stages we have the pure externality of things to things, the realm of matter where self is at its lowest and not-self at its highest. But still, the purpose of matter is to serve the ends of spirit. It is the object of a subject. We discover a gradual spiritual ascent in plant and animal. This joy of spirit and life never comes to self-consciousness till we come to man. In man the spirit has come to itself. The growth is thenceforward due to development from within and not to pressure from without. Thus the whole universe is seeking more life and fuller. We have in the world the struggle of life against the lower tendency, to attain self-realisation. But throughout the universe there is the one principle of spirit manifesting itself in a series of forms which have the power of representing the whole in a greater or less degree. The history of the world has been a process of the return of the Absolute into itself in the fulness of its self-consciousness. The evolutionary process of the world would be unintelligible without immanent spiritual teleology involving a continual ascent from God's minute beginnings to ever higher forms of existence and at last to man and superman. There is an underlying spiritual reality which is the source of

ated Absolute as well as the unmanifested *Mulaprakṛiti* are nothing, and so they are indiscriminately called *Avyaktā*, the unmanifested. Hegel has justified the usage by holding that pure being and pure non-being are one. It is in becoming that they are real.

evolution, and our consciousness is one expression thereof. The dissociation of the Absolute into the two, self and its other, constitutes the beginning of creation, and the work of the world is only an attempt to get back to the original wholeness through growth. The universe is just the way through which the abstract unity becomes a concrete totality. The world process is the becoming of the whole.

So matter, according to absolute idealism, is the lowest manifestation of spirit. Absolutism does not reduce matter to spirit, but points out, that matter is there for the sake of spirit. It is there merely to pass over and return into spirit. That by which an organism develops cannot be external to it. Man is harnessing nature and adapting her processes to his ends. The external world is there in order to be used by man. It enables him to attain his freedom. Through conflict with it and conquest over it, man reaches his individuality, and so nature is the home of spirit, and Hegel is right when he says that mind is the truth of nature. Quite as much as Bergson or any other vitalist, absolute idealism holds that though life is evolved from the womb of mechanism and is dependent upon it, it cannot be looked upon as the product of mechanism. Thus absolute idealism distinguishes (1) the origin of the universe which is due to the dissociation of the whole into Being and Non-Being, (2) the process of the universe which is the warfare of these two tendencies, where (3) the progress is measured by the supremacy of being over non-being, and (4) the goal or the destiny of the universe which is the complete supremacy of being over non-being or spirit over matter, when the Absolute comes to its own. But the end and the beginning are merely ideal, and what we have is only the pathway between the two, called the universe, where we all are pilgrims.

VIII

Let us ask whether Bergson admits the reality of a whole that becomes differentiated into the two, being

and non-being, through the conflict and interaction of which the process of the universe continues. He does admit the reality of a whole which breaks in twain. The nature of that whole is psychical. The absolute is spirit. "The whole is of the same nature as the self" (*C. E.*). Bergson postulates a spiritual whole of which matter, etc., are forms. For in the historical evolution of the world first comes inert matter, then life; and so, whether Bergson calls matter the relaxation of spirit or the negative effect thereof, matter presupposes spirit. Only, in matter spirit has not come to itself. In other words, matter is a low grade of spirit. Primordial spirit or consciousness falls asunder and breaks into two. On the one side we have spirit, which is looked upon by Bergson as the creative tendency ever making for fuller and fuller freedom; on the other, it lapses into matter, absolute determination, mechanical adjustment and space. Creative life is the active determining element (*Purusha*). But there are no objects in the world which are purely spatial or purely spiritual. "Although matter stretches itself out in the direction of space, it does not completely attain it" (p. 219). Matter does not wholly coincide with pure homogeneous space (p. 230). There is neither spirit which is completely active nor matter which is completely passive. Matter and life we come across in this world are both active and passive, and the two tendencies are in them struggling with each other. Both of them are kinds of order or activity, one more vital, the other more automatic. Matter is not pure passivity. It is not non-being, as life has to take forms forced on it by matter. Becoming alone is the true reality. Bergson does not view the world as dualistic. He does not consider that the world is broken up into two disparate portions. Life and matter are not two movements separate from each other, but are only the manifestations of the two different tendencies or articulations which we discover in the one real. Reality is one, though we can describe it as a struggle of two tendencies. It is

not a mechanical mixture of two elements but a conflict of two tendencies. It is a current which we call upward when the creative spiritual tendency is conquering and downward when the non-creative tendency is conquering. Becoming, which is the union of the two principles of being and non-being, is alone real. As Hegel would put it, being or life has an impulse to complete itself, and so relates itself to non-being or matter, and passes with it into the higher category of becoming. While becoming is the sole reality, conceptual thought discovers in it being and absolute nought, which is its other. Reality is change, activity, or becoming. The history of evolution is the continuous becoming of being by overcoming its other. The succession of living forms is just the attempt of being to overcome non-being. All the objects of the universe are mixtures of these two tendencies. The relative grades of the objects are determined by the more or less of the creative or the spiritual tendency. The hierarchy of values is determined by the more or less of the spiritual nature. The universe from its beginnings in crude matter to its heights in human persons is struggling towards the attainment of the whole. The life tendency moves on, creating endless forms which advance in the direction of, and beyond, man. When man gives up his subordination to matter, then spirit comes back to its own. But in the universe this goal is never reached. Here the struggle between the two goes on. For if it stops, the universe comes to a stop; it will be the death of the universe. Neither of them can cease to operate. Creative evolution is a continuous becoming where we have the action of being conquering non-being or non-being conquering being. Were the conquest ever complete, *i.e.* were being without non-being to conquer, or *vice versa*, we should then have, either pure being or pure non-being, which are both abstractions. The very essence of creation is the strife of being and non-being. We see how what Bergson says about the classical systems of philosophy applies to his case also. He requires something negative or zero to

be added to the original being before he can have the world of change. Bergson's conception of space corresponds to the "Platonic non-being, the Aristotelian matter—a metaphysical zero which joined to the idea, like the arithmetical zero to unity, multiplies it in space and time" (*C. E.* p. 334).

When our attention is confined to the universe we see in it a struggle between the two tendencies. Bergson seems to conceive the possibility of real duration pure and spiritual, without any taint of matter or non-being. On this point there is a difference between the absolute idealists and Bergson. If we open our eyes and see the world of experience we find it to be of the nature of becoming. In this becoming we shall soon be able to perceive that there are two tendencies of spirit and matter which both seem to present themselves as equally real and fundamental and existing of their own right. This is the attitude most natural for the unreflecting mind to take up. But absolute dualism will not do, since reality is of the nature of becoming. The two coalesce into one whole. So we call them tendencies upward and downward. They are the articulations which conceptual analysis reveals to us in the nature of the real or in the process of becoming. As we find progress in the world, *i.e.* in this strife of opposites, they cannot be negatively related. They contribute to the ends of the whole. The whole breaks up into the two which are tending to come back to their original union. In this description which is given by Bergson and the absolutists, they are employing concepts. If this theory is true, then the two tendencies must have been present from the very beginning. There cannot be a stage where only one tendency is present. The two are correlative, like subject and object. When Bergson occasionally suggests that the two are accidentally related, we cannot follow him. For in Bergson the two are fundamentally related. Even where Bergson admits that spirit acts upon matter, it could not put one step to the front or move out of its circle, were there not

matter everywhere confronting it, pulling it out as it were. If this is the relation of spirit to matter, then it cannot be an accidental relation but an essential one. But Bergson seems to admit the exclusive reality of pure or absolute duration. This seems inconceivable. Perfect duration would mean perfect activity. But perfect activity without something to resist it, is a contradiction in terms. For according to Bergson we cannot conceive of activity or force unless there is something against which it can force itself. The life force is unintelligible unless there is something to push itself against or exert force upon. Bergson is very severe upon the absolutist conception of being. Whatever the absolutists might say about the dynamic spiritual energy of the absolute, he persists in calling it motionless being, which we are taught to take for nothing. But we ask, what about the spiritual current which has nothing to push itself against? Is it not to be viewed as a static blank? Our point is that the upward current of life would have nothing to push itself against, if there was no matter. It would not have been a current or activity at all. Matter is the resisting obstacle, and as such the necessary means of the spiritual activity. Bergson seems to admit the possibility of one of these tendencies existing apart from the other. For he says, matter is spirit relaxed, pure activity condensed, duration precipitated. If matter is the arrest or interruption of spirit, what causes the interruption? Why does the ever-flowing stream suddenly get itself checked and arrested instead of pursuing its course to no man's land? If the inhibition of spirit is due to the collision with matter, we are begging the question. In the freedom of consciousness and flow of mind, it is all one swift current without any impediments of solid objects and distinct things. Bergson cannot explain matter as due to the alteration of the upward spiritual current in the inverse direction. That it alters and that in the inverse direction are, as we have already shown, pure assumptions. If these assumptions are accepted, then it follows that till the particular

point was reached where the upward current altered its course, there was no matter at all. But this contradicts Bergson's view that spirit, whichever way it turns, meets with matter and collides with it. Bergson is not able to give any satisfactory explanation of the interruption or fall. It is there. It is the downward movement potential in the upward. We have the capacity for detention in our consciousness. This means that spirit contains within it the potentiality of matter. With spirit there is matter. The practical need which is the source of change is in the very heart of reality along with the perennially self-renewing freedom. To account for the return of mind from its own free course, the skeleton must be put into the box, the worm must find its way into the magic circle. Surely we do not have first spirit, then matter, and then resistance between the two. Matter is a primal tendency of life and not an interruption of it. Matter is in the very centre of life. Bergson is truly absolutist when he holds that the dualism is not absolute. The two opposite tendencies are unthinkable except in relation to each other. They are the two aspects of the one effort. They are recognised in and through the struggle with the other. We do not know what each is apart from the other. All reality is a collision between the *élan vital* and its antagonistic cross-current which are unknowable as pure forms. Bergson is not consistent with his better and more logical self when he suggests that what exists first is the unhindered movement of spirit, later comes its arrest; and from that point onwards the struggle commences. He is logical when he says that from the beginning spirit collides with matter, that matter is contained in spirit as consciousness contains its detention. The two tendencies are present from the start, opposing each other and making for richness and variety, in the one life process of the world.

The becoming of the world is constituted by the two tendencies of life and matter. From the *élan vital* the whole universe develops by divergent evolution. The

élan vital and the force that opposes it have also a common ground, and so the life and matter of Bergson correspond to the self and not-self of the absolutists. One is the spiritual tendency which by overcoming the other material tendency makes for progress. In the lowest stages, the material tendency has in a sense conquered the spiritual, and we have there neither indetermination, nor choice, nor freedom. The not-self is in the ascendant, and all the changes of the material universe are purely self-repeating. We cannot, simply because it has not the characteristics of spirit, say it has nothing to do with spirit. Reality for Bergson as for the absolutists is spiritual, but this spirit lapses in the lowest stages where the automatic tendency is relatively supreme. That even matter is not pure non-being Bergson admits when he says that intellect does not give us a true picture of the material world, for it exaggerates its material character. Were matter completely material, intellect would be able to show us reality as it is. Then intellect would become intuition, for it is the nature of intuition to give us things as they are. From this lowest stage spirit is slowly progressing. We have life, and as this life takes on more of the freedom and indetermination characteristic of spirit, consciousness appears, and life becomes elevated to the next higher stage of animal life. Soon the animal consciousness becomes associated with reasoning and gets transformed into the human mind, and this human mind is also a stage to be surpassed.

That all these may well be looked upon as the higher and lower forms of spirit, whose nature is activity or becoming, Bergson admits when he says that all reality is a becoming or an unfolding. Reality is psychical throughout, and one of its indispensable characteristics is embodied in matter, in the pure externality of things to each other. The nature of a psychical content is to change, and this change is present everywhere, and in some cases, where consciousness is needed, it makes its appearance. The ultimate nature of reality is like that

of our inner life which is mind, spirit, freedom. All other reality differs from this only in degree and not in kind. Reality is a whole, concrete and universal, holding together in indissoluble unity aspects which in abstraction from one another and from their unity in the whole are contradictory, absolutely exclusive and even destructive of one another. Life and matter appear diametrically opposed in their nature, properties and the ends they have in view. One seems to be working against the other. But they are so only when they are abstracted from the whole to which they belong. In the whole they are found to live in a harmony ; apart from it they say, Kill me or I shall kill you. The opposites are opposed to one another and not to the unity. As Hegel would put it, the only reality is the concrete universal. The opposite aspects are mutually dependent, though antagonistic, moments of the universal. The pulse-beat of the universe is constituted by their unending strife. This is Hegel. This is Bergson. Only Bergson seems to consider the strife to be the end of things, the ultimate expression of the universe, while Hegel holds that their negativity is cancelled in the whole, viewed from a broader standpoint than that of narrow individual existence or experience. Reality ceases to be a strife of opposites and becomes a whole where the parts are mutually indispensable. Their seeming negation expresses the aspect of strife in the real. Reality is neither pure being nor pure becoming, neither one nor many, but a being in becoming, a one in the many. We shall revert to this topic at a later stage.

There are passages where Bergson views the universe of change as the progressive realisation of the ideal of the one in the many. What Bergson speaks of as life and its evolution is really spirit and its evolution. "As the smallest grain of dust is bound up with our entire solar system, drawn along with it in that undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself, so all organised beings from the humblest to the highest, from the first origins of life to the time in which we are, and in all

places as in all times do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of the movement of matter, in itself indivisible" (C. E. p. 285). The evolution of spirit into the universe is the everlasting realisation of the ideal of the one in the many. Throwing itself into endless species and individuals, it appears as many different lives. This is difference or plurality, but there is also sameness or unity. There is one and the same life force at work. One life has assumed infinite diversity of forms. Individual lives are but forms of the over-individual universal life. "Charged from the outset with the infinity of the diverse psychic potentialities of the species and the individuals which were yet to be, life realised all its latent possibilities by branching in many different directions without sacrificing the unity of its original concentrated form." Life process is the progressive realisation of the One through the Many. It is the supreme instance of the highest form of the universal which we call by the name of the concrete identity. Though Bergson is not clearly conscious of it, still the logic of his argument compels him to consent to the reality of a *whole* in which strife is.

While the absolutist considers the two tendencies to be those of self and not-self, Bergson calls them life and matter. Here Bergson is in the wrong. For if mechanical explanations cannot account for vital phenomena, since the properties possessed by organisms are different from those of crystals, then we may well ask whether purely biological explanations will account for conscious phenomena and psychological explanations for moral values. In the process of evolution we have gaps not only between the organic and the inorganic, but also between the physiological and the organic, the conscious and the physiological, the moral and the conscious. It is an arbitrary procedure to say that life and matter should be distinguished since physico-chemical explanations will not do for vital phenomena, but to content oneself with saying that consciousness and morality are only stages of life.

If consciousness and memory, logic and morality, can be looked upon as two grades of life, in spite of the fact that the laws of organic growth are inadequate to account for conscious and moral phenomena, in exactly the same manner, since mechanical explanations cannot account for organic objects, why can we not look upon matter also as a phase of life, lower than organisms? Either we should consider all these, men, animals, plants and minerals as stages of the one essence, or the world must be looked upon not as the warfare of two tendencies, life and matter, but four principles, matter, life, consciousness and reason. Bergson with the absolutists is willing to reject the latter alternative. He is anxious to establish a monism, notwithstanding the struggle of the world. If so, is it not better to use a term which is not so clearly associated with one of these stages as life? It will not do to call them all stages of life, as this term is closely associated with biological phenomena. We shall have to say, then, that all these are higher and lower forms of the one essential spirit. The whole manifests itself at one stage as matter, at another as life, at the third as animal consciousness, at the fourth as human intelligence. They are all forms of spirit at different stages. Instead of saying they are types of organisation due to life, we should say they are grades of spirit. As a matter of fact, Bergson is not very careful in his use of the word life. Life and consciousness are sometimes used synonymously. Life sometimes refers to the vital phenomena. We distinguish broadly three different usages: (1) the superconscious whole which breaks into the two, or (2) the upward current which comes into conflict with the downward one: "Life as a whole from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world will appear as a wave which rises and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter" (*C. E.* p. 284). "Life is essentially a current sent through matter, drawing from it what it can" (p. 280), or (3) the process of becoming which is due to the interaction of the two, spirit and space, being

and non-being. "Life is consciousness launched into matter." "Consciousness is distinct from the organism it animates, although it must undergo its vicissitudes" (*C. E.* p. 284).

Bergson bases his extreme opposition of life and matter on the ground that while in the physical world changes are external, being merely displacements of parts, in the world of vital phenomena changes are internal, being genuine creations of novelty. In what science calls the physical world time does not enter, and the present is determined by the past according to the necessary relations which science may discover; in the world of vital phenomena, time is very real and the future incompletely determined by the present. Predictability is possible in the world of physical phenomena, since all is given at the outset and everything is mechanically determined. In the vital world, which is free and spontaneous, predictability is impossible. Bergson again and again refers to the creative character of life and compares it to the ripening of fruit, while the movement of the physical world consists in a mere reshuffling of the old elements. Bergson emphasises the discontinuous and contingent nature of life. But a closer examination reveals to us that life is not so full of surprises as we are led to believe. Even Bergson insists on the continuity of life. Its future is not discontinuous with its past. Unless there be something common he would have no right to say that the life is one continuous whole. Emphasis on the continuity of living processes means connection between the past and the present. To that extent contingency is excluded. The only difference between the two lies in the kind of action. While mechanical acts are determined externally, vital acts are determined internally. But from this to infer that the activities of the one are rigid while those of the other are free is wrong and untrue to facts. Organisms are determined from within, by their own nature, while crystals are determined from the outside. When Bergson has an eye on facts, he sees

clearly that life is not a series of takings by storm, or leaps from one thing to another, but a continuous evolution. Life is not a repetition of the same parts, nor is matter that: it is a coherence of differences in a whole. As for novelty, it is not the property of vital phenomena only.

All that Bergson has established is that organisation is not manufacture, nor is an organism a machine. We cannot submit life process to mathematical treatment. "Astronomy, physics and chemistry cannot account for life phenomena. Calculation touches at most certain phenomena of organic destruction. Organic creation . . . we cannot submit to a mathematical treatment" (*C. E.* p. 21). Life cannot be resolved into matter and motion. Mechanical categories are not an adequate explanation of life process which resembles more the life of mind than that of the mineral. But this does not mean complete discontinuity between the two. "We do not question the fundamental identity of inert matter and organised matter." "That life is a kind of mechanism I cordially agree" (*C. E.* p. 32). The vitalists and the absolutists have an eye on both the continuity and the discontinuity of life and matter. They agree with Bergson in thinking that pure mechanism is insufficient to account for the phenomena of life; but they do not rush to the conclusion that therefore life is in every way opposed to matter. Bergson starts with an absolute opposition between the organic and the inorganic. But he has no right to do so, since there is as much opposition between the organic and the conscious, the conscious and the intellectual. If life is a fight against matter, consciousness is a fight against life. But if there is continuity between life and consciousness, then there is continuity between life and matter. Bergson cannot have much objection to the idealist solution of life and matter. In life matter is not destroyed but only transmuted. Life is not the destruction of matter, but only its transformation. The properties of matter are caught up in a higher synthesis. The idealist as well as Bergson

emphasises the uniqueness of life. He knows that it cannot be reduced to an aspect of matter. Life is more than mechanism, but is still born in it. To him life and matter are higher and lower aspects of a single reality.

That the two, matter and life, are not absolute opposites but relative differences in a whole, promoting the one unity of spirit, comes out in Bergson's writings. "Life must be something which avails itself of a certain elasticity in matter" (*Life and Consciousness*). "Life seems to have succeeded in this [overcoming the resistance of matter] by dint of humility, by making itself very small and very insinuating, bending to physical and chemical forces, consenting even to go part of the way with them. . . . Of phenomena in the simplest forms of life, it is hard to say whether they are already vital. Life had to enter thus into habits of inert matter, in order to draw it little by little, magnetised as it were, to another track" (*C. E.* p. 103-104). Bergson's contention that matter is only the relaxation of spirit, suggests the idealist view that mind has only to reveal the mind in matter. Matter, according to Bergson, is congealed mind, while according to Hegel it is concealed mind. To both, it is mind come to rest. Materiality is what life itself assumes. Life is only the truth of matter, as in Hegel mind is the truth of nature. In Bergson, while both matter and mind are looked upon as movement they are different because matter is self-repeating movement, while mind is creative movement. Consciousness and memory distinguish life from matter. Memory is just the way in which the past persists in the present. The persistence of the past in the present is common to both matter and mind. But as mind is essentially creative, it retains the past not by way of simple repetition or mere unaltered reproduction but in a different way which is called memory. So memory is only the special form which the common feature of the persistence of the past in the present has assumed in the case of mind. Consciousness again does not distinguish matter from mind absolutely, since for

Bergson, matter is so far from being the opposite of mental contents that it may be spoken of as consisting of images, which we would perceive were our perception pure, *i.e.* unadulterated with memory and sensation. These images can exist without being perceived. They generally exist so in the case of matter, for since there is no indetermination in it, it has no consciousness. But when it enters the living body the movement is held up for a time in the zone of indetermination provided by the nervous system. This arrest makes it become a conscious perception. Matter is thus only mind which through losing its indetermination no longer has need of either consciousness or memory. Consciousness and memory, then, are not points in which mind differs from matter absolutely, but rather the consequences of what according to Bergson is the fundamental difference, *viz.* the disappearance of novelty. Whether it is so fundamental is, as we already stated, open to debate. It is strange that while absolutist thinkers, although they make mind and matter differ in essential respects, still view them as phases of one whole, Bergson, though minimising the distinction, is not willing to consider them as belonging to one whole. But this absolutist conclusion is the logical implication of Bergson's argument. When he says that the nature of the whole reality is psychical it follows that life and matter are means to each other. They are parts of one whole, to be regarded as higher and lower phases of it.

CHAPTER VI

BERGSON AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM (*continued*)

I

WHILE the absolutist holds to a teleological conception of the universe, rejecting mechanism, Bergson rejects both. But to make his system consistent and satisfactory Bergson is obliged to admit teleology. For Bergson, reality is creative evolution. It is spontaneous creative process. Time is the very substance of reality. Mechanism and teleology both reduce time to an empty appearance, and rob the universe of everything in it which is unique and novel. The universe is determined by a first cause, according to mechanism, by a final cause according to teleology. Mechanism regards "the future and the past as calculable functions of the present," and claims that all is given (*C. E.* p. 40). The world of nature becomes a mechanism in which there is no room for the novel, the unique and the individual. If we cannot grasp the whole universe in one comprehensive vision, it is due to our mental impotence. Nor do we fare better with teleology, which conceives the world as the realisation of an absolute purpose. If the world is the working out of a prearranged plan, the cosmic process is non-creative. The world is committed to an externally imposed programme. Real time and duration become futile. The end is inevitable. There is no risk, no failure, no uncertainty. But for Bergson nothing is inevitable. Everything is in the making. "There is

radical contingency in progress, incommensurability between what goes before and what follows, in short, duration" (*C. E.* p. 30). Time is supremely significant and real. Both mechanism and teleology go against the central conceptions of Bergson's philosophy. In both everything is given ready-made from the first. Only teleology substitutes the pull of the future for the push of the past. It is inverted mechanism. Whether the individual is the result of the interaction of atoms or only a passing thought of God there is no place for the individual with his freedom and individuality.

II

But is Bergson's account of the nature of creative evolution correct? Is it an incessant flow without any plan or purpose? Does it not reveal a tendency or a fulfilment of end or purpose? Are we to think that this process of eternal change follows no end and pursues no purpose? In his anti-absolutist bias he regards the absolute as an eternal immutability making all agitation and disquiet illusory. And so Bergson starts with his conception of reality as becoming, but this leaves no room for rest and stability. Perpetual flux is the real. Bergson's cosmic principle seems to be the mirror of the twentieth-century soul which lives in an atmosphere of constant hustle and excitement in a perennial maelstrom of events. The world becomes unintelligible caprice since the creative principle is looked upon as obeying no laws, and fulfilling no ends. In short, absolute chaos would prevail, in which nothing rational could be undertaken. Unbridled force or mere change without a controlling element would mean death or confusion. Chaos is God. In a world of such absolute caprice, man will have to shut his shop and descend into dust at the earliest opportunity. It is impossible that Bergson should mean all that he says when he is emphasising the absence of teleology. It

cannot be that he is satisfied with a world without rhyme or reason.

If the world is only a bundle of disconnected states, if it is only a series of *tableaux*, we cannot be sure that the world is progressing at all. How can we be sure that the changes are all in the right direction? Unless we have a whole which is present throughout the universe, we cannot have any guarantee of progress. In its absence the world would be mere caprice, purposeless growth. What appears to us would be the ultimate reality. If the world with its horror and imperfection were the sole reality, if there were not in it a stable spiritual purpose which is working for the values and ideals of spirit, then we should be compelled to view the universe as a great tragedy indeed. If faith in the whole, faith in the possibility of harmony in the world is absent, what is there to inspire effort? Bergson cannot hold to any such conception of an irrational *durée* which throws no light on the heaps of happenings we call the world; for "an absolutely irrational *durée* might suddenly stop creating, explode, go into nothing and refuse to come back; its creation might be like the frenzies of a madman, or the ravings of genius run mad."¹ Bergson is sane enough to shrink from any such conception. As much as any absolutist he holds to a conception of an identity in difference, a whole in the world. Even with him all is given. Nothing comes into existence that was not there before. Bergson's creative principle does not create out of nothing. If the new existences were to be sudden and abrupt, having no relation to the past, they would have to be put down as mechanical additions from without. But Bergson, with idealists, thinks that they are developments from within. The life impulse contains an infinite number of possibilities. It is an "immensity of potentiality" (*C. E.* p. 272). Bergson is wrong in thinking that nothing is given. The creative principle, like the Leibnizian monad, is self-sufficient and has all the

¹ Frank Thilly in the *Philosophical Review*, xxii. 217.

potencies in it. The "organised world is a harmonious whole" (p. 53). The whole is an organic development where every stage is the sum of its preceding stages. There is enough of law and regularity in the working of the creative principle. The items of the creative evolution obey order and are not irrational. The *élan vital* battles with matter and overcomes it. Though Bergson does not admit the conception of a fixed goal towards which the process of evolution is tending, he still holds to the reality of a conscious tendency. Bergson does not say that the flux of the world is the whole. He postulates a God who is "the source whence issue successively, by an effect of his freedom, the currents or impulses each of which will make the world." He does not think that "what has always existed is the world itself" (Bergson's letter quoted in pp. 42-43 of *Henri Bergson, His Life and Philosophy*, Ruhe and Paul). Here Bergson clearly tells us that the world of change is not the all, but there is a God who is the source of it. There is unity of direction which ensures that there is no ambiguity, at least, no chance in the outcome. Thus Bergson is obliged to admit that while reality is a flux in one sense, in another it has a static aspect. Viewed from without, the cosmic process appears to be a plurality of individuals; from within, it appears a unitary energy. Bergson is not a monist if monism is wrongly interpreted so as to exclude plurality. But in the true sense of the word, he is a monist, as the plurality is the outcome of the original unity.

But when Bergson recognises the reality of a whole in which changes occur he cannot say that time is the ultimate reality. So if progress is to be assured, there must be a whole, and if there is a whole then time is not the absolute reality. As Bradley puts it, "If there is to be no supreme spiritual power which is above chance and change, our own spiritual interests are not safeguarded. But with any such power it seems to me nonsense to talk of the absolute reality of time" (*Truth and Reality*, footnote to p. 250).

III

Bergson frequently reminds us that the nature of reality resembles our psychical life. The only teleology of which we are conscious is the teleology of human life. Every other teleology is an inference. How does our human life proceed? Man aims at and pursues ends. We cannot say that his purposive willing and deliberate adaptation of means to ends freely chosen are all delusions. The presence of purposes freely chosen does not deprive man of his freedom. He is not in the grip of a law of progress imposed from without; for his ideals are set for him not by events, not by law, but by himself. There is novelty also since the course of moral life is the process through which an abstract ideal acquires flesh and blood, colour and perfume. Moral progress depends on new and untried expressions of creative spontaneity and freedom. The ideal is not yet realised, and the process of realisation will be something novel. We have there the novelty of becoming. Teleology operates in human life without depriving it of its freedom and initiative, novelty and creation. When Bergson admits that the acts though they cannot be foreseen can be accounted for by us when once they occur, he admits that they are embodiments of reason and purpose. Were they really contingent, we could not account for them. "M. Bergson holds that events, which, because they are contingent, even infinite powers of calculation could not foresee, may yet be accounted for even by our very modest powers of thought after they have occurred. I own this somewhat surprises me" (Balfour, *Hibbert Journal*, x. 13). This would be no surprise if it be admitted that they are not contingent even though they cannot be foreseen. R. L. Stevenson says: "I, as a personal artist, can begin a character with only a haze in my head; but how if I have to translate the haze into words *before I begin*? I can find language for every mood; but how could I

*tell any one beforehand what this effect was to be, which it would take every art I possessed and hours and hours of deliberate selection and rejection to produce?"*¹ Even in such acts of genius, though we cannot foretell, it is still clear that the original inspiration controls the whole process. There is the purpose of the artist present throughout, though it may undergo modifications in the very act of realisation. We do not say that simply because a purpose is present therefore moral life is a mere mechanical adjustment to a purpose imposed from without. Ethical life is a free, spontaneous, creative expression of the total active self of man. We have in it not merely the changing process but also the stable purpose. We do not have a dualism between the process and the purpose, for the process is only the expression of the purpose. If we make the purpose external to the process then the process becomes something externally determined. The two are aspects of the one whole. The process and the purpose evolve together; they are the twin expressions of the concrete life. The end is not predetermined but grows *pari passu* with the activity of its realisation. If then the moral life of man is the free pursuit of self-chosen ideals, cannot the cosmic life be conceived on its analogy? For, after all, the ideas of freedom and novelty are derived from human life. "Dynamism starts from the idea of voluntary activity given by consciousness." The cosmic process may be the free pursuit of ever-growing cosmic ends. As human conduct is free activity and consists in the creative expression of the entire past experience in free acts, even so the world may be viewed as a free spontaneous creativity. Random business without end or aim may result in abortions and misdeeds, but not in genuine creativity. Bergson's creative evolution is a regular continuous evolution fulfilling plans and purposes. The rich world with its wonderful variety and colour is more

¹ I owe this illustration to E. Hermann's book on *Eucken and Bergson*, p. 164.

the expression of artistic genius than of aimless dilettantism. So a teleology of the highest kind prevails in cosmic evolution. Such is the logical conclusion from Bergson's frequent insistence on the kinship of the cosmic process to human life. This principle that Reality is of the nature of self-consciousness or spirit is not the discovery of Bergson, even if we confine our attention to Europe. It had been vaguely suggested by philosophers before Kant, half understood by him, taken up by Fichte and Schelling, and completely developed by Hegel. As reality is of the nature of mind, it is a concrete universal or the perfect individual.

IV

It is urged that the absolutist theory which makes the process of the world a mere revelation of the nature of the whole deprives man of his freedom. The work of the universe becomes a twice-told tale. It adds nothing to the original unity. Reality exists ideally in the Absolute, and the Absolute is experience as it develops in time. This theory takes all as given, and makes freedom an appearance. It cannot be reconciled with a real time process. If the end is already achieved, then the moral struggle is useless. Reality becomes perfection eternally complete, something to which we can add nothing. But absolutism believes that the principle of wholeness works through man. There is a progressive realisation of the absolute in the world. The analogy of logical inference suggests how it is possible for the whole to be realised in a real process without making the process lose its sense and significance. We speak about the paradox of inference, that the conclusion must be contained in the premises and must also be something new. Both sides of this are true. Even though the conclusion is contained in the premises, it still requires the exercise of the logical intellect to draw it out. In the same manner, even though the essence of the world process is contained in the absolute, still the

effort of man and the process of the world are needed to draw out this essence and make it concrete. We do not say that the movement of thought is either unreal or unnecessary. It is a real activity that creates. Why should we say that the work of the world is either unreal or unnecessary?

V

Bergson may fear that if there be granted an ultimate purpose, then when that purpose is gained the process of the evolution of the universe must come to a full stop. If life were nothing more than the realisation of a plan, then when the goal is reached there must be cessation of activity; but for Bergson there is no finality since there is unending creation. "It is a creation that goes on for ever in virtue of an initial movement" (*C. E.* p. 105). It is so even for the absolutists, since it is impossible for the end to be reached in the time process. The universe can never become the complete expression of reality. For reality is like the complete integer trying to express itself in the terms $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$. This can go on extending without end but will never reach the limit. The whole remains an ideal only, however much the ideal is realised in the distinctions of the world. It is impossible for us to realise the whole in the finite world. We cannot empty the sea with a shell. We see that Bergson holds to an immanent evolutionary teleology which has the support of the absolutists also.

VI

Bergson believes that intellect is inadequate to the grasp of reality. We need intuition for it. There are some absolutists who are of the same opinion, who hold that intellect gives us the highest *knowledge* while intuition gives *reality*. It is only by a rough usage that we can call intuition also a kind of knowledge. For the

intuitive knowledge of these absolutists is really the intellectual love where the distinctions of intellect cease to have any applicability. In intuition the seer and the seen become one. This ineffable unity, they consider, cannot be described. It is an experience beyond utterance. The individual is lost in the divine eternal essence, and intellect cannot do justice to the fullness and force of that experience. But absolutists generally take care to establish intellectually the reality of that experience. Were it unreal, art, science and morality would lose their significance. This all-comprehensive reality is the pre-supposition of all our existence. In one sense or other this intuitive experience is admitted by the absolutists, from the thinkers of the Vedanta downwards. Plato, Plotinus, Dante, Spinoza, Hegel, Bradley and Bosanquet adopt it in different ways.

But no absolutist identifies it with the immediate data of sense. His intuition is not crude perception. It is the exercise of consciousness as a whole ; it is mind penetrated by the heart, knowledge suffused by feeling, intellect transfigured by emotion. Intuitive experiences are the moments of deepest wisdom which give us glimpses into the ultimate essence, or the whole which is the true and the real. Intuition is always viewed as the perfection of rational experience, since the demand of reason becomes a fulfilment in it. Intellectual stages will give us only arguments about it : but they will be unilluminated. In intuition, on the other hand, the soul meets the real about which it hears and argues through intellect. In the light of this fullness of experience which is the goal of logic, our intellectual knowledge looks relative and partial but not false. Intuitional experience alone is whole and absolute, where we feel the essential identity between the knower and the known. In a sense this cannot be called knowledge, as the latter depends upon the existence of the duality between the two. But the duality is also a unity, and this unitary aspect is emphasised in intuition. If there is anything that baffles

intellectual apprehension, it is the whole and nothing else. Intuition is a kind of knowledge and a kind of life. Bergson makes it both, but in him it is more a kind of life. For in intuition the knower plunges into the flux of reality and knows that reality from within by being one with it. It is knowledge that swims within the stream of life. Here truth is completely identified with reality. And this consciousness is not knowledge. As Bradley argues, truth when it becomes existential nullifies the distinction between the knower and the known on the basis of which knowledge develops. "Truth, while it is truth, differs from reality, and if it ceased to be different, would cease to be true" (*Truth and Reality*). Whatever opinion we may have about the soundness of Bradley's doctrine, this much can be safely asserted, that in the intuition of the absolutists the knower no longer regards himself as a particular, though he is that as an existing knower in dealing with others, but as the whole including himself. The point is that intuition with absolutists does not mean a break with our ordinary thought or an inversion of our rational procedure, but is only an expansion or completion of the labour of intellect, a grasp or comprehension which sees things as a whole. It is, in the expression of Wordsworth, reason in its most exalted mood. It is knowledge of the whole or integral experience. As Kant says, the ultimate principles are only ideals to pure reason, while to practical reason they are realities. Matters of faith are also ideas of necessary thought. Intuitive beliefs are to be logically necessitated by intellectual proofs. Intuition pure and simple is likely to land us in difficulties. No knowledge is possible if intellect is silenced. No intuitive experience can be the basis of a philosophical truth unless intellect endorses it. Without the aid of intellect intuition is not distinct from mystical gazing, and that is no substitute for philosophy. When Bergson makes intuition a kind of life, it becomes impossible of practice. We have true knowledge, he says, when we become one with the real, when the knower and the thing

known become one. "By intuition," Bergson means "that kind of intellectual sympathy by which one sets oneself in the interior of an object in order to coincide with the very reality of that object, with its uniqueness, with that in it, consequently, which cannot be expressed" (*Introduction to Met.*). To know reality we must become reality. Intuition is an effort to dissolve into the whole, but how is this possible? How can we know anything else than our own consciousness? How can we become one with, or assimilate the duration of the plant and the insect or a fellow-man or the world? How can we place ourselves in the moving currents of other objects? To know reality, the individuality or the concrete duration of reality must interpenetrate the being of the knower, but the possibility is that when it comes to consciousness it may get fused with his own duration in one blended whole. And when we say that we know the object, we are either drawing upon our imagination or relying on intellect. If we are doing the former, we would be opening the flood-gates to every form of mysticism, emotionalism and sentimentalism. The only chance of agreement among different intuitions seems to be chance. If two people have the same vision they may agree, but their experience will not be authoritative for others. We need somehow to bring Bergson's intuition nearer intellect. It is not life but our knowing consciousness keeping in step with the rhythm of the duration of the object intuited. It is only if we make intuition intellectual that there is any chance of communicating our intuitions to others. Were it not intellectual, how can an individual who has felt the duration of his own life assume that other people have the same experience? What is it that compels him to think that the essence of the world is of the same nature as his own consciousness? Intuition reveals to us only our inner life. How can we get from it a conception that shall embrace life as a whole? It has been the tendency of philosophers to make a part express the nature of the

whole, and Bergson finds the nature of consciousness a perpetual unfolding or creation, and so is brought to hold that what is true of the most intimate depths of our inner life furnishes the model according to which we may represent all other reality. But that the whole reality is of the same nature as the self, Bergson cannot assume. No intuition can give rise to this view. It is due to thought. Even if we assume for argument's sake that intuition can give us the truth of our inner life, it is thinking that enables us to grasp the true nature of everything else than our consciousness. Bergson admits this when he says that "dialectic is necessary to put intuition to the proof, necessary also in order that intuition should break itself into concepts and so be propagated to other men" (*C. E.* p. 251). Intuition has to be supported and supplemented by reason. Intuition when unguided by reason becomes instinct, and when supported by it it becomes divine and creative intuition. Intuition of the right sort will give us truths satisfactory to reason. Reason must sit in judgement over the findings of intuition and evaluate them. Absolute idealism has faith in the hidden harmonies of the universe, because they are to it matters of logical demonstration. The faith of absolute idealism is rational faith.

Bergson consents to the co-operation between faith and reason, intuition and intellect: "It is impossible to have an intuition of reality, *i.e.* an intellectual sympathy with its innermost nature, unless its confidence has been won by long comradeship with its external manifestations." Again, "it is reality itself in the profoundest meaning of the word that we reach by the combined and progressive development of science and philosophy" (*C. E.* p. 199). In these passages Bergson recognises that intuition need not throw overboard the results of intellect, but should only continue the work begun by intellect. "It is from intelligence that has come the push that has made it rise to the point it has reached" (p. 177). Here Bergson has not identified his

intuition with uncriticised experience or untested feeling, but has clearly advocated a *rapprochement* between the two, science and philosophy. "Notwithstanding his high valuation of intuition, he thought it should always be tested by verification, regarding intuition as a valuable guide-board, but one that, like other guide-boards, might point wrong" (Miller's *Bergson and Religion*, p. 79). We clearly see that Bergson's intuition is not emotional mysticism, but comes very near Spinoza's intellectual love, or Kant's practical reason, or Schelling's intellectual intuition. But still we cannot class Bergson with the absolutists, as a different view of the relation between the two, intellect and intuition, runs throughout his writings. His distrust of intellect is so great that it is enough to make us pause before we venture to rank him as an absolute idealist in his view of this problem.

Though Bergson comes very near the absolutists when he asserts that intellect gives us partial accounts of reality, still he breaks away from them when he holds that it does not touch reality at all. We have not much to choose between Bergson and the absolutists if he asserts that while both intellect and intuition give us knowledge of reality, one does it fully and perfectly, while the other does it partially and imperfectly. St. Paul says, "We know in part" (1 Cor. xiii. 9). Bergson sometimes, and the absolutist always, holds to this doctrine. This is the only view that can make Bergson's philosophy logical and consistent. But the other view that intellect distorts and mutilates reality is the more prominent doctrine in Bergson and gives uniqueness to his system. He wants us to grasp reality without the intervention of intellectual formulas. Our mind should become one with the central stream of life, and should not allow itself to be diverted from it by the fixed forms of intellect towards matter which owes its existence to the necessities of action. We must take reality by storm, seize it by a direct effort of introspection. We must catch reality on the wing without allowing reflection to settle on it to

reduce it to a series of states. Intellect cannot grasp reality as it is. It can only arrest it, break it up, schematise it. Bergson agrees with the pragmatists in thinking that intellect is an instrument of action. It is valuable in the world of inert matter where mechanism reigns, where there is nothing living, no individuality, no inwardness. It can well describe things at rest. When intellect tries to construct a picture of the universe it gives us a skeleton of skin and bone, and not a body of flesh and blood. Intellect misses the meaning of the whole and gives us relative symbolic pictures. It gives us snapshots of life while intuition seizes its movement. Intellect scratches only the surface of reality while intuition is needed to grasp its meaning. This view is due to an inadequate appreciation of the nature of reality as well as of intellectual activity.

Reality is looked upon by Bergson as a flow, a duration. Intellect cannot grasp duration but only that which endures. It makes of reality, which is unceasing flow or pure duration, a static motionless appearance. If intellect attempts to deal with the real it ends by spatialising it. It mechanises mind. The flow of duration slips between its fingers and in the place of the flow we have a series of juxtaposed concepts. We get for the perpetual flow a set of immobile pictures. Reality, as it is, is beyond the province of intellect. The phenomena of life cannot be squeezed into the rubrics of reason. Life eludes logic. Philosophy must be intuitive while science may be intellectual. "If science is to extend action on things, and if we can act only with inert matter for instrument, science can and must continue to treat the living as it has treated the inert. But in doing so it must be understood that the further it penetrates the depths of life, the more symbolic, the more relative to the contingencies of action the knowledge it supplies to us becomes" (*C. E.* pp. 198-199). Science treats of the immobile and the lifeless, but what is, is fluid and living. Philosophy dispenses with the symbols and

knows the real. Science, according to the absolutist, is viewed as giving us partial and imperfect knowledge of reality, but, according to Bergson, has no ontological significance at all. It is a product of fancy and imagination. "The philosopher must go further than the scientist. Making a clean sweep of everything that is only an imaginative symbol, he will see the material world melt back into a simple flux, a continuity of flowing, a becoming, and he will thus be prepared to discover real duration there where it is still more useful to find it, in the realm of life and consciousness" (*C. E.* p. 369). There is an absolute distinction between intuition and intelligence, philosophy and science. On this view the absolutist theory that intellect leads to intuition, science to philosophy, becomes a meaningless absurdity.

What is Bergson's distrust of intellect due to? Is he right in thinking that intellect can deal only with the static and the dead, the logical and the mathematical? No. Kant started with a similar view, but in the course of his work got over it. He begins by making intellect logical and mathematical in nature, so that it cannot account for vital and psychical processes. Since reality is looked upon by Bergson as vital and psychical in its nature, intellect which is, according to Bergson, logical and mathematical, becomes abstract and subjective. Intellect becomes limited to the world of inert matter. Mechanical categories will not give the essence of life. Intellect becomes incapable of grasping reality as it is. If we assume that science is identical with mechanism, then this conclusion is inevitable. Science requires supplementation by philosophy. For Bergson, intellect and science are mechanical. "Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness; intuition goes in the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction" (*C. E.* p. 267). But Kant revised his starting-point. His work taken as a whole shows that intellect is not purely mechanical. In the *Critique of*

Practical Reason, and in the *Critique of Judgment*, ethical and aesthetic categories are also employed. In his *Logic* Hegel codifies them all. There is no doubt that Kant's later view, which is practically the same as Hegel's, is a more rational one than his earlier view. If, following that view, we regard thought as including not only the Kantian categories of understanding but also those of ethical and aesthetic apprehension. Bergson would find that reason is adequate to interpret the whole of experience. Thought would then become an explication of the real. The attitude of doubt and distrust, which ought to have been confined to the pretensions of naturalistic science to interpret the infinite riches of mind and nature, is unlawfully extended to reason as a whole.

Besides the Kantian theory of understanding, the other fact that leads Bergson to think that intellect is mechanical is the consideration that the intellectual man is pre-eminently a tool-making animal. As the animal consciousness has no control over matter, and cannot make mechanical appliances, and as the intellectual man can do these things easily, it is thought that intellect has been evolved to enable him to control matter and harness it to man's needs. Bergson admits that man is not only a tool-applying but also a tool-making animal. . . . Intelligence is "the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools." It is capable of "indefinitely varying the manufacture" (*C. E.* p. 146). This means adaptation, or creative construction. Though the application of tools, symbols and concepts may be mechanical, still the first making of them cannot be that. Even Mr. Lindsay thinks that this account does not do justice to the nature of intellect. "The use of the machine may be mechanical but not its invention, for that requires the insight of genius" (*Philosophy of Bergson*). Knowledge of the universal is an act of spirit, while its application may be a matter of routine. It is an act of spirit or intelligence higher than that of mechanical understanding. So when Bergson grants that by intellect man makes tools,

he also grants that intellect is not mechanical. It then follows that for understanding life and its secrets we do not require a process opposed to intellect.

By the cleavage his metaphysics makes between the world of matter and the world of life and mind, Bergson is led to distinguish between intellect and intuition. Life movement in nature is due to the *élan vital* pushing itself through matter. Matter is dead while life and consciousness are living. To live is to create and invent. Bergson believes that because intellect mechanises life it has to be overthrown, and we have to take for our pilot intuition or faith. But surely protests against the mechanisation of life do not amount to protests against the use of intellect; for rationalist thinkers since the time of Plato have protested against the mechanisation of life and mind. Rationalism is not bound to treat the universe in such a dead and wooden way. Besides, we have seen how Bergson is wrong in thinking that life and matter are absolutely opposed, as they are only the lower and higher manifestations of spirit. In that case the opposition of thought to life breaks down. Continuity between life and matter means continuity between intuition and intellect. Thought becomes only a progressive interpretation of experience. The logic of Bergson's argument requires us to postulate a continuity of spirit throughout reality, as matter, life, consciousness are only the slowly-developing stages of the one spiritual ascent. Thought becomes adequate to its grasp. Intuition and mechanical understanding become the higher and lower aspects of a process, essentially the same throughout its stages. The philosophical or the intuitive view is that of absolute knowledge, and constitutes the highest kind of intellectual experience, while the mechanical view is the lowest.

Bergson thinks that intellect can deal only with abstract, repeating identities. As reality is concrete and ever creating differences, intellect must confess itself humbled in its presence. It can use words as tools or

symbols. The application of these depends on repetition. Intellect can never grasp the individuality of the real, but can only reconstitute it "with given and consequently stable elements" (*C. E.* p. 173). Intellect is here reduced to a bare apprehension of identity. Dr. Bosanquet has subjected this doctrine to a careful examination (see *Logic*, vol. ii., on "A Defective Formulation of the Inductive Law of Reasoning"). He considers it incorrect to say that intellect is inadequate to the grasping of mere identities. We can understand only an identity in difference. Bergson is wrong in thinking that intellect cannot deal with novelty. Psychology tells us that consciousness lapses when the same situation occurs again and again. Then the responding movement becomes automatic. It is only when a new situation arises, when the accustomed action is not adequate to it that consciousness appears on the scene. It is only then that intelligence has to devise a fresh action and react to it. Bergson admits all this when he says that the function of intellect is not merely to repeat a movement, but to reply to a new need. This is as good as granting that intellect has a capacity to deal with novelties and changed situations. It is quibbling to argue that though intellect deals with novelties, it does so by way of rearranging old elements or regrouping given parts. It is hard to conceive that when intellect is confronted by a new situation, what it does is to first break it to pieces, affiliate them all with old elements, and then apply set rules. Viewing varied and different situations in the light of universal principles is not a mechanical act in which we break the given to pieces and then apply the calculating machine. It is an act of intelligence which is much more than a mere mechanical repetition. It is the act of binding together a manifold by means of an identity. It is replying to a new situation. It is the adaptation of response to stimulus and not routine repetition. The truth contained in Bergson's view is that intellect cannot deal with mere difference, but only with sameness in difference. But

Bergson is wrong in thinking that it can deal only with absolute identities. Intellect will admit its insufficiency and confess its impotence in the presence of absolute difference as well as absolute sameness. But both these are unreal. What is, is an identity in difference. However much Bergson might protest against the description of reality or creative evolution as an identity in difference, our discussion of the relation of life to matter and mechanism and teleology has revealed that Bergson is compelled to consider the world as an identity in difference. Creative evolution is a concrete, universal binding together the different parts into a whole. If reality is a system, then, instead of the intellect being inadequate to its grasp, it is only to its grasp that it is adequate. "So far from its being true that an organic unity is something that we cannot understand, it would be nearer the truth to say that we can understand nothing else" (Caird, *The Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii. p. 530). "All the charges of narrowness, hardness, meaninglessness which are so often directed against thought from the quarters of feeling and immediate perception rest on the perverse assumption that thought acts only as a faculty of abstract identification" (*Hegel Encyclopaedia*, Sec. 115, Wallace's translation). It is this abstract view of intellect that makes Bergson think that intellect deadens everything that comes within its paralysing influence. The whole difficulty is due to a failure to appreciate the true nature of logical process and intellectual activity. Intellect is not merely repetitory but also constructive and creative. It can create novelties and understand novelties, for they are not only differences but also identities in difference. Creative genius in science, art and fiction is only the highest form of intellect. It is intellect viewed as constructive imagination which leads up to mind in its phase of integral knowing.

Bergson tells us that conceptual knowledge will not give a knowledge of the whole though "we easily persuade ourselves that by setting concept by side of concept, we are reconstructing the whole of the object with its parts,

thus obtaining so to speak its intellectual equivalent. . . ." (*Introduction to Met.* pp. 15-16). Bergson argues that if conception should seize the component parts of the objects, then the putting together of the concepts may perhaps result in the knowledge of the whole. But concepts give us only partial views, expressions or notations, and not real parts. If concepts could give us real parts we could fit them into objects and acquire the total vision, but what can we do with a mere notation or a scheme of symbols? Reality is movement or life, while concepts are timeless, immobile and dead. It is impossible for the dead inert concept to give us parts of living movement. As soon as intellect touches life, it solidifies and even the part becomes dead. Conceptual knowledge is symbolic only. It gives us dead symbols of live reality. "Intellect substitutes for the interpretation of real terms the juxtaposition of their symbols" (*T. and F. W.* p. 134). We cannot reproduce continuity by adding concepts to concepts. But this whole criticism is due to a confusion between the symbol and the object symbolised. Bergson argues that logic which deals with static concepts cannot give us knowledge of reality which is flow. There is a gap between reality, which is flow and duration, and concepts which are static and solid. But does Bergson really believe that in the material world these concepts give us the realities themselves? Do they not symbolise objects and things? Do they re-instate the experiences themselves? If in the world of life and duration they do not give us realities, even so do they not give us realities in the world of matter. They must be inadequate there also. But if they will suffice in the world of matter they must suffice in the vital world also. Intellect gives us interpretations, formulas and symbols, and not the experiences or the objects symbolised. It is the function of a sign to signify, but for this it need not resemble or reproduce the thing signified. Its function is only to symbolise and not to photograph. If this function of intellect is admitted, as Bergson admits it when he

considers the concepts to be valid in the world of matter, then it follows that intellect is good right through in logic and mathematics, in biology and psychology. But if we mistake its function then it becomes bad all through, notwithstanding Bergson. The whole fallacy is due to the confusion of the sign with the thing signified, a relation of symbols with a symbolised relation. We cannot say that he "who drives fat oxen should himself be fat."

Evolved by life, our intellect cannot understand life. Created by life, it cannot take hold of life. "Created by life, how can it embrace life, of which it is only an emanation or aspect?" Bergson argues that intellect can understand only dead matter and physical processes, and cannot represent reality as it truly exists in life, as intellect is created by evolution for the purposes of practice. But the origin of intellect is due not merely to life but to the interaction of life and matter. If it is the product of life it is as much the product of matter. Again, if intelligence cannot grasp life because it is evolved by it, the faculty which *can* grasp it must be something not evolved by it. But is Bergson prepared to say that intuition has not been evolved by life? Bergson does not give us any definite answer. According to him, every theory of knowledge has to take knowledge for granted. What we have to explain is the absence of intuition where it is absent, rather than its presence where it is present. In *Matter and Memory* he gives his explanation of the cases where we find only sense perception instead of intuition, and in *Creative Evolution* he gives his explanation of why insects stop short at instinct instead of reaching intuition, and why man usually stops short at intellect instead of reaching intuition more frequently. To get back to intuition, we have to adopt either the exclusive or the inclusive method. The former is not possible; the latter is suggested by Bergson himself. To comprehend life it would seem we should mix up intellect and instinct. But we ask if one part cannot comprehend life, and if the several products are to be combined, is it

not necessary that all the products should be combined? So to instinct and intellect we should add doses of automatism or torpor, and of those miscellaneous things which are all produced by life even though we do not have any knowledge of them. "If in evolving in the direction of the vertebrate in general, of man and intelligence in particular, life has had to abandon by the way many elements incompatible with this particular mode of organisation, and consign them, as we shall show, to other lines of development; it is the totality of these elements we must find again and rejoin to intellect proper in order to grasp the true nature of vital activity" (*C. E.* p. 52). So to intellect we should add not only instinct but also vegetative torpor, as that is also one of the developments of the primary impulse. "Vegetative torpor, instinct and intelligence, these then are the elements that coincided in the vital impulsion common to plants and animals, and which in the course of a development in which they were made manifest in the most unforeseen forms have been dissociated by the very fact of their growth" (p. 142). Bergson feels that this conclusion would be ridiculous, and so escapes from it by saying that vegetative life is only a retrogression. But he admits that the three are found in all though in different proportions. "There is no manifestation of life which does not contain, in a rudimentary state, either latent or potential, the essential characters of most other manifestations. The difference is in the proportion" (p. 112, *see also* p. 125). The only way of escape, which is not satisfactory, is to say that vegetative torpor cannot be mixed with instinct and intellect as it is not a phase of consciousness.

What, then, is the good of scientific knowledge which is untrue to reality? It is of practical utility. For practical purposes we conceptualise reality and spatialise spirit. So the world of our everyday life is only an appearance and not reality. We cannot agree with Bergson in thinking that intellectual knowledge is knowledge of an unreality. Granting that intellect can only

grasp matter, is not matter real? It is the inverse movement of life, and even though life is not grasped by intellect, its inverse is apprehended by it. All that Bergson's contention comes to is this: While reality in its fulness cannot be grasped by intellect, still parts of reality can be known by it. Intellectual knowledge has ontological value; only the whole of reality baffles it. Intellect does not deal with unreals but with partial reals. It is argued that even matter is duration, provided we re-attach it to the whole to which it belongs. Duration, according to Bergson, should be predicated of the material systems which science isolates, "provided such systems are reintegrated to the whole." Parts cut off from the whole are abstract; they have to be fitted into the whole to become real. It is the task of science to bind parts to parts in wholes. So intuition, which is supposed to give another kind of knowledge, is only intellect more thorough and radical than what it is when it deals with parts. If the scientific method is pursued to its end, we get the philosophical view. Bergson admits this when he says: "The more physics advances the more it effaces the individuality of bodies, and even of the particles into which the scientific imagination begins by decomposing them; bodies and corpuscles tend to dissolve into universal interaction" (p. 369). Certainly, then, the philosophical point of view is not opposed to that of science. The philosophic method is just the scientific method carried out more vigorously. Intuition is not opposed to intellect but is only intellect at its best. Intellect at its lower stages deals with parts and is called scientific; at its higher stages it deals with the whole and is called intuition. The difference between the two is one of degree and not kind. Intuition is more of intellectuality. But science and philosophy are expressions of the one type of experience. There is no break between them. "There is no essential difference between the intellect and the intuition itself" (p. 360). Thought is adequate to the grasp of reality as a whole.

VII

That there is a higher capacity than understanding which enables us to grasp the concrete in its wholeness is admitted by most philosophers at the present day. The question is only about the nature of that capacity. Bergson considers it to be more perceptual than conceptual. To him knowledge of reality as it is in its individuality and concreteness, can only be perceptual. It cannot be conceptual to him as he views conceptual knowledge in an abstract and unreal manner. But we are afraid that it cannot be even perceptual. For with him perception is occupied with the object as a number of assembled features. The sense organs by their selective activity break up the object: "Our eye perceives the feature of the living being, merely as assembled, not as mutually organised. The intention of life, the simple movement that runs through the lives, that binds them together and gives them significance, escapes it" (*C. E.* p. 186). So intuition which should be synthetic cannot be perceptual. What else is it? Bergson tells us it is integral knowledge which makes a whole of the abstract relations discovered by intellect, and the thinghood grasped by instinct. Intuition combines the fruits of instinct and intellect. Instinct deals with things and intellect with relations. Instinct has direct contact with reality. It is moulded on the very form of life. If questioned it would give up life's secret. But this is purely an assumption. Why should we think that instinct is adapted to life? Life is full of novelty, contingency and unforeseeability, and instinct has none of these features. How then can it give us the secret of life? Instinct is automatic and stationary while life is mobile and progressive. How can we fathom life, the mobile and the progressive, by an appeal to instinct, the immobile and the stereotyped? If Bergson is correct in thinking that instinct is moulded on the very form of life, then we should say that life is a machine as instinct is mechanical.

If life is novelty then instinct will not help us. But to Bergson instinct has direct contact with reality; only being undifferentiated it does not seek reality as a whole. Intellect on the other hand seeks reality as a whole, but by itself is not able to grasp it. Intuition is instinct become self-conscious, or intellect become disinterested. Intuition is the disinterested knowledge of the object in its wholeness. "If there is a means of comprehending a reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively, of entering into the object instead of selecting points of view over against it, of having an intuition of it instead of making analysis of it, in short of grasping it independently of any expression and any translation or symbolic representation; that is metaphysics itself, and this metaphysical knowledge can be had only in intuition. An absolute can only be given in our intuition" (*Introduction to Met.*). Instinct rises to intuition with the aid of intelligence. "Without intelligence, it would have remained in the form of instinct, riveted to the special object of its practical interest and turned outward by it into movements of locomotion" (p. 178). With intelligence it becomes integral knowledge. Intuition is neither perceptual nor conceptual but a combination of both. It is something like the artistic perception of a soul freed from practical necessities. It is the aesthetic feeling. "That an effort of this kind is not impossible, is proved by the existence in man of an aesthetic faculty along with normal perception" (p. 186). It is aesthetic intuition that can catch hold of the continuity of life. But this aesthetic feeling springs out of reason. The greatest works of art are the most rational and involve a good deal of training. It is not due to our immediate perception, but is due to the exercise of reason. The finished portrait embodies thought and reason (see *C. E.* p. 7). It is true that before the work is finished it could not have been foreseen. But this failing to foresee is not incompatible with reason. The new creation is a unique synthesis of given elements. Though we know

the product must be rational we would not be able to say beforehand in what way the rationality will express itself. There are so many ways of being rational. When Bergson compares intuition to the creative genius of the poet or the artist's vision or the trained instinct of the literary writer who synthesises in the desired form the mass of material collected by him, it comes very near reason and intelligence. There are positive descriptions of this philosophical intuition which clearly bring out its intellectual affinities. Bergson compares it to the creative vision of the scientist. The scientist, when he perceives the working of the universal in the particular, grasps reality as it is in its individuality, and this is intuitive or integral knowledge. When Bergson claims that we owe to this faculty all the greatest discoveries of science, when he tells us that in every system of philosophy we have facts which are vivified by intuition (*C. E.* p. 251), when he puts it to us that a successful practice of intuition requires previous study and assimilation of multitudes of abstract data, we feel that his intuition is not much different from our scientific imagination. It is nothing mysterious. Dr. Carr, the best-known interpreter of Bergson in England, describes it thus: "It is the most common and unmistakable fact, and we only fail to recognise it because it is so absolutely simple that it requires a strong effort to turn the mind from its intellectual bent in order to get this non-intellectual vision" (*The Philosophy of Change*). But it is not non-intellectual vision but a vision in which abstract analysis has already done its work. It is creative imagination (*M. and M.* p. 76). Bergson is not a supporter of mysticism which goes against intellect, for he says, "If by mysticism is meant (as it almost always is nowadays) a reaction against positive science, the doctrine I defend is in the end only a protest against mysticism" (quoted in Lindsay's *Philosophy of Bergson*, p. 19). Bergson is not willing to identify it with mystical experience. It is a kind of intellectualism. To quote Bergson himself: "There are two kinds of intellectualism, the true which

lives its ideas and a false intellectualism, which immobilises moving ideas into solidified concepts to play with them like counters" (*ibid.* p. 19). Where intuition is completely extra-intellectual then it becomes a subjective affection and cannot pretend to be a philosophic method. But the whole of this long discussion indicates that in Bergson intuition seems to be both the necessary condition of psychical activity, as scientific hypothesis is, and the summit of the work of thought, as the philosophic vision of the whole is.

We may here note the remarkable fact that, following the absolutist tradition and in opposition to the empirical current of thought, Bergson holds that practicality and action are opposed to the attainment of the highest level of insight and intuition. To become metaphysical we must cease to be practical. Pluralists and romanticists preach that in practice we come across reality and all speculation is the source of illusion. The search after truth requires, according to the absolutistic tradition, freedom from Maya or detachment from the illusions of ignorance and selfishness. This means only that in the world of practice we are absorbed by the details and have not the detachment for catching the universal. To gain an insight into the mysteries of the universe we require periods of contemplation. In meditation we become conscious of the inner nature of freedom. Freedom alone can comprehend freedom. In intuition we have a direct vision of reality, life envisaging itself. The detachment necessary for it is emphasised when we are asked to turn away from the world of practice and abstract reasoning. But the products of meditative insight vindicate themselves at the bar of reason. Bergson employs the absolutist device when he proves the inadequacy of intellect by pointing to the deadlocks and contradictions in which the exclusive use of intellect lands us. Bergson asks, "Would the idea ever have occurred to us to doubt the absolute value of our knowledge, if philosophy had not shown us what contradictions our speculation meets,

what deadlocks it ends in ? " (C. E., Introduction, pp. xi-xii). From the contradictory nature of the conclusions of reason Bergson argues that truth must be sought in unreason. But the logical inference from this fact surely is that if parts with which intellect deals set themselves up for the whole, then antinomies arise to point the moral that they are parts and not whole.

When all is said and done Bergson's conclusion comes to this that there are aspects of reality which our understanding cannot comprehend. Bradley, the greatest living absolutist, tells us that there are problems which are inexplicable and insoluble, for example, the relation of a finite centre of experience to other centres and the whole. To him a universe which would reveal its secret essence to a finite understanding would be a poor substitute for the actual one. "The complete experience which would supplement our ideas and make them perfect is in detail beyond our understanding" (*Truth and Reality*). Intellect should be supplemented by the other sides of consciousness if it would reach its end. Man's whole consciousness is needed to feel the central reality. There is more than logic in life. But philosophy simply points out the logical necessity of a whole which is of the nature of a concrete universal. There philosophy ends, and intuition gives the experience and confirms philosophy. For this experience one has to raise himself above the narrow, practical and utilitarian point of view and see life as it is. But this does not mean that practicality and action are opposed to truth and knowledge. It only means that we have to lift our souls above the business of life to find out its hidden secrets. In such an experience we free ourselves from the trammels of abstract ratiocination; we have there an evanescence of the intellectual activity.

Regarding this question, we are at one with Bergson if he means by his term 'L'Intelligence,' not thought or mind or reason in general, but only that phase of thought which deals with abstract identities, what

Hegel meant by 'Understanding' or Croce means by a thought which works with pseudo-concepts. Intellect so conceived operates by synthesising abstract universals reached by analysis. Then insight into concrete universals can be acquired only through intuition. But in his polemic against such an abstract L'Intelligence, Bergson has almost nothing new to say which idealist writers have not said before him. No doubt there is some novelty about his view of intuition. Bergson is right in contending that this rational insight is not reached by a *mere* synthesis or adjustment of partial and abstract concepts. It requires the exercise of powers of mind higher than those of understanding. It is true that intuitive or integral perception helps us here. But we hesitate to follow the lead of Bergson in his extreme opposition of intellect and intuition. He himself admits that when once the rational insight is reached, it is easy for our intellect to discover how the partial concepts are to be found in the whole. Then intuition and intellect become the higher and lower phases of mind and that is precisely the contention of the absolutists.

CHAPTER VII

BERGSON'S IDEA OF GOD

I

DEMOCRACY is the spirit of the age ; France is the home of democracy ; and Bergson is the greatest philosopher of France. No wonder that his philosophy appeals to the demos, the laymen, and the amateurs, while the trained and the expert look askance at it. In the street and in the market-place it wins applause, while in the study and the class-room it is severely criticised. Bergson's diction and style, his poetry and imagination, make his solution of the riddle of the universe quite an enchanting one to the popular gaze. The different tendencies which fascinate the modern mind—mysticism and romanticism, psychologism and pragmatism, vitalism and evolutionism—find their echo in his writings. The long-standing feud between science and religion is supposed suddenly to have been settled by his contributions to philosophy. His constant appeals to concrete science in the interests of ethical idealism and religion create the impression that science has become the ally of religion for the first time since the dawn of reflection. But the few, the specialists who judge systems not by their aims and intentions but by their actual results, are wondering if the fairy tale of speculation so charmingly described by Bergson does justice to the claims of religion and the demands of intellect. They admit that Bergson has rendered a great

service to the cause of philosophy in having emancipated it from the trammels of an abstract and vicious intellectualism, but they are not certain that his philosophic theories are self-consistent and satisfactory.

Ireland!
If we take up his idea of God, like the author of *Snakes in Iceland* who did his work in one short sentence, "Snakes in Iceland—there are none," we may summarily dispose of our discussion by declaring that Bergson's philosophy admits of no God. His reality is the ceaseless upspringing of something new—incessant, creative work. It cannot be considered to be 'God,' God cannot be a "continuity of shooting out." But Bergson is not prepared to own that his system is atheistic. He feels that his system establishes a free and creative God. "The considerations put forward in my essay on *Immediate Data* result in an illustration of the fact of liberty; those of *Matter and Memory* lead us, I hope, to put our finger on mental reality; those of *Creative Evolution* present creation as a fact; from all this we derive a clear idea of a free and creating God, producing matter and life at once, whose creative effort is continued, in a vital direction, by the evolution of species and the construction of human personalities" (quoted in Le Roy, *A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson*).

There is no doubt that Bergson's writings are instinct with religious interest, but from this it does not follow that he gives us a coherent view of God.

II

The point to be decided at the outset is whether the God of Bergson is the supra-conscious, spiritual, trans-human ground of reality from which have proceeded both the *élan* and the matter that opposes it, or is the *élan* itself opposed by matter, the evil principle.

What is the exact relation of life to matter? The distinction between life and matter is the foundation of his argument in *Time and Free-will*. Life is freedom, and

matter is necessity. Life is mobile and matter is inert. Considerations which hold in the case of brute-things—determinism, mechanism, etc.—do not apply in the case of soul-life. It is because intellect, adapted to “think matter” and accustomed to its ways, mechanises life and spatialises soul that the problem of freedom arises. If we get rid of the intellectual picture of the soul and grasp by intuition life as it is, we shall find that its essence is freedom.

In *Matter and Memory* an advance is made, in that even matter is looked upon as a kind of movement akin to that of consciousness. But intellect cuts across both mental and material movements, and converts them into separate states and solid things respectively. The dualism between matter and life still remains, as the arguments of *Creative Evolution* require it. Life has for its mission the grafting of indetermination on matter. Life is regarded as an effort to overcome the necessity of physical forces. For this purpose it requires energy which it cannot create. It therefore utilises the energy already existing in matter. Without the presence of resisting matter, life cannot set out on its task. Life breaks into individuals and species on account of the resistance it meets from inert matter. Without matter the *élan* will be like Spinoza's Substance, incapable of taking the field. Matter, then, is something over against life, an obstacle to its free flow and a necessary condition of its progress. Matter appears to be a *deus ex machina*, quite as original and fundamental as the *élan* itself, for the world-evolution. But this conclusion Bergson fights shy of.

In *Creative Evolution* he makes the two the inverse directions of one and the same spiritual movement. Materiality is only the interruption of spirituality. It is not a positive somewhat but only the arrest or the interruption of life. But it is difficult to understand why the ascending spiritual movement should ever have become interrupted. When once it has been interrupted,

how does it get itself condensed into matter? Even if matter is an interruption of life, it is not a pseudo-idea, or a mere nonentity, for Bergson's view of negation precludes such a possibility. Nor can we say that matter is phenomenal in the sense that intellect creates matter; for intellect only distorts matter but does not create it. Matter outruns intellect. All that intellect does is to falsify matter, make it appear that it is a co-existence of separate solids with fixed outlines, while it is really in a fluid condition. Again, were matter only a product due to intellect, it should have been non-existent prior to the rise of intellect, in the pre-human, *i.e.* plant and animal, stages of evolution. But evolution could not have started without matter. How then can matter be at the same time a product of evolution at the intellectual stage and a prime condition of evolution?

Bergson's theory of matter is riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies. If, to save his monism, Bergson makes matter phenomenal and unreal, he cannot account for the evolution of the world. If, on the other hand, to account for the drama of the universe, he makes matter an independent existence, then his monism is affected.

This short résumé is necessary to show that corresponding to the two views of matter, we have two different conceptions of God. If the dualism between life and matter is the last word of Bergson's philosophy, then the *élan* itself may be regarded as a kind of God opposed by matter, the evil principle. We are reminded of the familiar opposition between light and darkness, God and Satan, Ahura Mazda and Ahriman. Only the interplay of two such opposing forces can account for the imperfect world. Bergson's God becomes a suffering deity. It is as limited as any of us mortals, for it has to struggle through opposing conditions to win its freedom. It is not the source of all being; for matter is independent of it, nay, opposes its upward course. The life current, though it is utterly good, is not able to gain its ends on

account of the obstructive principle of evil. It is the finite God which alone can satisfy the popular demands of religion. Here Bergson satisfies the empirical tendency, and supplies us with a God who is utterly good, unlike the whole which contains both good and evil (see *C. E.* p. 255). But as we have seen, Bergson sometimes suggests that his free and creative God is the author of both life and matter. His logic requires him to make it an impersonal principle from which both matter and life spring. It is not to be identified with the life current, as it is the spring of both life and matter. "I speak of God as of the source whence issue successively, by an effect of his freedom, the currents or impulses each of which will make a world; he therefore remains distinct from them, and it is not of him that we can say that most often it turns aside, or it is at the mercy of the materiality that it has been bound to adopt" (*Bergson*, Paul and Ruhe, pp. 43-44). God is not the *élan* but the ultimate transcendent. It is not an immanent principle but a transcendent cause. There is not much to choose between Bergson's transcendent cause and Spinoza's Substance. Bergson lands us in either deism or pantheism. If he says that the transcendent principle is of the nature of becoming and not being, it is a matter of opinion which has no logical necessity about it. If it is not a transcendent deity but is the whole reality, if it is the supra-conscious spirit from which have proceeded both the *élan* and matter, then it is the God of pantheism which is identical with the whole process of evolution. Sometimes Bergson holds that the interaction between the two, life and matter, is the central reality and so God. God then becomes the unfinished universe, and with it he is ever growing. We get a God of perpetual youth of the type Mr. Wells suggests. But the two prominent notions are those of God as the absolute whole and God as the life current. It is the same old trouble between the Absolute of logic and philosophy and the God of ethics and religion. This struggle between the logical and the

empirical tendencies we notice in the Philosophy of Bergson.

III

Does Bergson's view of God satisfy the religious-minded? In other words, is his God personal, purposive, intelligent, free and creative? As the popular consciousness wants a personal God, Bergson is prepared to grant personality and make the prime soul a person. While he recognises the difficulty of coming to any positive conclusion about the original unity (see *Bergson*, Paul and Ruhe, p. 44), he allows himself the privilege of characterising it as personal. . . . "This source of life is undoubtedly spiritual. Is it personal? Probably. Of course, personal in a different way, without all those accidental traits which in our minds form parts of personality and which are bound up by the existence of the body. But personal in a larger sense of the term, a spiritual unity expressing itself in the creative process of evolution" (Dr. Louis Levine's interview with Bergson, *N.Y. Times*, Feb. 22, 1914). But God must be personal in the accepted sense of the term. M. Le Roy, the famous French interpreter of Bergson, referring to Bergson's idea of God, says: "We cannot regard the source of our life otherwise than as personal. We cannot regard him as impersonal. We seek in him our personality. God is personal in that he is the source of our personality." Is this conception of God different from that of the absolutists? Even in that scheme, God is the source of our personality, and if that be sufficient reason for the personality of God, even there God can be looked upon as personal. If God is personal he cannot be personal in the sense human persons are. After all, human personality is only a local and partial manifestation of life, and a part can never be true of the whole. Human personality in Bergson's metaphor is a "pebble left on the beach," and it cannot display "the form of the wave that brought it there."

The supra-conscious spirit works without plan and

purpose. The vital impetus drives forward the life growth, but with no definite end or aim. "It takes directions without aiming at ends" (*C. E.* p. 108). We are reminded of the story Huxley somewhere tells us about the Irish Jarvey who, when asked where he was going, said: "Sure and I don't know, but I am going at the Devil of a pace." The great thing is to go, does not matter in what direction. This, according to Bergson, is a point of merit. For on any finalist theory, the problem of evil is a stumbling-block. In Bergson's theory the problem is evaded and not solved by the substitution of animal instinct for intelligent purpose at the centre of things. If there is evil or disorder, it is the nature of things. "Evolution is not only a movement forward; in many cases we observe a marking time, and still more often a deviation or turning back. It must be so" (*C. E.* p. 109). That life should be full of surprises is what is to be expected from the way in which the creative principle evolves. The question is, whether such a principle, which invents, adapts, makes mistakes, but still in the main progresses, if we believe Bergson, can be called 'God.' The God of Bergson is not only immanent in nature but completely identical with it. Corbière says "God is hardly more than the central hearth of the universe's energy. . . . He is entirely immanent. . . . Bergson's conception leads to pantheism" (Charles Corbière, "Le dieu de M. Bergson," *Revue de Théologie*, 1910). It is the ocean in which we are bathed and immersed, in which we literally live, move, and have our being. God is the universal flux and is the only reality. What Bergson does is to exalt the flux of the world, with all its defects and discords, to the high position of divinity. He gives the whole the name of God and then tells us that in God we are. An appearance of a close and intimate relationship between God and man, the ultimate source of spirit and the human individual, is produced. But Bergson is here mutilating the meanings of words. To make the life impulse God is to commit spiritual suicide.

It is to defeat the aim of all religion. Nettleship remarks : " Whatever else ' God ' means, it means the highest we can think of—something in which all that we love and adore in human beings and nature exists without any alloy " (*Remains*, p. 105). But Bergson's God is a non-moral principle, from which all things good, bad and indifferent flow. His view is destructive of belief in a purposive God. " If all this is movement, incessant life, action, liberty, what room is there for the fixed thoughts and purposes that theists attribute to the Creator ? " (Prof. Muirhead in the *Hibbert Journal*, July 1911). It is not the God with whom we can come into relations, for which the religious soul hungers. It can in no case be an object of worship.

If Bergson's God would satisfy the theologian's demand, then intelligence should be an attribute of God. Unless omniscience and omnipotence are attributed to God, he is not really God. If he does not know the end, if his nature is to grow, then it means he is imperfect. It would be hard to say just what he is, seeing that with him all things are possible. But in Bergson's philosophy, intelligence is the product of the movement which has created matter and so has nothing to do with pure life or duration. Intelligence is not a quality of God. We may, in a sense, call it a divine attribute, for the original unity which contained in embryo the different lines of development, culminating in the automatism of plants, the instinct of hymenoptera and the intelligence of man, had in it the intellectual tendency also. But if God should be a being in whom intelligence is displaced by intuition, then we shall have to wait for some future day when a being with divine intuition may spring up. " The gates of the future stand wide open."

Is Bergson's God ' free ' ? In spite of his vehement protests against both mechanism and finalism, on account of their common assumption that ' all is given,' it is a matter of grave doubt whether in Bergson's system all is not given. The different tendencies which later

come into existence are fused together in the original unity. Creative evolution is only the differentiation or dissociation of these tendencies. "The unity is derived from a *vis a tergo*; it is given at the start as an impulsion" (C. E. p. 109). Can we not say that all sides of future evolution are prefigured in the original unity? Nothing not contained in the original impulse can come out at any stage. True, the future is incalculable, but surely there is no element of chance.

Is Bergson's God 'creative'? Does God create the world? We shall be twisting words if we make Bergson's original principle the creator of the world. Growth is not creation in the technical sense in which it is generally understood. According to Bergson, it is not only God that creates; we also do so. "Creation . . . is not a mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we act freely" (C. E. p. 262). The individual shares in the creative evolution of which God is the centre and source. He creates, he grows, he is being made and remade continually. We have freedom, duration and creative life and so has God. If *we* have obstacles in the way of our full freedom in that our souls are entangled in matter, God is no better off; for only with effort and trouble can he press into and penetrate the resisting wall of matter.

We see that Bergson does not give us a 'free' and 'creating' God. His God, when stripped of all poetry, will be found to be inadequate to the needs of the religious soul. His idea of God is likely to repel rather than attract religious people, and there is no doubt that it has more kinship with the Absolute of philosophers than with the God of theists. Fully aware of the conflict between absolute idealism and orthodox theism, Bergson tries hard to be on the side of the orthodox religion. But when he holds that God can be realised only by a transcending of human conditions, when he identifies religion with philosophy, when he insists upon the inadequacy of intellect and the need of intuition to grasp

the whole, and when he vacillates between God as the whole and God as part, namely, the *élan vital*, he is no better than the absolutists.

IV

The account of the individual which Bergson gives is not different from that given by the absolutists. The soul is a product of the world-being. Its destiny is to be reabsorbed into the whole as the mist from the ocean must slip back into the shining sea. Bergson would have been more in line with orthodox thinkers if he had held that man is a bundle of selfish tendencies and material ends which arrest and check the higher ideals and aspirations. In this case the good would be identified with something external, and there would be an undue emphasis on self-denial and self-sacrifice. But Bergson with the absolutists holds that the individual is a blend of the spiritual and the material. The individual is not completely spiritual, in which case he would be divine, not human. Bergson says "we are not the vital current itself; we are this current already loaded with matter" (*C. E.* p. 282). Were man completely material he would have no ideals and could not think of any moral law. It is because he is a complex of both that the moral problem has significance for him. The aim of morality becomes the positive promotion of the good. Sacrifice is not an end in itself but a means to self-affirmation. Virtue is the identification with the good, and is the development of the divine element in man. The individual is dependent on the ultimate reality. Only the absolute can be supposed to be completely real. Man is only attempting to become perfectly real. When man completely surrenders his lower nature, then he becomes divine. Distinction between God and man is not one of kind but one of degree. Bergson holds to a fundamental identity between the two, but unlike the absolutists he sometimes makes God also a being who struggles with

matter. The identity of nature alone can render possible free communion between man and God. Both Bergson and the absolutists agree in thinking that the whole alone is real, that the individual is partially real, and that for him to attain his goal the resisting matter will have to be overcome, and that, when the individual becomes dissolved in the whole life, when he becomes one with it, his life-end is realised.

V

With regard to the question of human freedom, Bergson agrees with the absolutists. The individuals of the world are free when they escape from the mechanism of habit and routine. The individual is free in so far as he maintains his true nature as spirit, and absolutism tells us the same thing, that man is free in so far as he acts from his higher nature. Man is free as he is a unique expression of God. Freedom is due to participation in the real. What freedom the individual has, he owes to the source from which he comes. His participation in the original life is his claim to freedom, "Life in the material world participates in the liberty" of the original impulsion. So long as we are human, this freedom can only be partially realised as we have to struggle against the inertia of matter. When we become the principle of life in its purity, we are absolutely free.

The objection repeatedly urged against absolutism, that it gives freedom to God or the whole and not to man the part, for whatever it is worth, holds against Bergson's philosophy also. Bergson establishes the existence of an underlying spiritual principle, beneath the particular manifestations of life. The one *élan vital* runs through all the divergent lines of evolution. In *Time and Free-will* Bergson emphatically asserts the freedom of the individual who freely acts on matter. But as with the absolutists, this is only a derived freedom; for the individual when cut off from the universal activity

of life is an unreality. Witness the following passage which many will mistake to be from Spinoza or Hegel : " Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave which rises . . . this rising wave is consciousness . . . on flows the current, running through human generations, subdividing itself into individuals. Thus souls are nothing else than the little rills into which the great river of life divides itself, flowing through the body of humanity." The individual is a particular manifestation of the universal life, and his position is not a whit better simply because Bergson substitutes for the material system of the scientist and the universal mind of the absolutist the dynamical life. What the man in the street wants is the freedom of the individual in his own right as a separately existing entity, and Bergson has not granted him that, however much he might have persuaded him into that belief in *Time and Free-will*.

Bergson is still dominated by the idea of freedom as pure contingency, which, he forgets, is as much an illusion as pure determinism. The spatialising of time is regarded by him as the cause of the illusion of absolute determinism. If so, it is also the cause of absolute chance. If the spatialising of the past is the cause of determinism, the spatialising of the future is the cause of contingency. Professor Pringle Pattison observes : " If we are true to the doctrine of real duration, we have nothing to do with this phantom future any more than with the other phantom of the past. . . . If, as M. Bergson says, we act now with our whole past and yet are free, why should this be otherwise in the future when what is now present will constitute part of the past which we carry with us ? " (*Idea of God*, p. 375). Bergson impresses on us forcibly the organic relationship between the past and the present, and it should follow that the past, present and future are inseparable parts of one development. To break the future from the past and make it the store-house

of miracles is to miss the continuity of duration and spatialise it. The past determines the present, though the present cannot be predicted from the past. This is the sort of freedom which absolutism offers us.

Our conclusion is that Bergson's point of view so eloquently set forth in his writings is not a system but only a philosophic vision. Bergson is more a prophet than a philosopher, more a seer than a dialectician. His vision is quite true. There is a supreme principle whose nature is free activity, from which change and everything else originate. But in the detailed development of this vision Bergson has not been quite logical. The vision requires for its basis and support a system of absolute idealism. To become a philosophy it needs supplementation by the fundamentals of absolute idealism, and as Bergson thinks that his view is opposed to that of absolute idealism, his true vision and false logic stand apart.

CHAPTER VIII

PRAGMATISM

I

A FEW years back, the world of philosophy was taken by storm when a number of enthusiastic and enterprising philosophic modernists in England and America ushered in Pragmatism with a great flourish of trumpets. In an age which prides itself on being progressive, when we are ever eager to hear some new thing, novelty is the sure path to success, and pragmatism, which considers success to be the only virtue, announced itself as a new method of philosophy which will solve all problems in heaven and earth, even those which were not dreamt of by any previous philosophy. Anxious to win in the philosophical polling-booth, it adopted the tactics of an electioneering campaign. A conscious attempt was made to thrill and horrify, bewilder and astonish. Proceeding on the principle that we are not wise if we do not call our fathers fools, the supporters of the theory attacked classical idealism, and tried not to argue but to laugh it out of existence. Though satire is a sure but a slow solvent and abuse a deadly but unseemly weapon, they missed their aim, as they were not supported by either life or logic. In the thundering criticisms poured by pragmatism on other systems, we hear the sound of the guns and see the brilliant display of fireworks, but do not catch any glimpses of the flag for which the battle is fought ; we feel the polemical zeal and the propagandist

fervour, but do not perceive the ideals underlying the new system so loudly and widely advertised. We are told that pragmatism will *humanise* philosophy and render it once again "a subject gentlemen can read with pleasure, dethrone barbarism of both temper and style; fight with the Dragon of Scholasticism, which deters men from approaching the golden apples that cluster on the tree of knowledge in the garden of the Hesperides" (*Humanism*, Schiller, p. xxiii). As yet, we must say that the entrance of pragmatism into the philosophic arena has resulted rather in a disturbance of the usual calm and an exhibition of bad taste and temper. Dr. Schiller heralds the coming of pragmatism as the renaissance of philosophy. It will be "a great tonic to reinvigorate a previously depressed humanity" (*ibid.* p. 30). William James, one of the greatest men of our age, sings the praise of pragmatism so exquisitely that many are charmed into an unconscious support of it. When one views the glorious virtues which are the peculiar possessions of the pragmatists according to William James, and contrasts them with the infamous ones which characterise the absolutists, the chances are that any one careful of good name and dignity would choose the side on which the pragmatist angels are. But if, without being led away by the false glamour of vain advertisement and moral monopolies, we try with self-possession and restraint to study the message of this New Dispensation and find out where exactly it differs from classical absolutism, we shall see that it is not after all so radical and revolutionary in its tendencies as we are led to believe by its protagonists, and that where it differs from speculative idealism, it does so at its peril.

At the outset we must refer to the pragmatist's claim that pragmatism is not so much a metaphysic as a method. It tries to affect the philosophic outlook not so much by directly supporting set conclusions as by insisting on a new method of approach to the problems of philosophy. It announces itself as a reform in the method of philo-

sophy. It emphasises a particular way of looking at things, a definite attitude towards the questions of life. It proclaims to a wondering world that truth is practical, and the meaning of an assertion depends on its application. The general charge against philosophy is its unpracticality, or, as Dr. Schiller likes to put it, 'Nephelococcygia.' Systems of philosophy which are developed in the Academy or the Porch do not appeal to the plain man of the market-place. They even protest against any attempts to introduce fresh air and light into their closed chambers. Pragmatism makes philosophy practical with a vengeance. It tries "to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to any one, if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing and all dispute is idle" (James, *Pragmatism*, p. 45). Pragmatism is thus "an attitude of orientation, the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts" (*ibid.* p. 35). If the new method of pragmatism is put in this manner we have no reason for complaint. Experience or life is ultimately the touchstone of truth. No theory has any meaning apart from its application to life. We are glad that pragmatism, without committing itself to any results in metaphysics, merely insists on an application of the teleological method. In the image of the Italian pragmatist Papini, pragmatism is like a corridor in a hotel which opens into numberless chambers. In one we may find a free-thinker worrying himself about the defence of atheism, in another an agnostic thinking out his apology, in a third a devotee on his knees praying to God for faith and strength in his despair, and in a fourth a synthetic philosopher trying to reconcile philosophy, religion and science. Each of them may adopt the method of pragmatism (see James, *Pragmatism*, pp. 53-54). But this method is not a new one in philo-

sophy. James himself calls pragmatism a new name for old ways of thinking. "Being nothing essentially new, it harmonises with many ancient philosophic tendencies. It agrees with nominalism for instance, in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasising practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions, useless questions and metaphysical abstractions" (*ibid.* pp. 53-54). It is only different from absolutism. Dr. Schiller argues that the philosophic method which pragmatism attempts to displace requires us to "expunge from our thinking every trace of feeling, interest, desire and emotion, as the most pernicious sources of error" (*Humanism*, p. x). Schiller is here adopting the old device of calling a dog mad to kill it. Philosophy does not revel in abstract forms; it has its own interests and passions. While to classical absolutism intellectual pursuit is itself a passion, it does not want to be bewildered and distracted by other passions and prejudices. It is quite possible for us to have a disinterested love of knowledge, and when Schiller condemns this attitude as a pernicious perversion of the cognitive instinct (see *Axioms as Postulates*, footnote 1, p. 85), his passion gets the better of his pragmatism, for an appeal to facts would have convinced him of the force and value of a dispassionate search for truth. The excellence of pure disinterestedness, of seeing for the sake of seeing, and knowing for the sake of knowing, emphasised by even Bergson, is strange to the pragmatists.

To criticise pragmatism is like flogging a dead horse. But our discussion of pragmatism will have a pragmatist justification, since we wish to show how pragmatism, so far as it is true and valuable, defends and develops absolutism, and so far as it is not, it is a philosophy fit for the philistines of the present age with their sickly sentimentalism and sordid commercialism. We shall trace the different tendencies that converged in the pragmatist emphasis on the teleological character of truth, state briefly the central

positions of pragmatism, and compare and contrast it with absolutism.

II

Of the many influences that led to the genesis of the pragmatist philosophy, the first to be noted is that of Immanuel Kant. He is not only the father of speculative idealism in Germany, but also a pioneer of the pragmatist theories of the present day. He was the first to emphasise the indispensable part played by human activity in the construction of experience. Knowledge, according to Kant, is not the copying or the contemplating of reality, but is the making of reality according to our purposes. Reality is not what we find but what we make. In the words of Dr. Bosanquet, it lies ahead of us and not behind us. Our understanding puts questions to nature and determines the lines in which we construct reality. The successors of Kant have dropped out, and quite rightly too, the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon, experience and reality. Kant's theory when stripped of its inconsistencies, seems to reduce itself to the pragmatist doctrine that reality is largely constituted by human activity. It is mainly of our making. But more consistently than most pragmatists, Kant points out that there are certain given aspects or objective elements to which we have to adapt ourselves. While Kant rightly insists on the subjective nature of the so-called axiomatic truths, while he elaborates the resources of the mind and makes out that in a sense our understanding makes nature, still he is equally emphatic in declaring that reality is not wholly of subjective manufacture. There are in knowledge objective elements which we are compelled to note. But this distinction of subjective and objective is no doubt one of critical analysis, and not felt by the experiencing individual. Kant saves us from subjective idealism by the adoption of this distinction of subjective and objective. But when pragmatism states that the purposive activity of mind is

all that is necessary for the construction of the world, we are straight landed in solipsism. Kant tells us that our experience is an interaction between the two factors of knowledge, the subjective and the objective. The mutual implication of self and the world on which later objective idealism is built, is first suggested by the philosophy of Kant. In our human experience the interpenetration of the self and the world is not complete. So long as we have things given to us, things to which we are opposed, which we have to manipulate, it is a sign that the ideal is yet remote. Human experience is trying progressively to realise this ideal. It is this reference to a common ideal that saves empiricist systems from the weakness of subjectivism.

By his insistence on the supremacy of the practical reason over the pure, Kant may be looked upon as the forerunner of pragmatism. It is Kant's belief, that though such central necessities of life as faith in God, freedom and immortality are theoretically indemonstrable, though we cannot adduce any logical evidence in support of them, nay, though it may appear that they contradict all conditions of objectivity in knowledge, still we have to believe in them for our moral purposes. As pure reason has a constitutional defect by which it comes into irreconcilable conflict with the practical necessities of life, it has to be supplemented by practical reason. If we want to vote for such sacred possessions of life as freedom, etc. we have also to vote for the inadequacy of intellect. The scientific understanding bound down to a world of mechanism has to be supplemented by the higher reason appreciative of values. Moral life ensures the reality of the human soul, God and freedom which the universal determination of science threatens to destroy. For the revelations of moral life are quite as genuine as the products of logical investigation. Kant is a thorough-going empiricist, whatever the critics might say about the 'high priori road,' for it is Kant's fidelity to experience in all its aspects that compels him to supplement pure by

practical reason, a world of nature by a world of ends. But we should remember that even Kant does not break up the unity of mind. His pure and practical reason are both expressions of reason. In some cases reason is satisfied with mechanism, in some others it demands teleology.

James's defence of the will to believe takes its rise from this doctrine of Kant, though it owes much to the views of Pascal and the theory of value judgements of Lotze and Ritschl. As Kant is believed to put practical reason above pure reason, James puts will above intellect. When we have to act and to choose between alternatives which are logically indifferent we are asked to choose that which is aesthetically satisfying or morally edifying. If to the scientific understanding the world appears morally colourless, *i.e.* if it looks indifferent, grinding out both good and evil impartially, and religion requires us to believe in the ultimate goodness of the world, James asks us to try the several alternatives. Believe in the ultimate goodness of the world and see how life will be affected; believe in the colourlessness of the world and see how it would look; believe in its rottenness and find out its results. If we conduct these ideal experiments to ascertain the possible bearings of the several theories on life, then, according to James, we will have to accept that course which is morally most satisfying. "The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me at definite instants of our life if this world formula or that world formula be the one which is true" (*Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results*). James when he is more careful tells us that we cannot believe whatever we want to believe. When we have different alternatives without sufficient evidence for intellectual conviction, James defends our right to believe that one of them which would aid us in life, and see if the practical results justify our ventures in belief. Ethical beliefs are practical attitudes where we have to find out by experimental verification which are desirable and which not. James's doctrine of the

will to believe is quite a limited one. It holds that in ethics and religion science is not truth and we live by faith. It asks us to believe where proof cannot be had. "Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must decide an option between propositions whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, 'do not decide but leave the question open' is itself a passional decision, just like deciding yes or no, and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth" (*Will to Believe*, p. 11). The wise man says, "In doubt, refrain from action." Whatever be the value of this advice in law-courts, in life we must not when in doubt refrain from action. Where intellect neither helps nor hinders, the claims of morals should decide the issue. Kant says very nearly the same thing. If supersensible realities cannot be proved, they have to be postulated if they are indispensable to life. Though they are inaccessible to pure reason, from the practical point of view, there is "valid ground to justify us in acting as if we knew that these objects were real" (Kant quoted in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, 1910, p. 199). There are cases of forced options where we are compelled to *assume* because we do not *know*. But this does not mean that they are true or that we believe in them.¹ [Even in the realms of morals and religion, if the consequences do not fit in with the facts, the beliefs should be abandoned. There is no question about the validity of this contention. When we seek for an explanation of moral conduct, the sole test of the validity of the explanation is its adequacy to account for moral life. And if moral life contradicts the proffered explanation, the explanation must fall to the ground. The only criterion of truth is working, not ethical or emotional, but logical.

¹ W. K. Clifford in the *Ethics of Belief* contends that it is a sin to believe unproved statements simply because they satisfy the believer. "It is wrong always, everywhere and for every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."

Philosophers, when they cannot prove logically everything they wish to, fall back on some extralogical principle. Locke looked to intuition, Descartes rested on faith in God, Kant asserted the supremacy of practical reason, and James defends the will to believe. On closer analysis we find that the difficulty of Kant and James is due to a false view of the nature of intellect. The defect is not in reason as such, but in the faulty method of Kant, James, and the positivists. When intellect is employed in natural sciences it leads to certain concepts; but the same intellect in moral consciousness leads to certain others. Science and ethics find a reconciliation in a higher synthesis. Mechanism and teleology are only different modes in which our intellect works in different spheres of reality. Kant admits it when he says: "We should explain all products and occurrences in nature, even the most purposive, by mechanism as far as is in our power. But at the same time we are not to lose sight of the fact that those things which we cannot state for investigation except under the concept of a purpose of Reason must in conformity with the essential constitution of our Reason, and notwithstanding those mechanical causes, be subordinated by us finally to causality in accordance with purposes" (*Critique of Judgment*, Bernard's translation, p. 333). We admit the proposition that our "whole man . . . is at work when we form our philosophical opinions" (*Will to Believe*, p. 192). We admit we cannot, in morals and religion, wait for scientific evidence of the type we come across in natural sciences. "Where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the lowest kind of immorality into which a thinking being can fall" (*ibid.* p. 25). Kant's insistence on practical reason as the clue to reality, and James's defence of the will to believe are both traceable to an inadequate conception of scientific truth and understanding. When once we admit that it is understanding and not a different faculty which works in the moral and

religious field, that everywhere it proceeds by the method of ideal experiment, and that beliefs are always tested by their adequacy to account for the facts, sensible and ideal, which provoked them, there will be no need to insist on a special faculty of faith. It is a complete dissociation of understanding as it operates in natural sciences from the kindred method illegitimately called faith, which works in morals and religion, that led James to believe that the two were different and both were needed. In morals we mould reality to suit our ideals ; in thought we mould our ideals to suit reality, and this difference is all-important. When in realms of morals and religion James admits that faith in a fact helps to create the fact, he is quite right. But when he extends it to all knowledge and upholds the hypothesis that everywhere truths are man-made, he is wrong. When he makes out the quite unobjectionable proposition that in cases left open by intellect moral ideals may be employed to decide the struggle, he is right. But when he rushes to the conclusion that will and feeling play an important rôle in truth-making everywhere, he is illegitimately extending a theory which derives its plausibility from a falsification of the nature of intellect.

Modern methods of science have also come to the help of the new philosophy. The hypothetical method of induction and the 'economical' account of scientific theories are taken up by the pragmatist view. Every truth is a hypothesis and every axiom a postulate. Our axiomatic truths are really postulates which have had to be confirmed by ages of experience before they were accepted as axioms. Our mathematical truths are human constructions, demands we make on reality to convert it into a cosmos on which we can depend. The postulatory character of axioms is admitted by all logicians. For example, Dr. Bosanquet speaking about the laws of thought observes : "As reflective conceptions they are postulates, *i.e.* principles which we use because we need them ; . . . they cannot therefore be taken in a

definite form as hypotheses or axioms antecedent to experience. Experience may be said to begin with the certainty that 'there is somewhat,' and the postulates of knowledge do but express in abstract form the progressive definition of this somewhat" (*Logic*, ii. 206). The idealist would have no objection to the pragmatist theory of the postulatory character of axioms. When we do not know the world completely, we assume that it is knowable. We say the world should be a harmony though it is not yet one. We cannot but assume it for our intellectual life is impossible without the assumption. This only means that the work of reason presupposes some sort of faith. The famous principle of Mr. Bradley, that "what may be and must be, that certainly is," confirms the hypothetical origin of all knowledge. We frame a hypothesis, a possibility, a mere 'may be'; we test and verify the hypothesis and see if we are constrained to think it, if it is a 'must be'; if so, we say it 'is.' Schiller insists upon not only the postulatory character of axioms but also their verification. He does not want us to admit beliefs simply because they are convenient. Beliefs ought to await confirmation by life and logic. Any faith will not do. The pragmatist is in sympathy with Newton's "hypotheses non fingo." "The spurious faith which too often is all theologians take courage to aspire to is merely the smoothing over of an unfaced scepticism, or at best a pallid fungus that, lurking in the dark corners of the mind, must shun the light of truth and warmth of action. In contrast with it a genuine faith is an ingredient in the growth of knowledge. It is ever realising itself in the knowledge that it needs and seeks—to help it on to further conquests" (*Humanism*, p. xv). Intuitions cannot be accepted without criticism. Schiller puts the whole point in a manner quite agreeable to the absolute idealist. "Humanism . . . has the utmost respect for intuitions of all sorts. It regards them as psychological facts of the greatest interest, importance and significance. It would not attempt to do without them either in ethics

or in logic. It would define them as immediate judgements of value. But it would respect without adoring. It could not refrain from examining claims before admitting them as infallible guides to validity. It would regard it as uncritical to treat them as anything else than psychological. In the first instance at any rate, it would treat the claims of intuition as something which might require confirmation by experience. In this respect truth claims and intuitive moral judgements are fundamentally alike. Both are made constantly and freely and spontaneously, and are chronologically prior to the sciences which criticise them. Hence they form the data from which a prudent theory of logical and ethical values will set out. But the mere fact that truth claims are made does not prove that they are infallible; they may still require confirmation, and God knows they mostly need it!" (*Mind*, 1909, xviii. 126). We are glad that Schiller so clearly and sharply distinguishes psychological certainty from objective validity. Much that once appeared self-evident has later turned out false. The hypothetical method of induction is accepted by idealist logic. For the central proposition of the idealist theory of truth that there is a coherent and comprehensive system of experience is only a hypothesis.

Inductive science regards laws to be approximate accommodations to reality. They are conceptual shorthand, a labour-saving machinery, possessing only an economic value. When they cease to serve their purpose they are abandoned. Ptolemaic astronomy, Euclidean geometry and Aristotelian logic are examples of theories which were adopted for the sake of their utility for some time, but later considerably modified, if not rejected. The so-called laws of nature do not represent the immutable foundations of reality but only their tendencies. They are man-made formulas for handling events, calculating their past and predicting their future. The absolutist admits that the categories of science are limited in their value. He knows that if these limited

concepts relative to narrow purposes are extended to the whole sphere of reality, they lead to contradictions. Determinism and freedom come into conflict though each principle is true, in its own field, in relation to the purpose for which it is assumed. As a matter of fact, the absolutist contends that all truths except the whole truth are relative. The only necessity of which we are aware is a mediate or hypothetical necessity. Even the mathematical truths are relative to our ideas of space. We have no objection to the view that much that claims to be knowledge is provisional in its nature in the sense that we are content with relative truth, since the ideal of absolute truth is yet remote. It is not provisional in the sense that it satisfies some false, subjective and temporary interests. It is also said that the absolutist theory has no room for growth and evolution. "The essential contrast is that for rationalism, reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making and awaits parts of its completion from the future" (*Pragmatism*, p. 257). The absolutist admits the growth and progressiveness of human truth. Truth grows and develops, it outlives stages which are recognised as erroneous. While the absolute truth, which is the ideal, may be looked upon as fixed and immutable in its perfection, human truth is bound to grow till it becomes identical with the absolute. It follows that truth so long as it is human grows, a proposition which is declared to be the distinguishing feature of the pragmatist theory.

On the pragmatist view the question remains unanswered as to why the world lends itself to this process of economising by concepts, why it allows itself to be reduced to systems. If our reasoning attains its ends it is a proof of the relationship between human intelligence and the nature of things in general. This oneness of things is the pivotal principle of absolutism, and Schiller admits it in discussing the methodological character of eternal truth. "It is evident that unless

the nature of the world had lent itself to a very considerable extent to such interpretation, the assumption of eternal laws would have served our purposes as little as those of astrology, necromancy, chiromancy and catoptrromancy" (*Humanism*, p. 104).

Pragmatism can also be traced to the Darwinian hypothesis of evolution. According to this doctrine, consciousness is, like any other organic function, but a means of adaptation in the struggle for existence. The cognitive function is a means for the preservation of the organism. Thought is a product of vital adjustment. Intellect is the organ of will, a form which the will to live puts forth to meet the new experiences. It has no intrinsic value by itself. Just as the forms of evolution are not immutable and eternal, even so forms of thought are mutable and relative. They grow by adaptations to new conditions. Truth has its history as anything else in this world of evolution. If evolution tells us anything it is that the world is an unceasing flow. There is nothing stable and unchanging in it, and forms of thought are not an exception to this rule. Truths are only guides to reality, and when they fail of their purpose they may be abandoned. Truth is born into the world as any organic form, and perishes when it cannot stand the shock of new demands. The history of truth can be understood not as an attempt to progressively realise an absolute rational order immanent in things, but as the attempt of human intellect to meet the needs of life and action. Mr. Dewey of Chicago contends that thought is a function like other functions originating in determinate needs. Its occasion is a situation of conflict or tension, and thought interferes to re-establish the equilibrium of the system and thus preserve the integrity of experience. The whole function of thought lies in this work of restoration or re-integration. The validity of thought lies in effecting the transition from a conflicting situation to an integrated experience. But this whole account rests on a confusion between the

psychological and the epistemological. Truth may be due to needs of life, but our question is, what is its nature. The theory of evolution declares that the origin of intellect is due to the vital necessities, in which case we cannot subscribe to the divine right of reason to be inviolable. There are certain laws in accordance with which we act in our search for truth. These laws form the basis of all our knowledge. The objects presented to the mind, the problems set, in other words, the empirical contents of consciousness change and vary, but not so the principles of truth. The relativity of truth to the needs of man requires explanation. Ideas would not help us long in the struggle for existence if they did not conform to objective reality. Suppose the world were completely irrational, what could human intelligence do in such a chaos? The concept is useful because nature is not a flux. There is a harmony between human intelligence and the structure of reality. If the two were essentially different we would have to give up the attempt of knowledge. They are a manifestation of a higher reality which reveals itself in both. We may say that reality attains its full stature in truth and thought.¹

Pragmatism represents a revolt against the abstract and vicious intellectualism which ignores the other sides of human nature. The rise of the new psychology, with its emphasis on will and purpose, resulted in an exhibition of the weakness of abstract intellectualism, which seeks satisfaction of the soul in the scholastic logic-chopping gymnastics. The extravagances of pragmatism may also be traced to this revolt against the 'inhuman' philosophies of naturalism and absolutism. In both these theories everything is logically necessary. All are on the same level, and there is no distinction of values. If an idealist like Kant opens the back door to them,

¹ It is very curious that Bergson, who contends that intellect is relative to its material, should, to suit his convenience, forget this truth and urge that intellect is always dead and mechanical, and is therefore to be condemned.

critics are ready to put them down as subjective aspirations which have no logical standing place in the hall of truth. They do not belong to the world of reality but are dreams floating in the cloudland of fancy. Philosophical and religious scepticism seems to be the outcome, and we have to erect moral and religious faith on it. In the reaction against absolutism, while romanticists affirm the necessity of faith or intuition as a substitute for knowledge or reason, the pragmatists assert that knowledge itself is faith and reason is intuition.

It is said that absolutism criticises human experience not from the standpoint of human experience, but from the visionary and impracticable standpoint of an absolute experience. It has no intelligible doctrine of error, while, as we shall see, pragmatism propounds a philosophy of error which is famous for its simplicity if for nothing else. Truth claims which do not work are errors, while those which do are truths. We have purposes, and if they are furthered by beliefs we have truths, and if thwarted by them we have errors. This is a simple view and will be true if we substitute for purposes the expression, the supreme purpose of the harmonious adjustment of the elements of reality.

The constructive activity of the subject in the elaboration of knowledge and the supremacy of will over intellect are due to the philosophy of Kant and recent advances in psychology. The postulatory character of knowledge and the experimental nature of truth-making are traceable to the modern inductive or scientific method. The evolutionary hypothesis gets the credit for the practical nature of intellect and the relativity of truths to human ends. The inspiration for absorbing these different elements into a new creed of philosophy finds its source in the emotional revolt against the rigors of the logical intellect and the barrenness of the absolute. In passing, we have referred to the extent to which these several sources might be rightly utilised. In the next section we shall further pursue this topic.

III

What is the pragmatist theory of truth? James answers this question by saying: "Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good and co-ordinate with it. The truth is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons. Surely you must admit this, that if there were no good for life in true ideas, or if the knowledge of them were positively disadvantageous, and false ideas the only useful ones, then the current notion that truth is divine and precious, and its pursuit a duty, could never have grown up or become a dogma. In a world like that our duty would be to shun truth rather" (*Pragmatism*, p. 75). We need not dispute the proposition that truth is a species of good if it only means that it is a form of value, something intrinsically valuable. Truth is one form of value as moral good is another. This cannot mean that the true is the same as the good; but it seems to be James's meaning. For he says: "The possession of truth, so far from being here an end in itself, is only a preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions" (*ibid.* p. 203). Schiller writes: "Nothing more is required of a truth than that it should be relevant to a specific situation, valuable for a purpose, and the most satisfactory answer to a question" (*Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 133). The purpose may be ethical or aesthetic. Beliefs may be *practically* valuable, as so many fictions have been, and they have to be regarded as true. The 'true' thus becomes confused with other values. Against this contention we defend the independence and the intrinsic worth of truth. It is not a subordinate species of the ethical good. The true is not to be confused with the good or the beautiful, though all the three are to be found in the ultimate reality. They are 'distincts' which we must carefully discriminate, while we should beware of any suggestion of their final incom-

patibility. It is the ambiguity of the word 'good' that causes confusion here. Truth is *a* good, *a* form of value. It is logical value, in the words of Schiller. But the logical 'good' is distinct from the moral 'good,' though both are species of 'good' in general. Truth is a primary value quite as fundamental and ultimate as any other kind of value. It is what satisfies the logical purpose. Schiller admits this view when he urges, "in all actual knowing, the question whether an assertion is true or false is decided uniformly and very simply. It is decided, that is, by its consequences" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 154). We need not debate this proposition if by consequences is meant theoretical consequences, effects on the system of knowledge. Speaking of the validation of truth claims, Dr. Schiller admits that "the validation of such claims proceeds by the pragmatist test, that is, by experience of their effect upon the bodies of established truth which they affect" (*ibid.* pp. 157-158). Again, "The true is what forwards, and the false is that which thwarts a human purpose (primarily logical), or, in other words, true and false are the forms of logical value" (*Mind*, No. 59, p. 389). Schiller here recognises that true and false are logical values and not ethical. Truth is a purposive effort, but the purpose is not any temporary superficial private one, but a deep-lying logical or cognitive purpose of understanding reality. Reality is not here looked upon as a means to the satisfaction of social or practical ends, but as that in which the will to know can find its fulfilment. The one supreme logical interest is the unifying of all experience, and the harmonising of all contradictions. But there is also to be seen a tendency to confuse logical with ethical values. Schiller writes: "There is no reason to set up a peculiar process of verification for the satisfying of a purely intellectual interest, different in kind from the rest, superior in dignity, and autocratic in authority. For there is no pure intellect" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 7). While it is true that all

intellectual interests have their own mental contexts, this does not justify us in repudiating the reality of purely cognitive interests. Intellectual interests are always found in union with emotions and desires, but it does not follow that there are no intellectual interests at all. Schiller asks, "Real *means* real for what *purpose*, to what *end*, to what *use*?" (*Humanism*, p. 11). He makes much of the different purposes which inspire different sciences, but this does not touch the point at issue. To say that different sciences put different questions and get different answers does not support the pragmatist theory. The wealth of experience requires that it should be studied in all its aspects. The limitations of man compel him to abstract from some and concentrate on others. Dr. Schiller quotes from the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle the statement that "in the case of intelligence, which is theoretical, and neither practical nor productive, its good and bad is truth and falsehood" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 152). We agree with this view, and hold that truth is a form of value, and it satisfies our purpose. We only say that that purpose is one of theory. Truth is practical in the sense that it fulfils one side of our nature, the will to know. It has its own right, which is quite as fundamental as that of the will to do or the will to enjoy. Life is not only worth living as morality says, or worth loving as art declares, but is also worth knowing as science and philosophy announce. Knowledge is not always sought after as a means to conduct, but is also pursued for its own sake, for the theoretical satisfaction it brings. Logic fulfils a part of our being. In any other sense it is wrong to reduce the cognitive attitude to the practical, however much they may be related.

If there is one point more than another emphasised by modern psychology, it is the purposive character of mental life. Pragmatism rightly insists on this purposiveness of thought. All meaning depends on purpose. Truth inquiry is for the fulfilling of an intellectual interest. But the mistake of pragmatism lies in confusing the

deeper need or impulse of logic with the temporary interests and purposes in which it is wrapped up. It forgets the existence of the underlying dominating will to know, and considers the fleeting purposes and superficial phases to be the sole reality. There is the structural need of intellect to remove contradictions, and this is the impulse to logical thinking. Special needs, which set to us special problems, are the outward expressions of the underlying demand of intellect to clear up contradiction. Because the logical impulse is mixed up with temporary purposes, the pragmatist concludes that thought is sporadic, being occasioned by special needs and purposes. Absolutism maintains that all consciousness is judgement, one continuous affirmation, though we become conscious of this fact when the needs and purposes are deeply felt. The principle of rationality operates throughout our life; we become conscious of it when the striving to get rid of irrationality meets with obstacles and checks. "Just as we feel no particular pleasure when we breathe freely, but an intense feeling of distress, when the respiratory motions are prevented," even so, James says, "any perfectly fluent course of thought awakens but little feeling," but "when the thought meets with difficulties we experience distress" (*The Sentiment of Rationality*). Even the Protagorean formula that man is the measure of all things is approved of by the idealists; they only contend that it is not the superficial individual selfish man that is the measure, but the true human being with his effort to know, to will, and to love. The world conforms to the true nature of man. We admit that these fundamental needs exist as elements in consciousness. But because thought is only a part of concrete mental life, it does not follow that we should study in logic the psychological structure of the whole, of which thought is an integral element, for the validity of thought does not depend on the variable and contingent facts of conscious life. We can stand apart from personal idiosyncrasies, but still determine the

value of thought. "Because we can abstract from the personal peculiarities of this man or that," Dr. Schiller argues, "it does not follow that we can abstract from *all men*" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 64). We agree. If we eliminate the personal prejudices and understand the common character, then it is the logical need to know operating in mental life, whatever its particular applications be, that strikes our attention.

When the pragmatist says that the true will be ultimately useful, we have no quarrel with him. Man's real nature is so far dependable that truth must satisfy his fundamental needs. Things have laws of their own which are not extraneous to the nature of intelligence. The whole world is an organism with basal affinities between its members. Again, it is said, if the truth were positively dangerous and disadvantageous, we would not pursue it. It has a relation to life. It has practical consequences worth discussing. If it makes no real difference which of two rival statements is true, then there is no real difference between the two. Dr. Peirce in his essay on "How to make our Ideas clear," in the *Popular Science Monthly* of January 1878, points out that our beliefs are really rules for action, and to develop a thought's meaning we have only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce. It is the same principle that ideas influence our practice that Shadworth Hodgson emphasises when he declares that reality is what it is *known as*. The truth which has no practical consequences is a meaningless one. If the lesson of all this is to tell us that thought has its application in conduct, theory in life, we have no objection. There is no question that the concrete meaning of life is enriched in different ways by theories.

But when James asserts that the true is the expedient in the way of our believing, as the good is the expedient in the way of our acting, then his view is open to question. Schiller supports James sometimes in a timider sometimes in a bolder spirit. "As regards the objects

valued as true, truth is that manipulation of them which turns out on trial to be useful primarily for any human end, but ultimately for that perfect harmony of our whole life which forms our final aspiration" (*Humanism*, p. 61). The timidity of thought, which induces Schiller to admit perfect harmony of life to be the ultimate ideal, is abandoned when he says that truth will have to be decided by "its consequences, by its bearing on the interest which prompted the assertion, by its relation to the purpose which put the question" (*Studies in Humanism*, pp. 154-155). Our ideas are true if they answer to the needs which give them birth, if they fit the designs for which we have shaped them, if they lead to the desirable results. Truth is determined by utility; its test is satisfaction. This view justifies the relativity of truth, and in a sense vindicates the relative and national truths which this war has created. Truth is yoked to policy. It is adaptable to the purposes of the state. Pragmatism readily admits that what is true for one may be false for another. The same raw material may give rise to different versions of truth. We have the news now retailed to the Cabinet Ministers, the House of Commons, the citizens of the British Empire, the Allies, the Neutrals and the Enemies. The same fact is adapted to different ends, and so assumes different shapes. The worst superstitions of the world can be defended on this hypothesis. It is good to believe that there is a hangman's whip in the other world, as it is likely to make people less wicked. "Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is . . . to determine it so that it will combine with all the working truths" (*Pragmatism*, p. 299). Apologists for various doctrines take shelter in the philosophy of pragmatism. It is suited to be the philosophy for the masses. It has nothing to do with the purely intellectual and objective pursuit of knowledge. It seems to support faith in the crude sense as the power of believing that which we other-

wise know to be untrue. Satisfaction of individual beliefs is its criterion. Only the solutions which pragmatism offers remain subjective and anarchical. Thought instead of remedying the subjectivity and the fragmentariness of the individual mind rivets the chains and confines him to his prison, adding the legend that the prison is the house of truth. That truth has practical consequences, that it begins and grows on account of human needs and interests, that truth is not a mere copy or reproduction of reality, and that reality is a construction are propositions quite agreeable to speculative idealism. But when pragmatism treats with contempt serious attempts to solve philosophical problems in a scientific spirit, and rests its dogmas on religious beliefs and instinctive needs, it gives up all pretensions to the claim of a philosophical method. The test of truth lies in its relation to the human will and purpose no doubt. But, as Dr. Schiller admits, there is the will to know, which is not different from the will for consistency, and no truth can really be useful and satisfactory unless it is consistent with itself and with the whole. James also insists on this aspect of truth. "After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests is his interest in consistency" (*Meaning of Truth*, p. 211). It is not therefore practical utility but intellectual utility that is the test. The true is the useful in the sense of co-ordinating our experiences into a consistent whole. It is not the convenient and the opportune, but the rational and the coherent.

So long as we believe in the rationality of the universe, truth includes something more than utility. If a theory allows us to play our part well in the world, if it works, it is because it is true. There is all the difference in the world between 'It is useful because it is true' and 'It is true because it is useful.' The first statement is right and the second wrong. James is wrong in thinking that the two mean exactly the same thing. "True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification process, useful is the

name for its completed function in experience" (*Pragmatism*, p. 204). If an idea is verified, and if it is found to harmonise with the rest of experience, then it is no doubt useful as it satisfies the intellectual needs; only in this sense is the useful the same as the true, but it is not the pragmatist sense. There are degrees of usefulness, and any degree of usefulness is not truth. A theory is true when it is useful in the sense of reflecting the nature of the real, leading "us towards other moments of experience which it will be worth while to have been led to" (*Pragmatism*, p. 205). If 'use' is taken in a narrow sense of serviceability for particular ends or adaptations to external acts, we emphasise only a part of truth. Coherence not with this or that aspect but with the whole of experience is the essence of truth. Truth is a guide to reality and not to the satisfaction of our whims. And this is the idealist notion of truth. Reality as it is felt is the actual; reality as the ideal is a harmonious experience, and absolutism contends that if this logical ideal has not also a metaphysical reality, our logical enterprise becomes a huge joke. While coherence with the whole is the real test, adaptability to bits of experience is generally a sign of truth. Working is a symptom of truth, but not its nature. The pragmatist theory suffers from a confusion between truth and the recognition of truth.

As another illustration of the same confusion we may give the pragmatist's opinion that the true is the satisfying. No doubt satisfaction is a sign of truth, but is not its essence. The true satisfies as the will to know is fulfilled. Fulfilled desire gives satisfaction. A belief satisfies because it is true, but we cannot say it is true because it satisfies. It is a fundamental tenet of idealism that the universe as rational will satisfy man's will to know, as an object of enjoyment his aesthetic needs and as a field of service his ethical demands. A philosophical hypothesis satisfies when it is true, that is, when it furnishes us with a fruitful rendering of the world of experience. This James admits, when he says: "Truth in science is

what gives us the maximum possible sum of satisfactions, taste included, but consistency, both with previous truth and with novel fact, is always the most imperious claimant" (*Pragmatism*, p. 217). The contradictory is the unsatisfactory. The non-contradictory is the satisfactory. The struggle of thought is to avoid the contradictory. And this striving is a part of the great cosmic process (see *Humanism*, p. 188).

Schiller argues that "the practical value of scientific conceptions has accelerated and determined their acceptance" (*Humanism*, p. xiii). This does not prove that the practical value converts stimulating falsehoods into truths. The practical value selects truths, popularises them, but does not determine our acceptance of them as truths.

There cannot be truths which are unverified. Every truth must be tested with regard to its capacity to fit the relevant facts. In this sense the truth of an assertion depends on its application. Pragmatism rightly stresses the need for verification and experiment. The futility of useless unverifiable knowledge is evident to all. If in the process of verification we find any idea theoretically untenable, it is put down as false; if not, it is true. But pragmatism has its own theory of verification. An idea is verified if in the guidance of action it serves as a substitute for an immediate perception. That is, the idea must agree with the perception in the sense that the two prompt the same action (see *Pragmatism*, p. 215). It is the functional identity that the pragmatist requires. As immediate experience is looked upon as more real than the theoretical construction, the ultimate test according to pragmatism is whether an idea leads to the right perception or not. But this is not the only kind of verification. Even where complete perceptual verification is out of question, we may apply the criterion of coherence. The same confusion between truth and its recognition reappears in the pragmatist contention that verification constitutes truth. Verification only helps us

to know the truth, but does not make truth. But still James says: " Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events " (*Pragmatism*, p. 201; see also *Studies in Humanism*, p. 118).

IV

There is no question that if the pragmatist theory is interpreted in the way in which its supporters wish us to interpret it, it is entirely subjective. It becomes difficult for the pragmatist to account for the common world by reference to which we lead our life. Truth is not the private property of any one, but is possessed by all. Schiller admits that the individualities of interests, and purposes and points of view are negligible or relatively subordinate, when compared with the common ideals and universal impulses which inspire the progress of humanity. Schiller recognises the danger of subjectivism to which pragmatism lies open, and tries to remedy it. He says: " Even in the individual there is a good deal of regulation of the individual's subjective valuations ; there is a tendency to the consolidation and subordination of interests under the main purposes of his life. Hence many of his initial interests will be suppressed, and the valuations which ministered to them will tend to be withdrawn, to be judged *useless*, and ultimately false " (*Humanism*, p. 58). We cannot therefore say that anything which satisfies any interest is true. We have to find out the main interests of life, and whatever satisfies them is true. So Schiller says, that though truth is motivated by desire and emotion, though thought is guided by interest, there is the security that the subjective valuations will disappear and the objectively true experiences will survive. There is the social factor to be taken into account, for man is not a Crusoe with a desert island for the world. " Even though every truth may start in a minority of one, its hold upon existence is exceedingly precarious unless it can contrive to get itself more exten-

sively appreciated. Those unfortunate enough to have acquired and retained an exclusive view of truth are usually secluded in prisons or asylums" (*Humanism*, p. 58). This social recognition is sometimes made the result and sometimes the cause of truth (see *Humanism*, p. 59). But majority opinions and beliefs of the multitude are not necessarily true. The question of truth is not to be decided by feeling, whether individual or social. Our experiences as felt are neither true nor false. It is the interpretations we put upon them and their rationality that would help us in evaluating beliefs.

The subjectivism of pragmatism is due also to the idea that nature is entirely plastic and can be moulded to human desires. But the facts of life contradict the view that reality has nothing determinate about it. We cannot adapt nature to any and every wish and whim. We have to yield to nature, stoop to conquer in many cases. If nature is so entirely plastic and fluid, that we can determine it as we please, how is it that we meet so often with failure? When we do not bend to nature but try to bend it, we do so at our risk. Facts do not always say what we wish them to say. It shows that there is a resisting power in the environment. The evolutionary concepts of adaptation, natural selection, etc. presuppose that there is a nature independent of us which selects us only on condition that we adapt ourselves to it. There is no meaning in the phrase adaptation to environment, if the environment is only that which we wish it to be. For struggle, progress, etc. presuppose the persistence of nature and its resistance to man. Dr. Schiller adopts the Aristotelian theory of matter as the potentiality of whatever form we succeed in imposing upon it. Out of the raw material we can develop forms of life in which our spirit can find its satisfaction. Though we do not know the exact extent to which nature is plastic, still Schiller asks us to assume that it is wholly plastic, "to act as though we believed this." While the idea is highly invigorating and helps to increase

our sense of importance and responsibility in the world, it is not true. Reality is not all of our making. There are other forces at work. Again, the pragmatist's idea of shaping our reality to suit human ends requires that reality should have some fixity about it. If it is a mere mass of incoherency or caprice we cannot make either head or tail of it. What succeeds this moment may not succeed at the next. If reality should be of such a protean nature as to take different forms at different moments, then there is no question of true or false, successful or unsuccessful. Everything succeeds, and therefore everything is right and true.

As the theory of absolute plasticity conflicts with the plain man's belief and leads to deadlocks, the pragmatists hit upon compromises. Mr. Dewey allows that the organic situation which provokes thought has some determinateness about it. James admits that sensations come to us and we have no control over their nature and order. There are relations which are thrust upon us and are not thought constructions. But when James asserts that truth is not a reproduction of a perfect reality but only a process of gradual completion through the activity of thinking beings, he seems to allow that sensations and their relations are not given. For if they are given to us and are only to be apprehended by us, where is the need for the spiritual activity of man? We cannot conceive reality to be independent of thought. For that commits us to a thing in itself behind experience. When James insists upon the activity of the subject he is logically bound to hold that there is no reality behind experience, and in experience we have a steady growth from an indeterminate flux into a rounded whole. James insists upon the givenness of sensations and relations only to intimate to us that the world which we accept as our starting-point is determinate to a certain extent in that it is determinable only on certain lines. Absolute plasticity is therefore abandoned. As James clearly says: "Between the coercions of the sensible order and

those of the ideal order, our mind is wedged tightly. Our ideas must agree with the realities, be such realities concrete or abstract, be they facts or be they principles, under penalty of endless inconsistency and frustration." Schiller in accounting for the objectivity of the world points out how the individuals are constrained to think in a particular manner at the peril of their lives. He also admits the sensible core of reality. There are sensations and relations forced on us which we have to take account of. Pragmatism in the last analysis repudiates the suggestion that each individual makes his own truth according to his own needs and pleasure. There are other persons with their experiences and beliefs, and there are also lines determined for us and not by us along which alone reality can be constructed (see *Mind*, xiii. 463). Pragmatism therefore recognises the reality of an objective world. We cannot call this common world a mere abstraction from individual worlds. For a world with only the common features would be an unreality. It must be the whole including the individual and the universal, the whole which lives in the parts, the whole which though at no time completely embodied in any individual, is still the animating ideal of every individual's life.

V

Reality is an experience. In its fulness it is not an original datum. It has to be apprehended through a process of ideal construction. Truth grows by interaction between thought and reality. Pragmatic principles which are valuable in the upward progress cannot be looked upon as metaphysical realities. We only mean that there are certain features of our life, which it is useful to describe in terms of pragmatism. But the pragmatist logic, we have seen, commits us to the absolutist metaphysics. To escape from subjectivism, pragmatism is forced to admit that reality which is experience is not the experience of the individual subject,

but a perfect experience of which our individual worlds are imperfect suggestions. But because we say that absolutist theory is ultimately true, it does not follow that the experiences of the finite subjects are of no value. The pragmatist criticism that knowledge as known to us is personal and purposive, while absolute experience stands aloof from human knowing, forgets that absolutism has long ago given up the idea of the absolute as a static entity existing alongside of the actual. The absolute is not a static reality which our human knowledge is to copy, for that would be to court all the difficulties of realism and 'correspondence.' It is the ideal which works in human knowledge, for any partial truth if worked out will show itself to be the whole. It is the whole which gives significance to the parts. There are not two things to be externally related, but only one whole which is the integration of several aspects. The difference between pragmatism and absolutism seems to be one of emphasis, occasioned by the teleological character of modern psychology, and if pragmatism professes to be quite independent of absolutism and interprets its main propositions in that spirit, then it lands us to subjectivism. True pragmatism inclines towards absolutism. False pragmatism with its principle of payment by results is unworkable. What Leslie Stephen observes in another connection hits off so well the character of the false pragmatist that we take leave to quote it. "The so-called believer of this type is a cynic in a thin disguise. He is partly aware that his belief is a sham, but he is not the less resolved to stick to so pleasant a sham. He answers his opponents by a shriek or a sneer. The sentiment which he most thoroughly hates and misunderstands is the love of truth for its own sake."

CHAPTER IX

THE ' PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE ' OF WILLIAM JAMES

I

' WHOSO touches this book touches a man.' We are reminded of this pregnant saying of Walt Whitman when we approach the work of William James. His powerful intellect, fierce passion for the good, and strong empirical sense come out in every page of his writings. His early scientific training as a doctor and a psychologist, coupled with his innate artistic temperament, led him to notice the individualities of things. This emphasis on the concrete realities of life is the distinguishing feature of James's work as a psychologist and philosopher. Whatever philosophic effort of his we take, the tendency to submit theoretical constructions to the test of life and experience is to be seen. Whether it is psychology or philosophy, pragmatism or radical empiricism, pluralism or theism, studies of religious consciousness or psychical research, everywhere that which is original to James can be traced to his burning passion to be faithful to the concrete particulars of life. He hates system and symmetry whenever they are secured at the expense of the empirical realities. This accounts for his impatience with vicious intellectualism and abstract absolutism which provide us with ' finished ' pictures of the universe, which make no provision for the cardinal principles of popular thought such as freedom of the will, the reality of evil, the existence of God, and the progress of the world.

James takes up these ideas of current Christian thought, and tries to defend them against monistic systems, naturalist as well as idealist. He opposes static views of reality and stands out for genuine freedom and continuous creation in a flowing world. His moral seriousness, which has the courage to face risks and surmount difficulties, cannot be satisfied by theories which find no room for man's adventure, daring and energy, and which trifle with man's sacred possessions by reducing the joys and sorrows of the world to mere freaks of the Absolute. James makes a serious attempt by means of his pluralism and radical empiricism to steer a middle course between empirical naturalism with its principle of the undisputed sway of the laws of mechanism, and transcendental idealism with its purely logical scheme of reality out of relation to the world of empirical fact. Both these theories regard personality as an illusion or a malady from which men suffer. But James had an American's democratic regard for the sacredness of personality. His one central interest in philosophy is to rescue human personality and its values from the clutches of 'inhuman' systems of science and philosophy. He makes an attempt to reconcile religion with science, common sense with philosophy (see the title of his paper on "Reflex Action and Theism"). "Let empiricism once become associated with religion as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin" (*Pluralistic Universe*, p. 314).

To realise this end, it was found necessary to twist the definition of philosophy. Systems of philosophy are, according to James, "just so many visions, modes of feeling the whole push, seeing the whole drift of life forced on one by one's total character and experience, and on the whole *preferred*—there is no other truthful word—as one's best working attitude" (*ibid.* p. 20). James openly confesses that his philosophy is the expres-

sion of his vision and not logic. "A man's vision is the great fact about him. Who cares for Carlyle's reason or Schopenhauer's or Spinoza's? A Philosophy is the expression of a man's intimate character, and all definitions of the universe are but the deliberately adopted reactions of human characters upon it" (*ibid.*). "Philosophy is more a matter of passionate vision than of logic . . . logic only finding reasons for the vision afterwards" (*ibid.* p. 176). When James makes out that philosophy is a matter of passion and not logic, that the true method of philosophy is that of direct and immediate experience, of intuition, of life, he is confusing philosophy with poetry, science with art, criticism with life. In philosophy we do not seek for faith and vision but for a reasoned explanation. But as we have already seen in the discussion of pragmatism, James cares more for the satisfyingness of the conclusion than for its logical cogency. Fulfilment of the needs of man is of greater importance to him than submission to logic and argument. He shares the instinctive beliefs of human nature in an open universe and the eternal self-existing many, freedom and individuality, spiritualism and theism. He gives us a philosophy of strife as in the world we see that "war is the father of all and the lord of all" (Heraclitus). Pluralism ought to be the permanent form of the world. "Real possibilities, real indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real crises, catastrophes and escapes, a real God and a real moral life, just as common sense conceives these things, may remain in empiricism as conceptions which that philosophy gives up the attempt either to overcome or to reinterpret in monistic form" (*Will to Believe*, p. ix).

Psychology commends itself as the best method of approach to philosophy, as it considers the self to be the unit of the world. It is no wonder that James, the greatest psychologist of his age, makes his philosophy hang round psychology. The will to believe is the guide to truth. The logical right to believe rests on the psycho-

logical will to believe. The kind of reality we will to believe is not the block universe which abstract intellect fastens on us, but the plastic, malleable, unfinished world which experience gives us. If intellect comes into conflict with the demands of will, so much the worse for intellect. James bases his world view on the testimony of immediate experience. The amateur is the judge of philosophers: "none of us may treat his verdicts disdainfully for, after all, his is the typically perfect mind, the mind the sum of whose demands is greatest, the mind whose criticisms and dissatisfactions are fatal in the long run" (*Pragmatism*, p. 32). If absolutism tries to rationalise experience while nourishing itself on it, James's view tends to hold fast to experience as it appears, immediate and pure, unanalysed and uncriticised. Being essentially democratic in its nature, James's philosophy has in view the interests of the plain man. As he finds experience to be full of multiplicity, diversity and opposition, as he finds the universe to be not a closed system but an open one with room for chance, novelty and freedom, every philosopher must take note of these features of experience and shrink from making a coherent whole of the world.

We will see from our survey of James's system that it suffers from the defects of its qualities. It is merely a mirroring of the moods of the empirical-individual. James takes things as he finds them, and leaves them side by side without attempting to systematise them. The greatest defect of James's philosophy is its unsystematic nature. This is due to James's belief that nothing is true that can be stated systematically. There are two fundamental aspects of James's philosophy, one negative and the other positive. The negative is the criticism of absolutism, and the positive is the defence of pluralism. We shall first turn to James's criticism of absolutistic monism.

II

James's intense repugnance to every form of absolutism comes out in all his writings. He makes a number of criticisms the value of which we may here consider. Absolutism does not adequately account for finite consciousness. He asks, "If nothing exists but as the Absolute Mind knows it, how can anything exist otherwise than as that Mind knows it? That Mind knows each thing in one act of knowledge along with every other thing. Finite minds know things without other things, and this ignorance is the source of most of their woes. We are thus not simply objects to an all-knowing subject: we are subjects on our own account and know differently from its knowing" (*Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 138). Absolutism considers that the finite individual knower is related to the Absolute as object to subject. "For monism, the world is no collection but one great all-inclusive fact outside of which is nothing—nothing is its only alternative. . . . When the monism is idealistic, this all-enveloping fact is represented as an Absolute Mind that makes the partial facts by thinking them, just as we make objects in a dream by dreaming them or personages in a story by imagining them. To be on this scheme is, on the part of a finite thing, to be an object for the Absolute: and on the part of the Absolute it is to be the thinker of that assemblage of objects. The Absolute is nothing but the knowledge of those objects: the objects are nothing but what the Absolute knows" (*Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 36-37; see also pp. 123 and 192-194). In the absolutistic theory, man loses his personal identity. "Pluralism lets things really exist in the each form or distributively. Monism thinks that the all form or collective unit form is the only form that is rational" (*ibid.* p. 321). We may observe here that it is an error to reduce the Absolute to the level of a purely cognitive subject. James tells us that idealism regards finite individuals as "constituent parts of the

Absolute's eternal field of consciousness," a view for which he would find it hard to get support from any of the classical absolutists. Again, idealistic monism is interpreted as the extreme opposite of pluralism, when it is said that monism assumes the all form, while pluralism the each form. The logical principle of idealism is not all or each, but all in each or identity in difference. It is the attempt of idealism to unify the manifold, not in the superficial way which for abstract philosophies has a fatal fascination, by either cancelling the all or the eaches, but in a vital and organic manner. The Absolute is not a unity which deletes all differences any more than a mechanical aggregate which collects all the parts. James's criticism holds against theories which regard the One as the sole reality, and the empirical variety as but the illusive appearance of a temporal unrolling. The concrete Absolute is not the unity in which all diversities disappear and all elements of human experience fade away. We have monism and monism, the monism of Parmenides as well as that of Plato, the monism of Spinoza as well as that of Hegel, the monism of Bradley as well as that of Bosanquet, the monism which makes the whole one and static, and that which includes the static and the dynamic aspects. James's criticism assumes that the abstract atomic individual is the final reality. We know he exists, but is existence identical with reality? What absolute idealism denies, is not the existence of the individual but his ultimate reality. We cannot get on in the world if each individual makes his self the centre of the universe. We cannot attain to the truth if we seek it from the individual point of view. Logic and life deny the ultimate reality of the individual. They clearly establish that what is is not the particular self but the universal embodied in the particular.

There is another way in which the same defect of absolutism to account for finite life is urged. "Why should the Absolute ever have lapsed from the perfection of its own integral experience of things and refracted itself

into all our finite experiences?" (*P. U.* p. 120). "How, if perfection be the source, should there be imperfection?" (*Some Problems*, p. 138). If God was self-sufficiency, why did he issue out of it? Why does the supreme consciousness disperse itself in the dust of several consciousnesses? How can we reconcile metaphysical unity with phenomenal diversity? Why should finite centres come in at all? Mr. Bradley confesses it to be a mystery. Mr. Joachim admits the problem of how the complete coherence of all things in the Absolute should involve as a necessary moment in its self-maintenance the self-assertion of the finite minds, a self-assertion which in its extreme form is error, to be an insoluble puzzle (see *P. U.* p. 121). But if absolutism fails to account for evil and error, pluralism does not fare better. James admits the incapacity of pluralism to account for evil and imperfection, by declaring that the problem for pluralism is not speculative but practical, "not why evil should exist at all, but how we can lessen the actual amount of it" (*P. U.* p. 124). Even on the pluralistic hypothesis, the account of creation is not clear. "We are indeed internal parts of God, and not external creations, on any possible reading of the panpsychist system. Yet because God is not the Absolute, but is himself a part when the system is conceived pluralistically, his functions can be taken as not wholly dissimilar to those of the other smaller parts—as similar to our functions consequently. Having an environment, being in time, and working out a history just like ourselves, he escapes from the foreignness from all that is human, of the static, timeless, perfect Absolute" (*P. U.* p. viii). How God can be a creator of whom we are internal parts and a part of the world just like ourselves, it is hard for us to conceive. Absolute idealism contends that there is no God without a universe. The temporal is the necessary condition of the eternal, imperfection of perfection.

The objection of James that monism contradicts the character of reality as experienced is invalid. James

argues that in the world we are acquainted with, change is real, and history is real. There are novelties and struggles, losses and gains. "For pluralists, time remains as real as anything, and nothing in the universe is great or static or eternal enough not to have some history" (*P. U.* p. 44). If good is already accomplished, then the process of its gradual accomplishment is an illusion. If God is the whole of experience, then evil becomes an illusion. But James has such a deep sense of the reality of evil and human suffering that he cannot but revolt against any philosophy which regards them as illusions, if not the inevitable alloy of perfection. The world of the Absolute, which is represented as unchanging, eternal, out of time and therefore out of history, a world which makes evolution and progress a mirage or an illusion, we cannot either apprehend or appreciate (see *Some Problems*, p. 139). Nothing is done on earth, it is all being done. We are important factors in the world's work of soul-building. A perfect and eternal Absolute is fundamentally irrational even though the absolutist deludes us into the belief that the rationality of the universe requires it. If what is real is eternal, then history is unreal. But historical reality, as we know, which is essentially living, self-producing and self-creating, cannot be unreal. Therefore the eternal Absolute is unreal. But the alternatives are not exclusive. Both the eternal and the temporal may be real. The absolute is not a blank eternal which denies the finite world of change and striving. With James, the absolutists are anxious to do justice to the finite process. They go the length of saying that there is no Absolute apart from the finite process. As James well knew, his colleague Royce (*P. U.* p. 115) had declared to the effect "were there no longing in time, there would be no peace in eternity" (*The World and the Individual*, vol. ii.).

How does the philosophy of James differ from absolute idealism? "The philosophy of the Absolute agrees with the pluralistic philosophy in that both identify human

substance with the divine substance. But whereas absolutism thinks that the said substance becomes fully divine only in the form of totality, and is not its real self in any form but the *all* form, the pluralistic view is willing to believe that there may ultimately never be an all form at all, that the substance of reality may never get totally collected, that some of it may remain outside of the largest combination of it ever made, and that a distributive form of reality, the *each* form, is logically as acceptable and empirically as probable as the all form commonly acquiesced in as so obviously the self-evident thing" (*P. U.* p. 34). But, if God and man are identical, what is the meaning of saying that the parts of reality are separate and are only externally related? If there is no dominating principle or controlling spirit, if things are cut off one from another, we have a radical pluralism without any trace of unity or order. If reality is a chaos, the general harmony which has resulted must be a chance resultant of independent forces. But James believes that there is unity in the world; only it is not complete (*Pragmatism*, pp. 139-140). In the world there is a tendency to attain more and more unity, though complete unity is not reached. 'Ever not quite' is true of all finite attempts to reach the infinite—a formula quite acceptable to the monistic idealist. Absolutism does not say that the actual world with which we deal is a realised unity. It is only the ideal. We should view the world as a vast and complex whole where everything is related to everything else. Plurality and chaos we have; unity and order we have to achieve. Victory is not yet won; perfection is not yet achieved. The fight is still going on. While it is true to say that the One is unthinkable without the multiplicity, multiplicity is unthinkable without unity. If James tells us that the finite world is a plurality of individuals with an environment opposed to and external to them, the monistic idealist admits it, since the presence of an opposing environment is a necessary

condition of finiteness. Everything finite, however vast and inclusive it may be, has still some elements unreduced to unity. It only shows that the finite is only the finite and not the perfect whole. But to say that there is no unity simply because we as finite cannot realise it, to say that there is no all inclusive spirit or all form at all, is to doubt the central principle of our life with its aspirations after unity, love and service. If James has really doubts about the reality of the all form, then it means that the individuals or each forms are alone real. In that case there will be no stimulus for progress, no assurance of victory, and no need to be dissatisfied with our self-sufficiency. The all form is a thought bubble, and logic, ethics and aesthetics which try to realise it live in a fool's paradise.

Monism is fatalistic. To it freedom is an illusion. "What is, is necessary, and aught else is impossible" (*P. U.* p. 139). The iron hand of necessity grips the universe. The pluralist's world is yet in the making, and depends for its fulfilment on man's effort. "If this life be not a real fight in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is not better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will" (*Is Life Worth Living?*). Again, absolutism grants us 'moral holidays,' for "since in the Absolute finite evil is overruled already, we may, when we wish to treat the temporal as if it were potentially the eternal, be sure that we can trust its outcome, and without sin dismiss our fear and drop the worry of our finite responsibility. In short, they mean that we have a right ever and anon to take a moral holiday, to let the world wag in its own way, feeling that its issues are in better hands than ours and are none of our business" (*Pragmatism*, pp. 73-74). But if this way of arguing is correct, the belief in the Absolute gives us not only moral holidays, but makes our life one long vacation. It justifies our relaxing our anxiety not only occasionally but for all time. "It is very comforting to sick souls to be told that nothing

happens here below without the consent of God." But while morality requires pluralism, religion to which morality leads and in which it is swallowed up demands the abolition of pluralism in a monism. Our moral experience is not the highest. The religious experience transcends the moral. Moral life may presuppose an unfinished universe, a finite God, and a doubtful struggle. But the moral life will lose its vitality and meaning, and moral struggle its inspiration without the religious assurance. Morality points beyond itself to religion where we feel the oneness of the universe and see all things in God. Only the religious conviction assures us of the triumph of good. "Any absolute moralism is pluralism; any absolute religion is monism" (Introduction to *The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James*, p. 118). As religion is the truth and completion of morality, even so is monism the crown and consecration of pluralism.

The chief argument against absolutism is put thus: "*Prima facie*, there is this in favour of the eaches that they are at any rate real enough to have made themselves at least appear to every one, whereas the absolute has, as yet, appeared immediately to only a few mystics, and, indeed, to them ambiguously" (*P. U.* p. 129). But this argument is unsound. So many things which appear to us real are found to be unreal. The mystics are the specialists in religion who attempt to see God face to face and not merely through the eyes of tradition and history. The average man is not a mystic. Miss Evelyn Underhill writes: "We hope that the great dynasty of the mystical saints will never fail, but the lessons of history suggest that they are never likely to be numerous. Their virile spirituality is too difficult for the average man, and is unlikely in the future, as in the past, to form the dominant element of his religion. Such mystics are the fine flower of humanity possessing as their birthright a special aptitude for God. Like other great artists and specialists, they have given years of patient effort to the education and full development of those powers in obedience

to that innate passion for the perfect which is the greatest of all human attributes." As the mystic's career is not within the reach of the majority of mankind, we should "be content with the tidings which these great wayfarers bring back to us" (*Theosophist*, Jan. 1918, p. 363). In matters of religious belief we live at second hand, and it is only the mystics who can say, "We musicians know." They alone can speak, not as the Scribes and the Pharisees, but as having direct authority. The testimony of mystic consciousness is not ambiguous. If by mysticism we mean not merely the true spiritual life but magic and occultism as well, James is right in thinking that the verdicts of mystics differ. But there is mysticism and mysticism, mysticism which is magic and mysticism which is philosophy and the life of spirit, mysticism which is a disease of the brain and mysticism which is a discerning of reality, mysticism which is delusion and mysticism which is revelation. Differences are seen if our attention is turned to the views of the religious souls who are bred in creeds and conventions. Though the soul is the supreme judge in spiritual matters, it is much hampered in its life by the consciousness of books and traditions. So while those who know reality at first hand are unanimous about the mystic vision and experience, it is those that have received faith second hand that differ. If we interpret mysticism rightly then, there is nothing more remarkable than the perfect agreement of the testimony of the mystics far removed from each other in time and space, race and language. Perfectly unaware of each other's utterances, they still corroborate each other's evidence, suggesting to us that there is the inexorable logic of truth which forces them to have the same experience. Though in the expression of their vision the mystics generally make use of the religious formulae of the times, they agree in the fundamental facts, that spirit is the all inclusive reality and the world is a divine manifestation. God is all and man is a passing phase of the infinite. "They *know* that we inhabit an invisible

spiritual environment from which help comes, our soul being mysteriously one with a larger soul whose instruments we are " (*P. U.* p. 308). That a higher principle operates in the universe and that reality is not an assemblage of things as they immediately are and appear to us, are the conclusions of mystical insight. Absolutism satisfies the mystic element in man. James recognises that absolutism has given satisfaction to most noble minds and has thus pragmatist justification. It offers consolations for the shortcomings of mundane existence and gratifies the longing for cosmic emotion. It is not impossible for the average man to reach the mystic state when he can verify the truth of the absolutist vision. The mystic insight is within the power of all. We only need to employ the higher sense which so few use. While mysticism is not a part of the normal soul's experience, it still can enter into it. The all form can appear to all when it will be seen how the each form is a relative 'degradation' or expression of the all form. To a man steeped in the world and lost in this labyrinth, the absolute may be " a metaphysical monster, neither intelligence nor will, neither self nor collection of selves, neither truthful, good, nor beautiful as we understand these terms " (*P. U.*). But to the mystic, it is the supreme all-enveloping spirit which is perfection itself. Absolutism is not, therefore, without its empirical verification. James admits that " the existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows the pretensions of non-mystical states to be the sole and ultimate dictator of what we may believe " (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 427).

A great difficulty in the way of accepting absolutism is, How can many consciousnesses be at one and the same time one consciousness? This problem once led James to shrink from absolutism, but now he has solved it to his own satisfaction, though it was not his anxiety to vindicate absolutism that led him to do so. What is responsible for it is James's enthusiasm for Fechner's conception of the earth-soul. Fechner assumes that

conscious experiences combine and separate. They can keep their own identity unchanged while they form parts of wider fields of experience. James, for long, was of opinion that such combinations were impossible, and that higher thoughts were psychic units and not compounds. James says: " Shall we say that every complex mental fact is a separate psychic entity succeeding upon a lot of other psychic entities, which are erroneously called its parts, and superseding them in function, but not literally being composed of them? This was the course I took in my psychology, and if followed in theology we should have to deny the absolute as usually conceived, and replace it by the God of theism. We should also have to deny Fechner's earth-soul and all other superhuman collections of experience of every grade, and so far at least as these are held to be compounded of our simpler souls in the way which Fechner believed in " (*P. U.* chap. v.). But Fechner's philosophy has such a fascination for James that he rebels against the tyranny of logic and seeks shelter in Bergson's intuition. We cannot logically conceive this compounding, but still reality affords practical evidence of it. Life seems to be irrational. We have only " to give up the logic, fairly, squarely and irrevocably as a philosophical method," for " reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it " (*ibid.*). Thus by declaring that life transcends logic, James upholds the possibility of the compounding of conscious states and withdraws his previous objection to psychic synthesis (see *Psychological Review*, 1895). Now that " the self-compounding of mind in its smaller and more accessible portions seems a certain fact, the speculative assumption of a similar but wider compounding in remoter regions must be reckoned with as a legitimate hypothesis. Mental facts do function both singly and together at once, and we finite minds may simultaneously be conscious with one another in a superhuman intelligence." It is doubtful whether the

psychological problem of the composition of mental states is analogous to the metaphysical problem of the relation of the Absolute to finite minds, but whatever be here the truth, James is clear that absolutism cannot be criticised on this account. In vindicating Fechner's view of the earth-soul James allows that human consciousnesses can somehow form parts of a superhuman consciousness. The cosmic mind can very well unify and supplement its finite elements without in any way diminishing their reality as individual beings. It is thus open to an absolutist to consider finite selves at least as parts of the higher mind, even if he is not authorised in regarding them as the passing thoughts of God or his unreal appearances. But James is satisfied, seeing that, though the conceivability of the Absolute is admitted, it is done at the expense of logic. It is the anti-intellectualism, if anything, that can save absolutism, if at all.

III

While James's view of pluralism is contrasted with that of monism, his method of irrationalism is contrasted with that of intellectualism. As James believes that rationalism and monism go together, he upholds an irrationalist pluralism. As logical systems of absolutism do not satisfy the cravings of the will, James suspects a snare in logic. The intellectual method is thin and abstract, while James's method is thick and concrete. The former is the purely logical and dialectical way of thinking, which is severed from contact with particular objects, while the latter stands on the secure region of positive facts and never leaves it. Absolutism follows the proud but arid path of intellectualism, while James pursues the humble but fertile path of resorting to the particulars of life. What James is fighting against is the tendency of abstractionism. While abstraction is necessary to get on in life, abstractionism is fatal to philosophy. Concepts help us to predict the future,

and they are of no value if they do not help us in the world of perception. As the concepts are the instruments by which we can grasp the rich moving world, we cannot totally break from the concrete current. Abstractionism anatomises the living whole, while abstraction helps us to realise its wealth and complexity. On account of our human limitations we cannot grasp the whole, but will have to study it piecemeal, but this does not mean that parts exist by themselves. Abstractionism is condemned by the intellectualist systems of concrete idealism. But James neglects the distinction between abstractionism and the use of abstraction, and complains of the intellectualist's method. He holds that concepts can give us only abstract outlines of things, wherein we should miss their concreteness, their continuity, and their living connections. With Bergson, James says, "The essence of life is its continuously changing character; but our concepts are all discontinuous and fixed" (*P. U.* p. 253). "When you have broken the reality into concepts you never can reconstruct it in its wholeness. Out of no amount of discreteness can you manufacture the concrete" (*ibid.*). "Life is logically irrational" (*ibid.* p. 208). The reality of a changing world cannot be conceived by our intellect, but has only to be directly apprehended by living experience itself. We are told that as concepts are fixed while life is fluid, concepts cannot describe life. But why should a concept resemble life to signify it or describe it? Philosophy is not life, any more than thought is the thing. It does not require a William James to tell us that the abstract formulas of metaphysics are not the concrete riches of life. One cannot supersede the other, though one is not a falsification of the other. The continuity of sensible experience is no ground for the condemning of logic. If mechanical determinations are inadequate to the flow of life, we may try the teleological ones like life, organism, beauty, etc. There is no need to surrender hard thinking and take to intuition and such other doubtful remedies.

Again, what does James mean by saying that "life is logically irrational"? Does he mean that it is not the embodiment of reason? If so, it cannot lend itself to intellectual interpretation at all. But James gives us such an artistic though incoherent interpretation of life by his powers of intellect. He argues the question of monism versus pluralism and tries to convince us of the futility of monism. It is logic that has led James to pluralism. No doubt the real is the experienced, but it is also the rational, and the true view of life would be not a radical but a rational empiricism.

James's chapter on M. Bergson gives us the impression that the two writers are of the same opinion about the nature of intellect and its objects. But on examination we shall find that it is not so. While both discredit the conceptual function altogether, they do so for different reasons. Both recognise the distinction between immediacy and reflective experience. To Bergson immediacy belongs to pure duration and intellect is a fall from it, as it disintegrates the pure flow. To James immediacy belongs to perception, impulse and feeling. As this immediate experience is conflicting, knowledge comes to the rescue to remedy its defects. Intellect in James does not disintegrate but harmonises. Bergson and James have different views of intellect. According to Bergson concepts alone make things intelligible, but things are not the living flux. They are static aspects of reality, which is genuine freedom and continuous creation. When the flow of life is arrested, it solidifies into hard lumps which we call things. To know reality as it is, we must plunge into the stream of consciousness; to know things as they are, concepts are quite adequate. Intellect correctly represents things. Bergson with James regards intellectual distinctions and logical methods as instruments of practical action. But Bergson does not believe in the ultimate reality of the world of practice. As the tools and concepts of intellect have arisen for the satisfaction of practical needs, their validity is also confined

to the world of action. But we should dispense with intellectual symbols if we want to catch the nature of reality as it is. As for Bergson truth and reality are extra-practical; the deficiency of practical intellect to grasp reality follows logically. Bergson does not say with James that the world we deal with in the ordinary business of life is the only reality. If there is no other world than this, then Bergson holds that intellect is sufficient for its needs. From the practicality of intellectual concepts and the sole reality of the world of action, the complete adequacy of the conceptual method irresistibly follows. It is surprising that James does not realise that the adoption of Bergson's theory commits him to the unqualified support of the conceptual method. The world of practice and conceptual thought are not incongruous to Bergson, and, therefore, to James they ought not to be incongruous. James is anxious to fight and kill intellectualism and so upholds Bergson, but as he does not accept Bergson's premises, he does not achieve his aim. James is not very particular about the consistency of his arguments, if only his heart's desire is fulfilled. While contending that logic should not be the sole guide to philosophy, but that will also should be consulted, he finds fault with monism for doing just what he asks philosophers to do. "The whole monistic pyramid seems to me to be a product of will far more than one of reason" (*P. U.* p. 143). Any stick will do to kill a dog!

James prefers immediate experience to intellect; we cannot say anything about it, neither criticise it nor approve of it. In its presence we have to be dumb and speechless. "As long as one continues *talking*, intellectualism remains in undisturbed possession of the field. . . . I must point to the mere *that* of life, and you by inner sympathy must fill out the *what* for yourselves" (*P. U.* p. 290). Bergson throws both perception and scientific thinking into one class of inadequate methods of grasping reality. But to James perception is all right.

Sense experience is to him the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of knowledge. Bergson develops on the lines of Plato and Spinoza ; James looks to Hume and Mill for inspiration. For him, the true home of reality is to be sought in the primitive flux of the sensational life. James's world-view is based on the testimony of immediate experience. It is one of radical empiricism as he himself styles it.

IV

Radical empiricism according to James consists of (1) a postulate that things which are of an inexperienceable nature like the Absolute, thing-in-itself, etc., do not form part of the material for philosophic debate ; (2) a statement of fact, that " the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more nor less so than the things themselves " ; (3) a generalised conclusion, viz. that " all portions of our phenomenal world are continuous, one with another, without any foreign principle being necessary to serve as their cement or support " (*The Meaning of Truth*, Preface, p. xii). Our immediate experience is not to be identified with the pure experience with which it is continuous. Pure experience rid of all conceptual elaboration does not exist. It is only an unattainable limit. We can reach it by relaxing our consciousness. It is not to be identified with a purely subjective state, for to James everything is both subjective and objective. More correctly, the distinction between self and not-self arises later (see *Radical Empiricism*, p. 23). We may be inclined to call this theory panpsychism, as we find experience everywhere, and an unconscious experience is a contradiction in terms. But James would not consent to this description, as according to him pure experience which constitutes reality has nothing conscious about it. Not only things but relations among things are directly experienced. The relations that bind and contribute to

oneness are quite as much as the terms that are bound immediate data of experience. The relations which unify have the same metaphysical status as the terms they differentiate. This view of the externality of relations is the effect of James's immediate and particularistic vision. Empiricism to be radical should not admit into its constitution any element that is not experienced, and if relations that connect experiences are admitted, they should be viewed as "experienced relations" as "real as anything else in the system" (*R. E.* p. 42). Pure experience is the stuff of the world. It is viewed as mental or material according to the context. In itself it is unqualified actuality or experience. The table is physical when regarded as part of the chain of physical causation, mental when regarded in relation to the function of knowing. Sensation and the sensible reality are absolutely identical with each other. What is in one context a physical phenomenon becomes in another a fact of consciousness. The content of the real does not differ from that of the psychic. Subject and object, thought and thing are but practical distinctions of functional order. Pure experience has a knack of getting into two places at once, the human mind and outer space. What distinguishes consciousness is the function of knowing which is a relation between different parts of pure experience. Knowing involves an experience felt in two different contexts. The pragmatist's theory of truth follows from this doctrine. Truth is no transcendent, indefinable relation, but only a particular relation between the different parts of experience. A conscious occurrence, a fragment of experience is real, but not either true or false. It only *is* with the stamp of reality impressed on it. It bears the immediate evidence of its existence. Truth and falsity apply when we take into account the leadings of this experience. If it leads to confirmatory developments, it is true; if it leads to deadlocks and contradictions, it is false. Truth therefore happens to ideas. It is not an intrinsic indefin-

able quality but an extrinsic and adventitious property which supervenes on facts of experience. It is the attribute of the relation between the present fact and the future course of experience.

James regards radical empiricism as more fundamental than pragmatism. The view is too original not to produce a shock. On examination we shall find that radical empiricism can be justified only as a temper of mind or an attitude, but not as a philosophy or a doctrine. To call a thing which does not involve relation to a knower, experience is a queer use of terms. Experience is always a relation. It implies over and above the object experienced relation to a subject by whom it is experienced. Even though we admit that the actual object is immediately given, without any mediation, it does not follow that experience is not a relation. There is a difference between being and consciousness of being, existence and knowing. We cannot reduce all things in the universe, acts, objects and contents, to experience pure and simple. Again, when James says that everything is born of pure experience, we ask, What is this pure experience? James thinks that it is "*that* which is not yet any definite *what*." It is another name for feeling and sensation, which perhaps new-born babes in their first moments have. But even if it is feeling or sensation, we require a feeling individual. When James says that both mental and material states are pure experiences which differ only in their functions, he repudiates a distinction which is imbedded in the very structure of experience. Criticising the ontological argument Kant asked, What is the difference between 100 dollars which I think of and 100 dollars in my coat pocket? James's answer is that it is nothing. We seem to be perilously near Humism with its doctrine of ideas and impressions which differ not in their stuff, but in some accidental qualities like the aggressiveness, with which they strike on the mind, concreteness, etc., Are we to imagine that pure experience is material when

it is thick, and mental when it is thin? Is the difference between the mental and the physical just a difference between two ways of arranging the same material? Is it only a difference of context and function? Are we to say that concepts which have according to James a logical reality, sensations, or ideas, which have a mental reality, objects like trees and houses, which have a physical reality, are only forms of pure experience? James answers in the affirmative. He holds that the same item becomes either an object in mind, or a state of consciousness or a physical thing in the outer-world, according to the net-work of relations into which the item enters (see *R. E.* pp. 13-14). If it is the same thing that now figures as thought and now as thing, how is it we have two sets of properties which differ so much? But James thinks that the two are not so widely different as commonly conceived. For he asks, "How, if 'subject and object' were separated by the whole diameter of being and had no attributes in common, would it be hard to tell, in a presented and recognised material object, what part comes in through the sense organs, and what part comes 'out of one's own head'?" (*R. E.* p. 29). It is James's considered opinion that the two worlds differ, not by the presence or absence of qualities, but by the relations in which they exist.

If both mental and physical contexts refer to the same experience, can we not have a comprehensive consciousness? Can we not have an experience in which we can contrast the one context with the other? It is quite possible for us to have such a higher experience, an absolute mind distinguished from the relative minds with their special contexts.

What on this theory is the nature of self? Consciousness as a metaphysical entity is dismissed. It is a complex of pure experiences which can be related in various ways. It is only a context of experiences. The same items figure as members of diverse relational contexts. Grouped in one way these items form mind, in another, they form the physical world. The relation

between subject and object becomes illusory, and we do not know what makes the context of self. May it not be that a total context is necessary to account for the process of knowledge? Do we not require some identical being throughout the psychical changes? How else can we explain the obvious psychological fact of a self which owns all thoughts, feelings and desires? Can a mere 'passing state' be capable of personal activity?

The problem of knowledge cannot be easily understood on this theory. Our knowledge of objects is of two kinds, knowledge of either mental or physical objects. We can say that knowledge of an object which is mental belongs to the mind series, but to what series does knowledge of a physical object belong? The problem of perceptual experience is unsolved in this theory.

To say that reality is experience means in theory of knowledge that reality is known as experienced. But the way in which James interprets experience makes it impossible for the individual to reach other reality than his own experience. In systems of Idealism, while sense data are taken as the starting-point of knowledge, it is possible for us to transcend sense knowledge by means of thought. But that way is closed to James. For according to James things as well as relations are given to us immediately in experience. We have but to open our eyes to see in experience things as well as their relations. If we irrationalise reality and assume with Kant that it is a disconnected manifold, then there is work for thought which is to induce order and unity from outside. There is no need for any such thought function in James's view, as the given order is a real order with unity and continuity. The function of thought is only to represent and substitute symbols for experience, the source of all truth. The value of thought consists in its adequacy to experience. Its function in relation to experience may be compared to that of paper currency in relation to a gold reserve. Thought can abstract and generalise from concrete situations, but we can never go beyond them.

It follows that thought can never transcend experience. We transcend passing experiences, for we move on from one experience to the next. But we cannot go beyond the individual's experience. It is doubtful if we can on this theory recognise a reality other than the individual's own experience. James accepts as axiomatic the existence of a multiplicity of human beings. Has he any right to it? How does an individual acquire knowledge of other minds? How does James get over solipsism? "Objective reference is an incident of the fact that so much of our experience comes as an insufficient, and consists of process and transition" (*R. E.* p. 71). There must be something more than what we have felt, 'reality existing elsewhere.' Our experience is not self-sufficing but points beyond. But for this impulse to pass beyond given experiences our experience might remain subjective. It will not point outwards if it is not self-transcendent. But if there is an internal necessity compelling given experiences to point beyond themselves, does it not follow that there are internal relations as well? The only satisfying and self-sufficient experience is that which does not point beyond itself, and that is the whole experience. Fragmentary experiences are related to other fragments and will never satisfy our reason. The whole alone is self-containing. Our dissatisfaction with the immediately felt, and our need to call for 'more' are due to the fragmentary, discordant nature of the given. The felt discord is the stimulus to thought. Our reason tries to purge the given of its discord and contradiction and make it conform to its supreme laws. The tendency to pass from the given is traceable to the logical demand to eliminate the contradictions from presented experience. Our reason will not stop until we reach the harmonious whole which includes all experiences. James admits as much when he observes, "Though one part of our experience may lean upon another part to make it what it is in any one of several aspects in which it may be considered, experience as a whole is self-containing

and leans on nothing" (*Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, ii. 114). Thus James implicitly admits the reality of an absolute experience. Solipsism he tries to get over by saying that there are some common objects in which our minds meet. The same experience may run into a million contexts. How can separate individuals' different currents of experience come to coincide in certain points? How can the same object become part of different fields of consciousness? In short, how can we have objects or a universe in common? Idealistic monism gets over this difficulty by positing a universal consciousness which includes the individual consciousnesses and serves as a bond of union and basis of agreement, wherever there is agreement. As for the mind, James says, "Why do I postulate your mind? I see your body acting in a certain way. Its gestures, facial movements, words and conduct generally are expressive, so I deem it actuated as my own is by an inner life like mine. This argument from analogy is my reason" (*R. E.* pp. 77-78).

V

The criticism of absolutism has resulted in a negative account of pluralism. We are insensibly led to think that James's system guarantees freedom and novelty, a God who is of real help to us and personal immortality. Let us see whether it is so.

As we have already stated, the whole is in course of realisation. The sum total of things is not yet a single system but a totality of conflicting individuals. The universe is sustained by the perpetual struggle among the many forces that compose it. The connections among the parts are yet of the nature of linkages, and not yet vital and organic. The individuals are distinct; there is no doubt about it. The world process is quite a real one. But we cannot understand the growing unification, the impulse towards unity and the visions

of unity which mystics have, until we posit an absolute as the fundamental and controlling reality.

Pluralism does justice to the first impressions of the world. Physically speaking, the individuals are diverse. But there is a steadily growing unification among these separate units. In logic, ethics and religion we are told that the different individuals understand each other, love each other and interpenetrate each other. We are taught every day to aim at the unity and adopt the unselfish standpoint and drop the separatist selfish one. We are enjoined to promote the well-being of the whole and not conserve our private individuality. James's whole-hearted advocacy of sympathy, disinterestedness, and unselfish conduct, beauty, heroism and devotion to ideals is a tacit confession of the lower value of individuals as separate entities. While the differences are due to the artificial barriers set up by the senses, intellect is every day trying to break them down and enable the individuals to realise the unity of spirit which is present in them all. At first sight it may seem that we are cut off one from another, but we soon realise our unity. When the natural blindness or the *Maya* of intellect ceases, we feel the inwardness of God and the unity of mankind. The philosophic or the intuitive vision tells us of the harmony and living unity of all creation. "Monism must mean that all such apparent disconnections are bridged over by some deeper absolute union in which it believes, and this union must in some way be more real than the practical separations that appear on the surface" (*Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 115). There are some respects in which the world is many and some in which it is one, and if we are to evaluate the features of the world, the monistic are superior to the pluralistic. No pluralism can be a consistent one, unless it is subordinated to a monism which is the true crown of all pluralism. Such a relative pluralism will make God not a person over against other persons but an impersonal or suprapersonal spirit.

A pluralistic hypothesis is generally regarded as involving the independence of the soul. But when James rejects the mechanical determination of mental life, it is not in favour of the 'soul' theory. He does not admit a soul which is the ground of man's individuality and is capable of surviving the death of the body. In his psychology he no doubt considers it to be more satisfactory than the mind-stuff or the material monad theory, but he believes that psychology does not require it. The unity of mental life can be accounted for without it. While in his psychology he leaves it an open question, in his *Pluralistic Universe* he completely gives it up (see *P. U.* p. 210). The 'soul' is a useless and scholastic concept. Mental experience does not require a subject to support it. "To be as a mental experience is only to appear to some one" (*P. U.* p. 199). All that we need is the passing thought of each moment of consciousness. Separate experiences hang on to one another's fringes. Is it this kind of individual that James proposes to conserve?

In developing his view of immortality, James points out how the brain is the individuating organ, and how when brains are destroyed our drops of consciousness slip back into the shining sea. The way in which he develops the theme reminds one of Plato or Spinoza, rather than of Leibniz or Renouvier. "Out of my experience, such as it is (and it is limited enough), one fixed conclusion dogmatically emerges, and that is this, that we with our lives are like islands in the sea, or like trees in the forest. The maple and the pine may whisper to each other with their leaves, and Conanicut and Newport hear each other's fog-horns. But the trees also commingle their roots in the darkness underground, and the islands also hang together through the ocean's bottom. Just so there is a continuum of cosmic consciousness, against which our individuality builds but accidental forces, and into which our several minds plunge as into a mother sea or reservoir. Our 'normal'

consciousness is circumscribed for adaptation to our external earthly environment, but the fence is weak in spots and fitful influences from beyond break in, showing the otherwise unverifiable common connections. Not only psychic research, but metaphysical philosophy and speculative biology are led in their own ways to look with favour on some such pan-psychic view of the universe as this" (*The American Magazine*, 1908). If the individuals are only manifestations of a common mind, unique expressions of an underlying unity, is it right to call this theory pluralism?

There are pluralists who (like Dr. Howison) in their anxiety to safeguard the self-sufficiency and the spiritual nature of the monads hold them to be timeless. James does not belong to that group. He is interested in the temporal becoming of the individual, the process of his development. James calls himself a "lengthwise" pluralist (see *International Journal of Ethics*, pp. 141-142, vol. xxi. No. 2). This is due to his psychological bias. Experience is a flow, a temporal succession. No philosophy can ignore the temporal quality of experience. "The world that each of us feels most intimately at home with is that of beings with histories that play into our history, whom we can help in their vicissitudes even as they help us in ours" (*P. U.* p. 49). In the interests of ethical freedom James emphasises time and becoming, but if there is no individual who is to be subject to time the pluralism becomes but an empty word.

VI

Let us see whether James's views of God, freedom and immortality are radically different from those associated with absolutism and can be regarded as more satisfactory. As everywhere else, even here, James asks, How do these bear on man's life and experience? He does not worry about the so-called proofs of the existence of God. He simply wants to know

how a belief in God will work, what characteristic results religious emotion has. "According to William James all the philosophico-theological arguments which have in view the demonstration of God's existence and the determination of his attributes are illusory. In fact only those notions have a real content which are interpreted by the differences in practical conduct" (Émile Boutroux, *Science and Religion*, English translation, p. 318). James is anxious to give us a God who whether or not he satisfies the intellectual requirements, fulfils the moral and religious demands. "Meanwhile the practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man, and in a fashion continuous with him, there exists a larger power which is friendly to him and to his ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary. It might conceivably even be only a larger and more god-like self, of which the present self would then be but the mutilated expression, and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves of different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realised in it at all. Thus would a sort of polytheism return upon us" (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 525-526). Only the polytheism James thinks to be possible and probable is not the crude polytheism of primitive religions, where the Lords many and Gods many quarrel with one another, but a perfect harmony where the several heroes co-operate one with another. Polytheism is only a possibility (see *Varieties*, pp. 524-526). In his chapter on Fechner in the *Pluralistic Universe*, James suggests that there is room for a hierarchy of superhuman beings. But the conception of God, which has the hearty support of James, is that of an elder brother of all spiritual beings, vaster, wiser, and more powerful, but not essentially different from them. He dwells in the world and works under

limitations imposed by its essential nature. James offers us a God who is finite and limited, but still lends his ears to our prayers and looks after our wants. But James knows that God to be of any use to man should be continuous with man, friendly to him, more powerful than man, at least large enough 'to trust for the next step.' But unless God is infinite and all comprehensive, we will not have this security. Unless God is continuous with each individual and more powerful than all these put together, we cannot trust the outcome of the struggle. If there is something outside God, as there will be if he is only a big man, then he may suffer defeat on bigger issues. A finite God, even though he does his best along with man in a bad world, cannot be sure of success. A Napoleon or a Caesar may muddle through difficulties to the end, but it is quite possible he may not. James takes his stand on the reality of the moral struggle. "It feels like a real fight—as if there were something really wild in the universe, which we with all our idealities and faithfulnesses are indeed to redeem" (*Will to Believe*, p. 67). James suspects the Absolute, as it derealises the struggle we are at home in (see *P. U.* p. 49). The world is a battlefield between the forces of reason and chaos, light and darkness. In this field of combat peace is quarrelling with war, life with death, existence with extinction. Reason and light, life and existence are slowly progressing through human effort. It is in this struggle that man requires a power large enough to trust for the next step. Without it life is a gamble and is not worth living. Only the Absolute can give us the security we need. But James did not like this view of things. So he turns round and says we do not need to be assured of the issue of the struggle. It is better to be doubtful about it. We must be "willing to take the universe to be really dangerous and adventurous" (*Pragmatism*, chap. viii.). Pluralism does not think that the world will be saved, but only hopes that it *may* be saved with the help of man, for "shipwreck in detail or even on the whole is among

the open possibilities" (*Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 142). "For practical life, at any rate, the *chance* of salvation is enough" (*Varieties*, p. 526). The world *may* be saved, but there is no certainty that it *shall* be saved. What inducement will there be for man to work if James gives no answer to the question, whether we would reach the port or suffer shipwreck on the way? We are bound to ask, "Is there somewhere in the immensities some responsive kindness, some faint hope of toleration and assistance, something sensibly on our side against death and mechanical cruelty?" or, "Is the whole scheme of nature evil? Is life in its essence cruel? Is man stretched quivering upon the table of the eternal vivisection for no end—and without pity?" (Wells, *Mr. Britling sees it through*, pp. 119 and 294). God either is or is not. If he is, he offers us the security. If God be for us, who can be against us? If he is not, we have to surrender ourselves to caprice and fate, taking courage in both our hands. If we feel that we are wrestling with a relentless antagonist on a hopeless issue it will paralyse our springs of action. It will produce a chilling sense of aimless effort which will numb our hopes. James believes in God, tells us that we can trust him, and is sure that all is bound to go well. "A world with a God in it to say the last word may indeed burn up or freeze, but we then think of him as still mindful of the old ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that where he is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final Things" (*Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results*, p. 14). But as such an argument logically culminates in an absolutistic conception of God, which is a red rag to James, he suddenly turns the tables, abandons the whole scheme, and asks us to consider the world to be wild and chaotic, dangerous and irrational, and dispense with belief in God, which alone can give us the assurance that ultimately the world can be reduced to unity and order. Only belief in the Absolute can satisfy the

emotional and volitional tendencies of the human soul, its needs and aspirations, its visions of perfection. Without this belief about the Absolute, we shall not have the necessary moral earnestness. Evolution requires for its complement perfection ; time, timelessness ; appearance, reality ; and freedom and responsibility of individuals a deeper monism.

As a matter of fact, belief in a cosmic spirit which is friendly to us is the verdict of the religious consciousness. This belief is not dependent on dogmas. For if religion should stand on dogmas, it must stand, totter or fall with them. Religion is essentially personal and not dogmatic or institutional. It is a man's reaction to life and not faith in books and creeds. Religious experience tells the individual that through struggle and strain, discord and darkness, he will attain to peace and harmony, unity and light. James is not right in thinking that the religious consciousness does not demand an infinite God. It is not true to say that we only feel a connection with something greater than ourselves that makes for power and righteousness. We feel the reality of an infinite God. There is room for ambiguity in the testimony of religious consciousness, simply because religious souls have after all to employ the current philosophical jargon. In many cases intellectual traditions are unconsciously accepted in the interpretations of religious consciousness. What the religious soul utters may not always be faithful to what is felt. But reflection on the data of religious consciousness is decisive in showing that religion demands an infinite God. If philosophy takes into account facts of religious consciousness, we will be led to the absolutist theory. Only in it are the higher values of spirit affirmed and maintained. James declared in answer to a question put to him, " I believe in God, not because I have experienced his presence, but because I need it so that it 'must' be true " (*Hibbert Journal*, x. i. p. 232). If there is no God " there would be a great hush, a great void in life " (*ibid.*). James admits that mystical states

are unknown to him. To him the nearest approach to a mystical state is the condition when the individual feels himself at home in the universe, feels himself to be at one with the highest that he knows or can conceive of. The individual then acquires a broader outlook, larger vision and greater powers. New energies are added on to him from a wider order of things, which wider order James calls God when he is in a philosophising mood. But when he uses his psychological glasses, he calls it his unconscious nature. If God is not to be identified with the unconscious, it becomes the absolute experience which mystics have tasted and felt. Even if with James we admit that philosophy is a matter of intuition and not intellect, absolutism becomes justified. We are led to it, whether we take our stand on the vital life and faith of the mystics or the certainties of the understanding.

James's pluralism identifies the human substance with the divine (*P. U.* p. 34). This means that God should be viewed as the whole. If God and the creatures are viewed as distinct from each other, then we shall have a hard and fast dualism which James himself criticises. "The man being an outsider, and a mere subject to God, not his intimate partner, a character of externality invades the field. God is not heart of our heart and reason of our reason, but our magistrate, rather, and mechanically to obey his commands, however strange they may be, remains our only moral duty." A mechanical view which leaves the human subject outside the deepest reality of the universe cannot satisfy the contemporary mind, and if we insist on a more organic and intimate relationship between God and man, we are led to absolutism. "Our contemporary mind having once for all the possibility of a more intimate *Weltanschauung*, the only opinions quite worthy of arresting our attention will fall within the general scope of what may roughly be called the pantheistic field of vision, the vision of God as the indwelling divine rather than the external creator,

and of human life as part and parcel of that deep reality " (*P. U.* p. 30). If the human soul is to be viewed as "part and parcel" of the central spirit, what is the difference between James's pluralistic theism and absolute idealism? If God is to be a transcendent deity, then he becomes the God of David or Isaiah; if he is an immanent One, then he becomes the Absolute. A finite God partaking of the characteristics of both is an impossible compromise (*P. U.* pp. 110-111). If God is one of the 'eaches' we cannot understand how he can be at the same time an each distinct from other eaches and yet the soul of all of them.

James regards us all as the friends and collaborators of God. God and men are fellow-soldiers in the struggle to banish evil from the world. "God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity" (*Is Life Worth Living?*). If God is not morally perfect to begin with, if he has also to grow in insight and wisdom, if his character is subject to growth, it is a misnomer to call him God. Such a God is too human for any religious purpose.

The problem of evil leads to the conception of a finite God. We do not want to identify God with the whole of things, as it would be to make him the source of all imperfection and evil. The perfection of God, we somehow assume, is incompatible with his being the author of evil. Strictly speaking, the only satisfactory conception of God is that which makes him not a creator but a fellow-creature. If God is the creator also, then he becomes responsible for the universe and its evils. There is no point in his trying to break loose from the evils which he allowed to crop up. God finds evil opposed to him. He tries to fight it as we do, since he cherishes the ideals for which we live and long. So to preserve his perfection, we identify God with the goodness of things and oppose him to the evil. The God of religion is not the all but a higher presence, a part of the universe, though the ideal part. "God, in the religious life of ordinary men, is the name not of the whole of things,

heaven forbid, but only of the ideal tendency in things, believed in as a superhuman person, who calls us to co-operate in his purposes, and who furthers ours if they are worthy. He works in an external environment, has limits and has enemies. The only God worthy of the name must be finite. If the absolute exist in addition, then the Absolute is only the wider cosmic whole of which our God is but the most ideal portion, and which in the more usual human sense is hardly to be termed a religious being at all" (*P. U.* p. 125). But how can we say that God has an environment which is external to him, if we are part and parcel of the Divine substance? Supposing he has an outside environment, limits, and enemies, can we depend on him for the success of our moral enterprise? Is it not necessary for God to be the whole, if we should have the assurance of final triumph? Passing by such difficulties, we find James's finite God to be only one of the articulations of the Absolute. He may be the ideal tendency of things but the Absolute is the whole, unifying the ideal and the non-ideal tendencies. While God has something outside of himself, the Absolute is not limited by anything outside itself. God is not the Absolute since beyond him lie other experiences. There may be an absolute experience which includes those of God and man. "The Absolute is not the impossible being I once thought it" (*P. U.* p. 292). God is finite and subject to growth. But he can never grow into the fullness of the Absolute. "The finite God whom I contrast with the Absolute may conceivably have almost nothing outside of himself: he may have already triumphed over and absorbed all but the minutest fraction of the universe; but that fraction, however small, reduces him to the status of a relative being, and in principle the universe is saved from all the irrationalities incidental to absolutism" (*P. U.* pp. 125-126).

But in the struggle with wickedness, James feels sure that God will win in the end. Struggle and crisis are not the end of things. We shall attain to peace and

harmony. From this, it follows, if anything *follows* in James's philosophy, that evil is only temporary and partial. It is not the last word of life, though it is an essential phase of its existence. It is a chance element in the universe which can be expelled from it. Ideally the whole world is divine.

James asks us to admit the reality of God since such a belief has value for concrete life. "On Pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work" (*Pragmatism*, p. 299). But, as we have seen, what works is not a finite God who is one among many, nor a collection of Gods who are all larger than individual men, but an infinite God who is the whole, the source of our being as well as the support of our lives.

Again, James and Fechner regarded body and mind as necessarily connected, not only in man but throughout the world. James adopts Fechner's theory that no part of the universe is soulless or is a spirit without a body. "The vaster orders of mind go with the vaster orders of body. The entire earth on which we live must have its own collective consciousness. So must each sun, moon and planet, so must the whole solar system have its own wider consciousness in which the consciousness of our each plays one part. So has the entire starry system as such its consciousness; and if that starry system be not the sum of all *that is* materially considered, then that whole system, along with whatever else may be, is the *body* of that absolutely totalised consciousness of the universe to which man gives the name of God." As the body of man is an organism compounded of many organs, so the soul of man is the combination of all the various consciousnesses which belong to the various organs. There is a consciousness of the whole human race formed by the union of all human souls, though each soul in its individuality is unaware of the

union. James agrees with Fechner in thinking that "the more inclusive forms of consciousness are *in part* constituted by the more limited forms"; *only in part*, since the relations of the several minds constituting the earth-soul are there in addition to the minds themselves. Since our mind is not the bare summing up of our sights *and* sounds *and* tastes, etc., but has in addition to these terms their relations also of which the terms are unaware, so the earth-soul traces the relations between the contents of the million minds of which no one mind is conscious. So, according to Fechner, there is an earth-soul and a soul in every one of the heavenly bodies. All these compound and form a great universal consciousness. To account for the abnormal facts of self, James postulates a subconscious self from which we derive inspiration. Psychical research led him to believe in the reality of a wider psychic self with which our smaller selves are continuous. The tenderer parts of personal life are, according to James, "continuous with a more of the same quality which is operative in the universe outside of him and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on board of and save himself, when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck" (*P. U.* chap. viii.). Cannot we call the superhuman experience the Absolute experience? James fights shy of the name, but is quite willing to call it God. While our argument thus far leads us straight to an absolutistic conception, James, afraid of the difficulties of determinism and a block universe, which are incidental to the absolutistic conception, ties down the most comprehensive earth-soul to an eternal environment (*P. U.* pp. 309-311). James believes that Fechner makes God religious and places him under conditions which he cannot violate. "His will has to struggle with conditions not imposed on that will by itself" (*P. U.* p. 294). Thus does his earth-soul become the God of theism, and not the all-enveloping spirit. Our point is that when Fechner and James allow that human consciousnesses are parts of a

wider whole, they are accepting absolutism. But we cannot state better the absolutistic theory of the relation of the absolute to the individuals, than in the terms of Fechner. "No other *content* has it than us, with all the other creatures like or unlike us, and the relations which it finds between us. Our eaches *collected* into one are substantively identical with its all, though the all is perfect while no each is perfect" (*P. U.* p. 173). If there is the earth-soul of the type Fechner imagines and James allows, what is its relation to God and the world? James's account does not escape from the necessity to account for the origin of the world from the wider whole called God, if not the Absolute. How did it lapse from its perfection into error and imperfection?

James thinks that the Absolute is so inhuman and unpractical that it cannot be true. It is an artificial abstraction which has no influence on life. We have already shown how it alone can aid us in life. But let us set against James's view the statement of Royce, which indicates the real nature of the Absolute. "The Absolute seems to me, personally, not something remote, unpractical, inhuman, but the most pervasive and omnipresent and practical, as it is also the most inclusive of beings" (*W. James and Other Essays*, Preface vi-vii).

VII

Absolutism is deterministic, has no place for freedom, while James's pluralism provides us with an open elastic universe full of opportunities for the play of freedom. The reality of change, authentic novelty of future, etc., demand the reality of freedom and the negation of determinism. Freedom is the complement of pluralism. We require a universe where the individual is free to risk the realising of his ideal. To be a world of novelty and change, it cannot be a world where everything is the necessary effect of something else. We cannot conceive the universe as a closed sphere. Reality is to a large

extent indeterminate and characterless and makes it possible for us to make anything out of it.

James's whole doctrine of the will to believe presupposes that though the past is dead and gone and so is unalterable for ever, the future is indeterminate and determinable along the lines of human wishes. Of course no man has the whole field of possibilities open to him. There are certain aspects of the universe which are fixed and stable, and others which are fluid and unstable. It is difficult to draw a line between them. "Determinism denies the ambiguity of future volitions, because it affirms that nothing future can be ambiguous" (*Will to Believe*, p. 198). In monism there is nothing contingent, there is nothing in actual reality that corresponds to the notion of indeterminateness, everything is necessary. Dismissing this view, James relies on ambiguous possibilities. The theory of radical empiricism allows that the consciousness of bringing to pass one act out of a number of possibilities is a datum as precise and concrete as any other, a genuine experience accompanied by the immediate conviction of its objective reality. In short, there is the experience of choice. When one of several possibilities is realised, something new is accomplished in the world. "In our personal experience we are witnessing what is really the essential process of creation" (*Some Problems*, pp. 214-215). It is a world of real growths and crises, of genuine struggle. It is true that an analysis of the present does not tell us of what is to occur in the future. It may be that the future has to be won by an effort. But there is another aspect by which the future should be founded on the past and be in continuity with the nature of things. With absolutism James contends that mechanical determinations do not hold good in the higher levels of spiritual life. It does not mean that the life of spirit has no law or order in it. The contrast between mechanical and teleological or spiritual determination is not one of law and anarchy, but of two different kinds of order. James rightly contends

that the mechanical part of the universe does not lay down the law for the rest. As a matter of fact, mechanism is to be used in the realisation of the higher ends. But we cannot on that account infer that law is incompatible with selfhood. In his desire to reserve room for the will to create, James frees the self from all subjection to law. The nature of self is incompatible only with mechanical law. As we have seen in the discussion of Bergson, identity is not sameness, diversity is not unlikeness, negation is not contradiction, and law is not necessity. Creative synthesis of self is quite compatible with law and order. But it may be said that this law of immanent logic is quite as bad as that of mechanical necessity. It also implies a block universe which has no room for option or contingency, arrest or failure. But as we have seen, the law of logic we cannot escape from. We have to admit an ideal working in and through the parts. James allows it, Bergson agrees to it, and no pluralist can safely reject it. It is the whole that works unconsciously in the lower stages, and becomes the standard of right and the object of choice in the higher human stages (see James's *The Will to Believe: The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life*). But error and prejudice, ignorance and selfishness thwart the clear expression of the ideal. On account of these factors which vary with different individuals, the Absolute sometimes succeeds in manifesting itself, sometimes does not. Absolutism does not construct the universe after a dead pattern, but only tells us that if we dispassionately examine the march of events or the course of the world with all its arrests and set-backs, blind alleys and by-paths, we will find a particular tendency at work. If we accept this one central basis we secure freedom; if we surrender it we make chaos and caprice our Gods. The law of the whole is the law of freedom. Otherwise freedom becomes caprice, licence or acting on the spur of the moment. Free conduct is conduct determined by an ideal and congruous with the logic of human nature,

and this James has to admit in the interests of ethics. But in a world of pure indeterminism and fresh beginnings there is neither law nor order, neither freedom nor necessity.

If we apply mechanism to mind then there can be no freedom. Human choice is not mechanically determined by any conflict between the psychical contents at the moment of choice. This would be to travesty the purposive character of our mind's working. It is also true that the illusion of determinism is due to an *ex post facto* interpretation of mental life. For as James is fond of quoting, life looks forwards, intellect understands backwards.

But James is not an upholder of chance and caprice. James declares, "Whoever uses the word chance, instead of freedom, squarely and resolutely gives up all pretence to control the things he says are free" (*Will to Believe*, p. 158). But still when he speaks of novelty he does permit chance. James believes with Renouvier "in absolute novelties, unmeditated beginnings, gifts, chance, freedom, acts of faith" (*ibid.* p. 164). "That genuine novelties can occur means that from the point of view of what is already given, what comes may be treated as a matter of chance" (*Problems of Philosophy*, p. 145). We may not be able to predict what a man would do under given circumstances. This does not mean that his character has nothing to do with his conduct. But it only shows that the fulness of a rich spirit cannot be comprehended by us. The incommensurability between the future and the present is due to our weakness.

If the individual should have complete freedom, then that possibility would preclude the notion of a Providence governing the world. The crux of pluralistic theisms which are equally anxious for divine omnipotence and human freedom is the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. In this difficulty James employs the analogy of the chess player. As the expert chess player is certain to beat his rivals, even though he does

not know exactly the details of the proposed moves of his adversary, even so God, the infinite mind, will see that everything is ordered, in spite of the ambiguous possibilities open to finite spirits. "The creator's plan of the universe would be left blank as to many of its actual details, but all possibilities would be marked down. The realisation of some of these would be left absolutely to chance, *i.e.* would only be determined when the moment of realisation came; other possibles would be *contingently* determined, *i.e.* their decisions would leave to doubt till it was seen how the matters of absolute chance fell out. But the rest of the plan, including its final upshot, would be rigorously determined once for all" (*Will to Believe*, p. 182). God has got the certainty that whatever course the world may take, it will reach home ultimately. James allows now and then miraculous interferences, though they are not of the objectionable type (see footnote to p. 182, *Will to Believe*). God gives the finishing touches to the world of man. In spite of the indeterminations of the Pluralistic universe, the supremacy of good which is the goal of human endeavour is guaranteed. But that does not seem to be a world of real risk. James craves for a universe where the fight for freedom is genuine, where the result is not secured. For him there is no use of a world where the outcome is predetermined and the end is inevitable.

James and the absolutists are at one in denouncing the mechanical determination of psychical life; they are at one in upholding the teleological character of mental activity. They are agreed in the consideration that mechanism is only the helpmate of freedom and not its contradiction. Absolute determinism as well as pure chance they condemn with equal force. Freedom of the individual both uphold, but the difference comes here that, while James is able to say that the individual is free since when confronted by two motives he may do the one or the other, decision comes as a bolt from the blue without

any reference to past character, absolutism contends that this description of choice is inadequate and unsatisfactory. Arguing against the mechanical conception of the self, James still adopts it in his view. That is the root fallacy of James's theory. James propounds the problem from an abstract point of view. He allows himself the privilege of breaking up the concrete unity of the self into the two artificial abstractions of the self and object, and then asks, What is the relation between the two? Either there is order or no order. If there is, it is absolute fatalism; if there is not, it is pure chance. The former James cannot adopt, and so holds that the future is what is undetermined and unconditioned. James himself says that pure chance is no good as it is another word for impotence (*Will to Believe*). Real freedom where the whole self operates, which is the absolutistic theory of freedom, James will admit if he views experience as a whole. The nature of the decision is rooted in the essential character of self. Were it not so, then the operations of the self will have neither order nor intelligibility nor freedom. A truly free act will be based on the true nature of the self, and not be an anarchistic element which suddenly springs upon the scene of self. While each concrete situation is something new, special and unique, requiring the agent to judge and act for himself, it is wrong to think that the resulting decision may be unconnected with the past. In spite of varied play and adventure, James's chess analogy tells us there is a certain unity of direction which absolutism insists on.

VIII

We find that absolutism is sometimes criticised on the ground that it denies personal immortality. "Denial of personal immortality is one of the shibboleths of panlogism" (Sturt, *Idola Theatri*, p. 38). When James was asked, "Do you believe in personal immortality? If so, why?" he replied, "Never keenly; but more strongly

as I grow older " and " because I am just getting fit to live " (" Religion of William James," *Hibbert Journal*, vol. x. I, p. 228). James cannot logically hold to personal immortality since he does not believe in a soul. There is nothing which can survive bodily death in his scheme. James's philosophy is not therefore keen about the survival of human personality after the death of the body. James adopts the transmission theory of the relation of brain to consciousness. There is a great sea of consciousness and our individual consciousnesses are but drops of it, the brain of each man serving as the channel through which the water of the sea flows. The vast unity of consciousness is separated into parts and given finite forms by the brain. But James is not inclined to interpret the consciousness behind the brain as one absolute mind. It is quite conceivable according to James that there are many minds behind the scenes. But whether it is one mind or many minds, personal immortality is given up. But many pluralist thinkers would not agree with James in his view of immortality. But if with James we view our personality as of doubtful continuance after death, if personal life after death is only an illusion about death, then there is no reason why we should regard personal existence as real. We should treat it as less than real. James's ideal, even though it is not absorption in a universal mind, is still absorption in wider units of consciousness. If it is admitted that the individual after death is absorbed in some wider unit, this is to question the ultimate reality of the personal striving self. So long as we consider the life of the individual to be due to a temporary and partial separation of the part from the whole, so long as we think death to be reabsorption of the part in the whole, we can say that personality is a transitory illusion and self is a prison from which we escape at death. It also follows that James's hypothesis of many minds is a venture in speculation. We are told that the principle of individuation is the brain ; we ask, To what is the separate-

ness of the many units of consciousness behind the brains due? When all brains are lost, all separation will disappear and there will be only one mind. James's prejudice in favour of many minds or a hierarchy of consciousnesses is due to his pluralistic presuppositions and admiration for Fechner's philosophy. But even Fechner admits that each member of the hierarchy is at once a consciousness for itself and a part of a more widely inclusive consciousness of a higher level or order. It is quite possible and very probable that there is only one absolute consciousness. From this larger whole of which our minds are fragmentary manifestations each of us draws spontaneous energy in our moral and intellectual efforts. James's mother-sea of consciousness or subliminal self can only be one and not many.

IX

We see how the conceptions of a mother-sea of consciousness or the wider subconscious self of abnormal psychology, of God as creator of all, of freedom as a compromise between chance and necessity, of the transitory nature of the individual and the transmissive theory of the function of the brain, are all incompatible with a radical pluralism and can only be reconciled with a monistic idealism. In spite of all these doctrines, which find their natural home in absolutism, James professes himself to be an adherent of pluralism. But, as we have already seen, James is not very scrupulous about the logic of his position. One gets the impression that in philosophy he is at the mercy of the latest fad. He is ready to resort to Fechner and Bergson in his anxiety to pull down absolutism; but he does not pause to consider that the central theories of Fechner and Bergson go against the dogmas of pluralism. The one great lesson of James's philosophy is that no solution of the philosophic problem can be called satisfactory which does not take into account the claims of common sense. But

the failure of his system can also be traced to his hurried attempt to satisfy without critical analysis all the claims, artificial as well as profound, which the plain man puts forth. In spite of it all, James has secured for himself a permanent place in the republic of the great philosophers by his very valuable contributions to psychology and insistence in philosophy on the values of the human spirit.

CHAPTER X

THE NEW IDEALISM OF RUDOLF EUCKEN

I

THE greatest figure on the continent till M. Bergson came into the field was Rudolf Eucken of Jena. He has published a large number of works bearing on metaphysics and theology, and has propounded a new idealism which he prefers to call "spiritualistic activism." His work is a sign of the times, as many of the tendencies of contemporary philosophy (see Chapter II.) are visible in his writings. He advocates the substitution of life for logic and declares that life is action and not mere thought or intelligence. Action alone expresses the full nature of man. Eucken does not address himself to the task of solving the philosopher's riddle of the universe, but to that of helping the plain man to overcome the struggle for spiritual existence in the world of action. To Eucken the kernel of man's striving is not intellectual but ethical. The contradiction of life is felt rather as a life problem than as a logical riddle. As a confirmed activist, he believes in the reality of time and change. Eucken's works are an attempt to reconcile philosophy with religion, though he says that belief in God is not necessary for religion. He tries to vindicate the spirit of Christianity by means of his philosophy. "In all his writings, the religious note is heard. Indeed, what Eucken finally intends is a renovated and theoretically vindicated Christianity; in spite of his anxious

avoidance of everything which has the appearance of metaphysical dualism, Christianity and its logical foundations are his central concern" (Baron Frederic von Hugel, *Hibbert Journal*, p. 776). "Eucken's philosophy is a Christian philosophy of life" (Boyce Gibson, *Eucken's Philosophy of Life*, p. 166). His personal and religious idealism "is a philosophical restatement of the teaching of Jesus" (Hermann: *Eucken and Bergson*, p. 6).

As a philosophy which does not in some way represent the tendencies of the new spirit has no chance of survival in the present state of the philosophical world, Eucken's philosophy tries to express some of the aspirations of the new school. Professor Boyce Gibson contends that Eucken's thesis is that "Philosophy is homeless till it has found the main life currents of humanity, has sympathetically insinuated itself into these and allowed all its convictions to be moulded inwardly and objectively by the movements with which it has allied itself" (*Quarterly Review*, April 1914, p. 380). If this only means that no serious philosophy should construct its thought-structure in an *a priori* manner, it is right. Since philosophy has to account for life and experience, it must follow in the wake of life process and experience. We cannot deduce the course of world history as the Scholastics did from a number of dogmas, but have to go to experience and penetrate into its heart. To know the mystery of life, we have to study life. But quite in consistency with the spirit of the age, Eucken holds that speculative idealism substitutes thought for life and derives the universe *a priori*. What we are called upon to do is to get into the stream of life straight away, dive beneath the scattered data and seize the *élan vital* at work. Speculative systems which break the unity of experience into subject and object cannot see the movement of spiritual life. This criticism we have met often, and the wonder is how such a superficial charge can live to be repeated in season and out of season. Every idealist admits that concepts are determined by life, while they

also form a part of life. Philosophy is not completely subordinate to life ; it has also its place in the sun. And this Eucken admits on occasion. " Life has first to seek itself, its unity, its perfection ; and it is just this that is the problem of truth." And so thought which adequately represents " the upward endeavour of life to its own unity " has its function and may be sought after. " Philosophy as Eucken conceives it," says Professor Boyce Gibson, " is no mere reflection upon life, as though life were of itself complete without the reflection. It is rather a vital function of our spiritual activity. It is that form of spiritual vitality which brings to coherent expression the intuitions of experience " (*Quarterly Review*, April 1914, p. 389). From this it is plain that philosophy has an essential function in the life of spirit, if it only rests on experience and develops on its basis. That is what all serious philosophy has been. As satisfying an inherent need of reason, philosophy has its place in the life of mind. Eucken calls himself a spiritualist monist and holds that his system of spiritualist monism, whether or not it is logically consistent, still helps us to adjust the several aspects of life. Eucken does not speak of philosophical theories but of spiritual currents and life systems or Syntagmas, and his own view of life he develops by criticising rival systems.

II

Eucken adopts the method of dialectical development and puts forward a view of his own after criticising other systems. There is the Greek view of life modelled on Art. In art, matter and form exist together. Though matter is subordinate to form, it is still necessary to it. Eucken holds this view to be unsatisfactory since it does not recognise personality, spirituality, etc. Another defect, according to Eucken, is that in it the actual and the ideal, the evil and the good are looked upon as necessarily related. We shall see that on the question

of the organic relationship between the natural and the spiritual the Greeks are right and Eucken is wrong.

Naturalism is next criticised. It makes life a mechanical process. In it everything is necessary and has its fixed place in the development. If everything in the world has only to be accepted, how can we fight evil or attempt to improve life? There is no place for freedom and personality in the natural scheme. The basis of reality is the physical world and man is only a product thereof. Naturalism ignores the life of spirit; it disregards the facts of man's inner life. It does not solve the problem of knowledge either on its metaphysical or its psychological side. It does not account for the unity of consciousness (see *Main Currents*, p. 235). The conclusion which Eucken derives from the criticism of naturalism is that man is more than a mere fragment of nature. Though he is bound up with nature there is something in him that cannot be derived from nature. Man's capacity to know testifies to it. Nature is only a juxtaposition of things or a succession of states; but man can rise above nature. It is possible for man to be dissatisfied with nature and routine. There is in him a higher kind of life unknown to nature. And if we are interested in understanding the values of spirit, we should give up the psychological method, which is only next door to the naturalistic, and adopt the noölogical. The psychological standpoint "occupies itself with purely psychic processes, and in the province of religion especially it occupies itself with the conditions of the stimulations of will and feeling, which are not able to prove anything beyond themselves. The spiritual experience, on the contrary, has to do with life's contents and with the construction of reality; it need not trouble itself concerning the connections of the world excepting in a subsidiary manner, because it stands in the midst of such connections, and without these it cannot possibly exist" (*Truth of Religion*, p. 454). The psychological method treats mind from the naturalistic point of view. The

noölogical method recognises the growth of spirit through the interaction of subject and object. Eucken's method is distinguished from (1) the naturalistic method which deals with the world as independent of its relation to the individual consciousness, and (2) the psychological method where the individual consciousness is viewed as independent of its relation to the world. The noölogical method which he adopts is based on the conception of spiritual life and views the world as a whole.

Eucken views nature as merely mechanical though he has no right to do so. But if nature is mechanical, there is something higher than nature in man, and this the idealists would grant. "If there is such a thing as a connected experience of related objects, there must be operative in consciousness a unifying principle, which not only presents related objects to itself, but at once renders them objects and unites them in relation to each other by this act of presentation and which is single throughout the experience" (Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 37). This view of Green is repeated by Eucken when he says, "There must be a unity of some kind ruling within us ; but the mechanism of nature can never produce such a unity" (*Main Currents*, p. 69). Idealism is strong on the point that ethics is no natural science. It is vain to preach any ethical law to a being who is the result of natural forces. He has no conception of an 'ought.' Though there is an aspect in which man can be viewed as a natural object, the more important aspect is not that. Eucken is relating here the results of the idealist analysis of experience. But, as we shall see, the exclusive view of nature leads Eucken to a dualism between nature and spirit which he never completely overcomes.

Intellectualism is only another species of the same genus. It tries to construct the universe after a logical pattern. It takes its stand on a belief in universal reason immanent in man. It includes within its framework the whole of life and experience. Everything actual is

necessary since the real is the rational. Again, evil has only to be accepted. Freedom and personality are disregarded. The evolution of the world becomes a mere unwinding of the thread from a reel, but not a creative growth. Intellectualism looks upon the problem of existence as one of belief and not of life, while to Eucken "the intellectual conflict is one of outposts; the real conflict is between ways of living." In this criticism Eucken ignores the essential unity of mind.

In his reaction against Hegelianism Eucken comes to a thorough divorce between knowledge and life. Hegel, it is said, represents the universe as the growth of a concept. Reality is reduced to thought. "The system, if forced to abide by the position it has taken up, can offer nothing more than a thought of Thought, a radiation of the forms and powers of thought into the universe, a transformation of the whole of reality into a tissue of logical relations . . . and thus necessarily destroys the immediacy of life in all its forms" (*Problem of Human Life*, p. 512). The logical result of this view in practice is that knowledge and not moral life is the more important thing. "The gist of religion is with Hegel nothing but the absorption of the individual in the universal intellectual process. How such a conception can be identified with moral regeneration of the Christian type, with purification of the heart, is unintelligible to us" ("Hegel To-day," *Monist*, April 1897). So logic has no place in life. What shall we say of this argument? Philosophy is conceptual explanation, and as such is not reality or experience. Therefore philosophy is of no good. The central secret of life can be loved, adored and comprehended. But is comprehension to be dismissed simply because it is not life or love? Eucken's criticism is due to a confusion of issues. Spiritual life expresses itself in art, philosophy and religion, beauty, knowledge and perfection. None of these exhausts the fulness of it. But Eucken seems to consider that religion is the highest form. The holy life of

the saint is to be preferred to that of the seeker of truth or the singer of joy. But religion when so viewed is not exclusive of the cognitive and emotional sides. If religion is the highest stage, then in it we have all sides of our consciousness represented. They illumine the whole without imperilling each other's freedom. Religion is spiritual life in its fulness. But if religion is viewed in the narrow sense of the term as pious conduct or activism, we cannot hold it to be a *special* manifestation of spiritual life worthier than others.

Hegel does not attempt to derive life from logic, or concrete experience from pure thought. Hegel takes up the facts of experience and disentangles from them the universal principles which constitute the framework of reality. Hegel's method of advance is dialectical, *i.e.* it proceeds by the alternate production and removal of contradictions until we reach the highest category, called the Absolute Idea, which has no contradiction. Hegel proceeds on the assumption that contradiction is a mark of error. Just as Eucken develops his view by a criticism of rival systems, Hegel criticises the opposite concepts of subject and object and points out how the highest is a union of these two opposites. Eucken says, "We shall not criticise reality from our own individual standpoint, but shall bid the facts criticise themselves, being led from appearance to the reality by the help of a dialectic immanent in the things themselves" (quoted by Boyce Gibson in the *Quarterly Review*, p. 382). That is exactly what Hegel does. In him thought is as fluid as the real itself. Benedetto Croce, speaking about Bergson's intuitive knowledge, asks, "Was not this just what Hegel demanded, and the point from which he began—to find a form of mind which should be mobile as the movement of the real, which should participate in the life of things, which should feel the pulse of reality, and should mentally reproduce the rhythm of its development, without breaking it into pieces or making it rigid and falsifying it?" (*Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 214). The

movement of conceptual thought depends on and is determined by the larger movement of life. Absolutism takes its stand on the deeper experiences of the soul, and it is therefore not a system unconnected with experience. At a later stage we will have an opportunity of showing that Eucken points to a spiritual life which is sometimes looked upon as beyond experience.

Eucken, as the result of the critique of Hegelianism, subordinates theory to action. It is true that mere knowledge is not enough to satisfy the whole of human nature. But there cannot be any activity apart from theory. Eucken asks us to act. What is it we are to realise in life or action? We must know something about spirit before we can act spiritually. But as a criticism of a false view of intellect which tries to spin theories without relation to facts, Eucken's point may have value; unfortunately no writer holds to that absurd position. "Intellectual work itself does not become positive and productive until it becomes an integral portion of an *inclusive spiritual life*, both receiving from, that life and contributing to its advancement, until it is guided by the resultant drift of great spiritual organisations and impelled by the energies which originate from these sources" (*Main Currents*, p. 85). It only means that intellect is an element of life but not the whole of life, quite an obvious proposition. The 'thought' of the absolutist is not exclusive of action. The 'knowledge' of the idealist systems is not mere cognitive comprehension, but force of mind which drives man to move in the direction of spiritual reality. Knowledge is not a mere acknowledgement of the ideal, but a vision of the spiritual life which is a precious possession of the soul coming out in life on every side. Mere knowledge is vain without love. Immanent idealism does not stop with the consideration that the goal of man is reached when he recognises the presence of the Absolute in him. It is clear that knowing is not being, and he does not truly know who is not stirred to his very depths

by the consciousness of the infinite in him. Quite as much as Eucken, Absolutism recognises that the spirit developing in man is a force striving towards expression through opposition and discord, developing through effort and struggle.

Eucken further develops his view of intellectualism by urging that life requires the shattering the given world to bits and reconstructing it into a spiritual whole. Intellect is looked upon as requiring us to accept the given without undertaking any task of reconstruction. It is therefore useless for the purpose of solving the riddle of life. Eucken once again is wrong. The first step in the great spiritual awakening is the feeling of discord between the ideal and the actual. Intellect in its pursuit confronts us with the contrast between the speculative ideals of consistency and system and the chaotic and irregular nature of the actual world. But since intellect has a feeling that the world is rational, it seeks to discover the order of the given and force it to the foreground. Intellect does not passively acquiesce in what is given, but tries to force out of the world its latent order. Eucken certainly knows that we do not passively receive impressions from outside, but react on them. The world of our mind or intellect is not a mere photograph of the world outside, but is an enlargement or interpretation thereof. Logic, according to the absolutist tradition, is the mental *construction* of reality. The task of shaping the universe to conform to our ethical ideals belongs to morals. But it is only through the co-operation of intellect, emotion and will that we can rebuild the universe on spiritual foundations. When Eucken says that cognition is useless, as life and will are necessary to create the world of spirit, he forgets how life and will cannot set to work without the aid of logic.

Eucken in agreement with one view of Bergson's theory of intuition believes that it is impossible to realise the truth of the world, the essential reality of spirit, unless man has had a rebirth in his own nature. As Professor

Boyce Gibson put it, "If we are fruitfully to grasp the movements of the world's spiritual history as systems of life, we must ourselves, through the deepening of our own individuality, have suffered that spiritual change in the depths of our own being, which can alone give us the requisite insight for recognising a spiritual drift elsewhere" (*Quarterly Review*, p. 384). We see how a sympathetic insight is necessary for a clear and true understanding, but we fail to see why we should ourselves experience certain things to see them elsewhere. If this becoming something to know it is necessary, then man's condition would be pitiable indeed. We could not know so many things. Subjectivism, which Eucken rebels against, will haunt him. His rejection of thought as the essential element of life does not bring him near the voluntarists, for, according to Eucken, life is more than either intelligence or will.

Eucken differs from the pragmatists since he regards utility to be an end considerably inferior to spiritual salvation, which is the proper end of man. Eucken recognises absolute standards in truth, morality, etc., which will not be agreeable to the pragmatists. Eucken is decisive on this point. "The essence of the conception of truth, and the life and soul of our search after truth, is to be found in the idea that in truth man attains to something superior to all his own opinions and inclinations, something that possesses a validity completely independent of any human consent; the hope of an essentially new life is held out to man, a vision of a wider and richer being, an inner communion with reality, a liberation from all that is merely human. . . . On the other hand, when the good of the individual and of humanity becomes the highest aim and the guiding principle, truth sinks to the level of a merely utilitarian opinion. . . . Truth can exist only as an end in itself. 'Instrumental' truth is no truth at all" (*Main Currents*, p. 78). Thus Eucken protests against subjectivism in philosophy. The world is not what suits our likes and

dislikes. The spiritual values of truth, beauty and goodness are over-individual.

The discussion of naturalism has shown that human life involves a break with the merely natural life; that there can be no spiritual experience without the negation of the natural; that the beginning of all positive morality and religion is in a new birth; that of intellectualism and voluntarism has pointed out the need of an independent but indwelling spiritual life which is more than mere intelligence or will. It has also directed our attention to the end of the free active and personal appropriation of the spiritual life. In criticising the rival systems, Eucken has suggested his own scheme of personal idealism, which is said to be confirmed by progress and evolution, culture and civilisation.

We have shown in a manner how these suggestions are not the necessary results of the weaknesses of the theories criticised. But our present problem is to see how far these suggestions are logically sustained in Eucken's system.

III

Nature by itself cannot account for the specifically human. In human nature we have an eternal and permanent principle which is opposed to the flux of the world. Man is free because there is the higher life in him. Were not the spark of spirit present in him, man would not make any effort to raise himself above himself. Man feels his existence to be "solitary, mean, nasty, brutish and short." The higher life tells him in clear terms that the life of the vegetable plant or the brute beast is not worthy of him. Man is both in time and out of it. He stands above the apparent chaos of natural conditions and penetrates to the fundamental spiritual reality underlying the changeful appearances. Knowledge is possible simply because man participates in a higher life. History is possible because it is not a succession of events, but a growth which man who stands

above the perpetual changes of time can understand. Without the life of spirit in which he has a share, man is not human at all. Man as an intellectual and ethical being is contrasted with the non-moral nature of the world from which he springs. Life is a problem or a discord because man is natural—spiritual or finite-infinite. The actual would have satisfied him if his life were a mere appendage to the world of nature. But no ; he is restless. His uneasiness is a sign that his life is rooted in an independent spiritual order. He feels life's problem to be capable of solution only through a negation of the merely natural. "The spiritual life declares its ability positively within the human province through a persistent effort to move outside the given situation, through a tracing out and a holding forth of ideals, through a longing after a more complete happiness and a more complete truth" (*Truth of Religion*, p. 200). In human life we have a struggle between nature with its mechanical causation and spirit with its creative freedom. Man's life is on one side a mere continuation of nature, while on the other it exhibits new forces. He is at the point where nature and spirit meet, and that is why life is not all meanness or vice. The drift of culture and development of history prove the presence of the spiritual in man who is the moulder of them.

While subhuman nature has no share in the spiritual world, man alone can enter into the membership of the world of spirit. He is a potential member of the kingdom of spirit. He has to fight a battle before he can secure his patrimony. There is the downward nature acting as a drag on him. "It is more especially true that it is through struggle alone that our life fathoms its full depth. Resistance alone drives it to put forth its whole strength and compels it to exercise its full originaive power" (*Main Currents*, p. 153). The ideal for man is the life of a wrestler fighting the dark forces of evil dwelling in his own breast as well as in the world of nature.

As Eucken conceives the opposition of nature and

spirit to be final and ultimate, he asks us to get rid of nature by violence if necessary. This getting rid of the natural means the birth of the spiritual. Man in his first birth is natural; in the second he is purely spiritual. Eucken sharply opposes the higher and lower stages of reality. Spiritual growth is regarded as due to a conflict and an overcoming and not an evolution or development. The ideal of man can be reached not by a perfecting of the natural, but by a denial thereof.

In emphasising overmuch the break between nature and spirit and the need for a second birth, Eucken is under the influence of the Christian conception of a new birth. He is trying to give a philosophical justification of the categories of grace and salvation. But why should we abandon the narrow, limited attitude of the finite self if we do not perceive in us a whole which already draws us toward itself? As Descartes asks, "How could we doubt or desire, how could we be conscious that anything is wanting to us, and that we are not altogether perfect, if we had not ourselves the idea of a perfect being in comparison with whom we recognise the defect of our own nature?" (Meditation III.). It is for the sake of the whole that the surrender has to be made. It is because we already possess the ideal of spiritual perfection we agree to those laws which serve its ends and repel all those hostile to it. If man possesses a sense of higher values, how can Eucken say that the higher spiritual life of man is newborn. It is there because human life is a part of the universal life of spirit. The vaster deep already stirs in man. The life of spirit appears in human consciousness, but it is true, as Eucken says, that for its full expression the human consciousness has to be transcended. All that this means is that the higher life is in him though it stretches beyond him. This should make Eucken concede that the spiritual life is also the natural for man. When the birth of spirit in man is looked upon as the second birth, man is viewed as a natural being to start with, and unless there is a

total conversion of his nature it is impossible for him to become spiritual. But if man were completely natural or rotten in his nature, no amount of manipulation could make him a spiritual being. The only chance is from the influx of spiritual life from outside. Man can be delivered from his sin by grace. Eucken thinks that he supports this doctrine by his view of second birth, etc. But this view clashes with Eucken's other statements that man to start with possesses a fragment of the life of spirit ; otherwise he cannot be intellectual, moral and artistic in his nature. It is meaningless to argue that man is weak and finite by nature and cannot therefore by the unaided exercise of his natural capacity develop spiritual perfection. If he is really so completely lost, if he is essentially and unalterably sinful or 'natural' in Eucken's sense, he cannot and would not think of God at all. No life of spirit will recommend itself to such a being. Eucken himself admits it : " Either the power of a new world is operative in man, and makes him strong outwardly and inwardly, or the whole life of man is spiritually lost—one great illusion, one great error " (*Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, p. 331). If, therefore, spirit is in man, then what is wanted is not a complete victory over human nature, which is partly spiritual but only a transformation of the lower and a development of the higher. The pathway to salvation is not through sudden conversion but gradual growth. What is required is not a letting in of divine energy from outside, but only a development of the spiritual note he already possesses. This view of man as potential spirit and of salvation as the development of his spiritual side is satisfactory, but it is the view of absolutism ; the view of man as merely natural and perfection as involving a second birth is Eucken's, but is unsatisfactory. We find in Eucken both these views left side by side. When he cares for novelty, he urges one view which is illogical and unsatisfactory ; when he cares for consistency, he urges the other, but then his system becomes identical with absolutism.

But we may be asked, Is not conversion a fact attested by all religious men? Yes. But there is such a thing as growth in the life of spirit. When this growth is steady and natural we do not notice it; when it is sudden and great our attention is attracted by it, and we call it a change of heart or conversion, revival or second birth. Conversions are only great changes or crises. There is no proof to show that new energy flows into the soul from sources completely outside it.

What is the truth contained in Eucken's severe opposition between nature and spirit? He only means to say that in the actual world the lower nature of man is opposing the higher; in the world the forces of evil seem to be fighting with the forces of good. We admit that in man the higher and the lower, the spiritual and the natural seem to be opposed when they are exclusively viewed. The realisation of spiritual life is due to a development or extension of man's higher nature against the lower. In the sense that we cannot have complete spiritual life without a negation of the lower nature, Eucken is right. In man it is not completely realised, though it is partly so. The spiritual life is both immanent and transcendent. The discord between the higher and the lower is felt most in human experience, but that is no reason why we should transfer what is true of human experience to the whole world and arrive at a dualistic metaphysics asserting the world of nature and, as an appendage to it, the world of spirit. But, as we shall see, even human experience involves a unity between the two sides, and so should the world.

The spiritual order has yet to be realised; it is to be won through struggle. It is *not yet*, but is in the making. In the unfinished universe we require a guarantee that the spiritual reality can be attained at the end of the evolutionary process. And Eucken grants us that assurance. We can have faith in the final issue of life. But if the victory of spirit over nature is so certain, then even in Eucken's scheme the end is inevitable and the

world seems to be determined as in the absolutist's picture. Eucken does not merely say that the goal is bound to be reached, but also that it is already realised. He posits the absolute eternal reality of the order of spirit. If it is already real, what is it we are struggling to attain? What is the significance of moral endeavour if perfection is eternally realised? The whole account is what is generally identified with absolute idealism. Eucken sets down the temporal and the eternal side by side. As the absolutist asserts the reality of the whole which is realising itself in the world process, so also Eucken asserts both eternity and time, in which one is being acquired slowly and gradually through the conquest of the other. Eucken's strictures against absolutism do not come with much grace from him. Sometimes Eucken is inclined to dismiss the world, if not as an illusion, at least as something to be completely negated. A concrete doctrine which holds to the reality of both the eternal and the temporal, victory of the good and yet a battle with evil, consciousness of perfection in religion and yet a burning moral will, is looked upon as the goal in absolutistic systems. It is a world where the two are inseparable. The one is necessary because of the other. This absolutist conception Eucken now and then plays with but does not posit as the highest truth.

Eucken's hostility to nature is unaccountable. Professor Bosanquet says there is "a certain hostility alternating with neglect towards the realm of Nature below man, towards the beginnings of morals and religion in early society, towards the detail of normal character and conduct, towards the ethical import of institutions and towards the greatness of Hellenism and the Middle Age" (*Quarterly Review*, 1914, p. 376). Eucken makes nature mean the evil passions of man and the physical world. Since they generally oppose the higher aspirations, he holds that nature is evil. But this is to take nature in a very restricted sense. As we have seen, even the lower passions of man have to be transformed, and the world

of physical nature made an instrument of spirit. We do not know what authority Eucken has in speaking of the life of sense as natural. We admit that were man completely confined to the sense world he would not have any ideals by which to round off his experiences. Such a life would be one of dispersal or scattering into elements, while a life of reason is a gathering up, a unifying activity. But the two are not really opposed. We do not want a complete suppression of sense and birth of reason. What can reason do without sense? Sense and understanding are different aspects of one and the same life. Strictly speaking, the existence of nature presupposes a mind. It is compatible only with it and with nothing else. Eucken contrasts the actual and the existent with the ideal and the essential, and breaks the universe into nature and spirit. Eucken admits that we can remove the contradictions of our actual life through our activity. It follows that what appears at first to be contradictory is there merely to sting us to progressive activity. The spiritual is the inspiration of the natural. Nature is the stage on which the spiritual life has to realise its possibilities. Ultimately the world of nature is to be subordinated to that of spirit. It is unreal if it has not any spiritual significance. The religious souls of the world feel the unity between the two. They whose lives are lifted above individuality and subjectivity into a plane of universal and objective personal being see clearly the vision of spiritual perfection in which nature plays but a subordinate part. To the great spiritual leaders "the new kingdom was no vague outline, and no feeble hope, but all stood clear in front of them; the kingdom was so real to their souls and filled them so exclusively that the whole sensuous world was reduced by them to a semblance and a shadow, if they could not otherwise gain a new value from a superior power" (Eucken). Eucken is quite definite that the whole must be a spiritual evolution, for the rise of mind and spirit would be unaccountable if the world below man were purely natural.

Thus Eucken answers the question of the relation of spirit to nature in the way in which it is answered by the absolutists. Eucken is clear that spirit is the source of all reality and nature only an aspect thereof. He dismisses contemptuously the other suggestion that nature is the basis of reality of which spirit is the by-product. The contrast between the ideals of man and nature lies within the life of spirit. The oneness of the whole is attested by religious experience where the individual feels his unity with something greater than himself, where the peace and harmony of all is the outstanding fact. The opposition between nature and spirit is due to imperfect apprehension. Were it real and not apparent, we can never break down the opposition. Eucken lays undue stress on the negative movement of the spirit away from nature in its quest for freedom. While we admit that negation is essential, it is at the same time a side of the positive progress. It becomes an abstraction if it is cut off from the whole. The impulse after freedom first expresses itself as a break from nature which is restraint, but the reconciliation is effected so soon as the human consciousness finds its true centre in the spirit. The shock of resistance is no doubt needed to make the self aware of its real destiny. The ego can come to self-consciousness only by beating itself against obstacles, by being reflected back upon itself from the world of nature. This meeting with opposition is a necessary condition of becoming aware of the self's real purpose, but the opposition is not the end of things. Though the upward ascent is not a smooth, peaceful, but a steep, difficult path, though the issue of the conflict may tend now in one direction and now in another, there is no doubt about the ultimate victory of spirit. In over-emphasising the opposition between spirit and nature, Eucken is trying to come into line with the orthodox Christian view of the relation between the spirit and the flesh, the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world, but in so doing his religious prejudices get the mastery over his philosophic impulses.

IV

What is the spiritual life? We are not told what exactly it is. Everything about it is vague and uncertain. We are only told that it is an inward, self-sufficing and independent life. Certain indefinite characteristics which are ever on the lips of religious philosophers are given us. But these indications of spiritual life lead us nowhere. We do not know how to construe it, since Eucken does not trace the relation of the spiritual life to the various aspects of life. Some of the descriptions given of it remind us of Bergson's *Durée*. The word 'spiritual' refers indiscriminately to the scientific, aesthetic, moral and religious aspects of reality. For example, it is said to begin when routine existence ceases. What exactly its relation to the psychical life and the natural world in the midst of which alone it has to be lived is, Eucken does not tell us. We have two accounts of it in Eucken's philosophy, one which Eucken the Christian theologian puts forward, and the other which Eucken the philosopher cherishes. According to the first, spiritual life is a remote phenomenon unconnected with the world; according to the second, it is the totality including the world within its scope.

There are passages in Eucken where the world of spirit is regarded as an independent realm of reality superior to the sensuous or the phenomenal world which is but a changeful shadowy reflection of the eternal reality. The spiritual life is said to be independent of nature. "But one thing we must, above all, bear in mind—that if the invisible world is to have the requisite stability and breadth, it cannot be the mere object of our finite longing or any inference laboriously drawn from the conditions of our finite experience; it must be completely independent, and exist in its own right" (*The Meaning and Value of Life*, p. 75). The spiritual life is quite distinct from the psychical life of man. For it "demands a complete inclusive activity transcending the opposition between subject and world, inward feeling and outward

fact. Our merely psychical life, however, is at the mercy of this opposition" (*ibid.* p. 109). When the spiritual life becomes discontinuous with the natural, it loses that from which it acquires content. If it is so completely different from what we know in the actual world, we cannot describe it, for it is nothing at all. There is no meaning in saying that the spiritual values are higher and unconditional. We do not know what the life of spirit is. All that we can say of it is that it is immutable, free, permanent and rational, simply because life, as we know, is mutable, changing, necessary and irrational. Spiritual life is a self-existent reality opposed to the natural, the human and the individual, the unfree and the automatic. It is the spiritual, the divine, the universal, the free and the creative being. The eternal unity lies outside the world of experience, completely transcendent to it. According to this view, the world is an appearance empty and vain, and human nature sinful and corrupt. The only chance of salvation is by a second birth. This view of the corruption of the world, the rottenness of man, need for conversion and deliverance by grace is a mistake of fact and judgement. If spiritual life is independent of man, how can man ever partake of it? If it is removed completely from the human, if it is a mere beyond, it will be unrealisable. It cannot be assimilated or appropriated by man. If it is a timeless reality having no connection with the temporal, then the two are left side by side without any mediation. Either the world or the spirit must be an appearance. Conflict is the end of life and human existence is a tragedy indeed.

But Eucken sometimes takes a concrete view of spirit, and that is the philosophically satisfactory doctrine. It is the all-embracing whole of which mechanical nature and human consciousness are aspects at different levels of manifestation. "The natural and the spiritual stages both fall within an all-enveloping life whose very process of self-development is to pass upward from the

one to the other, and so come into full realisation within our universe through the very impulse of its own movement" (*The Meaning and Value of Life*). The material elements have helped spirit in its upward course. The mechanical nature has travailed to bring the human into existence. The growth of evolution, life, consciousness, morals and religion are proofs that the life of the spirit has been expressing itself in higher and higher forms. The lower forms have always to be interpreted in terms of the higher. Nature may condition spirit, but is conditioned by it. It represents to us the conditions in the external world which are necessary to bring forth spirit. Thus are man and nature organic to each other. The end of evolution is not reached in human consciousness, for even there we have oppositions and discords. Man himself feels in moments of insight that between his actual self and his ideal there is a gap or a cleavage. He reaches out towards the spiritual whole which he can never completely grasp. Therefore his position is one of doubt and distraction, discord and difficulty. It only shows that we are not completely spirits as yet, but are only claimants for spiritual life.

Here Eucken takes a more positive view of the relation of spirit to nature. Spirit is not opposed to nature. The change from the natural to the spiritual life is due to an unfolding of the inner nature of existence. The spiritual life is in the world of experience, is present in man, but has not as yet come to its own. The mechanism of nature gives us a low degree of reality when compared with the creativity of spirit. When man reaches the highest state, the opposition between spirit and nature is completely overcome. The eternal life transcends human existence only in the sense that human life is not complete and self-sufficient since it is not raised above the opposition between subject and object.

This view is confirmed by Eucken's suggestion that artistic creation supplies a clue to the interpretation of the spiritual life. For in a work of art we have a mutual

interpenetration of the subjective and the objective. The soul of the artist transfigures the natural. Things receive a soul by his vision, and his soul acquires a content. If in art we bring out the soul of things, how can we do it if things had no souls? The life of the artist points to the affinities between nature and spirit, world and idea. The world of fact is not opposed to the life of spirit, but is itself a grade of the evolution of spirit.

In another place we have pointed out the need for the opposition. Why should the Absolute develop differences? This question is not answered by Eucken. He only tells us that there has been a development. "The idea becomes irresistible, that for reasons beyond our ken, in some certain sphere of the spiritual world—for unquestionably the problem reaches higher than humanity—a split, a severance of operation from essence, has taken place, and that for our eye this conflict reaches its climax in human existence" (*Einheit des Geisteslebens*, p. 445). This split, bifurcation or severance of existence from essence is viewed by Eucken as an event in time, and not rightly. There has been no eternal spirit without the world process, no God without energising. There has been no whole without nature and spirit and their struggle. Eucken himself admits it when he says, "The whole develops itself through the agency of the antithesis of subject and object, of power and resistance, but it remains superior to it, and holds both sides together even while they are divided" (*Main Currents*, p. 58). The spirit sunders itself into distinctions which are finding through the world process their way back to the original unity.

Eucken says that spiritual life is the central fact which alone gives a clear, connected and complete account of the world of natural existence, history, morality, science, art and religion (*Meaning and Value of Life*, p. 84). It alone imparts value and meaning to all that occurs in the lower levels of being. It forms the ultimate

basis of reality while transcending all human life. It is the whole which has been steadily unfolding from the lowest upwards. It is at once the basis and pre-supposition as well as the goal and climax of the world process. It is the supreme power which supports and sustains all reality, the constantly active source of the life of the human spirit. It is a self-sufficient life superior to space and time. It is that which "sustains, dominates and unifies the visible world." Thus though Eucken starts with the conception of nature as a hostile power with which man is in conflict, he is compelled to admit in the end that nature is an integral element of a spiritual universe. Spiritual life is the whole in which the parts or grades of reality find their function and meaning. It reveals itself from the lowest matter up to the highest love and devotion. Though the whole is spirit, it is not present in full perfection at every point of the universe. There is generally opposition between the parts. The world is the process of the progressive realisation of spirit. Through conflict a higher harmony is being slowly attained. The world is trying to win back through effort and struggle the unity of the two, nature and spirit. Eucken insists on the reality of the world process, which is a slow conquest of spirit over nature, but in indicating that the end as well as the beginning is the complete reconciliation of the two, he sides with absolutism. And if he does not put himself down for an absolutist thinker, his theological prejudices are responsible for it. There is nothing special or new about the statement of absolute idealism which Eucken has contributed to it, he has only given a special emphasis to the view at a time when emphasis was needed.

V

It is therefore as an ethical preacher that Eucken will be remembered. He feels much worried about the distracted condition of the world around. On every side

we meet with problems and paradoxes, puzzles and contradictions. The disease is not so much one of intellect as of will. The problem is one of life and has to be met by life and action. We must so act as to transform the problematic and the discordant into the whole and the harmonious. With all the advance of culture and civilisation man is not happy.

What is the reason? The average individual of the world simply accepts the natural without knowing it to be apparent and transitory, and thus misses the eternal reality. We come into contact with the real in spiritual life, which is ethical and religious. The unrest of life is due to the complexity of human desires which crave for satisfaction. Material needs and pursuits absorb man's energies so that he has not time to think of the higher values. Mental unrest has only one cure, the possession and practice of the spiritual scale of values. Eucken summons all those who suffer from the insecurity of spirit and flimsiness of faith—whose name is not legion or million, but many-million—not to surrender themselves to matter with its mechanism which is bound to enslave the spirit, but fall back on soul force. Man is great because of his inner spirit. Outward things cannot satisfy the inward soul. "But we are now experiencing what mankind has so often experienced, viz. that at the very point where the negation reaches its climax and the danger reaches the very brink of a precipice, the conviction dawns with axiomatic certainty that there lives and stirs within us something which no obstacle or enmity can ever destroy, and which signifies against all opposition a kernel of our nature that can never get lost" (*Truth of Religion*, p. 62). Absorption in external things is the cause of the present depression of the soul. Man is delicately balanced between ruin and redemption, ruin if he follows nature, and redemption if he follows spirit. At present he is on the inclined plane to ruin since he is pursuing material ends.

How should we proceed in life? By not accepting

the natural. Nature as it comes to us is full of troubles, but we have so to act upon it as to rid it of its puzzles and build a spiritual order on its basis. We have to try to realise the spiritual life. We have seen how the spiritual life expresses itself in the impulse to unity. From the beginning it has been a whole, the creative power which moves towards unity at all stages, the vital energy which spurs us on to make a unity of the world. Anything less than the whole will not satisfy. Man will not be satisfied with his existence until he gives up his finiteness and relativity. Pain and unrest are the signs of his finiteness which he has to get over. Man has to fight against opposition to gain his ends ; he has to fight error and ignorance, confusion and prejudice to gain truth ; he has to fight impulse and immediacy to gain the moral good. Everywhere he can win his rights as a spiritual being only by shifting the centre of gravity from the natural and the individual to the spiritual and the universal. So long as man is finite, so long as there are elements which divide the life of man, like the claims of nature and the counter-claims of spirit, he will have pain and discord in his life. But when the ideal task is achieved oppositions cease. When the love of the whole is embodied in all our activities, then the spiritual being of man manifests itself and man attains satisfaction. It is then that the individual petty and particular small self becomes truly personal and spiritual. Since the separate atomic self is repudiated, he will lead a life of spiritual expansion and love. Then our work becomes our vocation, our duty our pleasure.

Eucken calls upon us to give up our false self-satisfaction and capture the cosmic spiritual life in which human life is rooted. This spiritual life is a fact in that it is real, but its reality has not become existence. We cannot say all existence is good. So spiritual reality is in one sense a reality, in another an aspiration. It is " a fact, and a task, a repose that can never be disturbed and an endeavour that cannot be satisfied " (*Main*

Currents, p. 61). Human effort is necessary to make a heaven of earth. Victory of good is promised by the reality of spiritual life. It is man's duty to turn this from an idea into a possession. The religious ideal should animate all social work. The ideal of man is not merely to understand the nature of reality but to subdue all things to the higher life of Spirit. Eucken is quite right in subordinating the mystic quietism to the practical work of building the spiritual kingdom. Eucken is to be praised for his insistence on the uplift of man by work. But we must remember that all forms of idealism emphasise the sense of a deeper life which is not satisfied by mere externals. All of them exhort us to secure our footing firm on the inner soul, to save ourselves from the dangers of outward objects and natural things, and work for mankind with a goal in view.

VI

Eucken's ethics is pure religion without any dogma. The life of spirit is something to be possessed. Mysticism is the highest religion. It is living the life of God. When the spiritual life becomes one's own life, then the finite man becomes an independent spiritual centre. "A genuine self is constituted only by the coming to life of the infinite spiritual world in an independent concentration in the individual" (*Life's Basis*, p. 186). The glory of Christianity is that it has shown as a historical fact what man has it in him to become. "Christianity for the first time reveals a complete knowledge of Divine Being; a deification of man" (Eucken). There are also the great personalities of the world in whom the actual and the ideal have become one. They are the mediators between God and Man. They are the witnesses to prove that man can be raised to the likeness of God. They are the supermen of Nietzsche, the philosopher kings of Plato, the true Brahmins of the Orient. They are the legislators of humanity summing up the spiritual

forces of the age and forcing the world along new paths and movements. They form the spiritual aristocracy of the world. In them the life of spirit is incarnate. It is lifted out of its shadowy existence into the world of ideals and presented to the world in full reality in visible form. Religion that can be sustained by logic, that satisfies all intellectual demands, is 'universal' religion. We feel that human life is rooted in an independent spiritual life. All sense of tragedy and failure, isolation and discord in the universe is removed. The soul is no more a stranger in the universe but feels quite at home in God's world. But this cannot be the final solution. Nature is found in conflict with spirit; right is worsted and wrong is triumphant. So the average man cannot be satisfied. He feels the need of what Eucken calls 'Characteristic' religion, as distinguished from the 'universal' religion. 'Characteristic' religion is specific and personal. The philosopher can understand and interpret what spiritual life is and what its bearings on practice are. But the man in the street accustomed to thinking in pictures cannot appreciate it unless it becomes concrete. So with special reference to the average life of man, a 'characteristic' religion adequate to his needs is found necessary. There is revealed a spiritual life of supremely personal character with all its glories of love and will, a presence that inspires and redeems our whole life. The difference between the 'universal' and the 'characteristic' religion may be stated thus: 'Universal' religion has no personal God. It asserts the reality of a spiritual life diffused through the world. 'Characteristic' religion asserts the reality of a personality in whom the spiritual life becomes supremely real. We rise from the colourless conception of a pervading spirit to a living personal God. Eucken does not offer any proof of this 'characteristic' religion. Its proof is practical in the sense that the spiritual life of the soul asserts its reality.

Now the Absolute becomes the God of religion. He

is the creator; the world is his revelation. The plain man wishes to know how the absolute spiritual life which philosophy posits exists. Eucken says it exists as a personality, not as a thing. Since the God of religion is an object of fear and reverence, worship and adoration, communion and fellowship, it must be a personality. It is a self-supporting personality or over-personality, if we please. But still, 'universal' religion is necessary as a corrective of 'characteristic' religion. The latter is useful as giving us immediate expressions of the higher life, but it has a tendency to become a slavish imitation of this or that life, and to lose its freedom and become dogmatic. At such times we have to fall back on the 'universal' religion.

'Universal' and 'characteristic' religions are not two different religions but two grades of one religion. We cannot say that the 'characteristic' religion is purely an arbitrary product. For it is the logical conclusion of the course. Only we are emphasising the concrete aspect of it. The object of knowledge at the 'universal' level becomes an object of love at the 'characteristic' stage. It may even be urged that this is the highest conception of the Absolute, as evidenced by the mystics. For it is a stage beyond the dialectics of knowledge perceived by the seers of religion in their Pisgah visions. What was an ideal in the stage of 'universal' religion now becomes a reality. The religious souls commune alone with the Alone and find it to be Infinite Love. When they come down from their heights to relate to us the glories of their visions, we will profit by their lessons. But they will not give us a philosophical religion, for to the question why do we consider God a person, no intellectual justification can be given. For, strictly speaking, belief in a personal God is not necessary to religion. "Religion can subsist without belief in a God; the old genuine Buddhism proves that; but without the duality of worlds, without an outlook into a new being, it becomes an empty phrase" (*Truth of Religion*, p. 129). Religion requires only

a cosmic spiritual reality but not God. Spiritual life is not identical with God, but seems to be the atmosphere in which God as much as any other being lives. Eucken understands the difficulties incident to the conception of a God. For a finite being like man, it is not possible to have knowledge of God unless God also is finite. We should either say that God is not infinite or man is not finite. We do not know how exactly the world of persons is related to a personal God. Is he the external author of the universe or is he the president of the republic? We have already said that we do not understand what precisely the life of spirit is. Sometimes we are told that it is the self-sufficient eternal vital energy, but sometimes it is also made a growing, changing, dynamic force. Spiritual life is a growing something which is trying to become independent of man. But religion, which brings man into union with God, is supposed to bring him into relation with the deepest basis of reality, and that reality cannot be something that has yet to attain its realisation. Here God is viewed as the goal of the world, while the spiritual life is merely the road to the final goal. Spiritual life is viewed here as the upward tendency entangled in imperfection and not as is usual with Eucken, "the self-consciousness of reality" (*Life's Basis*, p. 263). This spiritual tendency of the world is only a tendency, and, therefore, has yet to grow and progress, while God is not subject to growth. Spiritual life we are supposed to make, but we do not make God. Here spiritual life is viewed as the process of becoming in which we have the energising of the whole in part, or the spirit in nature, or infinite in finite. Such a kind of pure infinite we have in several places in this book shown to be spurious. When we begin to discuss about the nature of God, we come across indefinite and inconsistent views in Eucken. Eucken himself feels that we cannot prove the existence of a personal God. The nature of the divine can only be felt by the divine in us. "All opposition to the idea of the Divine personality is ultimately explained by the

fact that an energetic life process is wanting—a life process which entertains the question not so much from without as from within. Whenever such a life process is found, there is simultaneously found often in direct contradiction to the formal doctrinal statement an element of such a personal character of God" (*Truth of Religion*, p. 430). In the spirit of Bergson, Eucken asks us to hold our tongue for the heart has spoken. They have felt and we have no right to question.

VII

Eucken holds with Bergson and the pluralists that all genuine action is free and creative. It cannot be deduced or predicted. Eucken says that determinism "involves the disappearance of the present in any real sense of the word. When there is no demand for decision, no tension and no room for original action, when the future grows out of the past like a flower out of its bud, then there can be only the shadow of a present" (p. 437). But Eucken also says that a free act is the utterance and expression of the whole self. We genuinely possess ourselves only in such free acts. We live in them and not in others. If it is the expression of the full personality of man, then it would arise out of the man's self as the "flower out of its bud." We cannot say it is an absolutely new creation. Of course it cannot be predicted. As the artist's vision is the expression of the artist's being and at the same time a novel deed, even so a genuine act arises out of the self and is still novel. It is both old and new. Eucken agrees with the absolutists in thinking that a free act must be determined by the nature of the self. He with the absolutists adds the clause that for real freedom the self which determines must be not the small petty self but the whole spiritual self which we share. Our free acts are those which are determined by the wider and deeper self, and not the automatic surface self. So Eucken's freedom is not pure contingency.

The freedom of selves is due to their participating in the Absolute. The whole to which both man and nature belong operates in man and so he is free. The bare freedom of spirit which he has in him on account of the presence of the whole, is abstract and potential until it gains actuality and concreteness by commerce with reality. It is with growing life that man's consciousness of his inward life or sense of freedom develops and deepens. Eucken carefully distinguishes freedom from indeterminism or contingency. Man has to find his content in the given world. His freedom is, therefore, bound by the necessity of the world of actuality. So man is partly free and partly determined. This is the absolutistic theory that the whole alone is fully free, and not the individual beings. Till the self finds itself in the other it will be bound by the other.

VIII

Eucken proves personal immortality not for all but for some. But he also holds that soul sometimes *dies* before the body. The death of the soul! How then is immortality or survival even, possible? "The infinite pain and love that has provided a new spontaneous nature in man, over against a dark and hostile world, will conserve such a new nature and its spiritual nucleus and shelter it against all perils and assaults, so that life as the bearer of life eternal can never be wholly lost in the stream of time" (*Truth of Religion*, p. 431). The proof of immortality is the basis of life in spiritual experience. Empirical proofs are not of value, and the kind of immortality which Eucken makes room for cannot satisfy those who are dissatisfied with the absolutistic notion of immortality.

IX

We find how the system of idealism propounded by Eucken is absolutistic with only a difference in emphasis. While the insistence on will is present as an undercurrent

in all absolutist systems, Eucken puts it in the foreground. Not that systems of absolute idealism compromise in any way the central features of Eucken's system (personalism and activism). The independent life of the spirit, which is the one central idea of all the volumes of Eucken, remains as vague as ever. In many large volumes he has failed to give it any definite content. We cannot say that Eucken has made any serious contribution to philosophy (see Professor Bosanquet in the *Quarterly Review*, p. 378). Taking shelter under life, he skips over the many metaphysical problems which are puzzles to philosophers of the present day. He does not feel called upon to discuss them, seeing that we can continue to *live* even if we do not *know* the precise nature of God or future life. The central issues of life he leaves aside, but tries to persuade men to a higher life. But he forgets that we cannot improve or enlarge life unless we preserve the ideals necessary for higher effort.

Eucken is more a prophet than a philosopher. His work inspires us with higher ideals, and tries to lift us up to a larger and higher plane of being. It is Eucken's faith that whatever might have been the function of philosophy in ages gone by, just now, when spiritual distraction and mental unrest run high, the task of philosophy is to give peace of mind and soul by awakening the spiritual vision of wholeness and freedom. To this age, fast growing materialist, he offers as a way of escape a belief in the reality and supremacy of the spiritual world. Eucken contrasts graphically the real needs of man, and the insufficiency of the present situation to satisfy them. He gives us a vivid picture of the opposition between what is and what ought to be. He invites our attention to the meanness of man's existence, and with a reformer's zeal asks us to build better. On every side Eucken feels the lack of a great goal which would raise individuals from out of their smallness. The spiritual concerns of man are left uncared for. Eucken

calls for a revision of values and urges that religion should be the foundation of life, and not merely an incident of it.

The critics of Eucken agree in the view that Eucken is not so much a philosopher as a man with a message to his age. Professor Perry holds that Eucken's system is not a philosophy at all, if by philosophy is meant "the attempt to think clearly and cogently about the world, and lay bare its actualities and necessities" (*Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 154). Professor Widgery in his Introduction to *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal* observes: "It has been remarked, and the present writer would be among the first to acknowledge the truth of the statement, that the voice is that of a prophet in the sense of an ethical teacher rather than that of a philosopher in the more technical sense" (p. vii). This estimate of Eucken's philosophy may best be concluded with Professor Bosanquet's words about Eucken's system: "Eucken's wide influence appears to rest partly on a very considerable merit and partly on a piece of good fortune. It is his merit to have made himself the prophet of a simple and central truth, which has been the burden of the greatest philosophy of all ages. This is the truth of the primacy and solid reality of the substantive spiritual life by which man rises into membership of an eternal world. And it was a piece of historical good fortune that, striking in at a moment of anti-speculative reaction in his own country, he was enabled to be one of a few in preaching this truth, and yet to preach it as a modern to moderns, liberated by the critical temper of the day from a great deal of lumber (as, for instance, the philosophy of nature), which makes much in the classical German philosophy obsolete and unendurable" (*Quarterly Review*, April 1914, p. 376).

CHAPTER XI

THE NEW REALISM OF MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL

THE realistic reaction deserves a place in any study of contemporary thought by its growing influence and novelty of standpoint. It is difficult to criticise it as the theory is yet in the making, and we do not have any systematic exposition of it. We cannot say that its way of looking at things is influenced by religious bias.¹ Still, since realism is a departure from the traditional method and more or less satisfies the needs of a world which is impatient for new things, and has much in common with contemporary systems which oppose absolute idealism and support pluralism, it may be well to devote a chapter to it. Much of what passes for new realism is logical and methodological in its nature, and our interest is not so much in logic as in metaphysics. We shall here confine our attention to the views of the most influential of the realistic school, the Honourable Bertrand Russell, F.R.S. The fascinating facility with which he employs mathematical concepts in defending philosophical propositions and the free use of the concepts of science and strict logic, which meet us

¹ Compare what Mr. Russell says: "Driven from the particular sciences, the belief that the notions of good and evil must afford a key to the understanding of the world has sought a refuge in philosophy. But even from this last refuge, if philosophy is not to remain a set of pleasing dreams, this belief must be driven forth. . . . In thought, at any rate, those who forget good and evil and seek only to know the facts are more likely to achieve good than those who view the world through the distracting medium of their own desires" (*Mysticism and Logic*).

almost at every turn, give us the impression that the logic of realism is not faulty, though the instinctive feeling that its metaphysical conclusions are hardly convincing is not easily removed.

I

We may approach the study of Mr. Russell's philosophy from the standpoint of its opposition to idealism. It is said that the realistic attacks of monism are the most damaging.¹ Let us briefly notice them. We shall take up first the oft-repeated criticism that classical idealism assumes that *esse* is *percipi* rests on a confusion. Professor Perry argues that the fallacy of what he calls the egocentric predicament vitiates all forms of idealism (see *Mind*, N.S., No. 75). Mr. Moore thinks that idealism is disproved, because the Berkeleyan principle is false in every conceivable sense (*Mind*, N.S., 48). According to him it ignores the fundamental distinction between cognising on the one hand and what is cognised on the other. But Berkeley was chiefly concerned in demolishing the position of the earlier common-sense realism about the existence of matter. As we shall see, the direct outcome of Berkeley's theory, viz. subjectivism, is the logical consequence of new realism. The subjective idealism of Berkeley is as much repugnant to the classical idealism of Kant and Hegel as to the new realism of Russell and Moore. If realism means only opposition to subjectivism, then idealism is also realism. While it is true that the idealist has emphasised the mind-dependent nature of reality, it is false to think that he identifies the real with the perceived. While agreeing with the new realist that the real is not the perceived, he still revolts against the realist's sharp distinction of things and our consciousness of them. The realist affirms a dualism between the world of meaning and the world of direct

¹ Miss May Sinclair in her Introduction to *Defence of Idealism* considers the realist attacks of monism to be the most formidable.

experience. To the realist every object in consciousness, whether a material thing, a feeling, or a universal, has independent reality. The idealist, on the other hand, believes that meaning and fact are organic elements in one concrete whole. The dualism which realism creates by holding the two worlds apart idealism breaks down. If we want to make the universe intelligible the world should be conceived as one. But it is sometimes argued that realism is not committed to dualism. Mr. Montague, in his paper on "Current Misconceptions of Realism" (*Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, iv. 4), contends that realism does not logically involve psychophysical or metaphysical or epistemological dualism. None of them is implied by realism as such, though one or the other may have been held by individual realists. All that realism stands for is that things do not depend for their existence on the fact that we know them. They can continue to exist even when no subject is aware of them. While almost all realists in modern philosophy have held the theory of epistemological dualism, monistic realism is not self-contradictory. But idealism contests the central principle of realism that subject and object are completely independent. Realism and idealism are at one in repudiating subjectivism. The difference is about the neo-realistic assumption that there is a residual reality which is not experienced. It is clear that idealism has the support of common sense and psychology. The subject-object distinction is one within experience. Subject and object are contrasted and distinguished only when there is a need. So long as the course of our activity runs smooth, we do not distinguish between fact and meaning. While it is true that being in the knowledge relation to a particular ego does not constitute the existence of the object, still, if we admit the reality of a universal consciousness, existence seems to be constituted by a knowledge relation. God maintains objects in existence by knowing them. If realism is true in its belief in the absolute independence

of knowledge and existence, then the existence of a thing is no more dependent on God's knowing it than on my knowing it. Idealism is not solipsism ; for, according to it, the finite self feels itself to be limited. A limit implies something limiting. To know that the self is limited is to know that there is something existing beyond the limit. But absolute idealism draws a distinction between a finite consciousness which is opposed by the objective world and infinite consciousness which has nothing opposed to it. Simply because an object can exist apart from human consciousness, it does not follow that it can exist apart from the Divine consciousness. To the Divine consciousness, which is creative, knowing means being. This is the meaning of the idealist contention that the process of the world is the externalisation of self. In the finite consciousness we are dependent on a reality which we know but do not make ; God makes the object he knows. Of course, it is not the human mind that makes reality. For it is a bare and abstract ego craving for content and concrete filling from a reality which seems external to it. So far as human thought is concerned, we require it to think reality, though this thinking is not the condition of the existence of reality. To God the whole universe is an object of knowledge. If the world is not dependent on God, then it means that nature has its own self-existent and distinct being independent of God. But it is obvious that nature is not self-existent. Professor Pringle Pattison urges, " How this real system of externality on which as finite spirits we depend, is related to or included in an absolute experience, is dark to us ; for to answer such a question would mean to transcend the very conditions of our separate individuality. We can but dimly apprehend that, to such an experience, nature cannot be external in the way in which it necessarily is to the finite minds which it shapes and fills " (*Idea of God*, pp. 202-203). Nature is external to finite consciousness. Therefore Berkeley is wrong, and the realist right ; but nature is not independent of

absolute consciousness, therefore the realist is wrong and the absolutist right.

Secondly, idealism, it is said, reduces concrete experience to an illusion. We do not know what exactly is meant by this charge. If it means that the concrete experience of the individual is not the whole, but only an element in the whole, idealism pleads guilty to it. Reality, while it lives in the concrete individuals, is not exhausted by them. Things are not what they seem. The concrete experience of the individual has to be interpreted in the light of a whole to which it belongs, but this is not to deny reality to it, but Russell asks how can the monist account for "the apparent multiplicity of the real world? The difficulty is that identity in difference is impossible if we adhere to strict monism. For identity in difference involves many partial truths, which combine by a kind of mutual give and take into one whole of truth. But the partial truths in a strict monism are not merely not quite true; they do not subsist at all. If there were such propositions, whether true or false, that would be plurality" (*Philosophical Essays*, p. 168, see also p. 169). But here Russell makes a mistake. The monist, no doubt, contends that truth is the whole. From this it follows that no part of truth is the whole truth, and this is a bare tautology, but partial truths are not untruths. They are true of parts of reality, and serve partial purposes. Identity in difference is possible only in the monistic conception. In the realistic views, while each part is an independent reality, and while we, therefore, have an infinite number of independent absolutes and, consequently, whole truths, identity in difference does not obtain. Realism takes its stand on the experience of the plain man. To him facts are fixed 'out there.' He does not admit degrees of truth. Truths are hard, absolute and immutable, since facts are bits of reality each independent and accessible to apprehension. On this view identity in difference becomes a sham. It is realism that, by creating a dualism between the worlds of fact

and consciousness, runs the risk of reducing concrete experience, which is the unity of the two, to an illusion, not absolutism.

II

Russell believes that the difficulties incident to the idealistic conception will disappear if we take our stand on the facts of experience and adopt the mathematical method. He has quite a flattering conception of the value of mathematical logic to philosophy. He thinks that this new logic will help philosophy to come into its own for the first time in the history of speculation. He complains of the prevailing tendency to import ethical and religious values into philosophy and thus corrupt it. He deprecates classical idealism which ignores the limits of philosophical knowledge and aspires to a knowledge that is not possible. "Most philosophers—or at any rate very many—profess to be able to prove by *a priori* metaphysical reasoning such things as the fundamental dogmas of religion, the essential rationality of the universe, the illusoriness of matter, the unreality of all evil, and so on. There can be no doubt that the hope of finding reason to believe such theses as these has been the chief inspiration of many life-long students of philosophy. This hope, I believe, is vain. It would seem that knowledge concerning the universe as a whole is not to be obtained by metaphysics, and that the proposed proofs that, in virtue of the laws of logic, such and such things must exist and such and such others cannot, are not capable of surviving a critical scrutiny" (*Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 220-221). We have already protested against the view which confuses truths with desires. We have also pointed out that classical idealism as distinct from its recent aberrations allows our desires only to set the problems, and not furnish the solutions. The tendency to import ethical and religious values into philosophy is not profitable either to philosophy or to ethics and religion. Russell deserves congratulations for the force

and clearness with which he has impressed the truth that we have no right to cling to impossibilities simply because they happen to satisfy our religious hopes and aspirations. We have to depend on the report of reason. The essence of philosophy is logic. Russell's realism is thus the direct opposite of pragmatism. While pragmatism holds that every belief which agrees with our instincts and feelings is true, realism requires us to be logical even at the risk of coming into conflict with our cherished instincts. The central theories of neo-realism about mathematical infinite, external relations, immediate perception, etc., are all derived from mathematical logic. It is, however, risky to apply mathematical methods in philosophy, as objects of mathematical study are pure, while the real universe with which philosophy deals is complex. In trying to apply this method to philosophy, Russell is reducing the universe to its immaterial foundations. From the world with the kind of properties psychologists find in it, we pass, according to Russell, by means of logical construction to the scientific world with its particles, points and instants. The attempt to approximate philosophy to science results in reducing the data of sense to phenomena or appearances of objects. While science affirms the existence of real entities independent of consciousness, these real entities are not so much the data we apprehend as the invisible points, instants, etc. We shall see in the sequel how Russell's view by reason of his method becomes stale and flat, empty and unprofitable. No other result is possible when the real world we feel and live in is dissolved into a moving cloud of swarming abstractions, call them what you will, atoms, points or concepts.

III

The atomistic logic is applied to the universe without and within. Under its guidance, experience is broken up into an infinite number of classes or kinds of existences,

and an infinite number of existences within each class or kind. This analytic method of logic gives us a pluralistic realism. The complex world is broken up into simpler entities, which even when brought into relations somehow succeed in retaining their simplicity. When they become parts of a complex whole, they do not surrender their independence. On this hypothesis we do not feel any need to postulate an Absolute. The necessity for an Absolute arises only if we regard the empirical universe as an appearance imperfect, abstract and, therefore, unreal, but when, with Russell, we hold that everything is absolute, time, space, concept, relation, or universal, we have no desire to seek for another absolute. The unity of the world is the central point. To the absolutist the world is a concrete synthetic whole where the entities are interdependent; to the realist it is an infinite number of things loosely crowded together. We cannot be satisfied with a world which is only a conglomerate of a number of repellent atoms, hard and impervious. The instinctive craving of the mind for a unitary conception of the world asserts its rights, and in obedience to its demands the realist distinguishes different kinds of wholes, for example, collections of single terms, collections of collections, and collections of propositions which relate or qualify (see *Principles of Mathematics*, ch. xvi.). Though the name collection makes out that the union is a mere putting together, still in the last case there seems to be a more living unity. Russell urges that an aggregate is "completely specified when all its simple constituents are specified; its parts have no direct connection *inter se*, but only the indirect connection involved in being parts of one and the same whole." But he himself admits that wholes of propositions "are not completely specified when their parts are all known" (*ibid.* p. 140). "A whole is a new single term, distinct from each of its parts and from all of them; it is one, not many, and is related to the parts, but has a being distinct from

theirs" (*ibid.* p. 141). Surely this is not a mere collection or an aggregate but a unity or an identity in difference. "Each class of wholes consists of terms not simply equivalent to all their parts; but, in the case of unities, the whole is not even specified by its parts" (p. 141). Besides, the collections to be real must obey the principle of identity in difference. When we analyse complex wholes, we may get simpler entities which we may think possess the same character even as parts of wholes, but this impression may be incorrect, for Russell admits that there is truth in the statement that 'analysis is in some measure falsification' (see *Principles of Mathematics*, p. 466). Very inconsistently Russell holds to complex units which cannot be analysed into terms and relations. Russell believes that the absolutely independent simples can work themselves into genuine unities by means of relations, but we cannot conceive how there can be unions together with simplicity and independence. The simples may come together but not get united. Appreciating the difficulty, Russell calls the relations external, but this term only states the problem. External relation means that there is relating, while the relata are left absolutely independent. If the related elements get united, they cease to be independent and become interdependent elements in a whole. In all this account of the ultimate constituents of reality and analysis of the world into many things and relations, Russell believes that he has the support of experience. But in the essay on the "Free Man's Worship" he traces the many things to matter and motion. In reducing even minds to collocations of atoms Russell transcends the data of experience and emphasises the oneness of things. He thereby admits that we are not in any way constrained to be faithful to the superficial appearances of experience.

Russell holds to the extramental reality of sense-data, things, qualities, relations, universals, etc. To prove the independence of sense-data, he urges two

arguments : (1) What I see and what I hear are distinct from seeing and hearing. This only proves that subjective idealism is mistaken. All idealists, who are not subjective idealists, recognise that over against knowing stands something known. It is a mistake to think that to idealism the object ceases to exist when we are not conscious of it, and comes to exist when we become conscious of it. Realism has a good case against solipsism, but not against idealism. We admit that there is a world of reality independent of finite consciousness. The world may have existed for long without being known to a finite knower. It may be that when human beings arose, they found a world awaiting them which would continue to exist even if human beings are washed off the face of the earth. But there cannot be a world without absolute consciousness. When this absolute consciousness ceases to exist, the world of fact will also cease to have any being. We need not press this point since we have already noticed it. Let us ask for the reason why Russell assumes the reality of sense-data. When we say we see a table, " what we know by experience, what is really known is a correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations with changes in visual sensations " (p. 76). But how do we know that, besides sensations, there are extramental sense-data? In this difficulty, Russell takes shelter under the involuntariness of sensations. In the history of philosophy, this involuntariness has been ascribed to a good God, a malignant devil or dead matter. The argument from the involuntariness of sensations to the extramental reality of sense-data is not conclusive. (2) " Colours and noises are not mental in the sense of having that . . . peculiarity which belongs to beliefs, wishes and volitions." It is hard to conceive how sound and colour are sense-data rather than sensations. To the realist primary and secondary qualities are both objective though tertiary qualities are reserved as the sphere of the subjective. Aesthetic feelings and creative values are examples of

subjective qualities. Realists are not quite agreed as to what is to be included among the purely subjective products. Beauty and goodness are subjective according to Mr. Alexander, while they are objective according to Messrs. Russell and Moore. Can we not say that even aesthetic feelings and emotions are equally objective? Why should a distinction be made between love and desire on the one hand and sound and colour on the other? If tastes and colours, hardness and heaviness are in particles of matter that excite them, what is it that prevents us from holding that wonder and awe, love and fear are also out there? A thing may be beautiful or charming quite as really and truly as it is sweet or red, and if its sweetness or redness is mind-independent, so should be its beauty or charm. Again, we do not understand what exactly is the place of pain in this scheme of things. Is there any meaning in speaking of pleasure or pain except as the experience of some individual consciousness? To Russell sense-data like cold and loud, percepts like tumbler and glass, and concepts like smoothness and greenness and relations are all extramental. Sense-data are outside and self-subsistent objects of sensation, percepts are outside of perception, and concepts outside of conception. Concepts are not mental existences, for that would be to rob them of their essential quality of universality (*Problems of Philosophy*, p. 155). The concepts are no more in the conceiving consciousness than they are in the objects of perception. They have a world of their own, a Platonic world of timeless and changeless ideas. "Thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they *subsist* or have being, where being is opposed to existence as being timeless. The world of universals . . . may also be described as the world of being. The world of being is unchangeable, rigid, exact, delightful to the mathematician, logician, the builder of metaphysical systems, and all who love perfection more than life" (*ibid.* pp. 153-56).

Universals are as real and as independent of consciousness as any of the objects in space and time. These universals are indispensable for reasoning. We have to assume as many universals as there are propositions for the sake of reasoning. Simple enumeration cannot give rise to them. The general propositions of logic transcend the bounds of sensible knowledge which is limited to particular facts. From particulars we cannot derive principles of universal validity. We would be arguing in a circle if inductive principles are only derived from experience. Laws of experience possess a historical and not a logical value. Empiricism which holds that the universals are the products of experience, and idealism which reduces them to subjective forms of mind are equally false, since in either case we cannot employ them in reasoning. It follows that we must have a world of universals possessing a reality of its own, external both to the mind of man and the world of space and time. Unless we assume these universals our house of knowledge would crumble to pieces. They exist in a spaceless and timeless world as objects of perception exist in a world of time and space. We have concepts or universals for every thing, quality or relation. The world of universals is as infinite as the world of space and time. The universals do not function in our experience, but are still objects of conceptual contemplation. While particulars are private to individuals, the universals are public possessions. If to every percept there is a corresponding concept, if in the world material things perish after a time, then their corresponding essences are to be regarded as alive. The world of space and time changes ; that of universals is unchangeable. No wonder we prefer to think of the world of universals as reality and that of particulars as appearance. Russell holds that we can have direct acquaintance with universals as with sensible data, though of material objects in space and time, which are independent of our subjective perception, we have only indirect knowledge by description (see *Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 81 and 161).

Do we not have here the old difficulty about Plato's ideal types? Russell's doctrine of universals is based upon Meinong's theory of objects. While empirical sciences deal with existing reality, the theory of objects deals with rational essences which can be developed *a priori*. Mathematics deals with the ideal and not with the real, with what subsists and not with what exists. Do not all objects of the universe, good, bad and indifferent, share in an immortality since they all are rooted in unseen reals or essences? Is not this immanent or immortal unseen reality the ground of the existence of the objects of the world of space and time? If these objects share in an immortal reality, we must look upon them as lasting for all time and therefore as real. The realists guard against any such high claims for the objects of the world, since they hold that universals and particulars have nothing to do with each other. There is no question in realism about the participation of the particular in the universal. But we need universals to account for particulars. The function of the universals is that, otherwise, the world will be broken up into a number of dead particulars on the one side and abstract universals on the other. To bring the two together, to develop the given into an organic concreteness, the two must be bound together. Then law is rooted in fact. If once we grant the immanence of the universals, then the two worlds become interdependent, and the highest and the most unique universal as the keystone of the arch would become the absolute idea. But such a hypothesis becomes incompatible with strict pluralism, and so the realist shrinks from it. But if a barrier is set up between particulars and universals, sensible cognition and rational knowledge, the familiar difficulties raised by Aristotle against Plato's scheme of ideas crop up. How are we to conceive the union of the ideal and the real so necessary for the cognitive act? Unless the universals are immanent in the particular, they cannot help us in the reasoning process; but if they are immanent, pluralism disappears.

The realists think that the universals are not thought constructions. We find but do not make them. Any and every universal we want we seem to be lucky enough to find. All the universals necessary for sustaining the world of sense perception are thus easily slipped in. The abstractions of logic are given a reality. This policy may justify the positing of the Absolute if only we find a need for it. Logic brings about its own revenges, and a system of philosophy which prides itself on being the absolute antithesis of pragmatism unconsciously finds its home in the neighbourhood of pragmatism. This tendency to postulate universals whenever we feel a need for them has very dangerous consequences. We seem to have as many universals as there are objects conceivable and real. Very likely, we may become aware of universals corresponding to fire and brimstone, paradise and purgatory, dust and deity.

Relations according to Russell's logic are external. They are not grounded in the nature of the terms. They cannot be deduced from the essence of related things. Every relation is independent of the relater as well as the related. It follows that the relations are not the work of thought. "The relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent on thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create" (*Problems of Philosophy*, p. 153). Russell objects to internal relations on the ground that if relations are rooted in the nature of the terms, there can be no diversity in things (see *Philosophical Essays*, p. 163). We can say that A is different from B, only if the two have different predicates. But on the hypothesis of internal relations there is only one thing. We can have no judgement at all if "the one final and complete truth must consist of a proposition with one subject, viz. the whole and one predicate. But as this involves distinguishing S and P, as if they could be diverse, even this is not quite true" (*ibid.* p. 164). The fundamental defect of idealism according to Russell is that it over-

looks the distinction between quality and relation. There is a difference between relating a thing and qualifying it, between saying that a thing has this or that quality and that it stands in this or that relation to something else. A thing's relations are not the qualities of the thing. Changes in relations do not alter the nature of the objects, while changes in qualities do. Alter the colour of the stone, it becomes different. Alter its relations to other objects, its nature is not changed. Idealism makes a mistake in reducing relations to qualities. To the idealist logician relations are internal. The characteristics of a thing, whatever we may call them, constitute a unity. The bond of cohesion among these characters is necessary and logical. He conceives the whole universe to be a single whole. Every particular thing in a manner reflects the whole nature of the universe. Every logician finds that a fragment or a part involves the nature of the whole. To the realist the meeting of two entities is contingent and accidental. A causes B not because it is the nature of A to cause B, but because they happen together. There is no necessity in the nature of things to make two objects bind themselves together. We cannot ask why two terms get related. They are together and that is all. If the relation between S and P is not grounded in their nature, the relation cannot be permanent, but we do have certain permanent relations which the realist cannot account for. If the relations are not internal, we cannot anticipate and say what will come next. Every change will be an absolute shock or surprise. There is no reason why one change rather than another should occur. Dr. Bosanquet writes: "In a large proportion of cases the relevancy of the relations to the properties of the related terms involves a community of kind. You cannot have a spatial relation between terms which are members of a moral world. Why is it absurd to ask for the distance from the London bridge to one o'clock? Because the one term is in space and the other in time" (*Logic*, ii. 277-78). The London passenger's question

about the distance between Piccadilly and Thursday will be quite justified on the realist's hypothesis. The 'external relations' theory seems to be supported by abstract mathematics where the relations are completely external and do not alter the nature of the terms related. But what is true of a world of abstractions is not true of the world of reality. In the latter, things are changed by the action of other things on them. If relations are external we cannot have inference. Implication is meaningless without system, and system means internal relations. From the world of sense perception, which is the starting-point of knowledge, we develop through insight into its implications the world of science. Without internal relations and logical implication we do not know how it will be possible for us to discriminate fact from fancy, truth from error, and imagination from reality. We quite recognise that there are relations which are not essential to the nature of realities. But we cannot therefore say that relations in general form no part of and are external to the essential nature of all realities. The nature of relations external or internal has to be empirically determined.

Russell, fifteen years ago, held the view that truth is a quality, an immediate characteristic feature of independent entities which are what they are in and for themselves without relations to mind (see *Mind*, N.S., No. 52). But for many years now, he has advocated the view that truth is a quality of propositions as opposed to facts and is dependent for its existence upon mind though it is external fact that decides whether a given belief or proposition is true or false (see *Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 188 and 202). What makes a belief true is a fact which is independent of mind. Truth consists in correspondence between beliefs and facts. The property of truth or falsehood which propositions possess is wholly dependent on the relation of the beliefs to outside things. It is supposed that experiencing makes no difference to the facts. In sensation we

have two simple factors and a relation. (1) The quality apprehended—a simple independent real; (2) the act of apprehension which is mental or psychical; and (3) a relation between these which cannot be further defined as it is unique. The relation between subject and object in experience holds the related facts together, but leaves them untouched and unaffected by their union. A proposition is either true or false according to the nature of the relation between the terms. This character is only to be immediately recognised. It cannot be further defined. Some propositions are true and others false as some substances are sweet and others sour. Mr. Joachim criticises this theory of truth in his book on the *Nature of Truth* from the idealist standpoint. Even though facts are independent of the experiencing of this or that individual subject, they cannot be said to be independent of experiencing as such. We cannot have experience of something independent of experiencing. Realism asserts that objects experienced are not dependent on our experiencing of them. Idealists grant that the real is not a mere mental state, but that which we are forced to think about it in sheer consistency. The real is not the point which lies behind perception, *i.e.* it is not what exists when our perception is removed, but what we have to make of it. In the words of Dr. Bosanquet, "Reality lies ahead and not behind" (*Logic*, ii. 302). Truth and falsehood according to this theory become matters of immediate intuition.¹ Knowledge is the direct relation between the knower and the known. We seem to be reduced to the correspondence theory. If idea and object are independent and extraneous, we cannot say whether the idea corresponds with the object or not. If the object is outside the idea, there is no meaning in saying that the idea should correspond to or represent the object. There is no security that knowledge represents things as they really are. Subjectivism, phenomenalism and agnosticism

¹ For, "Derivative Knowledge is what is validly deduced from premises known intuitively" (*Problems of Philosophy*, p. 207).

are the logical correlates. We have the thing in itself on one side as it exists apart from its being known, a subjective modification on the other, which is a state of man's mental being. We know only the mode in which our consciousness is affected, but we do not know by what it is affected. We have no idea about anything on which our experience leans. As Dr. Stirling has it: "The scratch only knows itself; it knows nothing of the thorn" (*Text-Book to Kant*, p. 353). So long as we have mediation which is looked upon as external to the terms mediated, we cannot have knowledge. The relation between the knower and the thing known must be an organic one and not contingent and accidental, for there is neither object nor subject apart from reality, which includes them both. The subject is an abstraction apart from the system with which it is in relation and which gives it its mental filling. An object again is not what it is in itself, but what it is known as. The late Professor Laurie put the whole thing neatly in the following passage: "For the real is truly to be found in the *final presentation* to a subject; it is in that *crisis* that the thing gathers up all its casual conditions and prior processes (etheric, dynamic or what not) and offers itself to us in all the richness of its phenomenal individuality. It is at this point that the bony skeleton of abstract mathematico-physical explanation is clothed with flesh and blood and lives; it is this that touches the emotions of the human breast, and gives birth in poetry and the other arts to the highest utterances of genius regarding our complex experiences" (*Synthetic*, i. 84-85). Except in a conscious subject the object cannot fulfil itself. The process of mediation is absolutely essential, and it is not a defect if the mediation expresses the organic aspects of reality. If, however, we put the subject entirely outside the world it seeks to know, then mediation becomes mutilation and our knowledge a distortion of actual reality. Even if, for the sake of argument, we hold it possible to reduplicate the world in terms of

consciousness, what is the good of it? After all, what right have we to say that the relation of the knower to known is contingent? Is it possible to find them in any other relationship? Can we catch the subject apart from the object or *vice versa*? If they are never separate in experience, their relation cannot be accidental. Knowledge, when adequately conceived, reveals the organic relation of the two. Mind envelops the world not as a thing alongside other things of the world but as the whole.

On this theory of dualism, cognitive relation becomes inexplicable. If thought and being, presentation and reality are completely independent of each other, we cannot understand how one can be related to the other as in the cognitive act. Again, we cannot say that in cognition the nature of the subject is not in any way altered. It must undergo a change in the process of apprehending facts of experience. The theory of external relations requires us to assume that consciousness does not undergo any change when it cognises reality. But it can never be the same subject as that to whose consciousness the experience was not present before. In other words, all cognition alters the nature of the subject, *i.e.* subject and object do not remain always external to each other. Russell has no right to assume that consciousness with its faculties simply mirrors the finished world opposed to it. There are philosophers who think that the mental apparatus comes between the mind and the object. Then knowledge will get vitiated by subjective peculiarities. The realist has no right to assume that there is no falsification of facts. He rightly emphasises the uniqueness of the knowledge relation and points out how we have both subjective and objective factors in it, but knowledge is not representation. The knower is everywhere in direct relation to the object known. We cannot identify the object with our sensations and images, and we must recognise the underlying reality of the object as we know it. This the absolutist does as much as the realist.

If pluralistic realism is the fact, what becomes of our attempt to reduce the world to order and system? The institution of connecting links would break down the isolation of simple entities. To retain the pluralism the relation is looked upon as an accidental link which is itself a third term. A plurality of absolutely simple reals cannot constitute a unity in any intelligible sense. But on this hypothesis we cannot account for the wonderful harmony of the working of the many infinites. The world remains a mystery and scepticism seems to be the only safety. A genuine organic unity is possible only if the constituent elements are interdependent features of one whole.

If sense-data, etc. are repellent units, how and why do they collect themselves in the act of perception? What exactly is the difference between their co-presence apart from perception and presence to perception? Have we any means of knowing how or what they would be without relation to conscious subject? To Russell, terms as well as relations are given and there is no work for consciousness to do. But how can we say that all existences, original sense-data, memory images, dreams, fictions and hallucinations are independent realities of different orders? It is reasonable to say that memory images are different from sense-data but they also resemble them. They are seen to be spatial and real, extended and coloured. How are we to account for their likeness? Can we consider dreams to have an extramental reality? While we dream, the dream world seems independent of us, but can we have so many different worlds, one of waking life, one of fiction, one of dreams, etc.? How, again, can realism account for illusions and hallucinations? Perceptions as well as hallucinations seem to be equally real. How can we know in any given case whether we are genuinely in touch with reality or only apparently so? If hallucinations are looked upon as the products of a mental medium which sometimes distorts facts, we cannot call knowledge an

immediate relation as a medium intervenes. If, according to a strict interpretation of realism, we view what appears to be the reality, then the distinction between hallucinations and perceptions vanishes. If it is argued that the object appears differently to different organisms, then this conflicts with the theory of external relations, for the content seems to change with relations. To the naïve realist there can be no illusion of any kind in cognition. He will have to deny the central assumption of all logic and philosophy, that things are not always what they seem. Russell's solution of these problems is given in (pp. 173 ff.) his *Mysticism and Logic*. "Concerning the immediate objects in illusions, hallucinations and dreams, it is meaningless to ask whether they 'exist' or are 'real.' There they are and that ends the matter. But we may legitimately enquire as to the existence or reality of 'things' or other 'sensibilia' inferred from such objects. It is the unreality of these 'things' or other 'sensibilia' together with a failure to notice that they are not data, which has led to the view that the objects of dreams are unreal" (p. 176). Because the dream states are not continuous with the dreamer's past, because they cannot be combined according to the laws of physics with the things inferred from the sense-data of waking life, because they cannot be correlated with other private worlds, we call them dreams. The sense-data we have in dreams have exactly the same status as any others; only they are lacking in the usual correlations and connections. This feature is "always physically or physiologically explicable." Russell classifies sensibilia in two ways. We may group together all those which have direct temporal relations to each other. Such groups are called 'perspectives' or 'biographies.' All the sense-data cognised by a single mind constitute a biography. We may group together sensibilia which are related by the bonds of continuity and similarity. These groups are what we call things and their members are states of things. Dream states

are to be regarded as the sensibilia which, while being members of a biography, are yet not members of a thing. All normal particulars are susceptible of this double classification. All the same, the difference between the normal particulars of waking life and the abnormal states of dreams, hallucinations and illusions is one of inference and not of fact. This means that mind has an important function to perform in the construction of the world of reality. In short, the world is a mental construction.

IV

In his Lowell lectures, Russell tries to account for our knowledge of the external world. Though he has not much love for Kant, it is remarkable that the problem which Russell tackles is stated more or less after Kant. We start with the immediate data of sense, "certain objects of colour, tastes, sounds, smells, etc., with certain spatio-temporal relations." How is this starting-point to be transformed into the world of common sense belief and scientific knowledge? The contents of the world are different from sense-data with which we start. The contrast between science and primitive knowledge is thus brought out: "We have still in physics as we had in Newton's time a set of indestructible entities which may be called particles, moving relatively to each other in a single space and a single time. The world of the immediate data is quite different from this. Nothing is permanent; even the things that we think are fairly permanent, such as mountains, only become data when we see them and are not immediately given as existing at other moments. So far from one all-embracing space being given, there are several spaces for each person according to the different senses which give relations that may be called spatial" (*Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 104). Russell does not admit the reality of permanent things with laws of their own that cause the sense-data. Before we can get to the things of common

sense or matter of physics, we have to perform a long journey from *sensibilia*. Similarly with the problem of self. With Hume, Russell agrees that when we wish to think of self we stumble on a particular mental state. "The question whether we are also acquainted with our bare selves as opposed to particular thoughts and feelings is a very difficult one upon which it would be rash to speak positively. When we try to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon some particular thought or feeling and not upon the 'I' which has a thought or feeling. Nevertheless there are some reasons for thinking that we are acquainted with the 'I' though the acquaintance is hard to disentangle from other things" (*Problems of Philosophy*, p. 78). What makes this knowledge of world and self possible is the question which Russell, in the manner of Kant, proposes to himself. There is one difference between the two in that to Russell sense-data include certain spatio-temporal relations. But he does not give any reason for this opinion. According to him, we have direct acquaintance with sense-data, universals and perhaps selves, but our knowledge of the external world and of other persons is of the descriptive kind. This indirect knowledge is not perfect. Perfect knowledge is the immediate intuition of the eternal relations constituting in their ideal combination the system of mathematical logic.

In attempting a solution of the problem, Russell does not want to adopt the easy method of inferring the existence of things from the data of sense by the employment of *a priori* principles. If our philosophy is to be made scientific, if our beliefs should rest on observations and experiments, this method must be avoided (see the article in *Scientia*, July 1914). The objects of science are not sense-data. We cannot infer them legitimately as the causes of sense-data. How then are we to justify science and common sense? Here Russell turns to his method of logical construction. Instead of inferring

things and atoms, time and space, we have to construct them. "Wherever possible logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities." This 'construction' is supposed to characterise the new method of philosophy. What exactly is construction? We are told it is not mechanical putting together as when we build a house or make a chair, but a logical, intellectual or hypothetical construction (see *Our Knowledge*, pp. 87, 93). We build a hypothesis or frame an explanation. Space, world, point, matter, etc. are such constructions or explanations. It is hard to see how this logical construction is different from inferential explanation. To illustrate his point we may give the following passage: "The space of geometry and physics consists of an infinite number of points, but no one has ever seen or touched a point. If there are points in a sensible space, they must be an inference. It is not easy to see any way in which as independent entities they could be validly inferred from the data; thus here again we shall have, if possible, to find some logical construction, some complex assemblage of immediately given objects which will have the geometrical properties required of points" (*Our Knowledge*, p. 113). Thus space, time, matter, etc. are defined as logical functions of sense-data. They are not given in sense nor can they be inferred in the traditional manner from realities given in sense, yet they must be (see *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 128). Thus all *things* are constructions and not realities.

From this it follows that our logical constructions derived from sense-data must be private to ourselves. "A complete application of the method which substitutes construction for inference would exhibit matter wholly in terms of sense-data, and even, we may add, of the sense-data of a single person, since the sense-data of others cannot be known without some sort of inference" (*Scientia*, July 1914, p. 10). Lest we should feel that all this is subjectivistic, we are told that sense-data exist independently of being given in sense to an indi-

vidual. Smells, sounds and colours have an independent existence of their own though they do not depend on any substratum in the external world. But how can subjectivism be avoided so long as the sensibilia cannot be common data? "So far as can be discovered, no sensible is ever a datum to two people at once. The things seen by two different people are often closely similar . . . but in spite of this similarity it would seem that some difference always arises from difference in the point of view." Each man's data of sense form a world private to him. We do not know what right Russell has to assume this except it be the empirical fact that when two men look at the same object they do so from two different points of view. How can we say that the two are slightly different appearances of the same unless we presuppose identical substances behind the appearances? Again, Russell distinguishes the act of awareness from that of which there is awareness, and calls the former sensation and the latter sense-datum. The sense-datum has to be distinguished on the one hand from the act of apprehension and on the other from the real object. Sense-data are appearances of the object which is a permanent possibility of sensations. Appearances are sometimes regarded as the way in which reality is apprehended by a finite mind. They have a reality independent of the object of which they are the appearances. Is the thing different from the appearances, or does the reality live in the appearances, is a question to which Russell gives no clear answer. In the former case we live in a dream-world, and to Russell there is no logical impossibility in the supposition "that the whole of life is a dream in which we ourselves create all the objects that come before us" (*Problems of Philosophy*, p. 35) (see *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 129-30, and *Mind*, p. 185, 1915). Realities to which our ordinary statements refer do not exist. The independent real is a matter of inference. This conclusion of subjectivism cannot be avoided, so long as we start with

the presupposition that knowledge is a construction out of sensations. Associationist psychology made sensations the ultimate irreducible entities and by reason of that mistake failed to give a satisfactory explanation of knowledge. Sensations instead of being the direct data of experience are the results of complex processes of analysis and abstraction. The notion of a thing precedes that of a pure sensation. James and Bergson are right in urging that our consciousness is a stream or aduration from which we abstract sensations. Conscious life, instead of being a number of discrete sense-data *plus* an external principle of union, is a concrete whole, simple and individual. There is no passage from discrete sense-data to the world of knowledge. If we dismiss these things behind sense-data and also keep clear of subjectivism, be true to modern psychology, we seem to come very near Hegelian Idealism. The world is an ideal construction and is therefore nothing apart from the categories of thought, though the acts of thought are to be distinguished from the objects thought about. As we have already urged, if universals are thought of as existing in an extramental world, then physical reality becomes confused with psychical presentations and we cannot escape from subjectivism. So long as the law and the fact, the universal idea and the immediate experience remain outside each other, subjectivism is our only goal. But in the world of reality we do not find them apart, but get them as aspects of a single unity.

V

Though Russell does not adhere to the representative theory of knowledge he retains the ultimate distinctness of subject and object. Consciousness is viewed by him as a *sui generis* relation called experience or awareness between subject and object (see the *Monist*, 1914, p. 438), but we cannot know anything about the

subject term of the relation. Unity of experience and recognition of remembered experiences require Russell to postulate the existence of a self which is not merely a referent. Otherwise what is the difference between A's experience and B's? Consciousness is not merely a passive spectator of existence. While there are many things which it sees, there are also some which it makes. Aesthetic and moral feelings and values have no reality outside consciousness. It is hard to see how creative works of art are merely subjective. Imagination deals with universals which are in the non-spatial world, and so works of imagination dealing as they do with eternal values are the least subjective. But still Russell holds that consciousness is an unnecessary spectator of external events adopting the passive rôle in perception, etc., and an active rôle in creation. But if relations, terms, etc. are all out there, there is nothing which remains to be done by consciousness. Russell recognises the difficulty of defining self. Mr. Moore reduces self to a mere empty conception. Mr. Alexander assumes its existence as the presupposition of feeling and choice. When every possible thing is looked upon as objective there is nothing which is the characteristic of the self. The self, if anything, is but a collection of experiences. Out of the total mass of reality a few are experienced, and these few crowd together into a mind. The self is therefore not the subject apprehending objects but the objects felt or experienced grouped together. There is no single self which is conscious of the multiplicity of changes. Each state is an absolute reality. There is no conscious spectator in the realist's universe. Thus the self is resolved into a series of mental states which get themselves collected, God knows how.

VI

It is the function of philosophy not merely to show how the world is made out of hypothetical simple entities,

but also to help us to appreciate and comprehend the concrete world of life and experience. The realist method which Russell adopts does not authorise him to assume that the world is good or that there is a God. We cannot worship the world as it is, nor can we say that there is a God. God is not the fact but is only the ideal of our hearts, a creature of our imagination. The free man will fall down and worship only a non-existent God. "In this lies man's true freedom; in determination to worship only the God created by our own love of the good, to respect only the heaven which inspires the insight of our own best moments." As realists with a new sense for facts which are not to be confused with our desires they deny the existence of God. Logic has no room for God or immortality. Intellectual argument does not strengthen man's instinctive beliefs. Russell, of course, has no sympathy with the pragmatist's advice to act as if there were a God and as if we were immortal. He does not want us to play with such fancies. Let us not add to the tragedy of our being the sin of self-deception. Theology is a fraud and religion a mockery. The world is a magic show, a pantomime in which God has neither part nor lot. We are the greater fools if we count on the defeat of vice and the victory of virtue. The universe is rotten to the core. Let us know it and accept it in calm resignation. Let us not live in a fool's paradise. Since die we must, let us do so in the open daylight, realising that the whole thing is a farce and all is vanity. In short, let us totally disbelieve in God. "The life of man is a long march through the night, surrounded by invisible foes, tortured by weariness and pain, towards a goal that a few can hope to reach and where none may tarry long" (*Philosophical Essays*, p. 67). Man is helpless against the invisible powers of darkness tightening their coils round him. He tries to live in security and comfort by mastering natural forces, but sooner or later the pitiless powers close upon him and he collapses like a

wrecked balloon. The natural phenomena of earthquakes and volcanoes do not wait to consider their moral effects before they operate. An unfeeling machine created man in sport and would kill him in the same spirit. As in the vision of Mirza he slips from the raft of human existence and disappears even though his hands are lifted up to heaven. In such an unredeemed and unredeemable world how can man live? Since brute strength is all in all, there is no use of our kicking against it. Why shake our fists impotently at God, why defy the will of the earth, why strive against the fate that sweeps the globe? Justice, pity, loyalty, power, etc. are nothing to it. Out of the despair born of the awful encounter of the soul with the outer world arise renunciation and wisdom, hope and charity. Since our aspirations are dashed to pieces in the world of reality, we can only seek consolation in the world of art and imagination. "In thought, in aspiration, we are free, free from our fellow-men, free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, free even while we live from the tyranny of death" (*Philosophical Essays*, p. 63). Without marking time on earth, let the spirit of man fly from the actual to the ideal, which is the land of heart's desire. Thus Russell proposes a Copernican revolution. Since we can only grow desperate if we subject our mind to things, let us cheer up by subjecting things to our mind. Without submitting to conditions we do not like, let us lose ourselves in contemplating a world where the unrest of life is stilled. Since the actual world is full of pain and misery, let us seek delight and happiness by re-creating the world. Let us sing of the paradise to come, and not speak of the men, women and children caught in the mechanism of a dead and wooden civilisation. This is why Russell adores abstract mathematics. For we there get into the shadowland of poetic values and fancy pictures. "Remote from human passions, remote from the pitiful facts of nature, the generations have gradually created an ordered cosmos, where pure thought

can dwell as in its natural home, and where one at least of our noble impulses can escape from the dreary exile of the actual world " (*Mysticism and Logic*). Life is so hideous that we have only to avoid it. The best way is to live in art and contemplation. Instead of playing the fool and singing the glories of destruction, let us play the sage avoiding all dangerous illusions. The whole essay on the Free Man's Worship is one long outcry of a spirit in sorrow, which has a tragic fascination for the human mind in some of its moods.

The very possibility of these ideals which we are asked to reflect on indicates that the not-self is not supreme. As Goethe remarks: " There is no surer way of evading the world than by Art ; and no surer way of uniting with it than by Art " (*Maxims and Reflections*, translated by Bailey and Saunders). If we know that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins, how can we begin building these idols in the inmost shrine of the soul ? But this is the only way of escape from bondage suggested by Russell. Science does not tell us that human life is the product of accidental collocations of atoms. Of course, finite man cannot play the providence in the world. He is limited by other forces and his limitations are necessary for developing the higher powers of intellect and heart. Man refuses to regard himself as a mere ephemeral being for, by persisting in his art, etc., he tries to compass eternity with his thought and imagination. If the story which Russell relates with such dreadful earnestness has any meaning and basis, then man would wish to yield to the forces of the world, be crushed by them, and feed the devil of the world with yet another mangled life, and yet another. Russell does not adopt the Schopenhauerian thesis that man should suppress the will to live. If the world is nothing more than a waste heap of moral energies, if it is a vast shadowy whole moving out to some unknown nowhere, then self-destruction seems to be the part of wisdom

which Russell does not encourage. Nature is the ally of man in the work of self-realisation.

The impulses of art are expressions of a real longing of the soul to transform life. Art is the impulse of life made sensuous. The soul longs to transform a world of evil into one of good, rebuild the world of time and see it in a different light. Russell's worship of art means that he thinks it possible to make the world better than what it is. In other words, the unity of self and not-self is presupposed by it. Fidelity to facts requires Russell to admit the reality of a harmony between self and not-self.

Mr. Russell forgets that the mystic experience has for its object this unitive life which must be a reality. Experience includes the highest experience of all. The mystic experience which is admitted to be possible is the highest. Man can sometimes attain the infinite, breaking down the finite. "In many men the finite self remains always the gaoler of the universal soul; in others there is a rare and momentary escape; in a few the prison walls are demolished wholly, and the universal soul remains free through life" (*Essence of Religion*, p. 48). What is this life divine or mystic life? It is "a life free from struggle, a life in harmony with the whole, outside the prison walls built by the instinctive desires of the finite self" (*ibid.* p. 49). "The transition from the life of the finite self to the infinite life in the whole requires a moment of absolute self-surrender when all personal will seems to cease, and the soul feels itself in passive submission to the universe" (*ibid.* p. 49). If we should keep faith with the evidence of the mystics we will be delivered from the hard disgusting realities of science. Mysticism will displace pessimism by optimism. While sometimes Russell accepts the deliverances of the mystics, at other times he cries them down. To him they are not higher than the conclusions of logical reason. Intellect does not tell us that the race is moving towards any divine event. "A truer image of the world

. . . is obtained by picturing things as entering into the stream of time from an eternal world outside, than from a view which regards time as the devouring tyrant of all that is" (*Mysticism and Logic*). But still the mystic vision is accepted by Russell as constituting the true essence of religion. The fact of mysticism itself is a refutation of the dualism which is the fountain-spring of all pessimistic thoughts.

For the kind of religion Russell advocates, we do not require any belief in dogma. If a religion is based on dogma, it rests on shifting sands. Some time or other the traditional dogmas will reveal themselves to be hollow and beset with dangers and difficulties. In such cases we have either to give up the dogmas, when we will have to face the alternative of a morality without spirituality, or stick to dogmas which we know to be false. If we reject them, then Russell knows we will have bare morality, which "is very inadequate as a motive for those who hunger and thirst after the infinite" (*ibid.* p. 50). But if we cling to dogmas known to be false there will be a ring of insincerity in our religious life. We therefore require a religion which does not depend on dogmas. So he contends that the "religion which has no dogma is greater and more religious than one which rests upon the belief that in the end our ideals are fulfilled in the outer world" (*ibid.* p. 51). We need not believe "in the existence of supreme goodness and power combined," but Russell himself realises the necessity for such a belief. This worship of an ideal good, though necessary for religious life, will not do completely since "it does not produce that sense of union with the actual world which compels us to descend from the world of contemplation and seek, with however little success, to realise what is possible of the good here on earth" (*ibid.* p. 53). "When this worship stands alone it produces a sense of exile in a world of shadows, of infinite solitude and alien forces" (*ibid.*). Love of the whole cannot be developed on this basis. So Russell asks us to

worship the whole and not merely the good in it. In true religion we must have both the worship of the ideal good and that of the whole. To Russell the ideal world is the world of universals, and we wish this ideal to become real. The whole we worship is actual but not good, and we wish it to be good. Russell thinks that pantheism is wrong since it holds that the universe is good, and theism is also wrong since it contends that the ideal good has a reality. "The two worships exist side by side without any dogma; the one involving the goodness but not the existence of its object, the other involving the existence but not the goodness of its object" (*ibid.* p. 54). Religious activity is an endeavour to bridge the gulf between these two objects of worship by making more good exist and more of existence good. "Only in the complete union of the two could the soul find permanent rest" (p. 54). But this possibility of making more of existence good and *vice versa* is real only if we reject the dualism between man and nature, self and not-self, and acquire faith in the belief that good and existence are being slowly combined, and will finally dwell together in harmony.

VII

Realism has done a great service to ethical thought by freeing ethics from the fallacies of pragmatist utilitarianism, evolutionary hedonism, etc. The doctrine of universals is at the basis of realistic ethics (see Moore's *Principia Ethica* and Russell's *Philosophical Essays*). Goodness is an eternal reality, absolute and irreducible. It cannot be identified with anything else. Good is not the useful, the pleasant, or the expedient. While Messrs. Russell and Moore hold that beauty, goodness, etc., are objective reals, Mr. Alexander includes them among subjective feelings which have no existence outside the narrow border itself. In "The Free Man's Worship" Russell asks us to "preserve our respect for truth, for beauty, for the ideal of perfection which life does not

permit us to attain, though none of these things meet with the approval of the unconscious universe." But in the preface to *Mysticism and Logic*, he tells us, "in theoretical ethics the position advocated in 'The Free Man's Worship' is not quite identical with that which I hold now. I feel less convinced than I did then of the objectivity of good and evil." Ethics is looked upon as "essentially a product of the gregarious instinct" (*Mysticism and Logic*, p. 108). On this hypothesis the low sordid ethics of materialist utilitarianism becomes justifiable, while the lofty Stoicism of Russell remains unintelligible. Why should the individual seek the good? Is he under any obligation to adopt it? Goodness is a reality outside man. The sanction seems to be external to the individual. Besides evil also must be an eternal reality. If we can worship goodness, beauty, etc., what is there to prevent us from worshipping badness, ugliness, etc.? As Walt Whitman puts it, "What is called good is perfect, and what is called bad is just as perfect."

Russell thinks that we count for nothing in the constitution of the world. Reality is determinate and we cannot alter it. But ethics presupposes that it is only determinable and man's efforts count for something. Russell professes no sympathy with those who strive to rationalise the real and harmonise the discordant. He forgets that there is, besides the wish to understand why things are what they are, also the demand to make things as they should be. To Russell, life is bound in a network of fatal law. Impressed as he is with the inevitableness of the universe and the irrationality of human existence, he believes that the individual who wishes to realise his aspirations through his efforts is a victim of illusions. The most splendid heroism, the most magnificent sacrifice has no effect on a world which clumsily rolls on its paths of space and time without pity, without shame, and without even an apology. It is no use thinking that the world is at fault and is to

blame for delaying man's hopes. It is all a dream, a lie. It is madness to oppose the course of the world, but if the universal nature is the wild deep in which the soul of man with all his aspirations and hopes of the future is to be engulfed, if the world of existence is a system of radical and irremediable evil, not only religion but all life, ethical, political and social, becomes impossible. But this is too shocking a conclusion even for Russell. He quietly slips in an ethical ideal of stoic renunciation and moral fervour generally associated with absolutist ethics. A life in the whole is looked upon as the goal of man. Man is finite-infinite. "The finite life which man shares with the brutes is tied to the body, and views the world from the standpoint of the here and now" ("Essence of Religion," *Hibbert Journal*, October 1912, p. 47). Every impulse that makes the individual man small and selfish, makes him struggle with others to gain his own ends, makes him believe that his interests can be gained at the expense of those of others, belongs to the lower finite self. The infinite self impels us to rise above the life of sense, and seek a common good. "It has a life without barriers embracing in its survey the whole universe of existence and essence; nothing in it is essentially private, but its thoughts and desires are such as all may share, since none depend upon exclusiveness of here and now and we" (p. 48). The finite self seeks self-preservation and dominion over others; the infinite calls for the death of the finite and the rise of a life with the larger vision. "... through the bond of universal life the soul escapes from the separate loneliness in which it is born, and from which no permanent deliverance is possible while it remains within the walls of its prison" (p. 59). "It is the quality of infinity that makes religion, the selfless untrammelled life in the whole which frees man from the prison house of eager wishes and little thoughts" (pp. 46-47). It is not possible for Russell to hold to a pluralism with this ideal of ethics. The infinite is the intrinsic character

of self. The particularity of the self is due to its context. The self is petty and small when it considers itself to be exclusive and impervious to others. The real self is the universal. It is not exclusive but inclusive of the whole. "Of the two natures in man, the particular or animal being lives in instinct and seeks the welfare of the body and its descendants, while the universal or divine being seeks union with the universe and desires freedom from all that impedes its seeking. . . . In union with the world the soul finds its freedom . . . union in thought, union in feeling, union in will." "The division into two hostile camps seems unreal; what is felt to be real is the oneness of the world in love" ("Essence of Religion," p. 58). In that highest experience where we see reality the deeper divisions of the soul and the fundamental contrasts of the world are overcome and harmonised. When the finite self reaches its destiny of the infinite, then the world as a whole becomes the content of the self, its life and experience. This is the reality which each self is to progressively attain. The finite is intelligible only through the infinite. Russell has to modify his doctrine of the relation of universals to particulars. Universals are not abstracts excluding individuals. This arbitrary view vitiates his whole account of the world of universals and existences. But in his account of the dual nature of the self and oneness of the world, he is constrained to admit that the universal is the pulse-beat of the individual. The true universal is the whole which pervades and comprehends all individuals.

How can we think that the ethical ideal is unattainable? If the real nature of existence is incompatible with its fulfilment, then those who try to attain the goal are weaving strings of sand. If the vision of the absolute triumph of good is only a dream structure or a soap-bubble which can be pricked by the passing wind of the actual world, then we are striving after the impossible. But our attempts are real, and Russell feels that the ideal has also in some cases been attained. So it is

not a castle in the air or a huge self-deception. It only shows that the opposition between man and the world is apparent. Since the moral ideals are realisable, we cannot say that the universe is bad. Ultimately we have no quarrel with reality. It is not right to think that this world, which is the field for spiritual development, is set with knives and daggers, and is full of rocks and pitfalls. The world is not cruelty and mockery, littleness and misery. At first sight we may be struck by the immensity of nature and the insignificance of man, but appearances are misleading. If there is no deeper truth our soul will sink in despair. But our higher life tells us that the opposition of self and of not-self is overcome in the great vision of the self in the not-self. Man and world are made for each other. Man wills and nature yields. Man commands and nature bends. Man meditates and the world drops dead at his feet. If he stoops to nature for a time, it is only to conquer nature. Russell's censure is merited against the doctrine that sees in the universe nothing alien to the self. The pessimistic doctrine of the indifference of the world to man's hopes and aspirations is due to the atmosphere of gloom which Russell has created round himself. A truly scientific attitude tells us that nature is not blind and impotent, but can be used by man to further his own purposes. Both pleasing dreams and threatening nightmares about it are equally unjustified.

The great war led Russell to give more prominence to the place of impulse in human life. The keen dialectician with his faith in the might of mind and the power of reason now feels the strength of impulse. We cannot have even discovery of truth without the *impulse* to seek truth. "Impulse has more effect than conscious purpose in moulding men's lives" (*Social Reconstruction*). What is impulse? "It is the mere 'instinctive part of our nature,' a 'tendency to activity not prompted by any end or purpose,' 'erratic and anarchical not easily fitted into a well-regulated system,' 'blind in the sense

that it does not spring from any prevision of consequences' " (*ibid.* pp. 13-17). Reason is identified with calculation, and impulse with creative activity. When Russell supports a life of instinct and impulse, we really do not know where we are. If impulse is blind and erratic, it belongs more to the animal mind, since it is only there that impulse works with no end or purpose. It is quite possible that in his atomistic bias Russell may look upon mind as a complex of several entities, sensation, perception, imagination, thought, impulse, desire, will, etc., which retain their identities since they are only externally related in mind. But it is impossible for us to imagine that impulse retains unaltered in a self-conscious being the character it possessed in its original form. In the human mind impulses, though dependent on organic conditions, are still not blind. Simply because they do not contain representation of an end, we cannot call them blind. Most of our activities, automatic and habitual, do not prefigure an end, though they embody purposes of mind. It cannot be that Russell means all that he says since he makes certain impulses which he calls creative, responsible for science, art, etc. He holds that the best life is one where creative impulses operate. "I consider the best life that which is most built on creative impulses and the worst that which is most inspired by love of possession." In other words, the best life is that where the infinite side of man expresses itself, and the worst that where the finite is allowed free play.

About the belief in immortality realism adopts a negative attitude. Though Russell is not indifferent to the fate of man beyond the grave, still since his objective is truth, he is obliged to deny personal immortality. It may be a matter of deep regret that our lives become extinct at death, but it cannot be helped. The hereafter which theologians conjure up before us is a refuge of lies. But this gloomy conclusion about future life is bound up with his pessimistic outlook and disappears with the overthrow of pessimism.

To Russell the problem of evil is not a problem at all. Since he does not admit the reality of a good and omnipotent God, the question of the reconciliation of evil with a good God has no meaning for him. Evil is necessary for the moral discipline of man. It helps him to escape from the prison of private life into the wider life of the universal will. "The will is led away from protest against the inevitable, towards the pursuit of more general goods which are not wholly unattainable. This acquiescence in private griefs is an essential element in the growth of universal love and impartial will" (p. 56). Russell emphasises the chastening influence of suffering and sorrow. As for the larger evils of the world, we need not complain since there is no personal agency responsible for them. "When it is realised that the fundamental evils are due to the blind empire of matter, and are the wholly necessary effects of forces which have no consciousness and are therefore neither good nor bad in themselves, indignation becomes absurd like Xerxes chastising the Hellespont," (p. 57). In the presence of evil man has only to adopt a Stoic attitude of resignation. With the downfall of pessimism and dualism, Russell's conclusions on this question also lose their value.

Thus the realistic philosophy of Russell has no satisfactory explanation to offer of either knowledge, morality or religion. A strict interpretation of it makes the world a mystery, knowledge a myth, religion a lie, and life a failure. When Russell contends that his philosophy accounts for the unity of the world and makes knowledge intelligible, ethics elevating, religion truly spiritual, he has compromised with his pluralism. His philosophy is satisfactory in so far as it departs from its strict adherence to its pluralistic principles and makes friends with absolutism.

CHAPTER XII

PERSONAL IDEALISM

THOUGH we have considered the chief representatives of the pluralistic reaction, there are others no less important for our purposes, though it is not possible for us to review them at great length or refer to them all. The humanist emphasis on personality and its values comes out in the views of Dr. F. C. S. Schiller of Oxford, Professor Howison of America, Dr. Rashdall, and the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour. These views may be fitly grouped together under the title of "Personal Idealism," and may be noticed briefly in this chapter.

I

Schiller's¹ contributions are not so much to philosophy as to logic. But man cannot but philosophise, and Schiller's vision of the universe, which shows great daring and dialectical skill, is embodied in his *Riddles of the Sphinx*, and parts of his other works. He gives us a metaphysical system, though he admits that no system

¹ Schiller in chapter xx. of his *Studies in Humanism* discusses the relation of Humanist metaphysics to idealism and realism. From an analysis of dream experience, he concludes that both realism, if it is "taken to mean a denial that experience and reality *belong* together," and idealism, if it "asserts existence to be merely mental," are false. Humanism does justice to both the subjective and the objective elements. It is "alike the true Idealism and the true Realism, and has conceived the true Ideal, in which experience has become divine without ceasing to be human, because it has wholly harmonised itself and achieved a perfect and eternal union with a Perfect Reality" (p. 466).

of philosophy can lay claim to absolute truth and certainty. For, he says in his preface, "a system of metaphysics, with whatever pretensions to pure thought and absolute rationality it may start, is always in the end one man's personal vision about the universe . . . the idea that it is to hold true literally for all, and for all time, is ludicrous" (pp. vii-viii). This modest estimate of the value of metaphysics is due to the influence of "humanism." Though we are told that pragmatism is not committed to any scheme of metaphysics, Schiller thinks that it is inclined to a pluralistic construction of experience of the type suggested by him. "Pragmatism may be taken to point to the ultimate reality of human activity and freedom, to the plasticity and incompleteness of reality, to the reality of the world process in time and so forth. . . . Humanism in addition may point to the personality of whatever cosmic principle we can postulate as ultimate and to its kinship and sympathy with man" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 19). Schiller starts with a protest against the abstract metaphysical method of Plato and the other absolutists, and the pseudo-metaphysical method of the scientific naturalists. He proposes to adopt the concrete method, which is consistently and consciously anthropomorphic, which explains everything from individual existences viewed after the analogy of the human selves. For illustration of the use of the concrete method, Schiller refers us to Berkeley's spirits, Leibniz's monads, and Aristotle's concrete individuals. Modern science and the theory of evolution are quite in accord with this true method and its results, provided they are confined to their spheres, and we do not admit their claims to furnish us with metaphysical doctrines. But if we start with scientific metaphysics, we steadily get from bad to worse. The positivist rejection of metaphysics takes us to philosophical agnosticism with its doctrine of the unknowable. From this it is but a step to absolute scepticism, which destroys scientific as well as philosophical certitude. Pessimism, with a post-

script that all knowledge is both theoretically and practically invalid, seems to be the inevitable outcome. But we cannot live in the world with the chilling belief that the ground of things is wholly perverse and irrational. The false method of scientific naturalism we have to abandon. The abstract metaphysical method which leads to pantheistic monism has also to be rejected. Its central defect is the assertion of a real infinite. In any admissible sense of the term, the infinite is only a potentiality. An infinite whole is intellectually unmeaning and morally dangerous. The absolutistic conceptions of Pure Being, the Idea, etc., are nothing "but pitiful abstractions from experience, mutilated shreds of human nature whose real value for the understanding of life is easily outweighed by the living experience of an honest man" (*Humanism*, p. xviii). We have, therefore, to adopt the concrete metaphysical method, which, in Schiller, means a passive surrender to the claims of life as it appears to us. This method leads us to pluralism which alone can answer pessimism. The satisfactory life to which the method leads is its only justification. After all, what other justification can we ask for or have, in a world where theory and life, thought and action are as inseparably related as light and heat? Schiller holds that self is an ultimate reality. No philosophy can dissolve it away. We see in the world process an actual development of selves in society or individuals in association. Ultimate plurality of real existences is the conviction forced upon us by the world process. We may not be able to *prove* it, but proof is unnecessary. "Indeed it is a mistake to suppose that all things require to be proved" (*Riddles*, p. 264). These existences are spiritual in their nature. Before time and the world process they existed as a 'chaos' of absolutely isolated and independent beings. One fine morning the Divine Spirit determined to make a harmonious cosmos out of this chaos. The objective world arises out of the interaction between God and the other individual beings.

From this consciousness results. The form it takes in man is consciousness of the world on one side and of the self on the other. "Our actual selves and the world in which we live, are correlated results of an interaction between the Deity and ultimate spiritual beings or Egos, of whom we form the conscious part" (*Riddles*, p. 354). With the world process time begins. With time becoming and evil are conjoined. The world process is quite a real one with a beginning and an end, a development of actuality from potentiality. The later stages of the process contain more actuality and being than the earlier. A naturalistic evolution will not work, as in the true process of the world we have a progress from lower to higher. The process of evolution through all its stages consists in the perfecting of individual existences by their grouping into more and more perfect societies. After molecules have been formed from atoms and organs from cells, the process is continued in the formation of animal and human societies properly so called. This process goes on till the end of evolution, viz. the formation of perfect individuals in a perfect society, is reached. Thus, the world process works from its beginning of a precosmic stage where there is no order to a postcosmic stage with perfect order and adaptations of individuals to society. Here time passes into eternity and becoming into being. "But just as the development of ourselves reveals more and more our full nature, so it must be supposed that the development of the world will reveal more and more fully the nature of God, so that in the course of Evolution, our conception of the interaction between us and the deity would become more and more adequate to the reality, until at the completion of the process the last thin veil would be rent asunder, and the perfected spirits would behold the undimmed splendour of truth in the light of the countenance of God" (*Riddles*, p. 279). There, the ideals of goodness, truth, and beauty are realised in a unity which fuses them all and transcends them. The final state, according to Schiller, is the

eternal and perfect activity of perfected individuals. The eternal state is not one of inaction and stagnation ; for such a condition has the tendency to lapse into perfect nothingness, a changeless state of equipoise. (see *Humanism*, ch. xii.). Perfection is not rest but activity. It is consciousness, though it may not be self-consciousness. The highest which is the postcosmic and the lowest which is the precosmic are both limiting conceptions, the presuppositions of the world process.

What is the place of matter in this scheme of the world ? Since it is as much as spirit a manifestation of divine purpose, it has an end to serve in the world. To the highest spirits, it is useful as labour-saving machinery ; to the lower, it is useful as offering resistance to the free exercise of their evil tendencies. " Matter is connected with Evil in its double aspect, both as the engine of progress and the mechanism of the divine education of spirits, and also as the check upon consciousness. For, if evil, *i.e.* inharmonious spirits were permitted the full realisation of their conscious powers, they would be able to thwart and to delay, if not to prevent the attainment of the divine purpose of the world process. But if they are permitted intelligence only when they are ready to recognise the cosmic order and *in proportion as* they are ready to do so, the aptness of the contrivance of Matter becomes manifest. The lower existences, *i.e.* the less harmonised, have their consciousnesses limited and repressed by material organisation in order that their power for evil may be practically neutralised, and that in the impotence of their stupidity they may have little influence on the course of events. On the other hand, the higher existences, who have learnt the necessity of social order and harmony, are thereby enabled to acquire that knowledge which gives them power over matter " (*Riddles*, pp. 296-7).

Turning to the problem of freedom, Schiller admits the reality of choice and tells us that " philosophy ought not prematurely to commit itself to a static view of

Reality, and that it is not an ineluctable necessity of thought, but a metaphysical prejudice, to believe that Reality is complete and rigid and unimprovable and that real change is, therefore, impossible" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 427).

In religion, Schiller admits only a finite God. We require a God since there is no other 'reasonable' way of accounting for the world (*Riddles*, p. 357). We find signs of intelligence in the world which are not due to any known mind. In the struggle with evil, good prevails, and this cannot be put to the credit of the constitution of things, since the actual world is quite compatible with evil and disorder as with good and order. We cannot consider God to be infinite, as that would make the problem of evil insoluble. The old difficulty is restated by Schiller when he says: "If God is all-powerful everything must be exactly what it should be, from God's point of view, else he would instantly alter it. If then evil things exist, it must be because God wills to have it so, *i.e.* God is from *our* point of view *evil*" (*ibid.* p. 307). Infinity conflicts with all the rest of his attributes. "The attribute of Infinity contradicts and neutralises all the other attributes of God, and makes it impossible to ascribe to the Deity either personality, or consciousness, or power, or intelligence, or wisdom, or goodness, or purpose, or object in creating the world; an infinite deity does not effect a single one of the functions which the religious consciousness demands of its God" (*ibid.* p. 306). God is force, and force everywhere implies resistance. God, to enforce his will against the world, requires a world which limits him. God is not all, though he is a factor in all things. We can only infer a finite God from the nature of the world and the work expected of him.

According to Schiller's philosophy, the egos are uncreated and uncaused, while our phenomenal selves, which are only the manifestations of the ultimate egos, pass from life to death. There are according to Schiller degrees of immortality. The lower forms of

spiritual existence do not have any content which would enrich a memory, and without it there is no meaning in immortality. Immortality is graduated according to the degree of consciousness attained by the self during its past. Memory of the monads persists, but it can do so in a personal form only when a sufficient concentration of consciousness is attained. Schiller believes in pre-existence and succession of lives. Individuals may perfect themselves through a plurality of lives. When the body gets worn out with age, death occurs to give place to a fresh phase of life. Schiller believes in the ethical argument for immortality, and sympathises with the work of the Psychical Research Society since it offers empirical proofs of future life.

II

Schiller develops his position as other pluralists do through a criticism of the monistic view. It is from the practical or the ethical point of view that he attacks. Absolutism means the 'death' of morality (*Humanism*, p. 2). In support of this view, the greatest of the living absolutists, Bradley, is quoted: "Make the moral point of view absolute and then realise your position. You have become not merely immoral, but you have also broken with any considerable religion" (*ibid.* p. 2). But Schiller forgets that the moral struggle cannot be the end of things. It must be swallowed up in religion. Were it the ultimate reality, morality would lose its significance. Schiller asks: "What would our attitude have to be towards a world in which the ultimate significance of our ideals was denied, *i.e.* a world which was no world, a world in which nothing really meant anything, nothing was really good or beautiful or true, and in which the hope of happiness was nothing but illusion? . . . For in a world which had really renounced its allegiance to the ideal, all action would be paralysed by the conviction that nothing we desired could ever be attained because

the existent was irreconcilably alienated from the desirable. . . . We should be plunged in that unfathomable abyss where scepticism fraternises with pessimism, and they hug their miseries in chaos undisguised" (*Humanism*, pp. 261-2). If the chapter of life is not to be closed by death, we feel the need for an Absolute which guarantees to us the victory of the moral ideal. The Absolute, instead of being the death of morals, is the very life of morality. If the moral ideal is only a dream of desire, if struggle is the end of things, morality will lose its value. But if the ideal is admitted to be real, then the truth of absolutism is also admitted.

The whole conception of the interaction of the egos is wrapped up in obscurity. Without this interaction, there will be no world. But we do not know how the interaction takes place. Why and how does God interact with other egos? Is there any common impulse which necessitates the common behaviour of interaction? Is there any psychical ground in which the egos are rooted? If there is, pluralism is compromised. If pluralism is kept intact, we cannot understand how interaction sets in and why God comes out of his isolation to interact with the egos.

Without a common inspiration and aspiration, Schiller's view will be subjectivistic. The world exists fragmentarily or incoherently in the egos. No ego, not even God, can hold the world in a complete form. The egos help to produce nature. We cannot say that there is a common nature. What is the objective world of space and time due to?

Again, if the end of evolution is once reached, we will have to imagine a cycle of evolutions somehow brought into being by God. When once becoming reaches being, what happens next? Mr. Fawcett, the author of *The World as Imagination*, holds that the experiment will be repeated by God. We will have the days and nights of Brahma, becoming and being following in quick succession. But any such possibility will conflict with the

teleological view of the conservation of all values. Schiller rightly contends that the end of becoming would never be reached, though he gives us no reasons for this belief. The deeper view that there cannot be any becoming without being, finite without infinite, is foreign to him.

Again, Schiller's 'potentiality' is a word and a word only. He cannot admit potentiality and real becoming together. We cannot have creative synthesis and a development of potentiality unless it be in the absolutist sense. If the end of things is a monistic unity, it means that this unity must have been a potentiality from the beginning in the world. This, Schiller admits when he says, "Pluralism is in a way based upon a monism; the Many presuppose the One. But not in any sense which can affect the substantiality of the Many. The One which is presupposed by pluralism is the most meaningless of all things; it is a mere possibility of the interaction or co-existence of the Many; it is a mere potentiality which has no actual existence except as an *ideal* factor in a *real* plurality" (*Riddles*, p. 344). But that which is the ideal of our activity, that which we are slowly trying to realise by transcending the actual cannot be 'meaningless.' The ideal goal of the world process is not an empty conception. "The Many who at present interact discordantly may come not only to interact but also to act together; and their perfect and harmonious interaction would realise the ideal of a true union, of a real unitedness as far superior to the imperfect union of our present cosmos, as the latter is to the abstract unity of the underlying One" (*ibid.* p. 346). If this means that the goal is a concrete unity we have no quarrel with it. But only the monism which was once the most meaningless of all things now becomes the "Alpha and Omega; as the basis of the many, it is the lowest and least of things; as their perfection and final harmony, it is the highest and last of things" (*Riddles*, p. 346).

We may here notice the question, whether the end of

evolution is a self or a society of selves. Schiller holds to the latter view. But since we can have distinctions only with phenomenal selves, when once we reach perfection we do not know how to distinguish between the several perfect selves. "The phenomenal self is that portion of the Transcendental Ego which is at any time actual consciously experienced. It forms but a feeble and partial excerpt of the Ego, but the self is as yet alone real, though as in the progress of its development it unfolds all its hidden powers, it approximates more and more to the Ego, until at last the actual and the potential would become co-extensive, the self and the Ego would coincide, and in the attainment of perfection we should *be* all we are capable of being" (*Riddles*, pp. 276-7). From this it is not clear what the nature of the end of evolution would be. In discussing the nature of sexual love, Schiller admits that "possibly this emotional impulse foreshadows the formation of coalesced existences of a higher order than our present partial and imperfect selves" (*ibid.* p. 407). But as Schiller admits that the end of evolution will never be reached, the world process will always continue to exist, and it will be not a single self but a society of selves. In the world of becoming, we have only selves, and not egos (see *Riddles*, p. 410).

The whole account of the relation of becoming to being, time to eternity, is conceived after the analogy of the absolutistic theory. "Time is a corruption of Eternity, just as Becoming is a corruption of Being" (*Riddles*, p. 257). Before the world was produced, Being was equable and unchanging. It later lapsed into change and becoming. Why did it lapse from its perfection to imperfection? is a question more often asked than answered. "*Time is but the measure of the impermanence of the imperfect*, and the reason why we fail to attain to the ideal of Eternity, is that we fail equally to attain to the cognate ideals of Being and Adaptation. The question resolves itself into the old difficulty of why the Real is not

yet adequate to the perfection of our ideals. But, if it could be, is it not evident that there would be an end of Time, as of change and of evil, and would not Time pass into Eternity? " (*Riddles*, pp. 257-8). The end of evolution is never to be attained, as then becoming or the struggle of finite existence will vanish. The time process is real as an integral part of the world structure. There is change within the whole, evolution in reality.

Evil springs from the resistance of the selves to the harmonious evolution of the cosmos. God represses by means of matter the power for evil which lower existences have. As these beings cannot be destroyed, the next best course is to reduce their powers. When they are reduced to a torpid condition, they unconsciously bend to the purposes of God. But this assumes that we will be able to get rid of evil by striking intellect dumb and overwhelming the world with matter. But is not stupidity a great source of evil? Again, if God created matter for the purpose of reducing the possibility of evil in the world, does he not take upon himself the responsibility for physical evil? Dr. Schiller roundly asks us to dispense with the omnipotence of God and assume a finite God. Then to account for evil, we want an Evil One or many Evil Ones. Though God is not powerful enough to overcome evil completely, he is not so weak as to yield to it without a struggle. Strictly speaking, Schiller's system is neither a monism nor a pluralism, but a dualism, and therefore a pessimism. If evil is opposed to God, and if he cannot overcome it, then despair stares us in the face as evil may engulf the good. But if he overcomes it, then Evil will vanish, there will be nothing thwarting God, and so he will have no work to do. "Omnipotence becomes impotence in the absence of resistance" (*Riddles*, p. 355). These difficulties are incident to all views which conceive of God in the image of man. Evil, though it is real in the sense that in life and practice we have to fight it, is not ultimately real. Though the distinction of good and evil is a vital one in life, though it

is true that the distinction "can be explained away only at the cost of dissolving the world into a baseless dream" (*ibid.* p. 310), still it is not ultimate. If ultimate, then an Olympian dualism would be the lot of the world.

Schiller holds that the development of matter and spirit proceeds along converging lines. When we reach the highest, we will see how a single reality is seen to embrace the manifestations of both. "The universe is one; Body and Soul, Matter and Spirit are but different aspects, the outside and the inside of the same fact: the material is but the outward and visible sign of the inward and spiritual state. No other theory of their relations can possibly be drawn from our premises; for, if the phenomenal world is a stress between the Deity and the Ego, the soul is but the reaction of the Ego upon the divine action which encases it as the body" (*Riddles*, p. 282). The whole world is a manifestation of one force. Atoms, crystals, animals and men are but the "successive embodiments of the process towards individuality" (*ibid.* p. 234).

But God in Dr. Schiller's scheme is only an ego among egos, a one among many and not one underlying the many. He is a finite being limited by the existence of other individuals. If he is only an ego among egos, why should we call him God at all? What gives him the right to rule? Why is he looked upon as the highest in the scale of being? How can we be sure that he will always preserve his superiority? Has he not an amount of perfection yet to acquire? Can it not be that in ages to come and in the worlds beyond a more powerful being may come into existence? Dr. Schiller believes that unless God is finite, he cannot well influence the minds of other egos. "By becoming finite, God becomes once more a real principle in the understanding of the world, a real motive in the conduct of life, a real factor in the existence of things, a factor none the less real for being unseen and inferred" (*Riddles*, p. 348). But in believing that God, to be of use, should be finite, Dr. Schiller is

obviously wrong. If God is viewed as the outcome of inference from the facts of nature, life and history, it is not a designing God of limited capacity that we are logically forced to admit. The world shows, if anything, not the signs of rational design but, as Mr. Fawcett has it, the adventure of imagination. The world is extremely irregular and imperfect; we have in it not only growth and aggrandisement but also decline and decadence. It suggests a chance experiment and not the working out of a set plan. It may be the product of an imperfect blundering deity but not of a rational God. A right view of the situation sometimes suggests to Schiller that God should be conceived of not as an ego among egos, but as an indwelling presence. God is then both immanent and transcendent. "God is immanent in all things, a constant, all-inspiring, ever-active Force. And yet God is not dissolved in the All, which was the heavy price paid by pantheism for the immanence of its God, but has also a real Personality, a truer and transcendent existence for himself" (*Riddles*, p. 355). God is not only the non-phenomenal cause of the world process, but also the sustainer of the world. We are willing to accord personality to God if by personality is not meant something limited and finite. If it can be reconciled with the immanence of God, we may call God a person, as personality expresses the highest we ordinary mortals know. We agree with Schiller when he says: "There is no objection to the use of terms like suprapersonal or ultra-personal, if we mean by them something including and transcending, rather than excluding personality. For, doubtless, the personality of God would transcend that of man as that of the highest man transcends that of the atom" (*Riddles*, footnote to p. 303).

No philosophy which is not mechanical disputes the relative freedom of man and holds that man is completely swept along the tide of fate. Even Schiller can grant us only relative freedom as he admits the inevitability of the end to which the whole creation moves. And this

is not an improvement on the kind of freedom we are offered in the absolutist systems.

Taking up next the problem of immortality, we find that Schiller is of opinion that the only immortality which has any significance for us is personal immortality. Monism, by making the permanent existence of the many impossible, abolishes all prospects of personal immortality. "The belief in the ultimate self-existence of spirits, uncreated, uncaused, that are and ever have been and can never cease to be, seems to be the only adequate ground for asserting the immortality of the individual" (*Riddles*, pp. 387-8). We may be led into the belief that personal immortality is safeguarded in Schiller's metaphysics as he views ultimate existences to be many and eternal. But that this is not so, will be obvious from the following statement: "As the whole world process was taken to be a process occurring in the interaction between the Egos and the Deity, the various stages of material evolution must correspond to different phases of that spiritual interaction. Parallel therefore to the physical evolution, there would run a spiritual evolution related to it as meaning and motive to outward and visible manifestation. And there would be, however, no reason why this process should not be the development, not of Spirit in general, but of particular spirits; nor why a single Ego should not pass through the succession of organisms and developments of consciousness, from the amoeba to man and from man to perfection. This gives, as it were, the *spiritual interpretation of the descent of man from the beasts*, and at the same time assures him of his due and proportionate share in the immortality of the ultimate spirit" (*ibid.* p. 388). There is no use in telling us that the transcendental egos are immortal, as we are now concerned with phenomenal selves. What is a gain to the transcendental egos is a loss to the phenomenal selves. Persons are phenomenal selves, shadows of the real egos, or, to be accurate, "parts of the Egos" (p. 393), and as such they have no chance of

separate survival. The phenomenal phases of the spirits' development persist and continue only "as *factors in the development*" (*Riddles*, p. 390). The individual impressions of a single life persist only in so far as they have coincided with the course of spiritual development. All this is very agreeable to the absolutist. The only question is whether the real self is one or many. Schiller inclines to the latter alternative, and as no reasons are forthcoming, we have to put it down for a matter of taste or opinion. Now and then we find Dr. Schiller paying unconscious homage to the absolutist theory. "Though monism would be an excellent theory when the world process was ended, it is for this very reason quite inapplicable and extremely mischievous while it is still going on" (*Riddles*, p. 340). We admit the validity of this contention. The world is still diverse and discordant though it is aiming at unity and harmony. But when Dr. Schiller admits monism to be ultimately true, it follows that the real self of the world apart from the phenomenal manifestation is one.

III

In Professor Howison's *Limits of Evolution*, we have a new variety of pluralism where time is not a very essential factor. He also joins in the general protest against idealistic monism and emphasises the reality of selves, freedom of action and the existence of a personal God. He advocates "an eternal or metaphysical world of many minds, all alike possessing personal initiative, real self-direction, instead of an all-predestinating single Mind that alone has real free agency" (*Limits of Evolution*, p. x). He resolves the universe into a number of self-subsistent individuals. Since freedom is an essential fact of life which cannot be explained away, and since it is incompatible with the createdness of beings, Howison holds that the selves are uncreated. "No being that arises out of efficient causation can possibly be free. . . . Not

even Divine Agency can give rise to another self-active intelligence by any productive act." Howison discards the old efficient causal notion of God and his function. Since the self is not the result of any action from without, it is its own creation. We cannot get behind the ego. The knowing self is as eternal as the universe. Freedom means essentially pluralism and *vice versa*. The temporal series requires for its ground and explanation an eternal principle, but Howison thinks that it is not one Eternal Mind but Many Eternal Minds. The world is a real multiplicity of spirits. "The members of this Eternal Republic have no origin but their purely logical one of reference to each other. . . . They simply are and together constitute the eternal order" (*ibid.* p. 337). Free agents subsist by defining or positing themselves "in terms of their own inerasable and unrepeatable *particularity* and of the supplemental individualities of a whole world of others" (*ibid.* p. 351). They place themselves in a series "that must run through every real difference from the lowest increment over non-existence to the absolute realisation of the ideal type" (*ibid.* p. 354). Thus Howison establishes the independence of the action of each human self, its cut-off character and personal responsibility.

Since it is assumed that the total society of selves must contain all possible grades of being from the lowest to the highest, we get a supreme self which differs from all the others in that it has no temporal side or taint of imperfection. This supratemporal supreme self is God, the pure Eternal. Creation is only the moral recognition of the world of spirits by God. This recognition is an eternal fact since it is the expression of God's own nature as a perfect moral being. The perfection of God "lies in his giving complete recognition to all other spirits, as the complement in terms of which alone his own self-definition is to himself completely thinkable" (*ibid.* p. 355; see also pp. xiii-xvii).

For Howison self-consciousness is the principle of

separation and exclusion. The mutual recognition involved in the self-defining act by which each individual subsists applies also to God. God is not the Absolute, since a solitary God would be lacking in personality, besides crushing out all autonomy in the beings he creates. Personality is essentially social, involving relation to other beings. If man is not co-eternal with God, there will be neither God nor man. God as personal is a member of the series ; as supreme, he is the central or the dominant member. Though God is limited by other beings he is not finite, for all minds are infinite in the qualitative sense (p. 422).

God and souls, the one and the many, "are different, unchangeably different ; they are even different in species." There is in every finite soul a 'derivative' life absolutely foreign to God. Every finite self has thus two aspects. While it is essentially eternal and perfect in one aspect, still it defines itself as different from other equally eternal selves by virtue of its association with a unique, individuated life in time, which just because it is in time involves some measure of imperfection. The perfection of God is the ideal implicitly operating in the life of the individual. The basis of the distinction of selves is the differentiation of self from others. In empirical existence we have the conjunction of the eternal with the temporal.

What is the origin and place of nature in this world of spirits? Man and other finite intelligences are 'nature-begetting' minds. We are "ourselves the causal sources of the perceived world and its cosmic order." "Not God only but also the entire world of free minds other than God must condition Nature." In fact, the finite minds are alone "directly and productively causal of it, while God's conditioning of it can only be indirect and remote ; namely, by the constant reference to him which these nature-begetting minds spontaneously have" (pp. 325-6). "All existence is either (1) the existence of *minds*, or (2) the existence of the items and order of their

experience. All the existences known as material, consisting in certain of these experiences with an order organised by the self-active forms of consciousness that in their unity constitute the substantial being of a mind, in distinction from its phenomenal life " (pp. xii-xiii).

IV

But what exactly is the relation between the items of mind and the facts of the world? How does the one explain the other? How, again, can the common world due to so many individual minds have any unity and stability? Howison speaks of the "benign consensus of the whole society of minds" (p. 276). But is this consensus due to chance, or does it indicate that the plurality is based on a deeper unity? How can a number of free individuals bring about order and unity in the universe so as to allow for the reality of all and provide for the individual differences? We seem to require a hypothesis of the type of Leibniz's pre-established harmony. Howison assumes that there is an identical content or system of reason common to all self-active intelligences. It is a 'universal rational society' or an 'association of beings limited by a common rational intelligence.' There is community of nature regarding intellectual, aesthetic and ethical ideals. It is the common reference to ideals that "raises Nature out of being a mere private show for each mind into a universal experience, with an aspect common to all minds alike" (p. xxii). The distinctions are due to the limitations which they are striving to overcome, and when the ideal is reached, the distinctions would be swallowed up in unity. The frequent reference to a common ground and centre of the pluralistic entities is a proof of the weakness of mere pluralism, and the insistence on social logic, etc., points to the strength of absolutism.

The whole account of the relation between mind and

matter is in congruence with the idealist tradition. He holds that the common sense contrast between mind and matter "is not intelligibly interpretable except as the distinction between two aspects of one and the same total nature in the beings that possess it—the distinction, namely, between the whole and its dependent part; between the primitive or unconditioned, or more accurately the self-defining, and the derivative or the conditioned which is defined and determined by the first (p. xlvi).

Howison is right in contending that a self-conscious being ought not to act from pressure from without. He is a self-legislative agent whose conduct is determined by his personal will. Efficient causality of the type which prevails in the world of things is rightly ruled out. But simply because the self is a genuine source of activity, it need not be looked upon as self-subsistent and eternal. If each individual has his fixed place in an absolutely continuous series, where is the room for freedom? If each individual has a definite nature assigned to him, then there is no meaning in saying that he is free because not God but he himself is the author of his nature. But even this self-authorship is not consistently carried out. Creation is self-contradictory if the creators should be free agents and not machines. We must give up either the freedom of the created or the creation by God. ". . . Creationism must logically exclude the possibility of freedom. For the *Creator cannot of course create* except by exactly and precisely conceiving; otherwise his product would not differ from nonentity. The created nature must therefore inevitably register the will and the plan of the creator" (p. 397). But still we require a God to settle the places of the individuals in the series. This dependence of the individual on God, Howison admits. "Real creation means such an eternal dependence of other souls upon God that the non-existence of God would involve the non-existence of all souls, while his existence is the essential supplementing Reality that raises them to

reality ; without him, they would be but void names and bare possibilities " (p. xvii). Most modern systems mean by creation only this. It is not an event which took place at a certain point of time, nor is it the transient activity of a co-called first cause. It is only the eternal dependence of the created on the creator. That God is the one ground of the world, and that the individuals are free because God the creator is free, is brought out in many passages, *e.g.* "The self-existent perfection of the deity itself freely demands for its own fulfilment the possession of a world that is in God's own image, and such a control of it as is alone consistent with its being so ; a divine creation must completely reflect the divine nature, and must therefore be a world of moral freedom " (p. 75). In the accepted sense of the term, creation is a condition of freedom.

But the chief problem of how imperfection in which the eternal selves are entangled and which reduces them to the finite level arises is not solved. The facts of experience compel Howison to posit an element of imperfection. He is not clear about the nature of this element. It is sometimes defined as "a degree of imperfection self-positing in the very being of each self defined " (p. 362). With some absolutists, who view nonbeing as sometimes positive and sometimes negative, Howison regards imperfection as a mere negative absence of reality and also an "actual antagonising check " (p. 364). Each individual has two aspects. It is primarily and essentially eternal, and viewed in this aspect it is perfect, but this does not explain the aspect of plurality, which is the main thesis of Howison. So he holds that each self defines itself as different from other equally eternal selves by virtue of its association with a unique individuated life in time, which just because it is in time involves some measure of imperfection. But if God can be both self-defining and perfect, cannot man be the same ? There is no reason assigned for treating man differently from God. But if God as self-defining is imperfect, then

imperfection is in the very heart of creation. In God is the source of evil; in perfection, of imperfection.

We do not find any adequate reason as to why there should be a soul corresponding to every possible degree of divergence from the perfect ideal (see footnote to p. 363). If the world is merely an assemblage of all conceivable degrees of perfection from zero to infinity, there is no room for any progress at all. One step up and one step down would be the way to Howison's Heaven. The actual world will be unimprovable.

What is the place of God in Howison's scheme? "The idea of every self and the idea of God are inseparably connected, so that if any self exists, then God also must exist; but any and every self demonstrably exists, for the very doubt of its existence implies its existence, and therefore God really exists" (p. 359). But can we not have the idea of self without the idea of God? Is a nontheistic pluralism impossible? If God is the necessary prius and presupposition of every self, if he is the supreme ideal and the defining standard, apart from which no self can apprehend itself, if he is the cause of all evolution, natural and moral, then God cannot be an individual among a number of self-subsistent individuals but must be the Absolute. As one among many, God cannot be the "fulfilled type of every monad and the living Bond of their union" (p. xiii).

The relation of God to finite selves is not on a par with the relation of the finite spirits to one another: "Each of them has its own ideal of its own being, namely, its own way of fulfilling the character of God. . . . God is the final cause of the whole existing self" (pp. 339-40). The unique meanings of God, the complex sides of his nature are substantiated into separate selves. While the meanings are different from one another, still they are meanings of one whole and as such are bound down to a unity. The individuals are the manifold embodiments of God, who as the whole is to be viewed as the Absolute.

God is the final and not the efficient cause of the

temporal striving of all selves. Each developing consciousness or finite self has for its ideal the timeless self-sufficiency and purity from sin and struggle which are realised in God. The ideal must be capable of being realised, otherwise it cannot be an ideal. The individual self inspired by the ideal should be able to realise the perfection of God. If by any amount of striving the individual self can never realise the ideal, if it is fated that he should always be in time and never above it, then pluralism is secured, but God cannot be the final cause. If he exists at all, he can only be a finite God or a magnified man. If Howison's system wishes to escape from absolutism, it must end in either a number of selves without God or a finite God.

There is running throughout in Howison's system a confusion between God and the Absolute. We are told sometimes that the only ground of the world is "a principle of connection between all minds, God included." It is supposed that the principle is not ontological but only logical, not metaphysical, but only teleological. But occasionally Howison identifies this principle with God. "As final cause, God is at once (1) the logical ground apart from which, as defining standard, no consciousness can define itself as I, nor consequently can exist at all; (2) the Ideal Goal toward which each consciousness in its external freedom moves" (p. 391). God is here the ideal goal as well as the logical ground. How can pluralism be sustained with the positing of such a God? "The theistic ideal of God immanent in the world by its activity of his image in the mind of man" is "the only Divine immanence compatible with the moral freedom of the soul" (Preface, p. xxx). As Professor Pringle Pattison observes: "The relations between the Divine and the human indicated by such phrases as a common essence and an immanent ideal are of a character so intimate and so unique as to make the metaphor of a republic—the whole idea of an association of independent individuals—totally inapplicable to the facts."

Howison's God is just the Absolute of the idealists and is rightly viewed as the root as well as the fruit of the universe.

. V

In a paper on "Personality, Human and Divine," which the Rev. H. Rashdall contributed to the Oxford Essays on *Personal Idealism*, and in his *Theory of Good and Evil*, he supports the current conception of God as finite and personal. He makes a distinction between God and the Absolute. God is a person since he possesses the characteristics essential to personality. A 'person' should distinguish himself not merely from objects we class as things but also from other subjects. This carries with it the further implication that a person can exist only as a one among many. God is a supreme self to which the world of persons and things is an object. In proving the existence of God, Rashdall adopts the traditional argument of idealism. The world as we know it exists in our experience. Apart from us there is no world for us to know, but the world any human individual knows is part of a much vaster world, which is independent of the individual, which existed ages before he was born, and will continue to exist for ages after he is dead. There must be an experiencing self indefinitely greater than the finite individual, as the world is greater than his world. In exactly the same way, Rashdall attempts to infer 'God' from the moral consciousness. The Absolute Moral Ideal *exists*. To 'exist' means 'to be in some mind.' Obviously, it does not *exist* in any individual mind. Therefore, there must be a Divine Mind in which its existence is to be located. Thus Rashdall establishes the reality of a spiritual self who is the subject of the world. In a sense the world is not outside God. But simply because the world of the finite individual is a part of the world of God, we cannot conclude that the finite individual is a part of the supreme spirit in the absolutistic sense. For

this would be to make a confusion between content and the consciousness which knows the content. Because the content of knowledge which exists in fragments and confusedly in "finite centres" must be supposed to exist entire and distinct in the "perfect experience," we cannot assume that "the finite centres which have these fragmentary experiences exist in and form part of the Being, which has the 'perfect experience'" (*Mind*, July 1918, p. 266). Identity of content does not prove identity of existence. The supreme consciousness may have identity of content with finite selves, but the experiences of the finite selves as unique and particular fall outside the consciousness of God existentially. The supreme spirit is not the whole since it is limited by other finite selves. The Absolute is the whole, which is God and the finite spirits. Reality is not a single self-consciousness but a community of selves. "The Absolute cannot be identified with God, so long as God is thought of as a self-conscious being. The Absolute must include God and all other consciousnesses, not as isolated and unrelated beings but as intimately related (in whatever way) to him and to one another, and as forming with him a system or unity. . . . God and the spirits are the Absolute—not God alone. Together they form a unity, but that unity is not the unity of self-consciousness" (*Good and Evil*, pp. 239-40).

He further emphasises the unity of God and the finite selves by saying that "the ultimate Being is a single Power, if we like we may even say a single Being, who is manifested in a plurality of consciousnesses, one consciousness which is omniscient and eternal and many consciousnesses which are of limited knowledge, which have a beginning, and some of which, it is possible or probable, have an end" (*ibid.* ii. 241). God is thus one of the eaches, a separate appearance of the Absolute. He has all the limitations of personality. He is finite and limited by other selves, but this limitation is not an arbitrary one from outside but a necessary one springing from his very nature. The limitation of God by finite

spirits, who are knowing subjects with their own individualities, is a self-imposed one. Of course, Rashdall does not mean that God once was, in the popular sense, 'Almighty' and then limited himself by an act of will. He means only that other spiritual beings derive their being from him and are willed to exist in order to bring about the greatest attainable good. There is only one mind which gave rise to the many that through their mutual interaction a supreme blessing otherwise inconceivable may be attained. Rashdall holds that all finite selves are created but still they are regarded as self-existent and mutually independent units. To satisfy popular prejudice, Rashdall makes the individuals free and independent, and provides space in his scheme for evil and imperfection. Instead of saying that the supreme power is working under limits imposed upon it by an intractable environment, under conditions which he cannot or does not wholly control, he holds that God limited himself by his own act of will. Rashdall contends that God made the human will free with the idea of realising a higher purpose, which it would have been impossible to realise apart from human freedom. God created the best world that could be had.

VI

Passing by the difficulties incidental to the existence of imperfection and evil in this world we may ask how can we distinguish God from the Absolute when once divine creation of the world, including finite selves, is postulated. God becomes an appearance of the Absolute and the finite selves the appearances of God. If the whole world is the object of God, if it is his creation due to his self limitation, then surely God is all and we cannot draw any distinction between God and the Absolute. God is viewed as one among many, simply because the many are asserted to be independent of God, but Rashdall's theory of creation suggests that the finite selves have

only a derivative and dependent being. God, as the cause of them, may be said to include them all. In this case there is nothing independent of God outside of him. This means that God is the whole. Even in Rashdall's view God alone is real, and the reality of God includes the reality of all beings derived from God. If we separate God from the finite selves, we will be compelled to substantiate the universal apart from the particulars, an illogical procedure—and end in undisguised abstract monism or pluralism.

But Rashdall is interested in attributing personality to God. He can do so provided he allows that it is not of the kind we are acquainted with in our experience. After all, even though the perception of selfhood or personality arises by way of contrast with another, we need not assume that the feeling of contrast is of the essence of selfhood. The way of knowing truth is not truth itself. But it is fidelity to the religious beliefs he entertains that induces Rashdall to distinguish God from the Absolute and make of him a supreme personality. He observes, "The alternative to a crude ultra-anthropomorphic conception of God is not a depersonalised idea of the Deity such as M. Loisy tends to share. The religious consciousness requires us to believe in a God who consciously wills moral ends"; and if we frankly admit that his power is, in a sense, limited, and at the same time that he is revealed "not merely in some imperfect and partially conflicting consciences, but in some supreme manner by one conscience," *i.e.* the Christ, we are entitled to claim that a "full-blooded Christian theism with (as it were) a background of confessed agnosticism is a far more philosophical attitude than a pantheism which professes to know and to explain everything, but does so only by the use of language which on closer examination turns out to be self-contradictory or unmeaning" (*The Modern Churchman*, November-December 1916, "Theism or Pantheism").

VII

The theistic humanism of Mr. A. J. Balfour is developed in his Gifford Lectures on *Theism and Humanism*, though anticipations of the later view are to be met with in his earlier works on *Philosophic Doubt* and *Foundations of Belief*. Considerations of religion weigh much with Balfour, and from the beginning he has adopted an attitude of protest against the employment of reason in general and absolute idealism in particular in the interests of the Christian Religion. Balfour the Christian is the father of Balfour the sceptic of the *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, the believer of *The Foundations of Belief*, the philosopher of *Theism and Humanism*. In the first book, Balfour develops an attitude of scepticism not because it is the right philosophical attitude but because he wished to take the wind out of the sails of the scientific thinkers who attack religion in the name of science. Its subtitle, *An Essay on the Foundations of Belief*, indicates the spirit of the volume. *Philosophic Doubt* is directed against the foundations of scientific knowledge. The second volume on the *Foundations of Belief* is more positive in its aim, and its subtitle, *Notes Introductory to the Study of Theology*, indicates the religious motive that prompts the investigation. Its main interest is a reconstruction of the foundations of belief in general, and religious belief in particular by a demonstration of the defects of scientific reason and the dangers of rationalising theology. It pulls down the pretensions of science and idealism that it may reinstate Christian theology and all its views about man, God and the universe. It inquires into the relation of reason to authority to conclude that science is no substitute for metaphysics, and religion cannot be made a department of science. Thus Balfour makes logic and philosophy a means to ethics and religion. The spirit comes out more plainly in his latest volume. Philosophy should aim at the fulfilment of the ethical and religious needs of man. Since these vary with indi-

viduals, Balfour takes the needs of the plain Anglican layman to be the standard and sets to work out a philosophy which would satisfy him. We should seek in philosophy not so much truth as ethical and religious satisfaction. "I ask him (the trained man of speculation)," says Balfour, "to consider whether his system provides an honourable place for the actual beliefs by which his waking life is ruled" (*T. and H.* p. 271). Belief becomes the test of truth and religion of philosophy. Balfour's thought reveals the complete supremacy of religion in philosophy, for the avowed intention of all his work is the vindication of certain beliefs about the course of the world and man's place in it.

The unsettlement in men's conceptions of life due to the advances of scientific evolution and German idealism, as Balfour interprets it, roused his wrath. He felt himself called upon to undertake a defence of religion and persuade men to pursue the path of righteousness and turn a deaf ear to the attacks of science and metaphysics. Anxious about the human hopes and aspirations, which are doomed to disappointment if the rationalistic systems of naturalism and transcendental idealism are to have the last word on them, he assailed both these types of scientific reason. In his first book, *Philosophic Doubt*, he asks if nothing is certain in this world, and everything is only probable, why should we care much for the attacks of science, which is, after all, only probable, against religion which is equally so? In his second book, on *The Foundations of Belief*, he goes a step further, and holds that the certainties we have are those which satisfy our needs and values. In his *Philosophic Doubt* he advocates scepticism, pure and simple, and challenges the validity of scientific principles. It is a piece of negative criticism directed against the foundations of scientific knowledge. Balfour takes extreme delight in proving that all schools of science and philosophy, both ancient and modern, are useless. If reason by itself cannot establish the theories of science and philosophy, if they are also matters of

habit, faith and speculation, why should we insist on different standards for morality and religion? If the scientist in his conceit derides metaphysical systems as fantastic fairy - tales, Balfour retorts by flinging the charge in the face of the scientists that their fundamental hypotheses are no better. "Religion is at any rate no worse off than science in the matter of proof" (*Philosophic Doubt*, p. 319). Both religion and science are "incapable of any rational defence." Our beliefs in these regions are only matters of psychological habit and association, and not of logical necessity. Our claims "are not rational grounds of conviction. . . . It would be more proper to describe them as a kind of inward inclination or impulse, falling far short of—or I should perhaps rather say, altogether differing in kind from—philosophic certitude, leaving the reason, therefore, unsatisfied but amounting, nevertheless, to a practical cause of belief, from the effects of which we do not even desire to be released" (*ibid.* p. 317). But it was not then Balfour's intention to identify claims and reasons. It was his interest only to show that science is no better than religion in the matter of its authority. We cannot prove either science or religion though we have need of both. Both have claims on us though the claims are not reasons. Balfour did not then declare that the "existence of an ultimate impulse to believe a creed" was a sufficient justification for considering it to be true. In his *Defence of Philosophic Doubt* he supported a universal scepticism and rescued religion from the attacks of science. He did not pause to consider how far this all-dissolving doubt is a gain to religion and a loss to science. But we need not pick a quarrel with him on this point.

When we come to the *Foundations of Belief*, we find Balfour bridging the gulf between need and belief. Here scepticism is made a means to the vindication of religious faith and authority. He assails the two types of philosophy which employ scientific reason. He asks us to ascertain the grounds of naturalism and science

before we take sides with science, which is a bar to religion, and naturalism, which is the enemy of theism. He finds that all our beliefs can be traced to "custom, education, public opinion, the contagious convictions of countrymen, family, party or church." They are due to authority and not reason. "If we are to judge with equity between these rival claimants, we must not forget that it is Authority rather than Reason to which, in the main, we owe, not religion only, but ethics and politics; that it is Authority which supplies us with essential elements in the premises of science; that it is Authority rather than Reason which cements its superstructure" (*Foundations of Belief*, p. 229). Our beliefs are due not so much to logical grounds as to the psychological causes which bring them about. Of course he carefully distinguishes need from belief, and also urges that it is not any need or desire that can justify belief but only the true and valuable needs. This method of establishing beliefs may be different from the strictly scientific method of logic, but it is not to be confused with the pseudo-pragmatist method of desire and its fulfilment. "If the relation described is, on the one side, something different from that between a premise and its conclusion, on the other it is intended to be equally remote from that between a desire and its fulfilment." Balfour is right in his contention that pure reason does not afford a basis for life, if it is interpreted in a narrow and abstract sense, as always working from 'premises to conclusion.' Such an abstract reason can only be "permitted to have a hand in the simplest jobs" (*ibid.* p. 72). Such scholastic ratiocination which regards as its function the deductive development from dogmas is not to be confused with the living intelligence of man. By reason is not meant mechanical syllogising but all human powers of insight. Even if with Balfour we hold our beliefs to be the products of custom, education and public opinion, and the other factors grouped together by him under the head of 'Authority,' deeper insight tells us that this Authority

is, after all, the embodiment of reason. The distinction between 'Reason' and 'Authority' as Balfour views them is not a distinction between the presence of reason and unreason respectively. Authority is the embodiment of universal reason, and does not, therefore, connote "nonrational causes" (*ibid.* p. 219). It is impossible for man to discuss all propositions, but he takes certain things approved of for granted, and proposes to proceed on their basis a step further. All those propositions which the individual takes on trust as already proved, without debating them, are grouped by Balfour under Authority.

From the argument of the *Foundations of Belief*, he insensibly takes us to the modern pragmatist theory, which in some of its forms substitutes belief for logic and need for truth. The ordinary beliefs about the scientific world are not based on reason, but are determined by the practical needs of life. "In accepting science, as we all do, we are moved by 'values,' not by logic. . . . If we examine fearlessly the grounds on which judgments about the material world are founded, we shall find that they rest on postulates about which it is equally impossible to say that we can theoretically regard them as self-evident, or practically treat them as doubtful. We can neither prove them nor give them up. . . . 'Values' refuse to be ignored" (*Hibbert Journal*, x. i, pp. 5-6). Philosophies are to be judged by their capacity to satisfy the values of spirit. Problems of philosophy are to be solved by reference to human values. Freedom is a fact simply because we are "not prepared to give it up" on ethical grounds (*ibid.*). There is no need to argue the question; we have only to admit it. Those systems of philosophy which are more inclined to reason out beliefs are warned that an unreasonable pursuit of reason will lead them to the devil or the deep sea. Absolute idealists have an implicit faith in reason, with the result that they "are not religious" (*ibid.* footnote to p. 22) M. Bergson is a great philosopher, if not for any-

thing else, at least for the reason that he declares his dissatisfaction with "the all-inclusive unification of the idealist systems" (*ibid.* p. 23). He gives us a super-consciousness which takes sides and wars against evil. Balfour believes that the Absolute of the idealists is absolutely useless. It seems to kill all the values we find and enjoy in the world. No man will be moved to do anything for it, not even labour intellectually. That is why Balfour could not bring himself to understand what the Absolute is and what it stands for!

Every system of philosophy should have in view the claims of the ordinary man, and secure an 'honourable place' for his beliefs in an independent world of persons and things, in universal causation, in the rationality of things, their goodness and beauty. While we agree with Balfour in the view that the highest values of spirit should be conserved, we are not prepared to say that the doctrines are true simply because Tom, Dick or Harry believes in them. We should think out the relations of the highest values of man to reality or existence as a whole. Everything we want to believe cannot be real. Balfour admits that most of our beliefs about the universe are "moulded by formative forces, which vary from irresistible coercion to faint and doubtful inclination" (*T. and H.* p. 218). If the beliefs which he admits "are to be regarded rather as the results of tendencies than as the conclusions of logic," are confused with valid truths, we would be reducing logical reasons to psychological causes and rational necessity to non-rational coercion. Then there will be no function for the rational part of our nature. Our philosophy would be a glorification of the animal mind and its way of working; for we do not propose to distinguish between coincidences and coherences, psychological associations and logical connections. Balfour believes that in this procedure he has the authority of Kant and his transcendental method. But Kant does not set to himself the task of understanding the subjective

experiences of men, their hopes, and fears, their joys and regrets and satisfying them. He asks about the conditions of experience, scientific, ethical and aesthetical. The centre of his philosophy is experience in general and not the needs of the plain Anglican layman of the twentieth century. Balfour knows the weakness of his theory and the merit of Kant's undertaking. "The correspondence postulated is not between the fleeting fancies of the individual and the immutable verities of an unseen world, but between these characteristics of our nature which we recognise as that in us, which, though not necessarily the strongest, is the highest ; which, though not always the most universal, is, nevertheless, the best " (*F. of B.* pp. 247-8). All that the transcendental method says is that philosophy is not a deductive development of conclusions from set dogmas, but the explication of the presuppositions of experience. Experience, if it is not to be dismissed as an illusion, demands explanation. There are certain things which we should assume, if we are not to derationalise the scheme of things. Such conditions which are necessary for rendering experience possible may be taken to be truths according to the transcendental method of Kant. But, as we shall see immediately, Balfour is not adopting this true method of Kant and the absolute idealists, but the subjectivist pragmatist method, when he declares that without a theistic conception of the Deity, as distinct from the absolutistic, humanist values cannot be conserved.

Balfour inclines to the God of religion as against the Absolute of philosophy. The distinction between religious and non-religious systems of philosophy is that " God, or whatever in the system corresponds to God, does in the former *take sides* in a moving drama, while, with more consistency, but far less truth, he is, in the non-religious system, represented as indifferently related to all the multiplicity of which he constitutes the unity " (*Hibbert Journal*, x. 1, p. 22). To Balfour, God is a " spirit among spirits " (*T. and H.* p. 20), an ethical

personality with whom personal relations of love and worship are possible. Absolutism, which regards its highest as "logical glue," which binds together multiplicity to make it intelligible, he cannot suffer calmly. "When I speak of God, I mean something other than an identity wherein all differences vanish, or a unity which includes but does not transcend the differences, which it somehow holds in solution. I mean a God whom men can love, a God to whom men can pray, who takes sides, who has purposes and preferences, whose attributes, howsoever conceived, leave unimpaired the possibility of a personal relation between Himself and those whom He has created" (*Ph. D.* p. 21). Let us consider Balfour's proofs for the existence of such a God. The first argument is, "that all we think best in human culture whether associated with beauty, goodness or knowledge requires God for its support, that Humanism without Theism loses more than half its value" (p. 248). "The root principle, which by its constant recurrence in slightly different forms binds together like an operative *leit motif* the most diverse material, is that if we would maintain the value of our highest beliefs and emotions, we must find for them a congruous origin. Beauty must be more than an accident. The source of morality must be moral. The source of knowledge must be rational. If this be granted, you rule out Mechanism, you rule out Naturalism, you rule out Agnosticism, and a lofty form of Theism becomes, as I think, inevitable" (*ibid.* p. 250). This argument that God is implied in science, art and morality appeared already in *Foundations of Belief*. "We bring to the study of the world the presupposition that it is the work of a rational Being, who made it intelligible and at the same time made *us*, in however feeble a fashion, able to understand it" (*F. of B.* p. 323). God must be rational, science demands it; he must be moral, morality demands it. We are thus led to a conception of God as a single personal Being at the head of the Cosmos, the Creator of the world. Balfour allows that God may

be superpersonal. But if the source of personality can be superpersonal, the source of morality can be supermoral, and the source of rationality super-rational. Let us next ask whether a theistic conception of God is the necessary implication of logic, ethics and aesthetics. The assumption of logic which growing experience verifies is that the world is a cosmos where the outer and the inner cohere. There is no necessity which commits us to a personal God. The same is the case with ethics and aesthetics. The humanist values of knowledge, beauty and goodness demand a spiritual unity self-dependent and self-explanatory. As Balfour himself suggests in a passage of his *Foundations of Belief*, "When once we have realised the scientific truth that at the root of every rational process lies an irrational one ; that reason from a scientific point of view is itself a natural product ; and that the whole material on which it works is due to causes physical, physiological and social, which it neither creates nor controls, we shall be driven in mere self-defence to hold that behind these non-rational forces and above them, guiding them by slow degrees, and, as it were, with difficulty, to a rational issue, stands that Supreme Reason, in whom we must thus believe, if we are to believe in anything" (*Foundations of Belief*, p. 323). Balfour makes much of the argument from design as supporting a personal conception of God. He emphasises how the universe is so shaped as to permit the production of spiritual beings. Beauty in art implies an artist ; beauty in nature requires God as its artist. But art implies only a spiritual reality and not a personal God. Balfour argues incidentally that great artists are theists, which is a mistake of fact. They consider every object a spirit or a manifestation of spirit. They are either polytheists or pantheists. But the argument from design is not conclusive since there is much error and imperfection in the world. If this argument proves anything, it is that naturalism is inadequate. But to refute naturalism is not to prove theism. The other considera-

tion Balfour puts forward, that there are certain forms of beauty and goodness which have intrinsic worth and not merely survival value, does not help theism. It only overthrows naturalism. There are philosophers of different persuasions who hold to intrinsic values. These values do not stand or fall with theism (see Moore, *Principia Ethica*). Balfour knows that his theism is not logically demonstrated. But he tells us that since logical proofs cannot be had even for scientific truths, we need not stickle for logic. In a world where everything is probable, theism cannot hope to be better. But if probability is the guide to life, absolutism is quite as probable as theism, and, besides, has the strength of logic behind it. To surrender logic because it is not palatable and take to probability is doubtful wisdom.

VIII

We are at one with William James in his view that "the difference between monism and pluralism is, perhaps, the most pregnant of all the differences in philosophy" (*Will to Believe*, p. viii). It is the supreme difference between first things and second things. Which shall we put first? Shall we put God first or man first? Shall we put subjectivism in knowledge, relativism in morals and polytheism in religion first or their opposites first? The views we have criticised in this book are inclined in favour of the pluralistic scheme, while the positive view in defence of which this study of contemporary philosophy is undertaken supports the monistic one. The pluralistic reactions which we have reviewed are the efforts of a distracted age which does not know how to reconcile its "intense need of believing" with the "difficulty of beliefs." Men feel the need of religion for the hopes and consolations it offers; but philosophy and science ask, Have we any right to it? Can it not be that the God we believe in and require for the satisfaction of the heart is only a dream of our imagination, with no

roots in reality? Have our deepest aspirations any warrant in the constitution of things? Is the faith for which we sigh a rational faith? The advance of scientific and metaphysical knowledge in the nineteenth century disturbed peace and comfort of mind by exploding the traditional concepts; and exposing the values of human life to the searchlight of science and logic. Naturalistic philosophy and some forms of absolutism looked upon religion as a web of illusions or a conscious fraud. To the scientific metaphysicians, the God of religion is as intolerable to thought as it is indispensable for the religion of the plain man. The need for God is intense; but the difficulty of the belief in God is equally acute. Faith seems to be tortured by reason. There is nothing to satisfy the need of those who want a reason for living. Matthew Arnold points to the unsettled condition of men's minds when he says, "There is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma which is not shown to be questionable, not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve. Our religion has realised itself in the supposed fact, and now the fact is failing it." God the Creator and the Redeemer yields place to the Immutable Energy and the Unknowable Power. There is an inward struggle between what Howison calls "the sense of authority in what seems truth declared by science, and the sense of majesty in what is felt to be an ineffable good, which the apparent good seems to put in peril" (*L. of E.* p. 5). The old world is dead, the new is not yet born. The old spiritual basis is lost, a new spiritual foundation has yet to be supplied. Life views vacillate between faith and thought. We do not know what to do when faith loses sovereignty over men's minds, and reason gives us no hope of a world other than this. The contrast between the greatness of man, who feels that there is God without whom there is no true happiness, and the littleness of man, who cannot prove it satisfactorily, is very disquieting. The anarchy in men's minds and the vague disquiet which is blindly feeling its

way towards some soul-satisfying scheme are exploited by the systems of the day. Pluralism takes upon itself the task of overcoming the contrast between faith and knowledge by interpreting life afresh, and reconstructing the foundations of philosophy and religion. A sure instinct tells us that it cannot be that the world with its endless conflicts and aimless courses, random achievements and broken lights, the triumph of evil, and the defeat of good, is the be-all and the end-all of things. The most satisfactory feature of the present pluralistic reaction is its insistence on human values. Pluralism is not so much a creed as a frame of mind. With a rare feel for the realities of life, and a living interest in the world around, it approaches the philosophic problem. Discovering the great gulf between philosophic results and humanist ideals, it adopts a protestant attitude. The fountain spring of this reaction is the deep sense of dissatisfaction with the prevailing systems which trifle with the values of spirit. So these pluralist systems have an irresistible charm for the man in the street, who cares as little for sound logic as the thinkers themselves, whose reason is at the mercy of their feelings. Men are eager to escape by any means from the chaos in which they had long been groping for a better state of things.

But, in our opinion, the greatest mistake of the new spirit is in its conception of the Absolute as Anti-Christ. The kind of absolutism which comes in for severe rebuke and condemnation at the hands of our pluralist critics is a fiction of their own imagination and not a theory held by any of its recognised exponents. The paramount question of philosophy whether concrete absolutism does not bridge the gulf between faith and thought is only raised to be dogmatically dismissed. To cast the career of philosophy on a negative answer to this question is to give up the philosophic endeavour. The 'new' philosophy no doubt reminds the monistic idealist of certain essential things which he in his passion for logic loses sight of, and has thus a negative value. It represents in this

sense a reaction of the individual who has become weary of monistic systems and stretched forth seeking hands towards a more reasonable and humane religious ideal.

But its value is limited because its faith in the values is so one-sided. While it emphasises the emotional and the practical, it ignores the logical values. Reflection is used by the pluralist writers not as a serious thought analysis but rather as a dialectical *tour de force* which must lead us to certain conclusions. A consuming hatred of thought, a complete faith in instinct and impatience of all reasoned solutions of the universe are, to a larger or smaller extent, the prominent features of the new mode of philosophising. The bearings of philosophic doctrines on human hopes have begun to reign in philosophy. Much of the chaos and unsettlement in the realm of philosophy can ultimately be traced to this sin against the scientific method of philosophy.

Pluralism is right in rebelling against the conception of a block universe. It points to the central defect of a shallow and static, narrow and abstract monism, which clings to a timeless absolute and reduces human effort to an illusion. Life is not a stage-play or a mimic show, but a hard battle where the individual has to risk and fight. Moral life depends on the autonomy of self. But in emphasising the moral aspect, the pluralist forgets the religious aspect where the individual feels a living dependence on God. As we have more than once said, without the religious belief in perfection, human effort loses its vitality and inspiration. The living ground of all individuals is God. The task of philosophy is to reconcile the claims of morality and religion. Pluralism, ignoring the data of religious consciousness, declares that the finite selves are the ultimate constituents of the universe. Indeterministic pluralism is offered to us as the way of escape from mechanical determinism. As we have seen, contingency and irrationalism are not the only alternatives to mechanism and necessity. The problem of freedom is not, as the pluralist imagines one, between the

determination of conduct and the non-determination thereof, but between the different kinds of determination, the true idealistic and the false mechanical. Idealistic determination holds that the ever active dynamic self is the determining condition. Since the governing factor is the rational self, all human acts will be intelligible, though they cannot always be foreseen.

In our survey of the pluralist systems we have seen how the 'horrid Absolute' rears its head on the most inconvenient occasions. If we start with the parts and attempt to make a whole of them, we shall not succeed, unless we somehow put the whole into the parts. Pluralism without undertaking an analysis of experience assumes that the world consists of a plurality of distinct selves of different grades of development. Their only impulse of activity is the instinct of self-preservation. The starting-point is fictitious. No individual can be conscious of himself as a self unless he feels his oneness with a universal which transcends his little self. The self-consciousness of man is bound up with the consciousness of a universal life. The individual when he opens his eyes to the light of the world does not have any ideas of his separateness from other units, but feels himself to be a part of the whole. It is the presence of the universal in him that goads him on to activity, and ever urges him to transcend his individuality. The individual self is able to conserve its momentary experiences and develop them into a whole of knowledge, wisdom and strength, simply because it is not a mere individual. An isolated individual cannot have any commerce with reality. The universe is not merely an assemblage of separate individuals, but a rational whole. Sooner or later every system of pluralism feels the need for a deeper philosophy and comes to regard its pluralism as an aspect of a deeper monism.

The pluralists in their anxiety to liberalise religion and humanise philosophy have overhumanised God. If

the interests of true democracy are consulted, we will not have a finite personal God, so dear to the heart of the pluralists, but an immanent infinite. If theology should follow politics, God the Father of the Bible or the King of Mr. Wells, would be displaced by God the life of the world, or the soul of the universe. God is the universal life force. He is not a personal God of limited power who shows his hand in human affairs.

Modern Science has no sympathy with a God who interferes with the course of nature. Were God all that the pluralists make him out to be, the challenges of the man in the street such as, Why does not God whisper into the ears of our princes and potentates words of wisdom? Why does he not end this great war? cannot be answered at all unless it be by saying that though he is abounding in goodwill, he is hopelessly destitute of power. The pluralists make God so finite and personal that he is absorbed in man and forfeits his nature. He becomes a growing God subject to time. In our exaltation of becoming, we subject God to the flux and succession of time. In such a philosophy time, instead of being viewed as only a part of truth, becomes the real God or Fate, holding in its grip the growing, struggling God. Such a conception is self-defeating. A personal God can only be an aspect of the Absolute, perhaps the executive authority of the Absolute.

Our conclusion is that the pluralistic movement has succeeded in giving a shake to the supremacy of absolutism in religion and philosophy, but has failed to overthrow it. False absolutism has come down while the true is considerably strengthened. Abstract monism, which destroys personal values and reduces individuality to illusion as much as radical pluralism, which means chaos, and relies on good luck and blind chance for the growing order and harmony of the world, is a defective attitude of life. While the false absolutist made too much of the reciprocal implications of things and the unity of the universe, the pluralist over-emphasises the sharpness and

distinctness of things, their uniqueness and individuality. What we want is a dynamic monism capable of accounting for a growing universe with its time and change. The Absolute should be a real living whole including both the finite and the infinite. Such an energising Absolute would lead to a fluid conception of the world. Then it does not matter what we start with, whole or parts, for we know the whole to be a concrete one, and the parts to be parts only. Since it is impossible at the end of a book to deal constructively with the problems raised, we will, in the next chapter, give the outlines of a scheme, which, to us, appears to satisfy the philosophic needs and impulses as well as the religious claims and aspirations.

CHAPTER XIII

SUGGESTIONS OF AN APPROACH TO REALITY BASED ON THE UPANISHADS

I

PHILOSOPHY is the attempt to think out the presuppositions of experience, to grasp, by means of reason, life or reality as a whole. It seeks to discover a rational explanation of the universe—an explanation which gives to all parts, nature, God and man, their due, views all things in their right proportion, and resolves the contradictions of experience. Philosophy has to find out an all-comprehensive and universal concept which itself requires no explanation, while it explains everything else. It must be the ultimate reality into which all else can be resolved and which cannot itself be resolved into anything else. Philosophy is the theory of reality if by reality we mean something that exists of itself and in its own right and not merely as a modification of something else. The test of a philosophical theory is its capacity to co-ordinate the wealth of apparently disconnected phenomena into an ordered whole, to comprehend and synthesise all aspects of reality.

Attempts to solve the problem of philosophy generally start from inadequate conceptions which lead us on to more adequate ones through their own inner logic. We start with some part of the whole, some conception which accounts for a portion of our experience, and soon mistake it for the whole or the final explanation of things.

We are surprised by contradictions and inconsistencies which condemn the theory as an inadequate solution of the riddle of the universe. The mechanical principles of the physical sciences are of great use and value in the region of inanimate nature, but so soon as we apply them to other fields of reality, say animal life, they confess themselves to be bankrupt. Their poverty becomes patent, and we, on the basis of these notions and their inadequacies, progress to more concrete and definite principles. Philosophy passes in review the different conceptions, which claim to represent the universe, and tests their varying fulness and worth. Philosophy, in this sense, is a criticism of categories. We start with a lower category, criticise it, discard it as incomplete and progress to a higher one wherein the lower receives its fulfilment. Philosophy, then, is a progressive discovery of reality or defining of reality in terms of fundamental conceptions or categories, or a gradual passage from lower, more abstract and indefinite conceptions, to higher, more concrete and definite ones.

The Vedanta thinkers sometimes approach the problem of philosophy from this standpoint. If we turn to chapter iii. of the *Taittiriya Upanishad* we see there a progressive revelation of the true nature of reality to the seeking mind.¹ The Absolute is identified first with one thing, then with another, until we reach a solution which stifles all doubt and satisfies all inquiry by its freedom from discord and contradiction. In that beautiful chapter we find expressed the central contention of the idealist that in all systems of philosophy there are elements of truth as well as inherent defects, limitations which lead us on to some other more concrete development which, again, has to be transcended. The pursuit of truth is more negative than positive, more an escape from incomplete conceptions than the attainment of perfect

¹ It is surprising that Dr. Weber should think that the *Taittiriya Upanishad* exhibits little of the true spirit of speculation, and that many of its notions are fanciful (*Ind. Studien*, vol. ii. p. 210).

truth. This does not mean that we do not reach any solid basis on which our feet can rest. By an immanent criticism of conceptions, we are enabled to discover the most complete or the most fundamental idea, relatively to the rest. We here propose to sketch the picture of the world as it appeared to those ancient seekers after truth.

The discussion about the nature of reality is in the form of a dialogue between the father, Varuna, and the son, Bhrigu. The son approaches the father, entreating him to teach him the nature of reality. The father mentions the general characters or the formal aspects of the Absolute known in the Vedanta philosophy as *Brahman*. It must be something which includes everything else. It is that by which the whole universe is sustained. "That from whence these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death; try to know that. This is *Brahman*" (*Taittiriya Upanishad*, ch. iii. 1). The ultimate reality is that in which we live, move and have our being. It is the whole or the totality. "It includes all the world"; naught exists outside it; "there is nothing else beside it"; it is the *res completa*, that which is complete in itself, determined by itself and capable of being explained entirely from itself. Thus the father describes to the son the general features of reality. He gives him the empty formula and asks him to discover by reflection the content of it. The son proceeds to identify it with one thing after another.

II

The most immediate datum which may be regarded as *given*, and which strikes our mind at first thought, is the world of relatively unorganised matter. One who does not care to strain his thought to go deeper than surface appearances will be struck by the universality and the omnipotence of the material forces. Matter is the basis of life. It is the stuff of which the world is

made. So the son decides upon *Annam*¹ (food, matter) as the content possessing the characteristics of the Absolute above set forth. "He perceived that *Annam* is *Brahman*, for from *Annam* these beings are produced; by *Annam* when born they live; and into *Annam* they enter at their death" (*Taittiriya Upanishad*, iii. 2).

III

It is the nature of any partial or abstract theory to transcend itself and thus manifest its inadequacy. Matter, though it accounts for a part of experience, cannot be the final explanation of things. Thought can never rest in it. While materialism is a sufficient explanation of the inanimate portion of reality, it does not account for the living and conscious aspects of it. If adopted in human affairs, it becomes a thoroughly inadequate and false guide. The materialist's picture of the world disregards the specifically human elements of life. The *whole* of experience cannot be identified with the part of matter. Our thought rebels against treating parts as wholes. So Bhṛigu is convinced that materialism does not effect the unification of reality needed for the Absolute, and it is, therefore, not more than a temporary resting-place for thought. Dissatisfied with his discovery that matter is the Absolute, he approaches his father for help, and his father asks him to think further. "Desire to know *Brahman* by reflection" or deep thought (*Taittiriya Upanishad*, iii. 2). *Paryalochanam* (reflection) is what the father advises.

The son adopts the advice. Further reflection reveals to him the precise inadequacy of the materialist's theory. In organised matter, the plant world, we come across something of which 'matter,' though it is the indispensable basis and aid, is not the complete explanation.

¹ *Annam* is used as equivalent to "matter." See the *Vedānta Sūtras*; *Adhyaya*, iii.; *Pada*, i.; *Sūtras*, xii. and xiii. Vidyāranya, referring to a Chandogya passage, says: "Here by *Annam* is meant 'Earth' or 'matter.'"

So this theory that 'Matter' is Brahman leaves out a good deal of the world of existence, while a true theory should cover the whole range of actuality or existence. Mechanical formulas do not account for life-phenomena. The ultimate reality should be, not matter, but something akin to *Prana* (life). "He perceived that *Prana* is Brahman, for from *Prana* these things are born; by *Prana* when born they live; into *Prana* they enter at their death" (*Taittiriya Upanishad*, iii. 3). Modern scientists recognise what is termed the mystery of life. They have ceased to regard life as a property of matter, but give to it an independent character. From this it should not be inferred that the Vedanta philosophy supports a theory of vitalism. That life cannot be completely accounted for on physico-chemical principles is the element of truth exaggerated in theories of vitalism. Vitalism is no explanation, but only the statement of a problem, to be compared to Molière's *virtus dormitiva*. It emphasises the autonomy of life. According to the Vedanta philosophy it is not correct to speak of a sudden revelation of spirit when we come to life, for even matter is spirit, though in its lowest mode of manifestation. When matter reaches a certain climax of development then life breaks out. Life is a later development or stage of the Real. The Real gradually progresses from one stage to another. We cannot say that the later stage of life is a mere product of the earlier stage of matter. Life is not an extension of matter. It is something different in kind from matter. The evolution of the world is not a mere development, but is a development of the whole or the Real. Both matter and life fall within an all-developing spirit whose very nature is to push onward from one to another and thus reach the full realisation through the very impulse of its own movement. The Vedantic view does not involve the sundering of matter from life. It rejects both mechanism and vitalism. We cannot make life mechanical. The world of mechanism is not the same as the world of life. The two are

distinct, but the discontinuity between matter and life is not so great as to justify vitalism. The world of mechanism is the medium in which alone life has its being. Though life is not mechanism, still life dwells in it. To make life mechanical or mechanism alive is to dissolve the differences in an abstract identity. It would be to sacrifice wealth of content and speciality of service for the sake of symmetry and simplicity. To make mechanism alive would be to deprive matter of its specific function in the universe. Dead mechanism has its own purpose to fulfil, its contribution to make to the wondrous whole. It is, therefore, not right to reduce unity to identity. We must recognise the difference between the two as much as their unity. The world of matter exists for the purpose of responding to the needs of life. The name *Annam* (food) is advisedly given by the Vedanta philosophers to the principle of matter. Matter exists for the purpose of being *used up* by life. It serves as food for living beings. It is not an alien element, but is something which can be 'eaten,' controlled and utilised. It is the food which enters into the organic life, the material which the organism uses to build up its body. The authors of the Upanishads make it clear to us that environment, with its necessity, is not a recalcitrant force, not some dark fate over against which we have to knock our heads in dull despair, but is rather the servant of the organism, the helpmate of life and consciousness, promoting the growth and perfection of higher beings. In short, life and matter, organism and environment are members existing for each other in a larger whole. They are unintelligible when viewed in separation. "Matter is rooted in life, and life in matter" (*Taittiriya Upanishad*, ii. 3).

"Matter decays without life. Life dries up without matter. These two (life and matter), when they have become one, reach the highest state, *i.e.* Brahman" (*Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*, v. 12. 1). The science of physics, which seeks to divorce matter from life and study

matter in its isolation, studies an abstraction, however useful it may be. The ideal of physical science is an explanation of life in terms of mechanism. Anything which comes in the way of this mechanical ideal is unwelcome to physics. Again, if the science of biology concerns itself with life to the exclusion of matter, it will be a science of dead abstractions. What we need is bio-physics and physico-biology. They only would do justice to the different aspects and their essential unity. The whole must be seen as a whole if it is to be seen at all. We see now the exact relation of life and matter. The same whole of reality manifests itself first as matter, then as life. The two are but lower and higher expressions of the deeper reality. They are but movements in one grand scheme. Life, being a higher stage than matter, is the completer truth. Life is the promise and potency of matter, its soul and spirit. The Upanishad says: "*This Prana (life) is the soul of the body.*" Matter is on the road to life, the crystal on the way to the cell; the clod is striving to be a worm. Life includes and transcends matter. It is a more concrete thing than matter. Matter is a fragmentary abstraction from the standpoint of life, for in life the mere externality of matter is transcended and overcome. The parts are no more external to each other, but are elements in an organic whole with a definite end. In the living body the elements co-operate in the preservation of the organism. But even in the living body there is an element of externality which will diminish as we proceed to the next higher category of *Manas* (mind) or consciousness.

IV

The whole world of reality refuses to be squeezed into the category of life. Though *Prana* or life is nearer to reality than matter or mechanism, still it cannot account for consciousness. The category of life, failing to embrace the whole of reality, confesses itself to be but a partial truth covering only a limited field of experience. It

cannot, therefore, be put forward as the ultimate essence or principle of the world of reality. Once again the son approaches the father. The father asks him to think to the bitter end without stopping at half-way houses. He pursues his reflection and discovers that the higher forms of life require us to introduce another category to describe their relations. The new factor of consciousness makes its appearance as life develops. *Manas*, or perceptual consciousness, is the sole reality. "He perceived that *Manas* is *Brahman*, for from *Manas* these beings are born; by *Manas* when born they live; into *Manas* they enter at their death" (iii. 4). Here by *Manas* is meant perceptual consciousness which delights in sense objects and is moved by instincts and impulses.

The relation of mind to life is exactly of the same kind as the relation of life to matter. "Mind is the soul of *Prana* or life." Mind is not a by-product of body or life, but is the central core of it. The two are different expressions of the one spiritual essence, lower and higher stages of a single all-embracing life. It is puerile to minimise the distinction between the two by vitalising mind or mentalising life. While recognising the distinction we should not lose our grip on the essential unity which underlies the distinction. The two contribute in their own distinct ways to the same individual whole. The two are so fashioned and constructed as to develop and promote a complete identity. They are aspects of the ultimate spirit, through the interaction of which the whole realises itself. The science of biology which studies life, neglecting mind, the fruit and essence of life, studies an abstraction. Psychology, if it divorces mind from life and studies mind as an isolated phenomenon, apart from its setting in life and the organism, lays itself open to the fallacy of the abstract. It studies not human minds but disembodied ghosts. It is 'phantomology' and not psychology. It is a good sign that psychology at the present day views its subject-matter from the biological point of view. Psychology studies not merely the

psyche, but the psychophysical organism. The conscious organism can be seen as a whole only by bio-psychology or psycho-biology. Only then shall we know mind in its origin and working.

V

The concept of *Manas* (mind) is higher than that of life or matter. It is the richer, fuller and more inclusive concept. But the searching intellect is not satisfied with its adequacy, for the perceptual consciousness does not exhaust the nature of reality. No doubt it accounts for the animal mind. Animals have only a perceptual consciousness, their mental horizon being restricted to mere perceptions of the present moment. The animal mind is devoid of the power of synthesis, and, therefore, of self-consciousness. But the human consciousness is capable of rising above itself, of comparing itself with other selves, and of passing judgements on its own character. The man judges while the animal only senses. He is a being of "wise discourse, looking before and after." He is able to transcend the animal limitations, break down the despotism of the senses and lift himself above himself. While the animal leads a life of mere feeling and impulse, the self-conscious individual regulates his life in conformity with the ideals of beauty, goodness and truth. The animal is at the mercy of impressions from without, abandoning its mind to every chance idea. But man gathers himself into himself and directs his impulses towards objective ends. Speaking of animals, Whitman observes :

They do not sweat and whine about their condition.

They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins.

Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things.

Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago.

Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth.

(*Song of Myself*, 32.)

It is the capacity to distinguish facts from idea which makes possible art, morality and science. A higher

category than animal mind or perceptual consciousness is felt to be necessary. The son approaches the father and is advised by him to think to the root of the matter. The son realises, on reflection, that the specific quality of man, which makes him the lord of creation, is his intellectuality. By his intellect or understanding he seeks the true, attempts the good and loves the beautiful. By it he connects sensations, compares and contrasts them with one another and derives inferences. It gives the power of synthesis. To it is due the self-consciousness of man. So the seeker after truth turns to *Vijnana* or understanding. "He perceived that *Vijnana* (intellect) was *Brahman*, for from *Vijnana* these beings are born; by *Vijnana* when born they live; into *Vijnana* they enter at their death" (iii. 5).

What is the relation of *Vijnana* to *Manas*, or understanding to perception? This is the familiar question of epistemology, the relation of the universal to the particular, concept to percept, thought to sense. Understanding is related to perception as mind to life, or as life to matter. *Vijnana* is the higher form of the lower *Manas*. It is the soul of *Manas* or its essential reality. "*Vijnana* is the soul (or spirit) of *Manas*" (ii. 4). Nothing is gained by divorcing intellect from sense. Such a divorce leads to abstract explanations of reality. Sense is the condition of thought. Thought does not produce or create a new order of existence. The sense world is not a mere chaos of particulars into which thought, later and from outside, introduces order and system. Thought only discovers or explicates the order which already prevails in the world of facts. The ideals of the world reveal themselves to thought. We seek order of facts. As in science we try to interpret the order prevalent in the actual and discriminate it from our errors and prejudices, so in morality we try to seek the goodness of things and discriminate the good from the bad. We are not creating a new moral world by our action. The tendency to neglect the perceptual basis is

the besetting temptation of the intellectualist temper. Rationalist theories which sacrifice the particular to exalt the universal reduce the universe, in the vivid phrase of Bradley, to an "uneasily ballet of bloodless categories." We get a philosophy of arid concepts having nothing to do with the flowing experience of life. Truth becomes a dead conformity to certain logical conceptions and ideas with no promptings from life. In art technique gets the mastery over temperament. Art expresses the critical and not the creative attitude of life. There is a predominance of form and a weakening of creative genius. Morality comes to be of the drill-sergeant type, insisting on nothing more than a blind unthinking obedience to the commands delivered. Moral life becomes identical with correct routine. Rationalism thus murders reality to dissect it. We miss the music of the stars in calculating their exact orbits. We find a mechanical perfection in place of spiritual beauty, cold uninspired reason in place of the vivifying light of synthesis, logic in place of life. Organisation is the ideal, but the process of starving the real leaves no material to organise. Philosophy becomes arid and abstract, art mechanical and soulless, and ethics formal and dead. The dire consequences resulting from the adoption of this exaltation of brain over the soul, in practical affairs of the world, we see to-day on the fields of Europe. We have noticed systems of philosophy which protest against this deification of intellect. But in their righteous revolt against the abuse of logic they are led to the opposite extreme of advocating inordinately the claim of immediate experience. The tendency to exclude logic from life is as vicious as the other tendency to exclude life from logic. The abstract and one-sided nature of mere empiricism is reflected in the world of philosophy, art and morality. Under its influence the superficial aspects of things are noted and the underlying principles neglected. Naturalistic explanations become dominant in philosophy. Art is sensualistic, and ethics economic or utilitarian in

the lowest sense of the term. Buoyant undiscipline and unrestraint are sometimes enthroned. Mere percept and mere concept are both good for nothing. Both are abstracts reified. Kant spoke a great truth which the world cannot afford to forget when he said that "percepts without concepts are blind ; concepts without percepts are empty." Percepts are blind without the universal of the mind that introduces order into chaos, but universals are abstract and empty until we actually see them operating in facts. The essential unity of these two distinct factors the Vedanta thinkers recognise. They hold that true insight is born of the union of the universal and the particular.

VI

The self-conscious individual in whom *Vijnana* functions at its best becomes the highest expression of reality, if there is nothing higher than intellect. But self-consciousness which is the product of intellect presupposes self-distinction. At the intellectual level that which is conscious of itself is exclusive of others. The self is a one among many. The self not only distinguishes itself from others, but excludes others from its nature. A "pluralistic universe" is the last word of wisdom if intellect represents the highest phase of reality. Pluralism is true within limits, but it is not final. It is but a step on the way to ultimate truth. The thinking mind recognises certain difficulties in the way of accepting the pluralistic solution as final. The natural outcome of such an intellectualist pluralism will be a narrow philistine spirit of individualism, sensualism, and selfishness. The individuals enter into rivalry with one another for the satisfaction of their appetites and ambitions. Such a view will develop a sort of morbid ease and self-satisfaction with the actual, and thus curb all efforts for the improvement of mankind. It would make it impossible for the finite mind to transcend its finiteness. It gives man no ideal of the solidarity of the universe to which he has to work himself up. The

religious experience in which the human consciousness in a mood of exaltation feels itself to be at one with the whole universe baffles this intellectual analysis. The fact of ever aspiring, ever striving for something higher which man has not, but hopes to have, is not satisfactorily explained. Man recognises his incompleteness and imperfection and seeks for something above himself, an ideal, an infinite. If the individual's highest aim is merely to secure an independent status for himself, he becomes divorced from his real, *i.e.* his divine self. It is impossible for man, a child of eternity, to distinguish himself from God in the long run. He cannot fix any boundary to his real life. If he seeks his private self-satisfaction he seeks the finite as if it were the infinite. It is the self-contradiction of a being who knows not what he really is, and seeks his good where it can never be found. If the world is a number of distinct and isolated units, then peace and harmony are *a priori* impossible. Pluralism by itself cannot give any satisfactory account of the unity of the world of spirits. Most of the modern pluralistic systems, as we have seen, suffer from this weakness.

There is no doubt that human self-consciousness represents, though not the highest, yet a very high manifestation of reality. "The Atman is expanded only in man. He is most endowed with intelligence. He speaks what is known, he sees what is known. He knows what is to come, he sees the visible and the invisible worlds. He desires to obtain immortality by appropriate means. Thus endowed is man" (see *Aitareya Aranyaka*, ii., iii. 2. 4). He has ideals of knowledge, beauty and goodness, but he does not as a finite consciousness realise his aspirations. He only struggles toward union, peace, and harmony. Though he ever strives toward union with the whole or the divine, he never grasps it on account of his finiteness and impotence. Finite souls never realise, though they ever strain after, the pure bliss and self-forgetful realisation, which in Vedantic phraseology is called *Ananda*. The sciences

belonging to the intellectual level are sciences of struggle and endeavour and not sciences of fruition or fulness of attainment. They are sciences of approach to reality. Logic with its impulse toward totality *d demands* a complete and consistent world ; love *struggles* for union with the whole, and life *attempts* to realise the all-perfect in conduct. In all these regions of mind we catch glimpses of the real, but do not have the full vision with its joy unspeakable and the peace that passeth all understanding. We have *demands*, *struggles* and *attempts*. We are in the *striving* stage. We are only on the road with a dim vision of the end ; the fulfilment is still a distant scene. The full splendour is not yet. So human self-consciousness, which belongs to the intellectual level, is incomplete and imperfect as it has still to pray and aspire. It is only a grade of reality to be transcended in something higher, but not the whole of reality. On the other hand, if intellect should be the highest phase of reality, then morality, law, and justice become the ultimate terms and struggle the end of existence. What a poor, imperfect thing man will be if he has no prospect of realising his ideals ! His effort to become something greater, holier and higher than his own finiteness will be unsuccessful. The world will be cut into two as with a hatchet, self and not-self, with the result of a metaphysical and moral dualism, antagonism between soul and body, and separation between God and man. Man's desire for unity cannot remain with such a state of division. If we do not embrace the two, self and not-self, in a final higher unity, then man's spiritual endeavours are foredoomed to failure. The uncertainty of life, the vanity of human wishes, the doom of love are writ large on the face of the earth, and man feels himself an utter stranger in it. It is vain to attempt to subdue the stars or overcome death. Pessimism is man's only refuge, and prayer all his business. He presses on towards a higher life, but cruel fate crushes the human soul. He desires to throw off his brutish heritage and reach heaven ; but the blind forces

of nature, which go on their relentless way caring naught for the human victims, dash him down to the bottomless void. He wishes to touch the Happy Isle, but the gulfs wash him down. The world which surrounds him is a dark and immovable fate which clutches, crushes and swallows up that priceless possession whose soul is worth more than all the worlds put together. He is a rebel against the universe, a Prometheus fighting against the course of nature with its silence and darkness, emptiness and immensity of space. The intellect, with its vision confined to outward appearance, is struck with "nature red in tooth and claw." Such an outward vision gives the impression that we are caught in the wheels of a soulless engine, which has neither the eyes to see our agony nor the heart to feel for us. We are the victims of a merciless fate, trapped in the grip of destruction. It is the Everlasting Nay of Carlyle. "I lived," writes poor Teufelsdröckh, "in a continual, indefinite, pining fear; tremulous, pusillanimous, apprehensive of I know not what; it seemed as if all things in the heavens above and the earth beneath would hurt me; as if the heavens and the earth were but boundless jaws of a devouring monster wherein I palpitating lay awaiting to be devoured." Intellectualist despair is the mental attitude of those who break the real into self and not-self and make the universe a tug-of-war between the two. Matthew Arnold's insistent note of sadness is due to his theory of the opposition of self and not-self.

"No, we are strangers here, the world is from of old. To tunes we did not call, our being must keep chime."¹

¹ Nature is cruel, man is sick of blood;
 Nature is stubborn, man would fain adore;
 Nature is fickle, man hath need of rest;
 Nature forgives no debt, and fears no grave;
 Man would be mild and with safe conscience blest;
 Man must begin, know this, where nature ends;
 Nature and man can never be fast friends.
 Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave.

M. ARNOLD.

How pathetic is this expression of despair, born of an intellectual vision which disdains to dive beneath appearances!

The world is foreign to us, and we are not tuned to it. "There is indeed one element in human destiny that not blindness itself can controvert; whatever else we are intended to do, we are not intended to succeed; failure is the fate allotted." That is the verdict of R. L. Stevenson. The system of nature does not sympathise with the bliss for which we sigh. Our boundless hopes are shattered to dust and our tenderest ideals mocked by the stern indifference of nature. The microcosm is pitted against the macrocosm, and to all outward appearances the external world seems to be the more potent force. If a man takes arms against the leagued powers of darkness his whole moral fabric collapses, and he will be struck by the pitiful impotence of virtue. The condition of man in eternal subjection to the dark and unreasoning but still eternal power is only an object of pity. If such a power that is alien to the human soul rules the universe, there is nothing left but to fold one's hands and be damned for ever. What can man do in this plight except withdraw from the world and obtain inner freedom by renunciation and contemplation? He must be ready to undergo every pang of personal and individual suffering inflicted on him by the blind and brutal forces working darkly towards no intelligible goal. He is the ideal man who tempers himself to go through the furnace unscathed, who trains himself to be indifferent to all extremity of physical suffering, and faces boldly and with proud endurance and resignation whatever befalls him, happiness or misery, good or evil. We should possess a will that is ready to suffer and endure. "By the Tiber as by the Ganges, ethical man admits that the cosmos is too strong for him, and, destroying every bond which ties him to it by ascetic discipline, he seeks salvation in absolute renunciation" (Huxley, *Romanes Lecture*, p. 29). Meredith bids the soul seek peace in solitude and separation. The *Sankhya* philosophy of ancient India starts with a dualism of *Purusha* (self) and *Prakriti* (not-self). They are the two eternal uncreated substances differing essentially from

each other. Deliverance is to be obtained by realising the separateness of the two and dissolving the bond between them. Man to gain his freedom has to cut himself off from the ties that bind him to nature. We are exhorted by Mr. Russell in his admirable essay on the Freeman's worship to cherish, adore, and love the ideals where the mind is at home, caring naught for the universe. He builds an ethic of renunciation on a "firm foundation of despair." The diseased asceticism of the sick soul who is not reconciled to the world, and not the robust and joyous asceticism of the healthy-minded is recommended to us. We are engaged in an unequal struggle between man and nature, self and not-self. A mere contemplation of it would produce a stoic calm combined with a stern pathos. We may adopt militant heroism if we care for the martyr's crown. We may oppose our will to the dark power of that immense and merciless God of sheer chance and necessity which dominates the courses of time. But even martyrs die with the complaint, My God, why hast thou forsaken me? When even a Christ had been left forsaken in the agony of the cross, why should we believe in the existence of God and the reality of spiritual values? It is not given to us to triumph over the shocks of circumstance. The destiny of man seems to be struggle, unrest and baffled hope. This pessimistic conclusion of the world-weariness is the essential theme of the Buddhists. To them pity is the highest virtue. A hard world of terror cannot but produce a stream of tears. They say there is nothing else than this world-process or Samsara. They have no idea of another world where life will be transformed. So long as the spiritual vision of harmony does not supplement the intellectual vision of discord, life will be one continuous shedding of tears for human suffering. According to Buddhism, there is neither a changeless God responsible for the world of misery nor a suffering deity struggling against the attacks of Satan. Buddhism considers the appearance of opposition to be final, and exhorts man to

get out of this whirlpool by sinking his selfhood. That is the only way of escape from the terror of the *Samsara*. The tendency of Buddhism is to drift away from the world, taking submission to fate as the chief virtue and exalting the contemplative life above activism. But this is too harsh a conclusion to be accepted by all. The necessity for a God who somehow helps us over this pass arises. Buddha is deified and made the means of escape to the great peace beyond from the confusion of the world. A supreme soul or *Iswara* soon appears to help the individual in his warfare against the not-self. So God along with man battles with the prince of darkness. The atheism of the *Sankhya* system gives place to the theism of the *Yoga* philosophy. We have, then, the individual self, God and nature ; the individual self, according to *Saiva Siddhanta*, *Vaishnavism* and Christianity and other theistic systems, has to extricate himself from the fetters of *Nature* by the grace of *God*. The Highest in all these theistic systems is looked upon as a personal godhead, a father, creator or providence, accessible to prayer and propitiation, ever loving man and granting his requests. By the help of God it is possible for man to escape from the world of *Samsara*. If we think in the acquired dialect of the intellect we will not be able to reach the highest, which includes all other things. We will get a pluralistic universe presided over by a God, whose position in the world is ambiguous. If we say that God is over against a number of spirits and that the Absolute is a republic of spirits including God, we ask what is the position of God in the republic ? If he is one among the many, he is reduced to the level of the finite beings. If man himself is part of God we shirk the whole problem by raising man to the level of the infinite. Pluralism is displaced by an abstract monism. But the pluralist's God is not the perfection transcending both good and evil, not the Absolute which absorbs them both, but only a force within it fighting with another. Such a God can only be an aspect of reality, and not the

whole of it. Besides this conception of God opposed to the world naturally culminates in deism. God is transcendent to the world because the world is evil and he is good. He has nothing which nature has, and can only be defined negatively. The universe is reduced to an opposition of self and not-self, God and the world, the infinite and the finite. Certainly both cannot be real, for the two are exclusive of each other. The finite world is dismissed as illusory and the absolute posited as real. Earth is a dream and heaven the reality. For if we argue about the problem of the origin of the world and man's place in it, we will be drowned in a sea of contradictions. Kant, and after him Bradley, have shown the difficulty of reconciling the antinomies with which our understanding confronts us. The self-contradictory cannot be real. Therefore the finite world is illusory and the Absolute is real, for it is pure affirmation. But the Absolute, which repels the relative, cannot be anything more than an undifferentiated unity which is the negation of the finite and the determinate. The Absolute is related, if we can talk of relation in this sense, only negatively to the world. The Absolute collapses into a self-identity, negatively related to the particulars, a featureless unity leaving aside all differences. To this Absolute none of the attributes of finite being belongs. If we attach any predicate to it we will bring it down to the level of the finite. It is not anything which the finite world is. If the finite world is many, it is one; if it is complex, it is simple; if it is varying, it is constant; if it is temporal, it is eternal. Strip off everything finite and what remains is the infinite or God. Everything positive is excluded from the real, mind and matter not excepted. Escape from the finite life is the goal of humanity. Such are the views of some of the neo-Platonists. The fatal criticism against all such abstract notions of the Absolute is that they do not give any explanation of the finite universe. To say that the Absolute is the external and accidental cause of the

universe is no answer. To dismiss the world as illusion only removes the difficulty a little farther, for the question still arises, What is the cause of this world illusion? If we stick fast to the intellectual level we have either a bare unity or a collection of separate elements. But in no case is it possible for us to have a unity in diversity, an organic system in which the whole should be known through the distinction and relation of all the parts. Are we to stick to this vision of the world where we do not see the two, unity and diversity, as elements in a whole or factors in a unity? That vision is not satisfying.

The distinction between self and not-self is not an irrational surd which cannot be eliminated, but a distinction within a unity. In man there is a struggle between the higher and the lower, self and not-self (*Purusha* and *Prakriti*). He is an amphibious animal living in two worlds. Born of matter, entangled in it, and oppressed by want and misery, he still has the divine spark which gives him a place in the spiritual realm of freedom. But the struggle between the divine and the human is bound to result in a complete triumph of the spirit, and the consequent idealisation of the material aspect. The self with its "ought" comes down on the not-self and, in spite of the refractory nature of the latter, transforms it. Knowledge presupposes a unity between subject and object; without this basis knowledge is impossible. The very distinctions made by the intellect presuppose a unity which is not grasped by intellect. The interpretability of nature is proof positive of the kinship of object with subject, nature with mind. The obvious correspondence between the nature in which we live, and the constitution of the intellectual powers we possess to explain it, points to their belonging to one whole. There is a reason in things to whose guidance we may confidently trust ourselves. The antithesis between self and not-self is resolved in the Vedanta philosophy, and the two are reconciled; "*Purusha* (the self) is the eater, *Prakriti* (not-self) is the food, and, abiding

with it, he feeds" (*Maitrayana Brahmana Upanishad*, vi. 10). The not-self offers the conditions which are the material of self, and the self, instead of being the slave of the not-self, is the highest and the most articulate expression of the not-self. Self and not-self do not run counter to each other. They are no rivals; rather do the two help each other in fulfilling the mission of the divine. They are co-operating and not conflicting elements in the whole. We cut in two the whole and then view the environment as an alien influence checkmating the individual at every step of his progress. An antagonism is set up between man and nature, and man is supposed to wrest treasures from nature, but truly man is in an environment which is human and spiritual. The world glows with God. The individual is said to progress by fighting and conquering nature. We forget that nature could not be conquered by him if it were different from him in its essence. It is unnecessary for man to tear himself away from his environment, place himself over against it to master it as if it were something alien. It is a kind of peaceful and restful union with the environment where its life flows over into his life. The world of intellect is not the absolute reality. It is only the half real world of claims and counter-claims. There is a higher stage, the life of spirit. The sceptic hypothesis that human experience with its strivings and defeats, mistakes and limitations, is the most complete is not in accord with fact, while the other view that there is a world where the problems are solved, ends attained, defeats overcome, and mistakes corrected, is. There is an experience which is the perfection of all imperfections in us. We are compelled to concede that man is but a transition stage, a rope, as Nietzsche puts it, between the beast and the superman of the future. It is therefore a system of absolute idealism, however much we may try to disguise it by giving it other names, that preserves to us the reality of the ideals and the unity of the pluralistic world. We have seen

how even thinkers strongly inclined to the pluralistic notions are compelled by sheer force of logic to embrace their pluralism in a higher idealism. We may here give another illustration. Professor Upton says : " It follows, therefore, that, though atoms and bodies appear to be isolated co-existences in space, this complete isolation and seeming independence of each other is only an appearance ; for the reciprocal causality by which all these atoms and bodies are linked together inevitably forces us to the conclusion that deeper than the apparent spatial distance and division there is a metaphysical unity, or, in other words, that the self-subsistent creative ground of all finite existence does not wholly separate Himself from any one of the plurality of dependent energies or beings into which He differentiates himself ; and therefore, as every finite atom or finite soul still remains, as regards a part of its nature, in indivisible union with its self-subsistent ground and source, the common relation of the self-subsistent one affords a true explanation of the metaphysical unity of the cosmos, and also of the possibility of reciprocal action of the monads of nature on each other, and of reciprocal action of the finite mind on nature and of nature on the mind. Thus the most recent science and philosophy appear to assert at once a real pluralism or individualism in the world of finite beings, but at the same time a deeper monism. The Eternal, who differentiates His own self-subsistent energy into the infinite variety of finite existence, is still immanent and living in every one of these different modes of being, and it is because all finite or created beings are only partially individual, and still remain in vital union with their common ground, that it becomes possible for them through the medium of this common ground to act dynamically on each other ; and it is for the same reason that those finite beings such as man, who have attained to self-consciousness, are able to enter into intellectual, moral, and spiritual relations, both with other rational finite minds and also with

the eternal being with whom their own existence is in some measure indivisibly conjoined " (*Bases of Religious Belief*, pp. 12-13). Pluralist thinkers are driven to admit the existence of an all-embracing unity as the ground of the world and recognise the finite selves as differentiations thereof, though they try very hard to give the finite souls separate individualities.

The reality of the ideals of knowledge, art and action has for its basis the highest unity such as cannot be realised by *Vignana* (Intellect) which revels in distinctions of self and not-self, subject and object, man and the universe, organism and environment. Our knowledge aspires to something more than knowledge, an intuitive grasp of the fundamental unity; our morality to something more than morality, viz. religion; our self to something more than personality, viz. God or the Absolute. Our knowledge is incapable of bringing us into contact with the whole. It aims at the unity, though the limitations of intellect forbid the attainment of unity. The highest unity " from which all speech with the mind turns away, unable to reach it " (*Taittiriya Upanishad*, ii. 4) cannot be grasped by intellect.¹ A mere thinker cannot understand the nature of reality. He cannot have the feeling of aesthetic satisfaction or enter into the life of the religious consciousness. If the nature of man is exhausted by pure thought, then perhaps the nature of the Absolute may be reduced to a mere skeleton, mere symbols by which we represent it, or methods by which we approach it. Our many-sided nature is a reflex of the many-sidedness

¹ *Kena Upanishad* says: " The eye does not go thither, nor speech, nor mind. We do not know, we do not understand, how any one can teach it. It is different from the known, it is also above the unknown " (i. 3-4. See also i. 5-9.) Compare what an English absolutist, Mr. Joachim, says in the *Nature of Truth*: " It is obvious that the demands thus made cannot be *completely* satisfied by any metaphysical theory. For the complete satisfaction of these demands would be complete truth manifest to itself. And every metaphysical theory, as the outcome of experience which is partial and so far finite, is at best a partial manifestation of the truth, and not the whole truth wholly self revealed " (p. 171. Italics in the original).

of reality. We must become sensuous-intellectual-intuitional to know reality in its flesh and blood and not merely its skin and bone. The universe does not spell out its secret to finite man. It withholds from him the mystery which he strains to see. The human understanding can classify, relate and create out of given data, but it cannot say anything about the Absolute which is one without a second, and which is no object of the senses, but constitutes the self of the whole world. The *Kena Upanishad* says: "It is other than the known and above the unknown." Simply because it is not open to knowledge we cannot say it is unreal. The illusions and contradictions of the intellect according to the Vedanta philosophy only exhibit the insufficiency of intellect to grasp the whole. They only show that there is a higher form of experience or order of consciousness, and that the spiritual life is not exhausted by the intellectual. To realise that there is the one all-encompassing reality including self and not-self, we have to proceed to the next higher stage. Finding the finite intellect infected with duality, and realising its inadequacy to represent the real, the son approaches the father, who asks him to persist in his inquiry. Bliss (or *Ananda*) reveals itself as the final explanation, "He perceived that *Ananda* is *Brahman*; for from *Ananda* these beings are born; by *Ananda* when born they live; into *Ananda* they enter at their death" (iii. 6). The whole world is *Ananda* taking form. Infinite in space and endless in variety, it is incontestably the whole. We have direct experience of this bliss or delight in philosophic contemplation, artistic worship and religious devotion. In them we gain the ultimate peace beyond the unrest of life, attain the glorious harmony transcending all discords, and grasp the unity of purpose which works through the apparent conflict of natural and social forces. The seer, the sage and the saint all enter into direct communion with the heart of things. In that stage self and not-self are felt to be clasped in one. "All fears cease."

Incidents of the earth no more trouble the knower. Timidity and despair cannot live in that spiritual climate. The self has the consciousness that there is nothing else beside the Absolute. "One finds nothing else, knows nothing else, but the self." "All this is the self and self alone" (*Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*, ii. 4-6). So long as the individual holds to the hard distinction between self and not-self, he has not reached the highest. It is said, "Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the infinite. Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the finite" (*Chandogya Upanishad*, vii. 24). The oneness of the universe cannot be characterised by anything else but bliss, joy, or delight. "Seeing the self by the self, he is satisfied in his own self" (*Bhagavad Gita*, vi. 20). The saying attributed to Jesus in 2 Clement vi., "When the two shall be one, that which is without, and that which is within," refers to this highest experience. It is the heaven of Dante, free from darkness, confusion and antagonism. It is characterised by peace, perfection and tranquillity. The aspirations of knowledge, love, morality are here transformed into actualities. The dim and fleeting consciousness of the ultimate oneness of the lower stages is transfigured into an enduring and all-transforming possession. The real and the ideal, the final and the efficient, become one in the self-realising whole. The unity of subject and object is no more an ideal, but we see it face to face. The oppositions of the finite consciousness are all reconciled. The son arrives at this stage and is no more troubled with doubts. His inquiry ceases. From *Ananda* matter, life, consciousness and understanding are born, in *Ananda* they live, and to *Ananda* they return. The harmony of man and the universe, *Chit* (intelligence) and *Sat* (reality) is realised. In that moment of divine vision described in the *Bhagavad Gita* the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth was seen by *Arjuna* moving in the radiance of God. In

those awful moments of mystic illumination we see things with the eye of eternity. This religious or intuitional experience is the summit of the whole evolution. It is the crowning round of human life. It is the completion and the consecration of the whole struggle. It is "the light that never was on sea or land, the consecration, and the poet's dream." Here terminates the philosopher's quest for reality in which thought can rest.

If self-consciousness is the distinctive mark of the intellectual experience, self-forgetfulness characterises the *Ananda* (bliss) condition.¹ It is the state where the self loses itself in the universe and by so losing finds its own realisation. Peace and harmony we have, for the self offers itself up wholly and completely to the service of the Absolute. So long as we feel ourselves to have individualities of our own, we will be beset with conflict and contradiction, pain, and pleasure, but when once we disinterestedly give ourselves up to the whole, there is an end of all discord. We are small and feeble creatures until the light shines upon us, the light that reveals to us that God is the central reality. But when once we are lit up by the fire, our imperfection and our little notions are consumed in it and we are fused with the great purpose of God. "Whatever thou doest, whatever thou eatest, whatever thou sacrificest, whatever thou givest, in whatever austerity thou engagest, do it as an offering to Me" (*Bhagavad Gita*, ix. 27). "Fix thy mind on Me, be devoted to Me, sacrifice to Me, bow down to Me. Thus steadied, with Me as thy Supreme Goal, thou shalt reach Myself the Self" (*Bhagavad Gita*, ix. 34). Only this complete renunciation of self and delivering up to the whole will liberate us from the pairs of opposites (cf. *Bhagavad Gita*, ix. 28). The beautiful tradition that no

¹ Dost thou know why wine I prize ?
He who drinks all ill defies,
And can awhile throw off the thrall
Of self, the God we worship, all.

man can see God and live¹ points to this truth that finite selfhood is incompatible with the life of the spirit. It shows how we cannot see God until we roll the stone of self away. The religious individual feels himself to be, not a selfish atom in the universe, but part of an order with a station to occupy and a function to fulfil in the economy of things. With his vision ever on the supreme, the religious soul approaches the facts of existence. Nothing daunts him as he is convinced that his soul cannot be conquered. "What do you think is the grandeur of storms and dismemberments, and the deadliest battles and wrecks, and the wildest fury of the elements, and the power of the sea, and the motion of nature, and of the throes of human desires, and dignity, and hate, and love. It is that something in the soul which says, 'Rage on, whirl on, I tread master here and everywhere; master of the spasms of the sky and of the shatter of the sea, master of nature and passion and death, and of all terror and all pain'" (Preface to *Leaves of Grass*, Whitman). He knows that the forces of the world co-operate with him in the realisation of the highest. He then cries with Marcus Aurelius, "O universe! what thou wishest I wish." He lives above the plane of human experience, but still in it. He is the hero of the world who deserves worship at our hands.

It is not right to presume that intuition, by which we see the oneness of things, negates whatever intelligence posits. Intuition does not cease to be rational simply because reason is transcended. Intuition is the crown of reason. "The blindness of intellect begins when it would be something of itself" (Emerson). Intuition is really the soul of intelligence. The unity we will be able to grasp by means of intuitive insight is the presupposition of all intellectual progress. Intuition is only the higher stage of intelligence, intelligence rid of its separatist and discursive tendencies. While it liberates us from

¹ "The Lord said to Moses, Thou canst not see my face: because man cannot see me, and live."

the prejudices of the understanding, it carries our intellectual conclusions to a deeper synthesis. Instead of being an unnatural or a mysterious process it is a deeper experience which, by supplementing our narrow intellectual visions, amplifies it. Intuition is not an appeal to the subjective whims of the individual, or a dogmatic faculty of conscience, or the uncritical morbid views of a psychopath. It is the most complete experience we can possibly have. It is the experience which devout souls have in moments of spiritual exaltation or religious devotion. Hegel, and after him Bradley, testify to the highest worth of this religious experience. Hegel says: "All the various peoples feel that it is in the religious consciousness they possess truth, and they have always regarded religion as constituting their true dignity and the Sabbath of their lives. Whatever awakens in us doubt and fear, all sorrow and all care, we leave behind on the shores of time: and as from the highest peak of a mountain, far away from all definite view of what is earthly, we look down calmly on all the temptations of the landscape and of the world, so with the spiritual eye man, lifted out of the hard realities of the actual world, contemplates it as something having only the semblance of existence, which, seen from this pure region bathed in the beams of the spiritual sun, merely reflects back its shades of colour, its varied tints and lights, softened away into eternal rest" (*Philosophy of Religion*, English translation, i. 3). So Hegel. Bradley says: "We can see at once that there is nothing more real than what comes in religion. To compare facts such as these with what comes to us in outward existence would be to trifle with the subject. The man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness knows not what he seeks" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 449). The religious consciousness represents the highest possible relation to reality. "So far then—psychologically and historically—there is nothing unique in religious faith at all: it is only the

crowning phase of a long series" (James Ward, *Faith and Science*, quoted in *Edinburgh Review*, January 1916, p. 80). Mysticism is the most scientific form of religion according to Dean Inge. "There is," Walt Whitman writes, "apart from mere intellect in the make up of every superior human identity, a wondrous something that realises without argument, frequently without what is called education (though I think it the goal and apex of all education deserving the name), an intuition of the absolute balance, in time and space, of the whole of this multifariousness, this revel of fools, an incredibly made belief and general unsettledness we call the world; a soul-sight of that divine clue and unseen thread which holds the whole congeries of things, all history and time, and all events however trivial, however momentous, like a leashed dog in the hand of the hunter" (*Specimen Days and Collect*, p. 174). It is the fault of neo-realism that it does not recognise this experience, the genuineness and validity of which are admitted by poets and philosophers alike.

When we talk of intuitional truths we are not getting into any void beyond experience. It is the highest kind of experience where the intellectual conscience of the philosopher and the soaring imagination of the poet are combined. Intuitional experience is within the reach of all provided they themselves strain to it. These intuitional truths are not to be put down for chimeras simply because it is said that intellect is not adequate to grasp them. The whole, the Absolute, which is the highest concrete, is so rich that its wealth of content refuses to be forced into the fixed forms of intellect. The life of spirit is so overflowing that it bursts all barriers. It is vastly richer than human thought can compass. It breaks through every conceptual form and makes all intellectual determination impossible. While intellect has access to it, it can never exhaust its fulness. The real is no more a pulseless identity excluding all difference, nor is it a chaotic disconnectedness with no order in it.

It is the spiritual life, embracing the facts of nature which are shot through and through with the forms of mind. Philosophy is neither purely conceptualist nor merely empiricist, but is intuitional. Art is the living expression of the soul which feels itself to be in tune with the infinite. Morality is no more self-satisfaction or blind obedience to a set of categorical imperatives, but is the life of a soul which feels its grip firmly on the spiritual destiny of the world. Philosophy, art and religion become different expressions of the one feeling of unity with the universe. This feeling of the essential oneness of the world-spirit failed the facts in the lower stages and made them lower, but now the identity is revealed and the Absolute is reached.

The relation of this Absolute *Ananda* to the other categories is one of higher to lower. The lower is included in the higher. The whole world is in *Ananda*, "The other beings live upon a small part of this *Ananda*." This joy is the reality or essence of the lower categories. "Life is the essence of matter, mind of life, knowledge of mind, joy of knowledge" (*Maitrayana Brahmana Upanishad*, vi. 13). The highest and the most concrete category is *Ananda*. It is the first and the last thing. It is the one fact of life. All the rest are imperfect revelations of it.¹ The whole variety of being rests in the Absolute and "is an evolution from that alone" (*Bhagavad Gita*, xii. 30). The world process is the evolution of spirit. The Vedanta philosophy cuts itself away from all materialistic doctrines of evolution. According to it, spirit must be postulated as the ultimate reality, the initial cause of the whole process of evolution; otherwise we cannot account for the rise of the organic from the inorganic, the mental from the organic, the

¹ The categories cannot adequately bring out the nature of Brahman though they all rest in it. "That which is not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed; . . . that which does not think by mind but by which mind is thought; that which does not breathe by breath and by which breath is drawn, that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore" (*Kena Upanishad*, 1, 5, 6, and 9).

rational from the mental, and so on. These constitute the limits of materialist evolution. Again, we cannot credit human reason with any authority if it is ultimately traceable to non-rational causes. The upper tendency or ascending effort which is the central fact of evolution is not thinkable without a central spirit, which is not a mere blind cosmic force, but an infinite and eternal spiritual energy purposeful and intelligent. The *Chandogya Upanishad* says: "From the Self is life, from the Self is desire, from the Self is love, from the Self is *Akasa*, from the Self is light, from the Self are waters, from the Self are manifestation and disappearance, from the Self is food" (vii. 26).

I knew. I felt . . .
What God is, what we are,
What life is—how God tastes an infinite joy
In infinite ways—one everlasting bliss.
From whom all being emanates, all power
Proceeds: in whom is life for ever more,
Yet whom existence in its lowest form
Includes.

BROWNING.

Ultimately, life, mechanism, consciousness and intellect are parts of this comprehensive whole. They are all abstracts from it, and the Absolute is the only *res completa*. It is the only individual. We cannot attribute a substantial existence to the individuals of sense. If we do so we remain, to use Spinoza's language, at the level of imagination without rising to the level of reason. The Absolute, therefore, is the whole, the only individual, and the sum of all perfection. The differences are reconciled in it, and not obliterated. The dead mechanism of stones, the unconscious life of plants, the conscious life of animals, and the self-conscious life of men are all part of the Absolute and its expression at different stages. The same Absolute reveals itself in all these, but differently in each. The ultimate reality sleeps in the stone, breathes in the plants, feels in the animals and awakes to

self-consciousness in man. We see the unity that links being to being, the unity of spirit which slowly passes from inert matter to living plants and so on, upwards through great travail gathering itself into its own substance until we reach God. It progressively manifests itself in and through these particulars. The Absolute thus is an organised whole, with interrelated parts in it. It embraces time, its events and processes. The finite universe is rooted in the Absolute. Life, mechanism, etc., are all members together in one whole. The Absolute is not an abstract unit, but a concrete whole binding together the differences which are subordinate to it. The whole has existence through the parts, and the parts are intelligible only through the whole. The values we find and enjoy while on the way to it are preserved and receive their full supplementation in it. They are not annihilated.

On this view there cannot be any "creation." The question as to why the Absolute limited itself, why God became man, why the perfect became imperfect, is irrelevant. For there is no such thing as infinite which first was an infinite and then transformed itself into the finite. The infinite is the finite. The Absolute is the self and its other. *Gaudapada* in his *Karikas* on the *Mandukya Upanishad* mentions the different theories of the creation of the universe. The universe may be the creation of an extra-cosmic God, or an illusion, or the product of evolution. He dismisses these theories as incorrect, and declares that it is of the nature of God to express himself. It is the essence of spirit to manifest itself. The word Brahman which stands for the Absolute in the Vedanta philosophy is derived from the root *brih* = to grow. It is the nature of the Absolute to grow into the world. The world is the affirmation of the Absolute. The universe is the energising of God. God realises himself in the world. We do not have the infinite and the finite, God and the world, but only the infinite as and in the finite, God as and in the world. The Supreme,

the Eternal, is the unity of all things finite and infinite. But when we consider the development of the Absolute, the distinction of self and not-self appears. The first existent or object in the Absolute is God, *Iswara* or the world-soul. He is the first-born Lord of the universe, the creator of the world and its ruler. The Absolute breaks up its wholeness and develops the reality of self and not-self. The self is God, and the not-self the matter of the universe. All Hindu systems of philosophy posit these two ultimate principles. In the *Sankhya* it is *Purusha* and *Prakriti*; in the *Vedanta* it is *Iswara* and *Maya*; in *Vaishnavism* it is *Krishna* and *Radha*; and in *Shaivism* it is *Shiva* and *Shakti*. *Maya*, *Radha* and *Shakti* are respectively the intellectual, the emotional and the volitional aspects of *Prakriti*. *Krishna*, *Shiva* and *Iswara* are one in essence, and so are *Radha*, *Shakti* and *Maya*. In the Hegelian phraseology "the self separates itself from itself to return to itself to be itself." We come across similar conceptions in the Hebrew doctrine of Wisdom, the Greek doctrine of the Logos and the Christian doctrine of the Son. This not-self is not a positive entity, as the *Sankhya* philosophers view it, but is only the reflection of the *Iswara*, the negative side of the affirmative. *Iswara* or the personal God is not the Absolute, but the highest manifestation of the Absolute. But even its highest manifestation is only a partial expression of it, and not the whole.¹ The opposition of self and not-self necessary for the universe arises. The universe is due to the conjunction of *Maya* (not-self) with *Iswara* (self): "I know *Maya* as *Prakriti* (matter), him who is controlling her as the great ruler (*Maheswara*). The whole world in truth is pervaded by his parts" (*Swetaswatara Upanishad*, iv. 10; cf. *Bhagavad Gita*, xii. 29). By the further differentiation of this original duality of self and not-self, *Iswara* and *Maya*, the whole universe arises. The world process

¹ Sankare speaks of Srikrishna, the fullest incarnation of God according to the tradition as "Amsena sambabhuva," born of a part.

is viewed as an eternal sacrifice, of which the one all-embracing reality is the victim (see *Gatapatha Brahmana*, x. 2. 2. 1; iii. 5. 3. 1; and xiii. 3. 1. 1).

We see now how the popular conception of the world as *Maya* or illusion is erroneous. Brahman, the Absolute, is described in the Vedanta texts as an all-inclusive and not as an exclusive idea. It is the life of life, "the reality of reality" (*Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*, ii. 1. 20). It is "existence, intelligence and bliss."¹ It is not a homogeneous one but a unity or a harmony of different constituent elements. The Absolute is the fulfilment and completion of everything that is in the universe, and not their extinction. It is the consecration of the lower forms of reality and not their destruction. The Vedantic Absolute is not the abstraction of an *être suprême* which deletes all differences but is a spirit that transcends and at the same time embraces all living beings. The *Maya* theory simply says that we are under an illusion if we think that the world of individuals, the pluralistic universe of the intellect, is the absolute reality. Pluralism is true only within limits. But it has to be transcended, that is, completed and supplemented, and not rejected and abolished. The lower is not unreal, which later reflection must attempt to explain away, but is only an aspect of truth that has to be fulfilled at the end. If in that way we make absolutely real what is only relatively real, and mistake a stage for the goal or the final resting-place, we are bound in the chains of *Maya*.² All things are real only as they exist in God. The finite is not truly existent. Again, the Vedanta system cannot be considered pantheistic if by pantheism we mean an identification of the world with God. According to the Vedanta,

¹ "He in whom the heaven, the earth and the sky are woven, the mind also with all the vital airs, know him alone as the Self" (*Mundaka Upanishad*, ii. 2. 5); "That immortal Brahman is before, is behind, Brahman is to the right and the left" (*ibid.* ii. 2. 11).

² See the writer's paper on "The Doctrine of Maya in the Vedanta Philosophy" in the July number of the *International Journal of Ethics*, 1914.

nature or the world is only an expression of God. God is more than the world. The finite reveals the infinite but it is not the whole infinite. The Vedanta does not say that the human self-consciousness of the twentieth century is an adequate revelation of the absolute mind. The Absolute is more than man or for that matter the finite universe which includes man. "This whole world is sustained by one part of myself" (*Bhagavad Gita*, x. 42). "All beings form his foot" (*Taittiriya Aranyaka*, iii. 12).

VII

We will conclude this discussion with a few remarks on the place of imperfection and evil in the Vedanta philosophy. The whole universe has in it the impulse toward union with the Absolute. The pulse of the Absolute beats through the whole world, self and not-self. The world is an imperfect revelation of the Absolute striving to become perfect, or to reach harmony. The universe is the Absolute dynamically viewed. If eternity is a circle, then the process of the universe may be viewed as a straight line. The universe of finite objects gives us, in the words of Plato, a moving image of eternity. The eternal is viewed as a growth or a becoming or a working out. In the universe we have the self-evolution of the Absolute. The lower stages, which are imperfect as compared with the higher, strive to become perfect. The whole universe is a vast struggle to realise the unity which is the ideal. This tension of the universe is mirrored in man, reflected in his individuality. The *Taittiriya Upanishad* declares that man is a microcosm in which all parts of reality are represented on a reduced scale.¹

¹ In chapter ii. of the *Taittiriya Upanishad* it is said that the individual should not be identified with either the physical or the vital or the mental or the intellectual self. The essence of the individual nature is to be found in the self of bliss which is the inmost self of all. Man's highest endowments are imperfect until they culminate in the infinite, viz. the apprehension or realisation of God. Only when he knows God or the Absolute from whom he proceeds

Man is the mirror of creation. His nature reaches up to the Absolute and down to the plant and the animal. While confined to a material organism, the individual self has the capacity to rise beyond intelligence into immediate contact with the divine. To bring about the unity between the higher and the lower is the aim of the individual self as it is the aim of the universe. The individual self is the theatre in which is enacted the drama of the universe, namely, the realisation of a central identity in and by means of the differences of mechanism and life, consciousness and intellect. The impulse toward union and harmony is present in all finite objects. The finite strives to pass out of itself. All objects of the universe are thus double-natured. "Whatever being is born, the unmoving or the moving, know thou, O best of the Bharatas, that to be owing to the union of *Kshetra* and *Kshetragna* (matter and spirit, finite and infinite) (*Bhagavad Gita*, xiii. 26). They are finite-infinite. The finiteness *qua* finiteness is a standing contradiction to the infiniteness. The presence of the infinite enables the individual to break the finite and proceed higher up. It is by such a breaking of the shell of finiteness that the infinite self finds itself and develops. To gain the higher, we must give up the lower. Unless our little self is sacrificed, progress is not possible. Every step on the upward path of realisation means sacrifice of something else. This sacrifice, which means friction, opposition and pain, is the penalty we have to undergo in rising to ourselves on account of our finiteness. Throughout we have these incidents in the growth of a soul. Pain and suffering are phases of all progress. The process of the life of self is also a process of death. To have the fruit

does he reach his perfection. The dim and obscure knowledge of God which he has at the intellectual level becomes definite and clear. Only then is he said to realise his ideal. In finite life we see the Absolute as through a glass darkly, but when we transcend our finiteness, when our spiritual faculties are purified and perfected we see the same reality face to face. The whole course of evolution tends to this goal. Humanism merges in theism, and theism in absolutism.

we must sacrifice the flower, though it is hard and painful to sacrifice it. Evolutionary hedonism which makes the life-promoting process pleasant, is wrong, for all progressive processes from birth and teething onwards are frequently painful. The destructive ones like disease and vice, for example drinking and opium-eating, are pleasant. It is through suffering that man has to rise both physically and spiritually. Sorrow is the birthplace of the life of spirit. "Out of the ferment of finitude as it changes into foam spirit exhales its fragrance" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, English translation, ii. 124). Wisdom is rooted in sorrow, and in suffering lies salvation. It was in the blood-stained trenches of Europe that many who were previously atheists discovered God. On the day red with judgement and terror man sees the face of God. The day of suffering is the day of reckoning. The old atheist Lucretius is reported to have said: "Who is there whose mind does not shrink into itself with fear of the Gods, whose limbs do not creep with terror when the parched earth rocks under the terrible blast of the thunderbolt and the roaring winds sweep across the heavens?" Suffering is organically related to the higher interests of man and is a necessary phase in the development of the individual self. Suffering is as real as the finite being is real. In the universe there is always development, we can never say "It is finished." The Absolute is never in history completely revealed. The end of the world will come when the last man becomes divine. Then there will be no universe and no finiteness. As Schelling says, "God never is, if *is* means exhibition in the objective world; if God were, we should not be." Again, "The ultimate goal of the finite ego, and not only of it but of the non-ego—the final goal, therefore, of the world—is its annihilation as a world." As Bradley puts it: "Fully to realise the existence of the Absolute is for finite beings impossible. In order thus to know we should have to be and then we should not exist." When we see Brahman we

become Brahman. That is the verdict of the Vedanta philosophy. As finite, we cannot see ; when we see, we become infinite. In the finite universe there will ever be approximation to the goal of reaching the infinite and never realisation. The Absolute in this world is half dream, half reality. The universe is only a partial revelation of the Absolute. Knowledge is an infinite progress ; morality, a ceaseless growth. That is why the Vedanta philosophy considers this finite world to be a beginningless and endless *Samsara*. We can never completely break the shell of egoism and attain the infinite if we remain in the finite universe, giving a substantial existence to our own individual self. The release from this world of trouble, risk and adventure can be had only by losing the separate self. Absolute surrender of self to God, a perfect identification with the divine will, will " let us pent-up creatures through into eternity, our due." The *Swetswatara Upanishad* says : " In this wheel of Brahman, which is the support as well as the end of all beings, which is infinite, roams about the pilgrim soul when it fancies itself and the supreme ruler as different. It obtains immortality when it is upheld by him," i.e. when the soul thinks itself to be one with him (v. 6). If the soul does not gain this height of spiritual splendour when it loses itself in the all, it will find itself again and again taking births in the finite universe, as a separate self with all the results of the past Karma entering into its nature. It will revolve in the wheel of births and deaths until it reaches the highest, when it gives up all subjection to time.

Pain and suffering then are necessary incidents in the development of a human soul, which, as given, is a discord. Man is at a parting of the ways. There is a conflict between the different elements, the higher and the lower. Man is the completion or fulfilment of the lower and the anticipation of the higher. But growth means the death of the lower and the birth of the higher self, and so it will be accompanied by the agony of death and the

travail of birth. We have moral evil and sin if the finite self assumes a false sufficiency and independence, and adopts a more or less indifferent, if not a hostile attitude to the universe at large. He is a sinner who, owing to imperfect understanding takes up a false defiant attitude to the not-self. He is an ignorant man who fails to recognise the incompleteness of the finite mind, and sets himself up as an independent and self-contained individual. "For this was my sin that not in God Himself, but in His creatures, in myself and others, I sought my pleasures, my exaltations, my truths, and so fell into sorrows, confusions and errors" (St. Augustine). Sin is putting trust in things that perish. Intellectually this act is error and morally it is evil. If a man considers his supreme good to be in the satisfaction of the appetites and the desires of the organism, he is a sinner. Self-will is the essence of sin. It is the opposition of the finite to the infinite, the rebellion of man against God. Evil is the separation of the soul from the source of life. Evil is as necessary as any other element in the universe. A universe without it will be a universe where the finite is swallowed up in the infinite. A mere infinite without finite is an impossible conception. Therefore evil is a permanent factor in the universe,¹ challenging the fighter to come out, though it has no immortal life in the transcendent spirit.

The *Upanishads* present us with the elements of a philosophic system and thus try to satisfy a permanent want of human life. They give us the formulas by which we represent the nature of the one great Fact of Life, God. Perhaps they may not explain everything, but there is no question that later philosophy has only been a series of attempts to give a fuller form of expression to the suggestions of the *Upanishads*. We do not mean to say that the philosophy subsequent to the *Upanishads* made a conscious attempt to start with the Upanishadic

¹ This is different from the Christian view, which holds that evil was not in the beginning and shall not be in the end.

ideal and develop it. What we urge is, the *Upanishads* being the earliest form of speculative idealism in the world, all that is good and great in subsequent philosophy looks like an unconscious commentary on the Upanishadic ideal, showing how free and expansive and how capable of accommodating within itself all forms of truth that ideal is.

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